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There has been a general view among British historians that popular 
opposition to tax increased dramatically in the 1970s. However, no 
study has looked in detail at the available evidence. This view has 
been based largely on politicians’ statements and a few isolated 
studies from the 1980s, most of which did not focus on Britain 
specifically. This thesis attempts to construct a more detailed picture 
of the development of popular attitudes to tax in Britain c1945 to 
1992.  
 
To do this it first examines the available quantitative evidence, 
variable and unreliable as much of it is before the 1980s and draws 
some cautious conclusions about how this suggests popular attitudes 
to tax developed. The following chapters look at discussions in the 
major national newspapers and political magazines, two main 
political parties, the civil service, Trades Union Congress, and 
Federation of British Industries, later Confederation of British 
Industry, in a series of case studies. These focus on moments when 
tax was a particularly high-profile issue: the 1949 budget and 1950 
election; the 1959 election and 1961 budget; the 1964 election and 
1965 budget, the late 1960s and 1970 election; the late 1970s and 
1979 election; and the 1987 and 1992 elections. 
 
The findings do not indicate that opposition increased significantly in 
 
the 1970s. On the contrary, the quantitative evidence suggests that 
popular opposition to taxation was consistently at a relatively low 
level throughout the period studied, potentially even decreasing 
through the 1980s, when the evidence is more methodologically 
reliable. Similarly, although there is evidence that some Labour 
politicians, in particular, were slightly more concerned about 
opposition to tax from the 1970s onwards, they were also convinced 
of opposition in the 1940s and 1950s, supposedly the high point of 
popular support for high taxation. Even in 1992, the evidence 
indicates that most Labour politicians remained convinced that 
perceptions of fairness in taxation were crucial and that support for 
public spending was also extensive.  
 
The views expressed by Labour and Conservative politicians’ during 
the 1980s indicate that they did not think at that time that popular 
opposition to tax had increased unprecedentedly in the 1970s. 
Instead, that idea first appeared in the press in 1987, becoming 
pervasive by 1992. Among the various organisations studied here, 
the research therefore indicates that this idea of opposition to tax 
increasing in the 1970s was found initially only among journalists in 
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“To tax and to please, no more than to love and be wise, is not given 
to men”, Edmund Burke’s 1774 statement, is still regularly quoted.1 
But inevitable and unchanging antipathy to tax has not been the 
dominant assumption among historians when it comes to post-war 
Britain. Instead, it has been assumed that people became 
significantly less supportive of high taxation and spending in the late 
1960s and 1970s prompting, or at least enabling, significant changes 
to the tax and welfare system under Margaret Thatcher and the 
transformation of Labour party policy in the 1990s.2 However, no one 
has actually looked specifically at popular attitudes to tax and how 
they evolved in this period. The argument that opposition increased 
 
1 See for example: ‘Taxing Non Doms’, Times, 11 February 2008; ‘City Spy: You 
Lose out If You Don’t Feel Like Dancin’’, Evening Standard, 31 May 2012; John 
Plender, ‘A Strange Aversion to Corporate Tax’, Financial Times, 4 January 2016; 
779 col. 1765. 
2 Martin Daunton, Just Taxes: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1914-1979 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3-5, 335-338, 368-369; Avner 
Offer, Why Has the Public Sector Grown So Large in Market Societies?: The 
Political Economy of Prudence in the UK, c. 1870-2000 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003); R. C. Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation: Party Identity and 
Political Purpose in Twentieth-Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 186-189. See also: Steven Fielding, The Labour Party: Continuity 
and Change in the Making of ‘New’ Labour (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003), 69-72; Rodney Lowe, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945, 2nd ed. 
(London: Macmillan, 1999), 295-299; Avner Offer, The Challenge of Affluence: 
Self-Control and Well-Being in the United States and Britain since 1950 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 7-8; Avner Offer, ‘British Manual Workers: From 
Producers to Consumers, c. 1950–2000’, Contemporary British History 22, no. 4 
(2008): 541-543; Avner Offer, ‘Consumption and Affluence, c. 1870-2010’, in The 
Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, ed. Roderick Floud, Jane 
Humphries, and Paul Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); 
Peter Sloman, Transfer State: The Idea of a Guaranteed Income and the Politics of 
Redistribution in Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 148-153; 
Peter Sloman. ‘‘Where’s the Money Coming From?’: Tracing the History of 
Manifesto Costings in UK Elections, 1955-2019’, Bennett Institute for Public Policy, 
2019; Adrian Williamson, Conservative Economic Policymaking and the Birth of 
Thatcherism, 1964-1979 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 63-66. 
 
2 
in the 1960s and 1970s is largely based on a few works citing limited 
survey evidence from the 1980s. Contemporary survey evidence 
suggests widespread willingness to pay higher taxes to fund 
spending, although whether this holds when it comes to voting has 
been questioned.3 This is important because ideas about what 
popular attitudes to tax are, and how they have changed or not, 
underpin contemporary calculations about feasible tax levels and the 
limits of state action. They also play a fundamental role in the general 
story of British history since 1945.  
 
Although there are significant disagreements, in general historians 
have divided the period from 1945 to 2000 in two, with the 1970s as 
the turning point. Both World Wars significantly ‘ratcheted’ up the 
level of taxation, but unlike post-1918, taxes barely fell after 1945, 
instead being maintained to fund the creation of the welfare state.4 
Although this might have been expected to produce significant 
opposition, the period from 1945 to the 1970s is most often 
 
3 See for example: E. Clery, J.  Curtice, and R. Harding, ‘British Social Attitudes: 
The 34th Report’, (London: NatCen Social Research, 2017); A. F. Heath, Roger 
Jowell, and John Curtice, eds., The Rise of New Labour: Party Policies and Voter 
Choices (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 46-47; Alan Hedges, 
‘Perceptions of Redistribution: Report on Exploratory Qualitative Research’, 
(London: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London School of Economics, 
2005); Hannah Morgan and Roger Harding, ‘Attitudes to Tax and Spending: A 
Briefing’, (NatCen, 2018); A. Park et al., ‘British Social Attitudes: The 30th Report’, 
(London: NatCen Social Research, 2013), 35-36; Peter Taylor-Gooby and 
Charlotte Hastie, ‘Paying for ‘World Class’ Services: A British Dilemma’, Journal of 
Social Policy 32, no. 2 (2003); Paul Johnson, Frances Lynch, and John Geoffrey 
Walker, ‘Income Tax and Elections in Britain, 1950–2001’, Electoral Studies 24, no. 
3 (2005). 
4 Daunton, Just Taxes, 36-102, 176-228; Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 
61-129; Tom Clark and Andrew Dilnot, ‘British Fiscal Policy since 1939’, in The 
Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, ed. Roderick Floud and Paul 
Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 369-370; Tom Clark and 
Andrew Dilnot, ‘Long-Term Trends in British Taxation and Spending ’, (Institute for 
Fiscal Studies, 2004); Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. 
Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2014), 636-642. 
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characterised as one of elite consensus about, and popular support 
for, a social democratic mixed economy with high levels of taxation 
and spending.5 Some historians have challenged whether this 
consensus has been overstated, but it is generally agreed that there 
was at least a limited and contested elite consensus, particularly in 
relation to specific areas of economic policy, characterised 
nonetheless by significant breaks in policy between administrations.6 
While this period has also traditionally been portrayed as the high 
point of popular consent to taxation and spending, work on attitudes 
to the welfare state has suggested that there was not significant 
popular support for a radical change in the welfare system in the 
1940s.7  
 
5 On consensus and popular support see for example: Dennis Kavanagh, ‘The 
Postwar Consensus’, Twentieth Century British History 3, no. 2 (1992); Paul 
Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War (London: 
Cape, 1975); Adrian Williamson, Europe and the Decline of Social Democracy in 
Britain: From Atlee to Brexit (Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer, 2019), 21-57; Peter 
Sloman, ‘Rethinking a Progressive Moment: The Liberal and Labour Parties in the 
1945 General Election’, Historical Research 84, no. 226 (2011); Ross McKibbin, 
Parties and People: England 1914-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
127-139. On affluence see for example: Offer, ‘Consumption and Affluence, c. 
1870-2010’; Offer, ‘British Manual Workers: From Producers to Consumers, c. 
1950–2000’; Offer, The Challenge of Affluence: Self-Control and Well-Being in the 
United States and Britain since 1950; Vernon Bogdanor and Robert  Skidelsky, 
The Age of Affluence: 1951-1964 (London: Macmillan, 1970); Jon Lawrence, 
‘Class, ‘Affluence’ and the Study of Everyday Life in Britain, C . 1930–64’, Cultural 
and Social History 10, no. 2 (2013); Selina Todd, ‘Affluence, Class and Crown 
Street: Reinvestigating the Post-War Working Class’, Contemporary British History 
22, no. 4 (2008); Daniel Wincott, ‘The (Golden) Age of the Welfare State: 
Interrogating A Conventional Wisdom’, Public Administration 91, no. 4 (2013). 
6 See for example: Noel Whiteside, ‘Creating the Welfare State in Britain, 1945–
1960’, Journal of Social Policy 25, no. 1 (1996). Harriet Jones and Michael 
Kandiah, eds., The Myth of Consensus: New Views on British History, 1945-64 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Peter Kerr, ‘Postwar British Politics: From Conflict 
to Consensus’ (Routledge, 2001); B. Harrison, ‘The Rise, Fall and Rise of Political 
Consensus in Britain since 1940’, History 84, no. 274 (1999); Williamson, 
Conservative Economic Policymaking and the Birth of Thatcherism, 1964-1979 7-
9; Todd, ‘Affluence, Class and Crown Street: Reinvestigating the Post-War 
Working Class’. 
7 See for example: Jose Harris, ‘Did British Workers Want the Welfare State? G. D. 
H. Cole’s Survey of 1942’, in The Working Class in Modern British History: Essays 




The economic trajectory of the 1950s and 1960s has been similarly 
contested, but with debates focusing on the extent of affluence and 
relative decline. The economic situation was initially difficult with 
austerity and other wartime measures persisting into the 1950s 
(rationing, for example, continued until 1954).8 Despite this, Britain 
became increasingly affluent, with higher consumer spending, rising 
living standards, unprecedented growth rates, and full employment.9 
Middleton argues that the British economy, despite ‘stop-go’ 
macroeconomic policy, was exceptionally stable, both historically and 
comparatively.10 However, some researchers have emphasised the 
 
Cambridge University Press, 1983); Nick Hayes, ‘Did We Really Want a National 
Health Service? Hospitals, Patients and Public Opinions before 1948’, The English 
Historical Review CXXVII, no. 526 (2012); Steven Fielding, ‘What Did 'the People' 
Want?: The Meaning of the 1945 General Election’, The Historical Journal 35, no. 
3 (1992); Peter Taylor-Gooby, Public Opinion, Ideology and State Welfare, Radical 
Social Policy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985); Peter Taylor-Gooby, 
‘Sustaining State Welfare in Hard Times: Who Will Foot the Bill?’, Journal of 
European Social Policy 11, no. 2 (2001). Both Fielding and Clarke have also 
emphasised the extent of popular distrust in politicians. See: Nick Clarke, The 
Good Politician: Folk Theories, Political Interaction, and the Rise of Anti-Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Steven Fielding, ‘A Mirror for 
England? Cinematic Representations of Politicians and Party Politics, Circa 1944–
1964’, Journal of British Studies 47, no. 1 (2008). 
8 See for example: Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery: British Economic Policy, 
1945-51 (London: Methuen, 1985); Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 91-134; Martin Daunton, ‘Britain and 
Globalisation since 1850: iii. Creating the World of Bretton Woods, 1939-1958’, 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 18 (2008); Williamson, Europe and the 
Decline of Social Democracy in Britain: From Atlee to Brexit 24-42; Ina Zweiniger-
Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain Rationing, Controls, and Consumption, 1939-
1955 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
9 See for example: Bogdanor and Skidelsky, The Age of Affluence: 1951-1964 ; 
Offer, The Challenge of Affluence: Self-Control and Well-Being in the United States 
and Britain since 1950; Rodney Lowe, ‘Modernizing Britain’s Welfare State: The 
Influence of Affluence, 1957-1964’, in An Affluent Society?: Britain's Post-War 
"Golden Age" Revisited, ed. Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2004); Offer, ‘Consumption and Affluence, c. 1870-2010’. See Todd, 
‘Affluence, Class and Crown Street: Reinvestigating the Post-War Working Class’. 
for an argument on the limits of affluence. 
10 Roger Middleton, The British Economy since 1945: Engaging with the Debate, 
British History in Perspective (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 40-43. See also Jim 
Tomlinson, ‘Economic Policy’, in The Cambridge Economic History of Modern 
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limits of this affluence, particularly for working-class Britons.11 The 
country was still highly unequal, particularly in terms of wealth, and 
affluence was based on long hours in strenuous jobs and the 
extension of credit on a new scale.12 ‘Stop-go’ policies also fuelled 
some macroeconomic instability, and growth rates, although 
unprecedented, were lower than competitors’.13 This led to elite 
concern about whether Britain was in decline compared to other 
countries, which would be a feature of economic and political debate 
for several decades. Whether Britain was in decline or not has been 
debated.14 Much current literature emphasises the relative nature of 
the decline and theorises that this focus was actually the product of 
psychological distress about Britain’s loss of status as a post-imperial 
power amid decolonisation.15  
 
Britain: Volume 3: Structural Change and Growth, 1939–2000, ed. Paul Johnson 
and Roderick Floud (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 197. 
11 See for example: Todd, ‘Affluence, Class and Crown Street: Reinvestigating the 
Post-War Working Class’; Selina Todd, The People: The Rise and Fall of the 
Working Class, 1910-2010 (London: John Murray, 2014), 152-169. 
12 Todd, ‘Affluence, Class and Crown Street: Reinvestigating the Post-War Working 
Class’; Lowe, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945, 284-295. 
13 See for example: Hugh Pemberton, ‘Affluence, Relative Decline and the 
Treasury’, in An Affluent Society?: Britain's Post-War "Golden Age" Revisited, ed. 
Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004); Rodney Lowe, 
‘Modernizing Britain’s Welfare State: The Influence of Affluence, 1957-1964’, ibid.; 
Middleton, The British Economy since 1945: Engaging with the Debate, 86-89; Jim 
Tomlinson, ‘Inventing 'Decline': The Falling Behind of the British Economy in the 
Postwar Years’, The Economic History Review 49, no. 4 (1996); Tomlinson, 
‘Economic Policy’, 197. 
14 See for example: S. N. Broadberry and N. F. R. Crafts, ‘British Economic Policy 
and Industrial Performance in the Early Post-War Period’, Business History 38, no. 
4 (1996). David Coates, The Question of UK Decline: State, Society and Economy 
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994); Tomlinson, ‘Inventing 'Decline': The Falling 
Behind of the British Economy in the Postwar Years’. Jim Tomlinson, ‘De-
Industrialization Not Decline: A New Meta-Narrative for Post-War British History’, 
Twentieth Century British History  (2015); Jim Tomlinson, ‘Managing the Economy, 
Managing the People’, in Twentieth-Century Britain: Economic, Cultural and Social 
Change, ed. Julie-Marie Strange, Francesca Carnevali, and Paul Johnson (Harlow: 
Pearson/Longman, 2007). 
15 See for example: Broadberry and Crafts, ‘British Economic Policy and Industrial 
Performance in the Early Post-War Period’. Coates, The Question of UK Decline: 
State, Society and Economy; Middleton, The British Economy since 1945: 




The 1970s have, in contrast, traditionally been portrayed in both 
academic and popular discourse as a decade of crisis, remembered 
for miners’ strikes, the three day week, high inflation, and the ‘winter 
of discontent’, leading finally to the rejection of the post-war 
consensus.16 ‘Going back to the 1970s’ is still used as a critique of 
left-wing policies in the right-leaning press today.17 Recent work has 
challenged this portrayal of the 1970s, arguing that the feeling of 
crisis was at least encouraged, if not created, by Conservative 
politicians and the press in an attempt to delegitimise corporatism 
and the Labour government.18 Tomlinson, for example, argues that 
 
Economic History and the Decline of Britain’, The Economic History Review 47, no. 
3 (1994). Simon Szreter, ‘British Economic Decline and Human Resources’, in 
Understanding Decline: Perceptions and Realities of British Economic 
Performance, ed. Peter Clarke and Clive Trebilcock (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997); Tomlinson, ‘Inventing 'Decline': The Falling Behind of the 
British Economy in the Postwar Years’. Jim Tomlinson, ‘The Decline of the Empire 
and the Economic ‘Decline’ of Britain’, Twentieth Century British History 14, no. 3 
(2003); Tomlinson, ‘De-Industrialization Not Decline: A New Meta-Narrative for 
Post-War British History’; Jim Tomlinson, Managing the Economy, Managing the 
People: Narratives of Economic Life in Britain from Beveridge to Brexit (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017), 41-62. 
16 See for example: P. F. Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-2000, 2nd ed. 
(London: Penguin, 2004); Lowe, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945. For a 
summary of this narrative see: Emily Robinson et al., ‘Telling Stories About Post-
War Britain: Popular Individualism and the ‘Crisis’ of the 1970s’, Twentieth Century 
British History  (2017)., particularly 2-3; Lawrence Black, ‘An Enlightening Decade? 
New Histories of 1970s’ Britain’, International Labor and Working-Class History 82 
(2012); Rodney Lowe, ‘Life Begins in the Seventies? Writing and Rewriting the 
History of Postwar Britain’, Journal of Contemporary History 42, no. 1 (2007). 
17 See for example: Richard Evans, ‘How Labour Will Take Tax Rates Back to the 
1970s’, Daily Telegraph, 3 June 2017; James Bartholomew, ‘Debt, Inflation and 
Union Power: Britain Is Sleepwalking Back into the 1970s’, ibid., 2 June 2020; 
Naomi Adedokun, ‘Labour’s Socialism Would Take Britain Back to 1970s 
‘Suffering’ - 'Piles of Rubbish!'’, Daily Express, 8 November 2019; Leo McKinstry, 
‘The Tories Must Keep a Tight Grip on Unprecedented Spending – or Risk a 
Return to the Miserable Days of the 1970s’, Sun, 2 June 2020. 
18 Tomlinson, Managing the Economy, Managing the People: Narratives of 
Economic Life in Britain from Beveridge to Brexit, 187-205; Robert Saunders, 
‘'Crisis? What Crisis?' Thatcherism and the Seventies’, in Making Thatcher's 
Britain, ed. Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012); Robinson et al., ‘Telling Stories About Post-War Britain: Popular 
Individualism and the ‘Crisis’ of the 1970s’; Colin Hay, ‘Narrating Crisis: The 
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financial journalists, with support from right-wing think tanks like the 
IEA, were central to constructing a narrative of the 1970s crisis as 
not a passing challenge related to external shocks, but a symptom of 
Britain’s terminal decline as a result of poor governance and the 
failure of social democracy.19  
 
However, even works that challenge the traditional perception of the 
1970s generally see the decade as marking a transition from social 
democracy to neoliberalism as the dominant political ideology. The 
definition of neoliberalism has been debated, and several authors 
have emphasised the specificities of Thatcherism.20 Some authors 
also argue that it was not as clean a break from social democracy to 
neoliberalism as has been portrayed.21 However, there does appear 
 
Discursive Construction of the ‘Winter of Discontent’ ’, Sociology 30, no. 2 (1996); 
Andy Beckett, When the Lights Went Out: What Really Happened to Britain in the 
Seventies (London: Faber and Faber, 2010); Alwyn W. Turner, Crisis? What 
Crisis?: Britain in the 1970s (London: Aurum, 2009). 
19 Tomlinson, Managing the Economy, Managing the People: Narratives of 
Economic Life in Britain from Beveridge to Brexit, 73-77, 187-205. On the press 
see also for example: D. W. Parsons, The Power of the Financial Press: 
Journalism and Economic Opinion in Britain and America (Aldershot: Elgar, 1989). 
20 See for example: Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, ‘Neo-Liberalism and Morality in 
the Making of Thatcherite Social Policy ’, The Historical Journal 55, no. 2 (2012); 
Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of 
Thatcherism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989); S. Hall, ‘The Neo-Liberal Revolution 
’, Cultural Studies 25, no. 6 (2011); Colin Crouch, ‘The Terms of the Neo-Liberal 
Consensus’, Political Quarterly 68, no. 4 (1997); Ben Jackson, ‘Currents of Neo-
Liberalism: British Political Ideologies and the New Right, C.1955–1979’, The 
English Historical Review 131, no. 551 (2016); Aled Davies, James Freeman, and 
Hugh Pemberton, ‘‘Everyman A Capitalist’ or ‘Free to Choose’? Exploring the 
Tensions within Thatcherite Individualism’, The Historical Journal 61, no. 2 (2018); 
Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the 
Neoliberal Thought Collective (London: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
21 See for example: Stephen Brooke, ‘Living in ‘New Times’: Historicizing 1980s 
Britain’, History Compass 12, no. 1 (2014); Hall, ‘The Neo-Liberal Revolution ’; 
Jackson, ‘Currents of Neo-Liberalism: British Political Ideologies and the New 
Right, C.1955–1979’; Daniel Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, 
Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2012); Sloman, ‘Short ‘Where’s the Money Coming From?’: Tracing the History of 
Manifesto Costings in UK Elections, 1955-2019’; Saunders, ‘'Crisis? What Crisis?' 
Thatcherism and the Seventies’; Jim Tomlinson, ‘Distributional Politics: The Search 
for Equality in Britain since the First World War’, in The Contradictions of Capital in 
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to have been a shift in the political discourse around economic policy 
in the 1960s and 1970s, which resulted in persistent changes to 
Conservative and Labour policies in the 1980s and 1990s. This did 
not come only from the right, as the rediscovery of poverty in the mid 
1960s and the economic difficulties of the 1970s challenged ideas 
about the success of post-war social democracy on the left as well.22 
It has been suggested that the perception of crisis in the 1970s 
should be seen as primarily an elite phenomenon.23  
 
Research has also looked at the extent to which Thatcherite ideas 
changed British culture and popular attitudes after 1979.24 Several 
authors have put forward theories of increasing individualisation.25 
 
the Twenty-First Century, ed. Pat Hudson and Keith Tribe (Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Agenda, 2017); Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 259-268. 
22 Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend, The Poor and the Poorest: A New 
Analysis of the Ministry of Labour’s Family Expenditure Surveys of 1953-54 and 
1960 (London: Bell, 1967); Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, 
Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics particularly 215-272; Rodney Lowe, 
‘The Rediscovery of Poverty and the Creation of the Child Poverty Action Group, 
1962–68’, Contemporary Record 9, no. 3 (1995): 603-609; Lowe, The Welfare 
State in Britain since 1945, 140-147; Ian Gazeley et al., ‘The Poor and the Poorest, 
50 Years on: Evidence from British Household Expenditure Surveys of the 1950s 
and 1960s’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society) 
180, no. 2 (2017). 
23 Joe Moran, ‘‘Stand up and Be Counted’: Hughie Green, the 1970s and Popular 
Memory’, History Workshop Journal 70, no. 1 (2010); Jim Tomlinson, ‘British 
Government and Popular Understanding of Inflation in the Mid-1970s’, The 
Economic History Review 67, no. 3 (2014): 760-765; James E. Alt, The Politics of 
Economic Decline: Economic Management and Political Behaviour in Britain since 
1964 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 266. 
24 See for example: Jon Lawrence and Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, ‘Margaret 
Thatcher and the Decline of Class Politics’, in Making Thatcher's Britain, ed. Ben 
Jackson and Robert Saunders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); 
Brooke, ‘Living in ‘New Times’: Historicizing 1980s Britain’; Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, 
‘Neo-Liberalism and Morality in the Making of Thatcherite Social Policy ’; Matthew 
Grimley, ‘Thatcherism, Morality and Religion’, in Making Thatchers Britain, ed. Ben 
Jackson and Robert Saunders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); 
Geoffrey Evans and James Tilley, The New Politics of Class (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017). 
25 See for example: Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, Individualization: 
Institutionalized Individualism and Its Social and Political Consequences (London: 
SAGE, 2008); Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man (London: Penguin, 2002); 
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Robinson et al, for example, suggest that a ‘popular individualism’ 
developed during the 1970s, with people demanding more control 
over their own lives. They argue that this was just as much rooted in 
left-wing politics and did not lead inexorably to Thatcherism.26 Other 
researchers, however, have challenged this, identifying individualism 
as a long-term feature of working-class British culture and pointing to 
the continuing importance of class identification.27 Sutcliffe-
Braithwaite has suggested that popular ideas about class changed, 
with ‘ordinariness’ becoming more important than traditional class 
divisions. However, she identifies the decline of deference as the key 
driver of this change.28 Davies’s work suggests that Thatcher’s 
governments were themselves undecided about exactly what kind of 
individual they were trying to create, with morality and free market 
economic ideas providing competing impulses.29 Ivor Crewe, and 
others, have also highlighted that survey evidence suggests that 
 
Peter Scott, ‘The Household Economy since 1870’, in The Cambridge Economic 
History of Modern Britain, ed. Roderick Floud, Jane Humphries, and Paul Johnson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Brooke, ‘Living in ‘New Times’: 
Historicizing 1980s Britain’, 24-25; Robinson et al., ‘Telling Stories About Post-War 
Britain: Popular Individualism and the ‘Crisis’ of the 1970s’. 
26 Robinson et al., ‘Telling Stories About Post-War Britain: Popular Individualism 
and the ‘Crisis’ of the 1970s’. 
27 M. Savage, ‘Sociology, Class and Male Manual Work Cultures’, in British Trade 
Unions and Industrial Politics, ed. Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman, and John McIlroy, 
Studies in Labour History (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); M. Savage, Class Analysis 
and Social Transformation, Sociology and Social Change (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 2000); M. Savage, ‘Working-Class Identities in the 1960s’, 
Sociology 39, no. 5 (2005); Lawrence, ‘Class, ‘Affluence’ and the Study of 
Everyday Life in Britain, C . 1930–64’; Jon Lawrence, ‘Inventing the ‘Traditional 
Working Class’: A Re-Analysis of Interview Notes from Young and Willmott’s 
Family and Kinship in East London’, 59, no. 2 (2016); Will Atkinson, ‘Beck, 
Individualization and the Death of Class: A Critique’, The British Journal of 
Sociology 58, no. 3 (2007); Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders, ‘Introduction: 
Varieties of Thatcherism’, in Making Thatcher's Britain, ed. Ben Jackson and 
Robert Saunders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), particularly 16-
17. 
28 Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, Class, Politics, and the Decline of Deference in 
England, 1968-2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
29 Davies, Freeman, and Pemberton, ‘‘Everyman A Capitalist’ or ‘Free to Choose’? 
Exploring the Tensions within Thatcherite Individualism’. 
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people moved away from the Conservative position on several key 
issues, including tax, through the 1980s.30  
 
Economically, whether the 1980s represented the reversal of 
decades of decline due to high tax and spending and the power of 
unions, or deindustrialisation, social dislocation, and rising inequality 
has been intensely debated.31 Again, some recent work has 
emphasised continuities in the 1980s as well as changes. Tomlinson 
has suggested, for example, that Keynesianism did not die, if 
anything becoming more influential in the 1990s after being 
temporarily side-lined.32 But the 1980s are, nonetheless, primarily 
portrayed economically as a period of change, with privatisation, 
deregulation, and deindustrialisation, whether those reforms are 
evaluated favourably or not.33 
 
30 I. M. Crewe, ‘Values: The Crusade That Failed’, in The Thatcher Effect ed. 
Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); I. M. Crewe, 
‘Has the Electorate Become Thatcherite?’, in Thatcherism, ed. Robert Skidelsky 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1988); Heath, Jowell, and Curtice, The Rise of New 
Labour: Party Policies and Voter Choices 31-57. 
31 See for example: Broadberry and Crafts, ‘British Economic Policy and Industrial 
Performance in the Early Post-War Period’. Coates, The Question of UK Decline: 
State, Society and Economy; Michael Kitson, ‘Failure Followed by Success or 
Success Followed by Failure? A Re-Examination of British Economic Growth since 
1949’, in The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, ed. Roderick Floud 
and Paul Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Paul Johnson, 
‘The Welfare State, Income and Living Standards’, ibid.; Lowe, The Welfare State 
in Britain since 1945, 295-299; Middleton, The British Economy since 1945: 
Engaging with the Debate. Supple, ‘Fear of Failing: Economic History and the 
Decline of Britain’; Szreter, ‘British Economic Decline and Human Resources’; 
Tomlinson, ‘Managing the Economy, Managing the People’; Tomlinson, ‘Inventing 
'Decline': The Falling Behind of the British Economy in the Postwar Years’. 
Tomlinson, ‘De-Industrialization Not Decline: A New Meta-Narrative for Post-War 
British History’. 
32 Jim Tomlinson, ‘Tale of a Death Exaggerated: How Keynesian Policies Survived 
the 1970s’, Contemporary British History 21, no. 4 (2007). See also: J. I. M. Bulpitt, 
‘The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs Thatcher's Domestic Statecraft’, 
Political Studies 34, no. 1 (1986). 
33 See for example: Broadberry and Crafts, ‘British Economic Policy and Industrial 
Performance in the Early Post-War Period’. Coates, The Question of UK Decline: 
State, Society and Economy; Kitson, ‘Failure Followed by Success or Success 




The story of post-war British history is rounded off with the rise of 
New Labour in the 1990s. Tax is again portrayed as crucial to this 
development. Labour lost the 1992 ‘tax bombshell’ election after 
being attacked by the Conservatives on their tax plans. Whether tax 
was actually the cause of Labour’s defeat is debated among 
academics, with many arguing that other issues, particularly 
perceptions of economic competence, were more important.34 
However, many prominent Labour figures identified tax as the key 
cause of their defeat and this belief shaped the political project that 
would become ‘New Labour’.35 It has been long lasting; in 2018 then 
 
Paul Johnson, ‘The Welfare State, Income and Living Standards’, ibid.; Lowe, The 
Welfare State in Britain since 1945, 295-299; Middleton, The British Economy 
since 1945: Engaging with the Debate. Supple, ‘Fear of Failing: Economic History 
and the Decline of Britain’; Szreter, ‘British Economic Decline and Human 
Resources’; Tomlinson, ‘Managing the Economy, Managing the People’; 
Tomlinson, ‘Inventing 'Decline': The Falling Behind of the British Economy in the 
Postwar Years’. Tomlinson, ‘De-Industrialization Not Decline: A New Meta-
Narrative for Post-War British History’; Eric J. Evans, Thatcher and Thatcherism 
(London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2013). 
34 David Sanders, ‘Why the Conservative Party Won - Again’, in Britain at the Polls 
1992, ed. Anthony King, et al. (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1993); Margaret 
Scammell, Designer Politics: How Elections Are Won (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1995), 261-263; Patrick Seyd, ‘Tony Blair and New Labour’, in New Labour 
Triumphs: Britain at the Polls ed. Anthony King, et al. (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham 
House Publishers, 1998), 50-51. See also: Daunton, Just Taxes, 3-4; Aled Davies 
and Peter Sloman, ‘Fiscal Promises: Tax and Spending in British General Elections 
since 1964’, in Electoral Pledges in Britain since 1918 : The Politics of Promises, 
ed. David Thackeray and Richard Toye (Cham: Springer International Publishing 
AG, 2020), 131-132; D. Coates, Prolonged Labour: The Slow Birth of New Labour 
Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 4-5; David Denver, ‘The 
Government That Could Do No Right’, in New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the Polls 
ed. Anthony King, et al. (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1998); 
Anthony King, ‘Why Labour Won - at Last’, ibid.; Sloman, ‘Short ‘Where’s the 
Money Coming From?’: Tracing the History of Manifesto Costings in UK Elections, 
1955-2019’, 14-15; Dominic Wring, The Politics of Marketing the Labour Party 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 113-115. 
35 Philip Gould, ‘Why Labour Won’, in Political Communications: Why Labour Won 
the General Election of 1997 ed. Ivor Crewe, Brian Gosschalk, and John Bartle 
(London: Frank Cass, 1998), 7. See also: Davies and Sloman, ‘Fiscal Promises: 
Tax and Spending in British General Elections since 1964’; Heath, Jowell, and 
Curtice, The Rise of New Labour: Party Policies and Voter Choices 44; Seyd, 
‘Tony Blair and New Labour’, 61. 
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Labour Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell explained his reluctance 
to oppose Conservative cuts to income tax with reference to the 1992 
election: 
"The experience of '92 is seared into me … In '92 I went round knocking on 
doors. If you remember the campaign the Tories waged with the big 
posters - Labour tax bombshell. I was knocking on doors of people who 
were unemployed, who were on low wages as well, saying to me 'I can't 
vote for you because you will increase my taxes'. And we hadn't won the 
argument about a fair taxation system. So of course I am not going to 
make that mistake again."36 
 
Whether popular opposition to tax increased in the 1960s and 1970s 
has clear implications for current political ideas about the limits of 
taxation as well as the dominant story of post-war British history. 
Despite this, no recent works have looked at the history of popular 
attitudes to tax in Britain. Academic interest in questions of inequality 
has increased following the 2008 crash, with Piketty’s research 
attracting particular attention. Piketty’s recent work has emphasised 
the importance of ideology in the development of what he terms 
‘inequality regimes’.37 There are also significant bodies of work in 
 
36 Nicholas Watt, ‘Budget 2018: Mcdonnell Guided by Memories of '92 Defeat’, 
BBC News, 2018, accessed on: 6 November at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
46101928. 
37 Thomas Piketty, Capital and Ideology, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (London: 
Harvard University Press, 2020); Thomas Piketty, Les Hauts Revenus En France 
Au Xxe Siècle: Inégalités Et Redistributions, 1901-1998 (Paris: Grasset & 
Fasquelle, 2001); Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, ‘How Progressive Is the 
U.S. Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective’, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 21, no. 1 (2007); Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century. See also: Howard Glennerster, ‘Why Was a Wealth Tax for the UK 
Abandoned? Lessons for the Policy Process and Tackling Wealth Inequality’, 
Journal of Social Policy 41, no. 2 (2012); Pat Hudson and Keith Tribe, The 
Contradictions of Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Agenda, 2017); Branko Milanovic, ‘Global Income Inequality by the Numbers: In 
History and Now’, Global Policy 4, no. 2 (2013); Branko Milanovic, ‘The Return of 
"Patrimonial Capitalism": A Review of Thomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century’, Journal of Economic Literature 52, no. 2 (2014); Avner Offer, ‘Models, 
Money and Housing’, in The Contradictions of Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 
ed. Pat Hudson and Keith Tribe (Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda, 2017); Simon 
Szreter, ‘Wealth, Population, and Inequality: A Review Essay on Thomas Piketty, 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century’, Population and Development Review 41, no. 2 
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psychology, political science, and economics about contemporary 
(predominantly American) attitudes to inequality, redistribution, and 
tax compliance.38 These suggest that there are many factors 
 
(2015); Noah Wright. ‘Data Visualization in Capital in the 21st Century’,2015. There 
was of course also work looking at inequality before the financial crisis, in particular 
by Tony Atkinson. See for example: A. B. Atkinson and A. J. Harrison, Distribution 
of Personal Wealth in Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); A. 
B. Atkinson, Wealth, Income and Inequality, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1980); A. B. Atkinson, ‘Distribution of Income and Wealth’, in Twentieth-
Century British Social Trends, ed. A.H. Halsey and Josephine Webb (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2000); Anthony B.  Atkinson, ‘Top Incomes in the United Kingdom over 
the Twentieth Century’,  (2003); Tom Clark and Andrew Leicester, ‘Inequality and 
Two Decades of British Tax and Benefit Reforms’, Fiscal Studies 25, no. 2 (2004); 
Charles Feinstein, ‘The Equalizing of Wealth in Britain since the Second World 
War’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 12, no. 1 (1996); Paul Johnson, ‘Taxes 
and Benefits, Equality and Efficiency’, in Paying for Inequality : The Economic Cost 
of Social Injustice, ed. Andrew Glyn and David Miliband (London: IPPR/Rivers 
Oram Press, 1994); Johnson, ‘The Welfare State, Income and Living Standards’. 
38 See for example: Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara, ‘Preferences for 
Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities’, Journal of Public Economics 89, no. 5 
(2005); Larry M. Bartels, ‘Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the 
American Mind’, Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 1 (2005); Roland Benabou and Efe 
A. Ok, ‘Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: The Poum Hypothesis’, 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, no. 2 (2001); Andrea Louise Campbell, 
‘How Americans Think About Taxes: Lessons from the History of Tax Attitudes’, 
Proceedings. Annual Conference on Taxation and Minutes of the Annual Meeting 
of the National Tax Association 102 (2009); Serena Fatica. ‘Preferences for 
Redistribution, the Size of Government and the Tax System’, Germany University 
Library of Munich, 2011; Andreas Georgiadis and Alan Manning, ‘Spend It Like 
Beckham? Inequality and Redistribution in the UK, 1983–2004’, Public Choice 151, 
no. 3 (2012); Giacomo Corneo and Hans Peter Gruner, ‘Social Limits to 
Redistribution’, American Economic Review 90, no. 5 (2000); Guillermo Cruces, 
Ricardo Perez-Truglia, and Martin Tetaz, ‘Biased Perceptions of Income 
Distribution and Preferences for Redistribution: Evidence from a Survey 
Experiment’, Journal of Public Economics 98 (2013); Jonas  Edlund and Ingemar  
Johansson Sevä, ‘Exploring the ‘Something for Nothing’ Syndrome: Confused 
Citizens or Free Riders? Evidence from Sweden’, Scandinavian Political Studies 
36, no. 4 (2013); Ernst Fehr, Helen Bernhard, and Bettina Rockenbach, 
‘Egalitarianism in Young Children’, Nature 454, no. 7208 (2008); Hedges, 
‘Perceptions of Redistribution: Report on Exploratory Qualitative Research’; Isaac 
William Martin, Ajay K. Mehrotra, and Monica Prasad, eds., The New Fiscal 
Sociology: Taxation in Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), particularly part II; Leslie McCall, The 
Undeserving Rich: American Beliefs About Inequality, Opportunity, and 
Redistribution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Morgan and 
Harding, ‘Attitudes to Tax and Spending: A Briefing’; Michael I. Norton, 
‘Unequality’, Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1, no. 1 
(2014); Michael Orton and Karen Rowlingson, ‘Public Attitudes to Economic 
Inequality’, (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2007); Steven M. Sheffrin, Tax Fairness 
and Folk Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Liam Stanley, 
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affecting attitudes to tax, including perceptions of fairness and 
efficiency, cognitive biases, trust, how homogenous groups are, and 
ideas about whether success/failure is due to luck or effort, along 
with the structure of institutions, the quality of services, and how 
progressive the tax system is.39 They often emphasise how little 
knowledge citizens have of the exact workings of their tax systems 
and their redistributive consequences.40 They do not, however, tell us 
how attitudes to tax have changed over time. 
 
Liam Stanley and Alt et al have come closest to a history of popular 
attitudes to tax in the United Kingdom. Both use British Social 
Attitudes (BSA) survey data and Stanley also discusses focus group 
evidence. Both suggest that support for redistribution fell between the 
1980s and 2010s.41 Stanley argues that British people have become 
 
‘“When We Were Just Giving Stuff Away Willy-Nilly”: Historicizing Contemporary 
British Tax Morale’, in The Leap of Faith, ed. Sven H. Steinmo (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018). 
39 Alberto Alesina, Fighting Poverty in the Us and Europe: A World of Difference 
(Oxford: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Campbell, ‘How Americans Think 
About Taxes: Lessons from the History of Tax Attitudes’; Hedges, ‘Perceptions of 
Redistribution: Report on Exploratory Qualitative Research’; Martin, Mehrotra, and 
Prasad, The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in Comparative and Historical 
Perspective, particularly part II; Sheffrin, Tax Fairness and Folk Justice. See also: 
Axel Hadenius, ‘Citizens Strike a Balance: Discontent with Taxes, Content with 
Spending’, Journal of Public Policy 5, no. 3 (1985); Christoph Kogler et al., ‘Trust 
and Power as Determinants of Tax Compliance: Testing the Assumptions of the 
Slippery Slope Framework in Austria, Hungary, Romania and Russia’, Journal of 
Economic Psychology 34 (2013); Christian Albrekt Larsen, ‘The Institutional Logic 
of Welfare Attitudes: How Welfare Regimes Influence Public Support’, Comparative 
Political Studies 41, no. 2 (2008); McCall, The Undeserving Rich: American Beliefs 
About Inequality, Opportunity, and Redistribution; Stanley, ‘“When We Were Just 
Giving Stuff Away Willy-Nilly”: Historicizing Contemporary British Tax Morale’. 
40 See for example: Bartels, ‘Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in 
the American Mind’; Hedges, ‘Perceptions of Redistribution: Report on Exploratory 
Qualitative Research’; Orton and Rowlingson, ‘Public Attitudes to Economic 
Inequality’; David Sanders, ‘The Real Economy and the Perceived Economy in 
Popularity Functions: How Much Do Voters Need to Know?: A Study of British 
Data, 1974–97’, Electoral Studies 19, no. 2 (2000). 
41 Stanley, ‘“When We Were Just Giving Stuff Away Willy-Nilly”: Historicizing 
Contemporary British Tax Morale’; James E. Alt, Ian Preston, and Luke Sibieta, 
‘The Political Economy of Tax Policy’, in Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees 
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less willing to pay taxes, particularly since the New Labour 
governments, due to changing ideas about the efficiency of the state 
and the deservingness of welfare participants, as well as 
misconceptions about the percentage of the tax budget that welfare 
makes up.42 However, he does not discuss the fact that the BSA data 
also suggests that the number of respondents advocating tax cuts 
has remained at a very low and stable level. 43  
 
Alt et al do discuss this apparent disconnect and posit that declining 
levels of trust in government might suggest that continuing popular 
support for redistribution and spending has been undermined by 
doubts about the efficiency of that spending. They also argue that 
any changes in popular attitudes seem to have followed, rather than 
led, cuts in tax rates, and that the cuts made in the 1980s came at a 
time of high support for redistribution and public spending.44 Some 
suggest, however, that the BSA data is not sufficient to draw 
conclusions about the historical development of popular attitudes.45 
 
Review,, ed. J. Mirrlees, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). See also: 
Clery, Curtice, and Harding, ‘British Social Attitudes: The 34th Report’, xi-xiii, 35-
38; John Hills, ‘Following or Leading Public Opinion? Social Security Policy and 
Public Attitudes since 1997’, Fiscal Studies 23, no. 4 (2002): 547; ‘Thermostat or 
Weathervane? Public Reactions to Spending and Redistribution under New 
Labour’, in British Social Attitudes: The 26th Report, ed. Alison Park, et al. 
(London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2010), 19-38. 
42 Stanley, ‘“When We Were Just Giving Stuff Away Willy-Nilly”: Historicizing 
Contemporary British Tax Morale’. See also: Sven H. Steinmo, ‘Introduction’, ibid.; 
Georgiadis and Manning, ‘Spend It Like Beckham? Inequality and Redistribution in 
the UK, 1983–2004’. 
43 Clery, Curtice, and Harding, ‘British Social Attitudes: The 34th Report’, 35-36; 
Morgan and Harding, ‘Attitudes to Tax and Spending: A Briefing’; Taylor-Gooby 
and Hastie, ‘Paying for ‘World Class’ Services: A British Dilemma’. 
44 Alt, Preston, and Sibieta, ‘The Political Economy of Tax Policy’. See also: Clery, 
Curtice, and Harding, ‘British Social Attitudes: The 34th Report’, xi-xiii, 35-38; 
Morgan and Harding, ‘Attitudes to Tax and Spending: A Briefing’. 
45 Peter Riddell, ‘Commentary by Peter Riddell’, in Dimensions of Tax Design: The 
Mirrlees Review,, ed. J. Mirrlees, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Guido Tabellini, ‘Commentary by Guido Tabellini’, ibid.; Chris Whales, 
‘Commentary by Chris Wales’, ibid. 
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Peter Riddell, for example, argues that a detailed historical 
evaluation would provide firmer evidence. He goes on to state that 
Conservative politicians certainly believed that people had become 
more opposed to taxation in the 1970s and that survey evidence 
supports this. However, his commentary is sparsely footnoted and he 
does not cite significant evidence to support this claim.46 Neither 
Stanley nor Alt et al look at evidence from before the start of the BSA 
in the early 1980s. 
 
The development of British tax policy and the tax system has been 
comprehensively covered, primarily by Martin Daunton.47 Daunton 
argues that inefficient administrative structures that were biased 
towards stasis resulted in an incoherent and contradictory fiscal 
system and a loss of popular consent, which opened the door for 
dramatic changes under Thatcher.48 Although Daunton’s work 
touches on political ideas about popular attitudes, it is explicitly not a 
 
46 Peter Riddell, ‘Commentary by Peter Riddell’, ibid. 
47 Marc Buggeln, Martin Daunton, and Alexander Nützenadel, ‘The Political 
Economy of Public Finance since the 1970s: Questioning the Leviathan’, in The 
Political Economy of Public Finance: Taxation, State Spending and Debt since the 
1970s, ed. Marc Buggeln, Martin Daunton, and Alexander Nützenadel (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017); Martin Daunton, ‘Creating a Dynamic Society: 
The Tax Reforms of 
the Thatcher Government’, ibid.; Daunton, Just Taxes; Martin Daunton, Trusting 
Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); Martin Daunton, Wealth and Welfare: An Economic and 
Social History of Britain, 1851-1951, Economic and Social History of Britain 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Martin Daunton, ‘The Role of the State: 
Taxation, Citizenship and Welfare Reforms’, in Twentieth-Century Britain: 
Economic, Cultural and Social Change, ed. Julie-Marie Strange, Francesca 
Carnevali, and Paul Johnson (Harlow: Pearson/Longman, 2007); Martin Daunton, 
‘Payment and Participation: Welfare and State Formation in Britain 1900–1951’, 
Past & Present 150, no. 1 (1996); Martin Daunton, ‘'A Kind of Tax Prison': 
Rethinking Conservative Taxation Policy, 1960--1970’, in The Conservatives and 
British Society, 1880-1990, ed. Martin Francis and Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska 
(Cardiff: University of Wales, 1996). 
48 Daunton, Just Taxes, 360-369. 
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study of popular attitudes to tax.49 The other major recent research 
into the history of tax in the UK is Richard Whiting’s work on the 
Labour party’s tax policy.50 Whiting comes closest to looking at 
popular attitudes to tax in his discussion of the public discourse 
around wealth taxation. He argues that working-class electors, and 
Labour, were more supportive of redistributive tax policies at a point 
where they were very unlikely to touch lower-income taxpayers.51 
However, again, popular attitudes are not the major focus of his work.  
 
Peter Sloman has looked in detail at the history of Universal Basic 
Income (UBI) and negative income tax proposals, arguing that Britain 
transitioned in the 1970s from a tax state to a transfer state, where a 
significant minority of the population depend on means-tested 
transfers.52 He has also, with Aled Davies, emphasised how 
consistently the Conservatives attacked Labour’s tax and spending 
policies at elections throughout this period, pointing out that the 1992 
election was part of a much longer pattern of attacks on profligacy 
and high taxation. He suggests that the first real ‘tax bombshell’ 
election was in 1955. Attacks on tax were less of a feature at the 
 
49 Ibid., 18, 26-27. 
50 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation; R. C. Whiting, ‘The Boundaries of 
Taxation’, in The Boundaries of the State in Modern Britain, ed. S. J. D. Green and 
R. C. Whiting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); R. C. Whiting, 
‘Income Tax, the Working Class and Party Politics 1948–52*’, Twentieth Century 
British History 8, no. 2 (1997). 
51 Whiting, ‘The Boundaries of Taxation’. See also: Whiting, The Labour Party and 
Taxation. 
52 Sloman, Transfer State: The Idea of a Guaranteed Income and the Politics of 
Redistribution in Modern Britain. See also: Peter Sloman, ‘Redistribution in an Age 
of Neoliberalism: Market Economics, ‘Poverty Knowledge’, and the Growth of 
Working-Age Benefits in Britain, c. 1979–2010’, Political Studies 67, no. 3 (2018); 
Peter Sloman, ‘Beveridge’s Rival: Juliet Rhys-Williams and the Campaign for Basic 
Income, 1942–55’, Contemporary British History 30, no. 2 (2016); Peter Sloman, 
‘‘The Pragmatist’s Solution to Poverty’: The Heath Government’s Tax Credit 
Scheme and the Politics of Social Policy in the 1970s’, Twentieth Century British 
History 27, no. 2 (2016). 
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1964, 1970, and 1974 elections, returning strongly in 1979.53 
Although Sloman suggests in passing that tax resistance increased 
in the 1970s, his work is, again, not primarily a study of popular 
attitudes.54 
 
Other works have also touched on the development of tax policy. 
Howard Glennerster has looked at the policymaking around the 
abandoned wealth tax in the 1970s, while Offer has also suggested 
that attitudes to tax changed in the 1970s, attributing this to rising 
affluence and an increasing opportunity cost to higher taxes along 
with diminishing returns from collective provision.55 Neither examine 
the evidence for popular attitudes in depth. Even attitudes to the poll 
tax, the only instance of popular tax revolt in the UK in the twentieth 
century, have not received extensive attention. Butler and Adonis’s 
study is the most comprehensive. They emphasise how Conservative 
researchers and politicians neglected popular attitudes and suggest 
that they increasingly saw Conservative conference attendees as 
representative of public opinion, leading them to believe they were in 
 
53 Davies and Sloman, ‘Fiscal Promises: Tax and Spending in British General 
Elections since 1964’; Sloman, ‘Short ‘Where’s the Money Coming From?’: Tracing 
the History of Manifesto Costings in UK Elections, 1955-2019’; Peter Sloman, 
‘‘Where’s the Money Coming From?’ Manifesto Costings and the Politics of Fiscal 
Credibility in UK General Elections, 1955–2019’, The British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations  (2020). 
54 Sloman, Transfer State: The Idea of a Guaranteed Income and the Politics of 
Redistribution in Modern Britain; Sloman, ‘Short ‘Where’s the Money Coming 
From?’: Tracing the History of Manifesto Costings in UK Elections, 1955-2019’. 
Sloman, ‘‘Where’s the Money Coming From?’ Manifesto Costings and the Politics 
of Fiscal Credibility in UK General Elections, 1955–2019’. 
55 Glennerster, ‘Why Was a Wealth Tax for the UK Abandoned? Lessons for the 
Policy Process and Tackling Wealth Inequality’; Offer, Why Has the Public Sector 
Grown So Large in Market Societies?: The Political Economy of Prudence in the 
UK, c. 1870-2000; Offer, The Challenge of Affluence: Self-Control and Well-Being 
in the United States and Britain since 1950; Offer, ‘British Manual Workers: From 
Producers to Consumers, c. 1950–2000’, 541-543; Offer, ‘Consumption and 
Affluence, c. 1870-2010’. 
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tune with popular attitudes.56  
 
Cronin has looked at tax policy in the context of state expansion 
across the twentieth century but does not examine popular attitudes 
in depth although, again, he suggests that attitudes changed in the 
1970s.57 Clark and Dilnot argue that 1973 marked a political shift 
from expansionary and active fiscal policy to a distrust of government 
intervention. They suggest a few possible causes for this shift, 
including Keynesian budget deficits allowing for expansionary 
spending without tax increases ending with the 1970s recession; an 
intellectual shift in the political elite; a demographic increase in the 
group in the electorate favouring tax cuts; and increasing 
unemployment creating a perception that most spending was going 
to the poor and reducing public support for high taxation.58 But the 
evidence for popular attitudes is not examined in depth. 
 
Tomlinson has looked at evidence for popular attitudes towards other 
areas of economic policy, and, particularly, political attempts to 
influence those attitudes.59 While not focusing on taxation, Tomlinson 
 
56 D. Butler, Andrew Adonis, and Tony Travers, Failure in British Government: The 
Politics of the Poll Tax (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 246-264. For other 
work on the poll tax see: David Deacon and Peter Golding, ‘When Ideology Fails: 
The Flagship of Thatcherism and the British Local and National Media’, European 
Journal of Communication 6, no. 3 (1991); Conor McGrath, ‘Policy Making in 
Political Memoirs — the Case of the Poll Tax’, Journal of Public Affairs 2, no. 2 
(2002); Simon Hannah, Can't Pay, Won't Pay: The Fight to Stop the Poll Tax (Pluto 
Press, 2020). 
57 James E. Cronin, The Politics of State Expansion: War, State and Society in 
Twentieth-Century Britain (London: Routledge, 1991). 
58 Clark and Dilnot, ‘British Fiscal Policy since 1939’. 
59 Jim Tomlinson, ‘It’s the Economy, Stupid! Labour and the Economy, Circa 1964’, 
Contemporary British History 21, no. 3 (2007); Jim Tomlinson, ‘Re-Inventing the 
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does suggest that Labour politicians thought that there was a ‘tax 
revolt amongst its supporters’ in the 1970s.60 However, he also 
highlights how popular the Conservatives believed spending on 
services was around 1979, and the evidence suggesting limited 
support for tax cuts if it meant cuts to services through the 1980s.61 
His work, in general, emphasises the limited evidence politicians and 
civil servants had about popular attitudes to economic issues, and 
also the importance that they placed on fairness in their propaganda 
attempts.62  
 
Tomlinson suggests that the evidence points to a fairly specific notion 
of fairness focused on ‘the justice of rewards among those close to 
one’s own economic position’, and the idea that reward and effort be 
commensurate.63 Roodhouse has also argued that fairness was 
perhaps the most important factor in popular interactions with 
rationing and the black market in the 1940s and 1950s.64 Scheve and 
Stasavage have looked more widely at fairness and debates around 
taxation. They argue that at its most basic fairness in relation to tax 
means equal treatment, but that throughout history there have been 
two primary ideas about fairness in relation to taxing the wealthy — 
ability to pay and compensatory arguments. They posit that although 
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Morality and the Black Market in Britain, 1939-55’, in Food and Conflict in Europe 
in the Age of the Two World Wars, ed. Frank Trentmann and Flemming Just 
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ability to pay, which suggests that taxation should be an equal 
sacrifice for all, has been the dominant argument in favour of 
progressive taxation since the nineteenth century, compensatory 
arguments, where taxation compensates for other inequalities in 
treatment by the government, have historically been more convincing 
and this is why increased taxation of the wealthy has coincided with 
mass mobilisation wars. They suggest that taxes on the wealthy 
declined in the 1970s as compensatory arguments lost their power 
and ability to pay arguments replaced them. However, Scheve and 
Stasavage’s work focuses on taxing the wealthy and their discussion 
of ideas in the UK is brief.65  
 
There has been significantly more research into the history of the 
welfare state in Britain, some of which has focused on popular 
attitudes.66 Studies by Jose Harris and Nick Hayes have looked at 
attitudes to the welfare state in the 1940s using survey evidence.67 
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Hayes uses Mass Observation records to argue that there was not 
widespread popular desire for change in the health service at the end 
of the Second World War and that people had strong feelings about 
how a reformed health system should be funded, with the majority 
supporting an extension of the NI system so that everyone was 
compulsorily covered.68 Harris similarly argues that a 1942 survey of 
popular attitudes to welfare does not suggest strong support for 
radical overhaul of the welfare system and again identifies support 
for contributory funding.69 This suggests that a perception that the 
extension of the welfare state after 1945 was primarily a response to 
popular pressure may be incorrect.  
 
Lowe — who has provided some of the most comprehensive 
overviews of the history of the welfare state — argues that 
Conservative polling suggesting that increasing spending was 
popular had a significant impact on their tax and spending policies in 
the 1950s and 1960s. He also emphasises that the welfare state 
continued to be highly popular, even after 1979, although he 
acknowledges the elusive and contradictory nature of popular 
attitudes.70 Both Lowe and Esping-Andersen suggest that attitudes to 
the welfare state are to a large extent selfish, with people supporting 
elements that they think will benefit them personally at some point in 
their lives.71 Esping-Andersen argues that the popularity and success 
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of welfare states therefore depends heavily on ensuring the middle 
class have a stake in the system.72 Survey evidence potentially 
supports this hypothesis, as the elements of provision that appear to 
have remained most popular, like the NHS, benefit middle-class 
taxpayers, while aspects like unemployment benefits, which are 
targeted at those on low incomes, have become less popular.73 
Studies of the history of the welfare state raise various interesting 
questions in relation to attitudes to taxation but, as with studies on 
the history of taxation, none have looked directly at attitudes to 
taxation.  
 
The development of British tax policy has also been considered in a 
comparative perspective.74 In his 1993 study of the British, American, 
and Swedish tax systems, Steinmo argued that citizens 
fundamentally wanted higher spending and lower taxes at the same 
time, and that this pushed governments towards hidden taxes or 
taxes that grew automatically with the economy.75 He has 
persuasively argued that elite ideas about taxation changed in the 
1970s, but suggested that popular discontent about taxation was not 
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about the level of taxes:  
Although it was true that the public in all three countries was skeptical and 
distrustful of their tax system - and while it continued to be true that no one 
likes to pay taxes - I have found no evidence suggesting that the majority 
of citizens wanted the kind of reforms that were implemented. The public 
resented their tax systems but generally on the grounds that they were not 
progressive enough. Survey after survey indicated that strong majorities 
believed that corporations and the wealthy paid too little in taxes, while the 
middle and lower classes paid too much.76 
Daunton has, along with Marc Buggeln and Alexander Nützenadel, 
also edited a volume on comparative tax history since the 1970s.77 
This, again, broadly argues that popular opposition to tax increased 
during the 1970s. While it puts forward various explanations for why 
this might have been the case, it does not examine British ideas 
about popular attitudes to tax in detail.78 
 
The history of taxation in other countries has, in some cases, 
received more attention than it has in Britain, although the vast 
majority of English-language research into the history of taxation in 
the twentieth century has concentrated on Europe or, even more so, 
North America.79 One exception is Sweden, although, as in the case 
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of Britain, the focus has primarily been on policy development rather 
than attitudes.80 An exception is recent work by Jansson. She 
suggests that the ruling Social Democratic Party were deeply 
concerned about popular opposition to taxation in the 1950s, when 
tax rates did not return to pre-war levels, and actively set out to 
persuade their citizens of the benefits of a high tax high spending 
trade off, largely successfully. However, Jansson argues that this 
broke down in the 1970s when unemployment rose and inflation 
increased marginal rates for average Swedes, while tax allowances 
increased the perception that the wealthy were not paying their fair 
share. Jansson emphasises the importance of fairness in Swedish 
attitudes to the tax system. In the 1980s the government worked 
actively to change the idea of fairness in relation to the tax system to 
one of everyone contributing, to legitimise flattening the scale of 
progressivity. Jansson does not suggest that these tax reforms were 
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in response to popular pressure and does not explore this in detail.81 
 
There has also been some work on the French tax system, although 
much of this has focused on earlier periods.82 Nicolas Delalande has 
produced the most comprehensive study of post-war French tax 
history and Alexis Spire has also looked specifically at tax resistance 
in the 1970s. Both highlight the significant tax resistance movement 
(termed ‘Poujadism’) among the self-employed and small 
businessmen in the 1950s. This diminished through the 1960s but 
revived again from 1969 and lasted through the 1970s. In the 1970s 
it gained support from some sections of the elite and the press, which 
ran stories arguing that the tax system was unreasonable and 
unfair.83 Spire suggests that although the anti-tax movement faded 
away at the end of the 1970s it: 
… contributed to the spread of an antifiscal frame of mind that reached the 
whole of French society. From that time, the claim for cheaper tax was no 
longer the slogan of a handful of self-employed people suffering from the 
modernization of the economy, but a public issue reaching all social 
classes, and quickly legitimized by French intellectuals.84 
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Spire does not, however, provide evidence of this. He also suggests 
that, in contrast to tax resistance in the United States (USA) in the 
1970s, equality remained an important part of French criticisms of the 
tax system and the rallying cry that broadened the movement’s 
appeal.85 
 
The United States has been the focus of the majority of English-
language research into tax history.86 Andrea Campbell has, however, 
produced the only work looking specifically at the evidence for 
historical popular attitudes in the USA. Using Gallup polling she 
argues that American attitudes to taxation were highly influenced by 
self-interest throughout the twentieth century, and the belief that 
income taxes were too high closely tracked the actual level of federal 
income taxation. However, she also suggests that the salience of tax 
as an issue for voters was strongly influenced by the attention that 
politicians paid to it — when political rhetoric about taxation 
increased in the late 1960s and 1970s, tax increased in importance 
for voters and attitudes towards it became more negative.87  
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The level of consensus around high taxation and spending in the 
USA in the 1950s and 1960s has been debated but almost all 
research highlights a significant increase in opposition to taxation in 
the 1970s, crystallised in the passing of Proposition 13 in California, 
which limited local property taxes.88 These complaints referenced 
fairness but were also in some cases clearly attempts to maintain 
pre-existing privilege and differentiation. They were also strongly, and 
increasingly, tied to racist rhetoric, particularly in relation to benefits.89 
Historians have identified economic conditions, declining trust in 
government, and growing anti-statism as potential causes.90 Huret 
has suggested that concerns about morality and cultural change 
were connected to changing attitudes about taxation.91 He also 
emphasises the role of academics and conservative publications in 
giving the campaign for tax cuts intellectual legitimacy among elites, 
a point echoed by Brownlee.92 Graetz and Shapiro have looked at 
the campaign to repeal the estate tax, emphasising the importance of 
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narrative in shifting attitudes.93 Michelmore has also emphasised the 
reluctance of politicians in both parties to increase taxes outside of 
crises, and to hide welfare benefits within tax expenditures, 
concealing both the benefits and the cost of the tax and welfare 
system.94 The backlash against taxation in the USA in the 1970s is 
well-evidenced and has perhaps encouraged the idea that a similar 
shift took place in the UK.95  
 
The tax system, 1945-92 
 
A brief overview of the British tax system in the second half of the 
twentieth century may also provide some useful context. The major 
taxes during this period were income tax, purchase tax (later value 
added tax (VAT)), corporate/profit taxes, and capital taxes, primarily 
death duties. Income tax generally provided the largest percentage of 
net tax receipts, although this began to change after 1979, when the 
tax burden was increasingly rebalanced onto indirect taxes, 
particularly VAT.96 In 1945 the standard rate of income tax was 50 
percent; by 1992 it had been cut to 25 percent.97 Various allowances 
and thresholds, based on income levels and personal circumstances, 
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meant that effective income tax rates could diverge significantly from 
headline rates, however. Although the standard rate broadly fell 
throughout this period, Johnson et al estimate that effective rates 
generally rose to the late 1970s, before falling slightly.98 Until 1973 
there was also an additional surtax on high incomes — in 1948/9 this 
ranged from 10 percent on incomes of £2,000-2,500 to 52.5 percent 
on incomes over £20,000. Before it was abolished in 1972/3 surtax 
rates went from 19.25% on incomes of £3,000-4,000 to 55 percent 
above £15,000.99 
 
National Insurance (NI) contributions had first been introduced in 
1911 but were significantly reformed in 1948. Initially workers and 
employers paid flat-rate NI contributions in return for benefit 
entitlements – the rate for workers was set at 4s 11d. From 1961 
onwards, however, contributions were increasingly tied to earnings, 
becoming more like an income tax. NI also became an increasingly 
important revenue source, rising from 8.8 percent of revenue in 1949 
to 16.4 percent in 1986.100  
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Figure 1: Total UK revenue as percentage of GDP, 1940-2000 
Source: Christopher Chantrill, Total Revenue United Kingdom from FY 1940 to FY 
2000, accessed on 17/6/21, at www.ukpublicrevenue.co.uk/revenue_chart_1940_
2000UKp_17c1li001lcn_F1t. 
 
Purchase tax was introduced as a tax on goods in 1940. The basic 
rate was set at 331/3 percent of wholesale price, with a reduced rate 
at 162/3 percent.101 Items considered essential were excluded, 
including, for example, food and children’s clothing. Rates changed 
regularly. In 1972, just before it was replaced by VAT, the previous 
two top rates of 30 and 45 percent were both reduced to 25 percent, 
while the lower rate was left unchanged at 10 percent.102 VAT was 
introduced in 1973 at a single rate of 10 percent, with some goods 
exempt. By 1990/1 this had increased to 17.5 percent.103 
 
Before 1965 companies paid both income tax and profit taxes. In 
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1945 companies were liable to income tax, the National Defence 
Contribution (NDC) — a flat rate tax on profits of 5 percent — and the 
excess profits tax — 100 percent on profits above what was 
considered a ‘normal’ pre-war level (with a post-war refund of 20 
percent). In 1947 the excess profits tax was abolished, but the NDC 
was continued as a profits tax and differentiated, with 25 percent on 
distributed profits and 10 percent on undistributed profits. Profits tax 
and corporate income tax were both replaced by a single corporation 
tax in 1965, initially set at 40 percent. A separate small companies 
rate was introduced in 1973 and both rates were substantially cut in 
the 1980s.104 
 
Death duties were the major form of capital taxation in 1945. The 
1946 budget increased the top rate of estate duty to 75 percent. In 
1965 estate duty was joined by a tax on long-term capital gains at a 
rate of 30 percent. By 1974 estate duty had been eroded by 
increasing avoidance and was replaced by the capital transfer tax, 
levied on the value of gifts, but this brought in little revenue and was 
in turn replaced by inheritance tax in 1986, at 40 percent over a 
threshold of £71,000. By 1989 capital gains tax had overtaken 
inheritance tax as a percentage of government revenue, but both 
made only a small contribution — 1.9 percent versus 0.9, 
respectively – significantly less than the 5 percent death duties had 
provided in 1950/1.105  
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Questions and approaches for examining popular attitudes to 
tax c.1945-92 
 
The secondary literature suggests that people were broadly 
supportive of high taxation and spending in the immediate post-war 
period, but that this consensus broke down in the 1960s and 1970s. 
However, no works have looked in detail at popular attitudes to tax 
over this period. Recent research has challenged the extent of 
consensus, popular support for the welfare state in the 1940s and 
1950s, the decline in support for spending in the 1970s, and the 
popular perception of crisis in that period. Given these developments 
it certainly seems possible that the history of popular attitudes to tax 
may not follow the pattern that has commonly been suggested.  
 
This thesis will examine the evidence for popular attitudes to tax in 
the UK c.1945 to 1992 to see whether and, if so, how they changed. 
Where the evidence allows it will also investigate whose attitudes 
mattered in the public discourse about attitudes to tax in different 
periods and what was influencing ideas about popular attitudes to tax 
among key groups — whether they had evidence of popular 
attitudes, whether there was any attempt to deliberately influence 
ideas, and whether there is any reason to take their views as 
representative or accurate. 
 
Although focusing on a shorter time period would allow a more 
detailed discussion of the available evidence, given the lack of any 
study of the general development of attitudes to tax in this period, 
and the fact that the current story about popular attitudes extends 
from the end of the war to 1979, at least, a longer overview seems 
necessary to properly interrogate whether the traditional periodisation 
 
34 
of attitudes to tax is correct. In order to combine this with detailed 
examination of the evidence this study will focus on a series of short 
case studies. Each covers a moment where tax was a particular 
feature of public debate — generally around elections or budgets — 
or when the secondary literature currently argues that change 
occurred.   
 
Even focusing on case studies, the scope of this project is 
necessarily limited, given space and time constraints. Firstly, it will 
focus specifically on central government taxation. This means it does 
not cover the poll tax. In part this is because when politicians and 
journalists talked about ‘tax’ in this period they generally meant 
central taxation not local taxation (and increasingly just income tax as 
time went on). The poll tax was an exceptional moment in British tax 
history and, as such, while incredibly important, is arguably distinct 
from the general historical development of ideas about popular 
attitudes. Labour politicians convinced of popular opposition to 
taxation in the 1990s did not discuss the poll tax, they talked about 
the 1992 election. Secondly, although this thesis occasionally 
touches on corporate taxation, personal taxes are the major focus 
because it is primarily a study of ideas about popular attitudes. 
Popular attitudes towards corporate or local taxation could form an 
entire study in their own right but, given the lack of any specific study 
of popular attitudes to any taxes, this thesis attempts to begin to fill 
this gap by focusing on personal taxes levied by central government, 
rather than looking in detail at how attitudes to other particular taxes 
evolved.  
 
The available sources also impose some limitations. Although 
geographical specificity is certainly important, it was rarely a feature 
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of the discussions examined here. I have highlighted it in the rare 
cases where it was mentioned. Conversations were also highly 
insular, with the exception of a few references to discussions in the 
USA. The influence of wider geopolitical and global economic 
changes on ideas about taxation are therefore not discussed in 
detail. The sources also set up a ‘public’ in relation to tax that is 
almost exclusively divided by class. It seems clear that implicitly the 
‘people’ whose attitudes about tax were considered were almost 
always white and male, but this was rarely explicitly discussed and 
so is hard to analyse in any meaningful way. It will be explored when 
possible. Similarly, while fairness emerges as crucial, sources rarely 
specified exactly what kind of fairness they were discussing. As 
many of the archives used here are covered by the thirty-year rule, it 
has also not been possible to conduct a detailed investigation of 
conversations after the 1992, or in some cases 1987, election. 
 
Sources and methods 
 
Sources of evidence for popular attitudes are methodologically 
complex, particularly when studying historical attitudes where the 
evidence is more difficult to access and often of questionable 
methodological quality. There are, however, various potential sources 
of evidence for popular attitudes to tax in the UK between 1945 and 
1992. The most commonly used evidence for attitudes is surveys. 
Unfortunately, a reliable time series on attitudes to tax in Britain is 
only available from the 1980s onwards. Prior to this, the survey 
evidence is individual surveys, or short time series, of variable 
methodological quality. Despite these issues, they still represent 
some of the best historical evidence for popular attitudes and, as 
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such, this thesis will first run through the available survey evidence 
and look cautiously at what it might suggest about how popular 
attitudes to tax have changed, or not. 
 
Given that the survey evidence is limited, and before the 1980s of 
questionable reliability, subsequent chapters will examine other 
sources of evidence. The press is a key source for the study of public 
discourse, particularly in the post-war period when the vast majority 
of adults read at least one paper. Adrian Bingham argues, for 
example:  
Newspapers provide one of the most effective ways of exploring the 
representations and narratives that circulated throughout British society.106 
Historians have used the press to look at various issues, although 
not taxation.107 Several authors have emphasised the importance of 
 
106 Adrian Bingham, ‘Reading Newspapers: Cultural Histories of the Popular Press 
in Modern Britain’, History Compass 10, no. 2 (2012): 140. See also: Adrian 
Bingham, ‘Ignoring the First Draft of History?’, Media History 18, no. 3-4 (2012); 
Adrian Bingham, ‘‘The Digitization of Newspaper Archives: Opportunities and 
Challenges for Historians’’, Twentieth Century British History 21, no. 2 (2010). 
107 James Hampshire, Citizenship and Belonging: Immigration and the Politics of 
Demographic Governance in Post-War Britain, Migration, Minorities, and 
Citizenship (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Laura Beers, ‘Labour's 
Britain, Fight for It Now!’, The Historical Journal 52, no. 3 (2009); Martin Pugh, ‘The 
Daily Mirror and the Revival of Labour 1935–1945’, Twentieth Century British 
History 9, no. 3 (1998); James Thomas, ‘"A Cloak of Apathy": Political 
Disengagement, Popular Politics and the Daily Mirror 1940-1945’, Journalism 
Studies 5, no. 4 (2004); James Thomas, Popular Newspapers, the Labour Party 
and British Politics (London: Routledge, 2004); Evans and Tilley, The New Politics 
of Class, 91-112. See also: Justin Bengry, ‘Profit (F)or the Public Good?’, Media 
History 20, no. 2 (2014); Adrian Bingham, Family Newspapers?: Sex, Private Life, 
and the British Popular Press 1918-1978 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); 
Adrian Bingham, ‘The “K-Bomb”: Social Surveys, the Popular Press, and British 
Sexual Culture in the 1940s and 1950s’, Journal of British Studies 50, no. 1 (2011); 
Bingham, ‘Ignoring the First Draft of History?’; Adrian Bingham, ‘‘The Monster’? 
The British Popular Press and Nuclear Culture, 1945–Early 1960s’, The British 
Journal for the History of Science 45, no. 4 (2012); David Blaazer, ‘'Devalued and 
Dejected Britons': The Pound in Public Discourse in the Mid 1960s’, History 
Workshop Journal, no. 47 (1999); Stuart Hall et al., Policing the Crisis: Mugging, 
the State and Law and Order, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Higher Ed M.U.A., 
2013); Hay, ‘Narrating Crisis: The Discursive Construction of the ‘Winter of 
Discontent’ ’; Tiago Mata, ‘Trust in Independence: The Identities of Economists in 
Business Magazines, 1945–1970’, Journal of the History of the Behavioral 
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journalists in spreading and legitimising neoliberal economic ideas in 
the 1970s, for example.108 James Hampshire has also looked at 
media discussions around immigration and benefit fraud, while 
Beers, Pugh, and Thomas have all looked at the popular press in 
relation to the Labour party and Labour voters in the 1940s.109 Evans 
and Tilley have also looked at how press representations of class 
changed.110  
 
Few people argue that the press is a straightforward proxy for 
popular attitudes. The impact of the press on popular attitudes, 
particularly in the USA, has been the subject of much debate. In 
general, it is suggested that the media has a role in setting the 
agenda for what is important and framing, or defining, issues in a 
particular way.111 Deacon’s work on press coverage of the poll tax at 
 
Sciences 47, no. 4 (2011); David Sanders, David Marsh, and Hugh Ward, ‘The 
Electoral Impact of Press Coverage of the British Economy, 1979–87’, British 
Journal of Political Science 23, no. 2 (1993). 
108 See for example: Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and 
the Economic Counter-Revolution, 1931-1983 (London: HarperCollins, 1994), 
particularly 325; Roger Middleton, ‘Brittan on Britain: Decline, Declinism and the 
‘Traumas of the 1970s’’, in Reassessing 1970s Britain ed. Lawrence Black, Hugh 
Pemberton, and Pat Thane (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013); 
Roger Middleton, ‘Brittan on Britain: ‘The Economic Contradictions of Democracy’ 
Redux’, The Historical Journal 54, no. 4 (2011); Parsons, The Power of the 
Financial Press: Journalism and Economic Opinion in Britain and America, 172-
199; Tomlinson, Managing the Economy, Managing the People: Narratives of 
Economic Life in Britain from Beveridge to Brexit, 73-74. 
109 Hampshire, Citizenship and Belonging: Immigration and the Politics of 
Demographic Governance in Post-War Britain; Beers, ‘Labour's Britain, Fight for It 
Now!’; Pugh, ‘The Daily Mirror and the Revival of Labour 1935–1945’; Thomas, ‘"A 
Cloak of Apathy": Political Disengagement, Popular Politics and the Daily Mirror 
1940-1945’; Thomas, Popular Newspapers, the Labour Party and British Politics  
110 Evans and Tilley, The New Politics of Class, 91-112. 
111 For an overview of these theories see: Ciaran McCullagh, Media Power: A 
Sociological Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). See also: Bernard Cecil 
Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1965); Robert M. Entman, ‘Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm’, 
Journal of Communication 43, no. 4 (1993); Stuart Hall, ‘Encoding/Decoding’, in 
Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-79 ed. Stuart 
Hall (London: Hutchinson in association with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies, University of Birmingham, 1980); Justin Lewis, Constructing Public 
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the time showed that survey respondents’ perception of the salience 
of the tax closely tracked the amount of press reporting, suggesting 
that the press did have a role in setting the agenda in relation to the 
poll tax.112 In terms of the representation of popular attitudes, Entman 
and Herbst argue that the media plays a key role in propagating 
perceived majorities, while Justin Lewis, for example, argues that the 
American media represents public opinion as more conservative and 
consensual than opinion polls suggest.113 It is also true that the 
perception of the media’s power is as important as its actual power; 
both Bingham and Thomas argue, for example, that the source of 
much of the political power of the press in Britain in this period was 
politicians’ belief in its ability to set the debate.114  
 
The press does not exist within a political or economic vacuum.115 
 
Opinion: How Political Elites Do What They Like and Why We Seem to Go Along 
with It (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 77-97; Maxwell E. McCombs, 
Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion (Oxford: Polity, 2004); 
Matthew W. Ragas and Spiro Kiousis, ‘Intermedia Agenda-Setting and Political 
Activism: Moveon.Org and the 2008 Presidential Election’, Mass Communication 
and Society 13, no. 5 (2010); John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
112 Deacon and Golding, ‘When Ideology Fails: The Flagship of Thatcherism and 
the British Local and National Media’, 299-302. 
113 Lewis, Constructing Public Opinion: How Political Elites Do What They Like and 
Why We Seem to Go Along with It particularly 44-75; Robert M. Entman and Susan 
Herbst, ‘Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy’, in 
Communication, Society and Politics, ed. Robert M. Entman and W. Lance Bennett 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). See also: E. Noelle-Neumann, 
The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion - Our Social Skin, 2nd ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
114 Adrian Bingham and Martin Conboy, Tabloid Century: The Popular Press in 
Britain, 1896 to the Present (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2015), 20-21; Thomas, Popular 
Newspapers, the Labour Party and British Politics 162. 
115 See for example: James Curran, ‘Rethinking Media and Democracy’, in Mass 
Media and Society ed. James Curran and Michael Gurevitch (London: Arnold, 
2000); Peter Golding and Graham Murdock, ‘Culture, Communications and 
Political Economy’, ibid.; Des Freedman, The Contradictions of Media Power 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014); Graham Murdock and Peter Golding, ‘For 
a Political Economy of Mass Communications’, Socialist Register, no. 10 (1973); 




Economic pressures shaped the content and development of British 
newspapers, with a decline from the late 1950s in left-leaning 
publications, and an increasing divergence (though not necessarily a 
depoliticisation) in the content of papers aimed at predominantly 
working- or middle-class readers.116 The majority of newspapers 
were also led by wealthy, and from the 1970s increasingly 
interventionist, owners, who had their own, generally right-wing, 
policy agendas.117  
 
Newspaper readership was high, if declining, throughout the period 
and it seems reasonable to conclude that papers played some role in 
setting the agenda and shaping the public discourse around 
taxation.118 As such, they provide a valuable source for 
understanding the wider conversation about popular attitudes to tax, 
despite their shortcomings as a source of evidence for popular 
attitudes themselves. Broadcast media was also clearly, and 
increasingly, important through this period, but is far harder to 
access, and so for practical reasons the media analysis here is 
limited to the press. Similarly, an analysis of local papers to look at 
regional variation or a wider examination of popular books and 
television programmes could both be highly valuable but were not 
 
116 Bingham, ‘Ignoring the First Draft of History?’; James Curran and Jean Seaton, 
Power without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the Internet in Britain, ed. 
Jean Seaton, 7th ed. (London: Routledge, 2009), 88-95; Fred Hirsch and David S. 
Gordon, Newspaper Money: Fleet Street and the Search for the Affluent Reader 
(London: Hutchinson, 1975); Murdock and Golding, ‘For a Political Economy of 
Mass Communications’; Colin Seymour-Ure, The British Press and Broadcasting 
since 1945 2nd ed. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). 
117 Curran and Seaton, Power without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the 
Internet in Britain, 68-98; James Curran, Julian Petley, and Ivor Gaber, Culture 
Wars: The Media and the British Left (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2005); Seymour-Ure, The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945 32-44. 
118 Curran and Seaton, Power without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the 
Internet in Britain, particularly 54-98; James Curran and Colin Sparks, ‘Press and 
Popular Culture’, Media, Culture & Society 13, no. 2 (1991). 
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feasible within this project’s time and resource constraints.119 
 
With digitisation, analysing press coverage of a particular topic has 
become increasingly feasible and there has also been growing 
interest in computational analysis of historic textual data.120 Despite 
these advances, reading all articles referencing tax over such a long 
period is clearly not possible. Articles mentioning popular attitudes to 
tax in the national papers with the largest circulations — the Daily 
Express, Daily Herald (-1964), Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily 
Telegraph, Guardian, Financial Times, Times, and Observer — and 
the major weekly political magazines — Economist, New Statesman, 
and Spectator —  were sampled for specific periods around budgets 
and elections where tax was a particularly prominent issue.121 In 
 
119 For an example of this for the USA see Carolyn C. Jones, ‘Mapping Tax 
Narratives’, Tulane Law Review 72, no. 3 (1998). 
120 See for example: Alberto Acerbi et al., ‘The Expression of Emotions in 20th 
Century Books’, PLOS ONE 8, no. 3 (2013); Bingham, ‘‘The Digitization of 
Newspaper Archives: Opportunities and Challenges for Historians’’; Frederick W. 
Gibbs and Daniel J. Cohen, ‘A Conversation with Data: Prospecting Victorian 
Words and Ideas’, Victorian Studies 54, no. 1 (2011); Thomas Lansdall-Welfare et 
al., ‘Content Analysis of 150 Years of British Periodicals’, Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 114, no. 4 (2017); Lauren F.  Klein, Jacob  
Eisenstein, and Iris  Sun, ‘Exploratory Thematic Analysis for Historical Newspaper 
Archives’, Digital Scholarship in the Humanities 30, no. Supplement 1 (2015); Tony 
McEnery and Helen Baker, Corpus Linguistics and 17th-Century Prostitution: 
Computational Linguistics and History (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017); 
Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., ‘Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of 
Digitized Books’, Science 331, no. 6014 (2011); Bob Nicholson, ‘Counting Culture; 
or, How to Read Victorian Newspapers from a Distance’, Journal of Victorian 
Culture 17, no. 2 (2012); Robert J. Shiller, ‘Narrative Economics’, American 
Economic Review 107, no. 4 (2017); Jean M. Twenge, W. Keith Campbell, and 
Brittany Gentile, ‘Increases in Individualistic Words and Phrases in American 
Books, 1960–2008’, PLOS ONE 7, no. 7 (2012). 
121 The searches used were: for budgets - (tax OR taxes OR taxation) AND 
(budget) AND (people OR popular OR attitudes OR opinion OR response); for 
elections - (tax OR taxes OR taxation) AND (election) AND (people OR popular OR 
attitudes OR opinion). For elections a period of one month previously and two 
months after election day were sampled. For budgets a period of two months was 
sampled starting one week before the budget date. Search terms and parameters 
were decided after initial sampling of various searches and time periods to 
determine which provided the best balance of capturing relevant material but 
returning a manageable number of results. 
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total, almost 2000 articles were recorded as containing relevant 
discussions.122 The Gale Digital Scholar Lab was also used to 
perform a sentiment analysis of a much wider range of articles 
mentioning tax in the Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily Telegraph, 
Economist, and Times over the entire period to complement the more 
in-depth analysis.123  
 
Other sources that have been used as evidence for popular attitudes 
to tax include the behaviour of trade unions and the views of 
politicians and other elite groups. Daunton and Whiting provide 
evidence that some politicians thought that opposition to taxation was 
increasing in the late 1960s and 1970s and this is clearly an 
important point to examine.124 Whiting also suggests that the Trades 
Union Congress (TUC) likewise believed that opposition was 
increasing, and that their support for tax cuts through the 1970s was 
in turn seen as evidence of working-class tax resistance.125 This 
theory of trade union activity as evidence of opposition to tax does 
appear to have been widespread at the time, fuelled by the work of 
Jackson, Turner and Wilkinson in the early 1970s.126 However, 
 
122 This is unlikely to have been an exhaustive list as relevant articles may have 
been missed by falling just outside the time periods or search parameters, or due 
to inaccuracies in the optical character recognition technology. 
123 A sentiment analysis is a natural language processing tool which gives each 
article a positive or negative score based on the number of words that appear from 
a set dictionary of words with primarily positive or negative associations. The 
papers chosen were those of the original sample available on Gale Digital Scholar 
Lab and the search focused on all articles referencing tax not just popular attitudes 
to tax between 1945 and 1992 excluding company reports. See chapter six for 
further detail. 
124 Daunton, Just Taxes, 335-336; Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 184-
189, 246-258. 
125 Whiting, ‘The Boundaries of Taxation’, 165-166, 187-188. 
126 See for example: Douglas A. Hibbs, ‘On the Political Economy of Long-Run 
Trends in Strike Activity’, British Journal of Political Science 8, no. 2 (1978); 
Douglas A. Hibbs and Henrik Jess Madsen, ‘Public Reactions to the Growth of 
Taxation and Government Expenditure’, World Politics 33, no. 3 (1981): 413-414; 
Dudley Jackson, Do Trade Unions Cause Inflation? Two Studies: With a 
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Whiting states that another study concluded in 1975 that 'trade 
unions have not been prepared to use their muscle on the issue of 
taxation’ and adds that the unions were discouraged from pushing on 
tax levels too hard because allowances meant that tax liabilities 
weren’t uniform across their members and ‘for fear of reducing the 
centrality of wage negotiation in their strategy’.127 Whether the TUC 
believed or represented that opposition to tax had increased is 
clearly important. Although little research has discussed the 
Federation of British Industries (FBI) — later the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI) — in relation to debates about popular attitudes 
to tax, they played a key role in public and political discussions about 
tax in general, providing a counterpoint to the TUC. 
 
In addition to the press analysis, the case studies therefore examine 
conversations about popular attitudes to tax in both the Conservative 
and Labour parties, the civil service, the TUC, and the FBI, then CBI. 
Of course, ideas about popular attitudes to tax in these organisations 
were not necessarily accurate, nor were they independent of their 
own agendas — representations of popular attitudes, particularly 
externally, were often a political tool. However, by primarily focusing 
on internal discussions, which would have been private at the time, 
this thesis attempts to build a picture of ideas about popular attitudes 
to tax in these groups to complement the survey evidence and press 
analysis. The sources of evidence available are all imperfect. 
However, by combining multiple sources and different methods of 
analysis, this thesis tries to fill some of the gap in our knowledge 
 
Theoretical Introduction and Policy Conclusion, ed. H. A. Turner, Frank Wilkinson, 
and Economics University of Cambridge. Department of Applied (Cambridge 
Cambridge University Press, 1972). 
127 Whiting, ‘The Boundaries of Taxation’, 165-166, 187-188. 
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about popular attitudes to tax between 1945 and 1992 and 





The first chapter looks at the available quantitative evidence for 
attitudes to tax over this period, to give an idea of the evidence for 
attitudes themselves and to draw some cautious conclusions about 
how they may, or may not, have changed.  
 
The second chapter looks at the 1949 budget and 1950 election. At 
the 1949 budget Chancellor Stafford Cripps told the country that they 
could not have their cake and eat it and the welfare state had to be 
paid for. This prompted anger on the left, particularly at the fact that 
Cripps cut taxes on beer but not purchase tax on essentials. Labour 
then lost numerous seats at the 1950 election, which key figures 
believed was the result of middle-class opposition to high taxation. 
This chapter explores whether individuals in the organisations 
studied believed there was widespread consensus around, and 
consent to, taxation in 1949-50. 
 
The third chapter examines the period between the 1959 election 
and 1961 budget. Labour’s loss at the 1959 election was once again 
partially blamed on taxation, after Labour promised to increase 
spending but not taxation and fund the difference through growth. 
This was attacked by the Conservatives as unrealistic and 
irresponsible. The 1961 budget, in turn, was highly controversial 
thanks to its clear bias towards wealthy taxpayers, who received 
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significant tax cuts. This chapter looks at whether ideas about 
popular attitudes to tax had changed after a decade of Conservative 
government and three consecutive electoral defeats for Labour. 
 
The fourth chapter investigates the 1964 election and 1965 budget, 
when Labour was elected with, and partially executed, a plan for the 
most radical tax reforms since 1945. These reforms were extensively 
attacked by the Conservative party but tax was not a major issue at 
the election. This chapter explores whether the Labour victory or the 
1965 reforms changed ideas about popular attitudes to tax.  
 
The fifth chapter looks at the years leading up to the 1970 election — 
the period in which it has been suggested that popular opposition to 
taxation started to increase. Despite this, tax has not been 
highlighted as a major factor in Labour’s loss at the 1970 election. 
This chapter assesses whether politicians and others believed 
popular opposition to tax was increasing in the years leading up to 
the 1970 election and during the election campaign itself. 
 
The sixth chapter examines the period around the 1976 budget and 
the 1979 election. This has been identified as the culmination of the 
shift in attitudes that started in the 1960s, resulting in the election of 
Margaret Thatcher in 1979. This chapter looks at whether individuals 
in the organisations studied thought, or argued, that opposition to tax 
had increased and whether they believed that it contributed to the 
election of Thatcher in 1979.  
 
The final chapter investigates the 1987 and, where possible given 
archival restrictions, 1992 elections. Labour was attacked on their tax 
policy at both elections and lost, although more famously during the 
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1992 ‘tax bombshell’ election. This chapter will examine whether 
politicians and others thought that popular opposition to tax lost 
Labour these elections, and what they believed about popular 
attitudes to tax in the 1970s a decade later. 
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1. Quantitative evidence for popular attitudes to tax 
 
Although there has been no systematic investigation of the available 
evidence for popular attitudes to tax in this period, several works 
have stated that antipathy towards both taxation and public spending 
increased in the 1960s and 1970s.1 Some have suggested that this 
may have been a natural consequence of falling tax thresholds and 
rising incomes, which drew more people into income tax, in the 
context of increasing affluence, materialism, and individualism.2 
Daunton argues, for example:  
By 1979, electoral support for Labour’s fiscal policies had weakened. Many 
former Labour voters were more interested in acquiring their own property 
and sharing in consumption than in the transfer of resources to an active 
state which seemed inefficient and unreliable … At the beginning of the 
period covered in this book [1914-79], the median voter had a modest 
income and did not pay income tax; there was strong electoral support for 
redistributive taxation. By the end of the period, the median voter paid 
income tax and was less inclined to support redistribution.3 
 
1 See for example: Buggeln, Daunton, and Nützenadel, ‘The Political Economy of 
Public Finance since the 1970s: Questioning the Leviathan’; Cronin, The Politics of 
State Expansion: War, State and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain, 242-244; 
Daunton, Just Taxes, 3-5, 335-338, 368-369; Fielding, The Labour Party: 
Continuity and Change in the Making of ‘New’ Labour, 69-72; Howard Glennerster, 
British Social Policy: 1945 to the Present, 3rd ed., Making Contemporary Britain 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 158-159; Lowe, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945, 
295-299; Offer, Why Has the Public Sector Grown So Large in Market Societies?: 
The Political Economy of Prudence in the UK, c. 1870-2000, 19-22; Offer, The 
Challenge of Affluence: Self-Control and Well-Being in the United States and 
Britain since 1950, 7-8; Offer, ‘British Manual Workers: From Producers to 
Consumers, c. 1950–2000’, 541-543; Offer, ‘Consumption and Affluence, c. 1870-
2010’; Sloman, Transfer State: The Idea of a Guaranteed Income and the Politics 
of Redistribution in Modern Britain, 148-153; Whiting, The Labour Party and 
Taxation, 186-189; Williamson, Conservative Economic Policymaking and the Birth 
of Thatcherism, 1964-1979 63-66. 
2 See for example: Buggeln, Daunton, and Nützenadel, ‘The Political Economy of 
Public Finance since the 1970s: Questioning the Leviathan’; Cronin, The Politics of 
State Expansion: War, State and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain, 242-243; 
Daunton, Just Taxes, 335-336, 368-369; Lowe, The Welfare State in Britain since 
1945, 299; Offer, Why Has the Public Sector Grown So Large in Market Societies?: 
The Political Economy of Prudence in the UK, c. 1870-2000, 22; Whiting, The 
Labour Party and Taxation, 186-189. 
3 Daunton, Just Taxes, 335-336. 
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Offer similarly suggests:  
… as consumers shifted their preferences away from prudence and 
towards gratification, voters also began to press for lower taxes.4  
Glennerster also posits that demographic change was a factor as the 
‘rising population was the middle-aged middle-class tax payer’, and 
that increasing home ownership also made retaining income more 
attractive.5 The tax system did become less progressive during the 
1950s and 1960s, and income tax increasingly encompassed those 
with lower incomes as the 1960s and 1970s went on.6 These 
explanations provide clear reasons why popular attitudes might have 
shifted against the tax system, but are not evidence that they actually 
did.  
 
Electoral results, and particularly the 1979 election, have also been 
cited as evidence for increasing opposition to taxation.7 Politicians 
have clearly assumed that taxes have an electoral impact.8 However, 
political scientists have argued that tax policy may have an effect on 
parties’ popularity but does not have a significant impact on voting 
behaviour once separated from economic expectations and general 
perceptions about economic competence.9 This has been challenged 
 
4 Offer, Why Has the Public Sector Grown So Large in Market Societies?: The 
Political Economy of Prudence in the UK, c. 1870-2000, 22. 
5 Glennerster, British Social Policy: 1945 to the Present, 158-159. 
6 Lowe, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945, 287-289; Whiting, The Labour 
Party and Taxation, 184-189. 
7 See for example: Daunton, Just Taxes, 3-5, 335-338; Offer, Why Has the Public 
Sector Grown So Large in Market Societies?: The Political Economy of Prudence 
in the UK, c. 1870-2000; Taylor-Gooby, Public Opinion, Ideology and State Welfare, 
13-17. 
8 Anthony Crosland, ‘The People Who Didn't Vote Labour ’, Tribune, 10 March 
1950; Denver, ‘The Government That Could Do No Right’, 22-24; Gould, ‘Why 
Labour Won’, 7; Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 102-103. 
9 See for example: Alt, The Politics of Economic Decline: Economic Management 
and Political Behaviour in Britain since 1964 53-54, 222-223; David Butler and 
Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice 
(London: Macmillan, 1974), 297; Johnson, Lynch, and Walker, ‘Income Tax and 
Elections in Britain, 1950–2001’; Federico Revelli, ‘Local Taxes, National Politics 
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by Johnson et al, who suggest there is some evidence that tax 
increases in an election year reduce re-election rates for incumbents. 
However, they did not find an effect for tax cuts, and the effect for 
increases was only found in some groups of voters and at particular 
income levels.10 Heath et al also point out that in contexts where 
taxes increased significantly this was usually because of poor 
economic management and was not accompanied by improved 
services but instead spending cuts.11  
 
The British electoral system also makes it difficult to use election 
outcomes as evidence for voters’ attitudes; landslides have been 
achieved without significant shifts in electoral support, and studies 
have argued that Thatcher’s victories did not necessarily indicate 
popular support for her policies.12 It is also difficult to separate out 
taxation from other issues; British Election Study (BES) data from the 
1979 election suggested that tax was an important issue, but so were 
strikes, rising prices, unemployment, and law and order.13 As 
Johnson et al argue, it is not clear that we should discard politicians’ 
 
and Spatial Interactions in English District Election Results’, European Journal of 
Political Economy 18, no. 2 (2002); Richard Rose and Terence Karran, Taxation by 
Political Inertia: Financing the Growth of Government in Britain (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1987), 161; Richard Rose and Ian McAllister, Voters Begin to Choose : 
From Closed Class to Open Elections in Britain (London: Sage Publications, 1986); 
David Sanders, ‘Economic Performance, Management Competence and the 
Outcome of the Next General Election’, Political Studies 44, no. 2 (1996); Bo 
Särlvik and Ivor Crewe, Decade of Dealignment: The Conservative Victory of 1979 
and Electoral Trends in the 1970s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 
183-196, 272-273. 
10 Johnson, Lynch, and Walker, ‘Income Tax and Elections in Britain, 1950–2001’. 
11 Heath, Jowell, and Curtice, The Rise of New Labour: Party Policies and Voter 
Choices 46-47. 
12 See for example: Crewe, ‘Has the Electorate Become Thatcherite?’; Hayes, ‘Did 
We Really Want a National Health Service? Hospitals, Patients and Public 
Opinions before 1948’; Fielding, ‘What Did 'the People' Want?: The Meaning of the 
1945 General Election’; Jackson and Saunders, ‘Introduction: Varieties of 
Thatcherism’, 16-17; King, ‘Why Labour Won - at Last’, 181-185. 
13 Ivor Crewe, D. R. Robertson, and B. Sarlvik. ‘British Election Study, May 1979; 
Cross-Section Survey ’, Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive), SN 1533, 1981. 
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perceptions of the importance of taxes as quickly as earlier political 
scientists did, yet it is also far from clear that they were, or are, right 
that tax increases straightforwardly lose elections. The 1979 election 
result alone is not adequate evidence for increasing opposition to 
taxation in the 1970s.  
 
This leaves surveys as the major available source of quantitative 
evidence for popular attitudes to tax. Although no works have looked 
at the survey evidence in detail, various surveys have been cited. 
Daunton references one piece of survey evidence for popular 
attitudes to tax, Peter Taylor-Gooby’s 1985 work.14 Whiting also cites 
some small-scale surveys, particularly from the late-1970s.15 Various 
other works have referenced the BES surveys or work based on their 
data. Finally, Lowe also cites an Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) 
survey from 1965.16 These surveys will be discussed in more detail 
below. Steinmo cites a 1982 work by Alan Lewis, which uses the 
1975 Eurobarometer survey, Gallup data, and a 1974 survey by 
David Piachaud to argue that while surveys showed support for tax 
cuts in the 1970s, once it was made clear that tax cuts involved 
 
14 Daunton, Just Taxes, 4; Taylor-Gooby, Public Opinion, Ideology and State 
Welfare. 
15 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 118-119, 238, 256. 
16 Taylor-Gooby, Public Opinion, Ideology and State Welfare; Butler and Stokes, 
Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice, 459; David Butler 
and Donald E. Stokes. ‘Political Change in Britain, 1963-1970’, Ann Arbor, MI: 
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research), ICPSR 7250, 2007; 
I. M. Crewe, D. R. Robertson, and B. Sarlvik. ‘British Election Study, October 
1974’, Colchester, Essex: UK Data Service), SN 666, 1974. cited in Rodney Lowe, 
The Welfare State in Britain since 1945, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005), 106-109; Hibbs and Madsen, ‘Public Reactions to the Growth of Taxation 
and Government Expenditure’. cited in Williamson, Conservative Economic 
Policymaking and the Birth of Thatcherism, 1964-1979 63-66; Paul Whiteley, 
‘Public Opinion and the Demand for Social Welfare in Britain’, Journal of Social 




spending cuts this support disappeared.17  
 
Despite touching on evidence for popular attitudes, none of these 
studies have looked at all the available survey evidence for attitudes 
to tax in this period. I will, therefore, review it briefly here. There are 
no consistent survey time series for attitudes to tax before 1979. 
Earlier evidence is fragmented, inconsistent, and of variable 
methodological quality. Constructing a reliable time series out of 
these surveys would be a significant statistical challenge, one that I 
am not qualified for and that this thesis will not attempt. However, I 
will briefly cover the main findings of the various surveys available to 
see what patterns emerge, while approaching any conclusions with 
caution. Even the best survey evidence, conducted to current 
methodological standards, can be unreliable, and very little of the 
survey evidence discussed here, particularly for the earlier periods, 
approaches those standards. However, given that it is some of the 
only evidence available, it is clearly worth examining, while remaining 
aware of its potential issues.  
 
Survey evidence for the 1950s and early 1960s 
 
Before 1963 only one-off survey questions were found. Government 
and Conservative party archives show that Gallup was asking 
general questions about how important tax was as an issue, for 
example, and respondents’ preferences between different taxes 
through the 1950s and 1960s.18 It has, however, proved impossible 
 
17 Alan Lewis, The Psychology of Taxation (Oxford: Martin Robertson & Co, 1982), 
41-62. cited in Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American 
Approaches to Financing the Modern State, 157-158. 
18 See for example: ‘Conservative Central Office: Public Opinion Summary No. 13. 
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to locate the original Gallup data they reference. In 1951 a 
Conservative polling summary stated that a Gallup poll had reported 
that two out of three respondents would be prepared to pay higher 
National Insurance (NI) contributions to increase spending on 
pensions.19 This majority appeared to have decreased by 1954, 
when another Gallup poll found 43 percent would be willing to pay 
more, while 39 percent would not, but it is unclear whether the 
question wording was the same.20 These results were reported 
without exact questions or data, making them highly unreliable.  
 
The Government Social Survey (GSS) conducted a series of surveys 
looking at public perceptions of the economic situation in the late 
1940s, but where these touched on tax it was usually in relation to 
incentives.21 A more detailed survey was commissioned from the 
 
January 1950’, CCO 4/3/249, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian 
Library), 1950; ‘Conservative Central Office: Public Opinion Summary No. 15. April 
1950’, CCO 4/3/249, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1950; 
‘Conservative Central Office: Public Opinion Summary No. 27. April, 1951’, CCO 
4/4/267, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1951; ‘Summary 
of Reports on Public Opinion up to 3rd April, 1954’, CCO 4/6/336, (Conservative 
Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1954; ‘Summary of Reports on Public 
Opinion up to 24th April, 1954’, CCO 4/6/336, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, 
Bodleian Library), 1954; ‘Poll Summaries No. 10: Gallup Political Index No. 49, 17 
March 1964’, CRD 2/48/107, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian 
Library), 1964; ‘Poll Summaries No. 11: Gallup Political Index No. 50, 24 April 
1964’, CRD 2/48/107, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 
1964; ‘Letter from the Government Social Survey Librarian to Mr Griffiths, Head of 
Information Division, HMT, 13 February 1969’. The National Archives (TNA) T 
328/367, 1969; ‘Letter from Linda Dixon, Government Social Survey Librarian, to 
Mr Griffiths, Head of Information Division, HMT, 24 March 1969’. The National 
Archives (TNA) T 328/367, 1969; ‘Memorandum from H M Griffiths, Head of 
Information Division, HMT, to Mr Hancock, 12 November 1969’. The National 
Archives (TNA) T 328/367, 1969. 
19 ‘Conservative Central Office: Public Opinion Summary No. 27. April, 1951’, CCO 
4/4/267, Conservative Party Archive, 1951. 
20 ‘Summary of Reports on Public Opinion up to 24th April, 1954’, CCO 4/6/336, 
Conservative Party Archive, 1954. 
21 The only exception was the question ‘Which of these taxes do you dislike most 
personally?’. See: Government Social Survey. ‘Survey of Knowledge and Opinion 
About the Economic Situation, December 1947’, The National Archives (TNA) RG 
23/92, 1947; Government Social Survey. ‘Survey of Knowledge and Opinion About 
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GSS by the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income 
and published in 1954. Although this was primarily focused on 
incentives, it did ask a series of questions about what respondents 
thought about Pay as You Earn (PAYE) as a system and found 
overwhelming approval — only 3 percent of respondents stated that 
they disapproved of PAYE. Although it stated: ‘nearly all grumble 
about it [tax] in general discussion’, the report concluded that tax 
probably did not have any significant incentive effects.22  
 
In 1961 Gallup also asked respondents: ‘If the Government were to 
cut expenditure - what should they do with the money they save, 
assuming that they could only do one of the things given on this 
card?’. Reducing income tax was the second most popular option, 
after increasing spending on pensions, but in aggregate options for 
increasing spending on other services were selected by significantly 
more respondents than tax cuts.23 Survey evidence for the 1950s 
and early 1960s is very sparse and unreliable. A very tentative 
conclusion might be that it suggested that a majority preferred 
increased spending over tax cuts, but perhaps particularly in relation 
to pensions.  
 
 
the Economic Situation, February 1948’, The National Archives (TNA) RG 23/94, 
1948; Government Social Survey. ‘Survey of Knowledge and Opinion About the 
Economic Situation, November 1948’, The National Archives (TNA) RG 23/103, 
1948; Government Social Survey. ‘Survey of Knowledge and Opinion About the 
Economic Situation, July 1949’, The National Archives (TNA) RG 23/107, 1949. 
See also: J. Tomlinson, ‘Welfare and the Economy: The Economic Impact of the 
Welfare State, 1945-1951’, Twentieth Century British History 6, no. 2 (1995): 213-
215. for a discussion of these surveys generally. 
22 ‘Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income. Second Report’,  
(H.M.S.O., 1954), 91-124. It also found that very few of the respondents had 
detailed knowledge of how income tax affected them. 
23 The Data Archive. ‘Database of Selected British Gallup Opinion Polls, 1958-
1991’, (Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Limited, Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive), 
SN 3803, 1998. 
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Survey evidence 1963-70 
 
From 1963 the British Election Study (BES), conducted by Butler and 
Stokes, started to ask a consistent question on attitudes to tax, which 
was repeated in 1966, 1969 and 1970: ‘If the Government had a 
choice between reducing taxes and spending more on social 
services, which should it do?’. The results suggested a slight 
preference for tax cuts over increased spending in 1963, rising to a 
significant majority in favour of tax cuts by 1969, which fell slightly in 
1970 (see fig. 2).24 A few things should be noted, however: these 
results indicated a majority in favour of tax cuts in 1963, significantly 
earlier than any backlash has previously been situated; no option for 
maintaining the same levels of tax and spending was given (often the 
most popular option in later surveys); and the question asked if the 
respondent would prefer tax cuts or increased spending, implying 
that it was possible to maintain current services while cutting taxes. 
In the surveys examined questions that asked about increased 
spending/services rather than maintaining spending/services 
consistently received higher percentages in favour of tax cuts, which 
is entirely logical and also makes this question at least as much 
about respondents’ views of the current level of spending.  
 
24 Butler and Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice, 
459; Butler and Stokes, ‘Political Change in Britain, 1963-1970’. 
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Figure 2: BES, tax cuts vs increased spending, 1963-70 
Source: Butler, David, and Donald Stokes. Political Change in Britain: The 
Evolution of Electoral Choice. London: Macmillan, 1974, p. 459. 
 
Butler and Stokes also asked: ‘Do you feel that the government 
should spend more on social services, or do you feel that spending 
for social services should stay about as it is now?’. This showed a 
majority in favour of higher spending but one that diminished 
significantly between 1963 and 1970.25 It did not offer the option of 
reduced spending. However, in another BES survey in 1970, 
conducted by Crewe, Robertson, and Sarlvik, only 4 percent of 
respondents opted for spending cuts.26 This suggests that support for 
 
25 77 percent of respondents selected increased spending in 1964 against 20 
percent who wanted spending to remain the same. This had dropped to 54 and 42 
percent respectively by 1966. In 1970 the question gave the option of increasing 
spending on pensions as well as services generally. In that survey 49 percent 
selected increased spending generally, 8 percent increased spending on pensions, 
and 38 percent spending remaining the same. Butler and Stokes, Political Change 
in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice, 459; Butler and Stokes, ‘Political 
Change in Britain, 1963-1970’. 
26 40 percent selected increased spending generally, 17 percent spending more on 
pensions, 36 percent spending remaining the same, 4 percent reduced spending, 
and 4 percent don’t know. Ivor Crewe, D. R. Robertson, and B. Sarlvik. ‘British 
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higher spending was falling through the 1960s, particularly in the 
middle of the decade, as Labour increased spending on services, but 
does not indicate any significant support for cutting spending.27 This 
is in line with the hypothesis that the increasing number of 
respondents opting for tax cuts might be at least as much about 
spending levels as taxation, and raises the possibility that if the 
previous question had asked about tax cuts and reduced spending 
on services it might have received different results.  
 
The IEA also conducted studies in 1963, 1965, 1970, and 1978.28 
They asked respondents to choose between three options: increased 
taxes and spending; reduced taxes with services provided only for 
those in need; and services remaining the same but with an option to 
‘contract out’, pay less in taxes, and use the money to pay for private 
services.29 In the case of health and education spending the surveys 
 
Election Study, 1969, June 1970, February 1974; Panel Survey’, Colchester, 
Essex: UK Data Archive), SN 422, 1976. 
27 Christopher Chantrill, ‘Multiyear Download of UK Government Spending’, 2020, 
accessed on: 22 May at 
https://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/download_multi_year_1940_1980UKd_17c1li0
11mcn_00t10t20t40t. 
28 ‘Choice in Welfare: First Report on an Enquiry Conducted by Mass Observation 
into the Extent of Knowledge and Preference in State and Private Provision for 
Education, Health Services and Pensions’,  (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 
1963); Ralph Harris and Arthur Seldon, ‘Choice in Welfare 1965: Second Report on 
an Enquiry Conducted by Mass-Observation into the Extent of Knowledge and 
Preference in State and Private Provision for Education, Health Services and 
Pensions ’, (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1965); Ralph Harris and Arthur 
Seldon, ‘Choice in Welfare, 1970: Third Report on Knowledge and Preference in 
Education, Health Services and Pensions’, (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 
1971); Ralph Harris and Arthur Seldon, ‘Over-Ruled on Welfare: The Increasing 
Desire for Choice in Education and Medicine and Its Frustration by 'Representative' 
Government ’, (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1979). The first two surveys 
were conducted with Mass Observation and the third with England, Grosse + 
Associates — the report stated that England, Grosse + Associates had been 
working with Mass Observation previously. It is unclear from the 1978 report who, if 
anyone, they worked with on those surveys. The survey samples were around 
2000 people. 
29 ‘Choice in Welfare: First Report on an Enquiry Conducted by Mass Observation 
into the Extent of Knowledge and Preference in State and Private Provision for 
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showed a preference for higher taxes and more spending in 1963, 
converging with, and then being surpassed by, contracting out in 
1965 and 1970, as the preference for higher spending fell. For 
education, higher taxes and spending remained the top preference in 
1970, but by 1978 there was a significant divergence, with 
contracting out much more popular (see fig. 3).30  
 
Education, Health Services and Pensions’,  44-49; Harris and Seldon, ‘Choice in 
Welfare 1965: Second Report on an Enquiry Conducted by Mass-Observation into 
the Extent of Knowledge and Preference in State and Private Provision for 
Education, Health Services and Pensions ’, 50-56; Harris and Seldon, ‘Choice in 
Welfare, 1970: Third Report on Knowledge and Preference in Education, Health 
Services and Pensions’, 25-35; Harris and Seldon, ‘Over-Ruled on Welfare: The 
Increasing Desire for Choice in Education and Medicine and Its Frustration by 
'Representative' Government ’, 44-54. The exact question wording was: ‘A The 
state should take more in taxes, rates and contributions and so on to pay for better 
or increased (health, education) services which everyone would have. B The state 
should take less in taxes, rates and contributions and so on to provide services 
only for people in need and leave others to pay or insure privately. C The state 
should continue the present service but allow people to contract out, pay less 
contributions and so on and use the money to pay for their own services.’ In the 
early surveys ‘more’, ‘less’ and ‘only’ were underlined. In 1963 and 1965 the 
question was preceded by the statement: ‘Suppose most incomes continue to rise 
in the next ten or twenty years, which of these three possible State policies would 
you prefer?’. ⁠ In 1970 this was replaced by: ‘On this card there are three possible 
policies which the State could adopt. Which of them would you yourself prefer for: 
Better or increased health services/pensions/educational services.’ ⁠  The first three 
surveys asked the question separately in relation to spending on health, education, 
and pensions. The 1978 survey asked only about health and education. 
30 ‘Choice in Welfare: First Report on an Enquiry Conducted by Mass Observation 
into the Extent of Knowledge and Preference in State and Private Provision for 
Education, Health Services and Pensions’,  44-49; Harris and Seldon, ‘Choice in 
Welfare 1965: Second Report on an Enquiry Conducted by Mass-Observation into 
the Extent of Knowledge and Preference in State and Private Provision for 
Education, Health Services and Pensions ’, 50-56; Harris and Seldon, ‘Choice in 
Welfare, 1970: Third Report on Knowledge and Preference in Education, Health 
Services and Pensions’, 25-35; Harris and Seldon, ‘Over-Ruled on Welfare: The 
Increasing Desire for Choice in Education and Medicine and Its Frustration by 
'Representative' Government ’, 44-54. 
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Figure 3: IEA increased taxes and spending, reduced taxes and 











Sources: Choice in Welfare: First Report on an Enquiry Conducted by Mass 
Observation into the Extent of Knowledge and Preference in State and Private 
Provision for Education, Health Services and Pensions.  London: Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 1963, 44-49; Harris, Ralph, and Arthur Seldon. Choice in Welfare 
1965: Second Report on an Enquiry Conducted by Mass-Observation into the 
Extent of Knowledge and Preference in State and Private Provision for Education, 
Health Services and Pensions. London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1965, 50-56; 
Harris, Ralph, and Arthur Seldon. Choice in Welfare, 1970: Third Report on 
Knowledge and Preference in Education, Health Services and Pensions. London: 
Institute of Economic Affairs, 1971, 25-35; Harris, Ralph, and Arthur Seldon. Over-
Ruled on Welfare: The Increasing Desire for Choice in Education and Medicine 
and Its Frustration by 'Representative' Government. London: Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 1979, 44-54. 
 
There are several potential methodological issues with these 
surveys. Firstly, in 1963 and 1965 they sampled only married men 
between 21 and 65, justifying this on the grounds that men made the 
decisions about services for the family, but excluding half the 
population. In 1970 they added in a mini sample of 200 women and, 
based on this, suggested that they had been correct that excluding 
women would not affect the results.31 Treasury officials at the time 
felt that ‘it was very doubtful whether any conclusions of importance 
 
31 In 1978 they did include women and extended the lower bound of the age range 
to 16 but still did not sample anyone over 65. 
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about public attitudes to taxation and the social services could be 
drawn’ from the 1963 survey, stating: 
The Central Statistical Office were consulted about the validity of the 
survey and were very critical about the wording of the questions used, the 
presentation of the results and the choice of the sample of people 
interviewed.32 
They were equally unimpressed in 1971, stating that the questions 
were ‘incredibly bad’ and gave the impression that ‘the State will go 
on taking more of your money for improvements under (a), but that 
under (b) or (c) you could get even greater improvements for less 
than you pay now’.33 Alan Lewis similarly argued that their question 
implied that people could pay less but the service could remain the 
same quality.34 Given this, it is perhaps surprising that more people 
did not select contracting out, which promised them no trade-offs for 
broadening their choices. There was also no status quo option.35 On 
face value these surveys suggest that support for increased taxation 
and spending was falling through the 1960s and 1970s but given the 
methodological issues the results are of very limited value. 
 
There were also a few one-off surveys in the 1960s. A Mark Abrams 
survey in 1969, titled The Lost Labour Voter, told respondents that 
spending had increased over the previous decade which had meant 
higher taxes and asked whether they would have preferred: ‘(i) 
Increased social services along with higher taxes; (ii) Fewer social 
services and no increase in taxes; (iii) Some other combination?’. 48 
 
32 They also reported that the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance were 
concerned as the IEA was ‘known to be biased in favour of private provision’. 
‘"Choice in Welfare": Commentary by a Treasury Group’. The National Archives 
(TNA) T 227/1788, 1964. See also: ‘Memorandum from J. E. Hansford to D. J. S. 
Hancock, 29 August 1963’. The National Archives (TNA) T 227/1788, 1963. 
33 ‘Memorandum from J. A. Patterson to Levitt and Widdup, 11 February 1971’. 
The National Archives (TNA) T 227/3288, 1971. 
34 Lewis, The Psychology of Taxation, 46-47. 
35 In 1978 option A was presented as keeping the system the same in charts and 
tables, despite the fact this was not the case. 
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percent of respondents selected service increases and higher taxes, 
while 32 percent preferred reduced social services and no increase 
in taxes.36 Again, this did not give the option of maintaining the status 
quo, nor was it incompatible with the Butler and Stokes’s findings as 
it was not actually offering tax cuts, just no tax increases, in return for 
reduced services. It nonetheless perhaps indicated a willingness to 
pay higher taxes to maintain services.  
 
The limited and methodologically variable survey data for the 1960s 
perhaps suggests that support for increased spending was falling, 
while support for tax cuts, if they did not mean spending cuts, was 
concurrently increasing. However, it also suggests that even in the 
early 1960s there was significant support for tax cuts if the alternative 
was increased spending, and that even in 1969 cuts to services were 
more unpopular than higher taxes.  
 
Survey evidence 1970-79 
 
Unfortunately, it proved difficult to locate survey data for the period 
from 1970 to 1979. The IEA survey discussed above was conducted 
again in 1978 and suggested that support for contracting out had 
increased since 1970, while support for increasing taxes and 
spending on education and health had decreased (see fig. 3, p. 
58).37 It also asked: 
In California recently two people out of three voted to reduce taxation and 
 
36 Mark Abrams, ‘The Lost Labour Voter’, Socialist Commentary, February 1969. 
The exact question wording was: ’Over the past ten years Government expenditure 
on the social services - hospitals, schools, pensions and so on - has gone up, and 
this has meant higher taxes’. 
37 Harris and Seldon, ‘Over-Ruled on Welfare: The Increasing Desire for Choice in 




accept fewer services. If there was a vote in this country on the same 
issue, would you vote for or against?38 
33 percent of respondents said they would vote for and 63 percent 
against, seemingly a resounding no to tax cuts if they meant fewer 
services.39 They conducted a follow-up survey in November 1978, 
which asked two questions about the Californian referendum, one of 
which asked if they would vote for it ‘even if, as a result, Government 
might cut some services?’.40 Without service cuts mentioned, a larger 
number of respondents (27 percent) were in favour than opposed (15 
percent), but an equal number (27 percent) said they did not know. 
With the possibility of cuts 33 percent were in favour, 27 percent 
opposed, and 34 percent did not know. Again, the percentage 
selecting ‘don’t know’ was as large as that selecting yes.41 Harris and 
Seldon suggested that this was because people did not know the 
size of the cuts in either taxes or services, which seems reasonable, 
but renders the responses not particularly helpful. It is also unclear 
why the two surveys produced such different results.42 As previously 
discussed, the survey had significant methodological issues. 
However, it still did not seem to suggest a majority for tax cuts if 
accompanied by spending cuts.  
 
The BES asked a question in 1974 and 1979 about whether social 
services should be cut back, maintained, or extended, but made no 
reference to taxes. This suggested increasing support for cuts and 
decreasing support for extending services, continuing the pattern 
 
38 Ibid., 21-32. This was a reference to Proposition 13, which was a referendum 
passed in California in 1978, which placed a cap on local property taxes. 
39 Ibid. 4 percent selected ‘don’t know’. 
40 Ibid., 21-32, 218. 
41 Ibid., 21-33. 6 percent said they would not vote. 
42 Ibid. The surveys had similar sample sizes but the one conducted in July/August 
1978 was long with multiple questions, while the November survey asked only 
three questions all about Proposition 13. 
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seen in the 1960s.43 However, the Eurobarometer survey also asked 
respondents in Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Denmark 
in October-November 1975 whether they would prefer taxes to be 
reduced even if that meant services were cut, or for services to be 
improved even if this meant that taxes were raised. 44 percent of 
British respondents opted for increased services and taxes, against 
38 percent who selected reduced taxes and services.44 As Coughlin 
concluded, this did not suggest a significant backlash against high 
taxation and spending.45 This result is particularly noticeable as it did 
not offer a status quo option and the option was to improve services 
not maintain them, and yet it still did not find a majority for tax cuts. If 
anything this potentially indicated that support for tax cuts had 
decreased since the 1960s. Overall, the survey evidence from 1970 
to 1978 suggests that support for increased spending and taxes had 
perhaps continued to decline, but again does not demonstrate 
majority support for tax cuts if they meant cuts to services. 
 
Survey evidence 1979-92 
 
From 1979 the evidence is clearer and more plentiful. It suggests 
either that there was either limited change through the 1970s or that 
people had become more favourable towards taxation (or at least 
less supportive of tax cuts if they also meant spending cuts). The 
 
43 I. M. Crewe, D. R. Robertson, and B. Sarlvik. ‘British Election Study, February 
1974, October 1974, June 1975, May 1979; Panel Survey’, Colchester, Essex: UK 
Data Service), SN 1614, 1981. See also: Särlvik and Crewe, Decade of 
Dealignment: The Conservative Victory of 1979 and Electoral Trends in the 1970s 
189-192. 
44 Excluding non-responses and ‘don’t knows’, this was 53 to 47 percent. 
45 Richard M. Coughlin, Ideology Public Opinion and Welfare Policy : Attitudes 
toward Taxes and Spending in Industrialized Societies (University of California 
institute of international studies, 1980., 1980), 127-154. 
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BES asked in May 1979 whether respondents thought that taxes 
should be cut even if it meant spending cuts or services maintained 
even if that meant no tax cuts. Altogether 25 percent of respondents 
selected options for cutting taxes, while 62 percent selected keeping 
up services.46 The BBC election day survey, also carried out by Ivor 
Crewe, asked a very similar question and got very similar results — 
24 percent of respondents selected tax cuts, against 65 percent who 
selected maintaining services.47 Neither of these offered an option to 
keep taxes and spending as they were, but both nonetheless 
seemed to suggest a clear preference for maintaining services over 
tax cuts in 1979.   
 
From 1978 Gallup also started to ask a consistent question about 
taxation. It offered three options:  
- Taxes being cut, even if it means some reduction in government 
services, such as health, education and welfare 
- Things should be left as they are 
- Government services such as health, education and welfare should be 
extended, even if it means some increases in taxes.48 
 
46 Crewe, Robertson, and Sarlvik, ‘British Election Study, May 1979; Cross-Section 
Survey ’. The exact options were ‘Taxes should be cut even if it means some 
reduction in government services such as health, education and welfare’ or 
‘Government services such as health, education and welfare should be kept up 
even if it means that taxes cannot be reduced’. It also asked whether they were 
‘Very strongly in favour/fairly strongly in favour/mildly in favour’, or ‘It does not 
matter either way’. Analysis of the BES data by Sarlvik and Crewe came to the 
same conclusion, but argued that given the fact that the Conservative campaign 
implied that they would be able to cut taxes while maintaining services, this 
preference was not necessarily incompatible with a Conservative vote. Särlvik and 
Crewe, Decade of Dealignment: The Conservative Victory of 1979 and Electoral 
Trends in the 1970s 205-209, 223-225, 274-280. They also suggested that tax had 
had only the seventh largest impact on voting choice, behind strikes, 
unemployment, prices, nationalisation, trade unions, and comprehensive schools. 
47 Ivor Crewe. ‘BBC Tv General Election Day Survey, 1979’, Colchester, Essex: UK 
Data Archive), SN 1365, 1980. The exact question was: ‘which of these statements 
comes closest to your view? A. Cut taxes even if it means some reduction in 
government services like health, education and welfare; B. Keep up government 
services like health education and welfare even if it means that taxes cannot be 
cut?’. 
48 Anthony King and Robert J. Wybrow, British Political Opinion 1937-2000: The 
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The results again suggested a clear preference for expanding 
services, increasing through the 1980s (see figs. 4, 5).49 The 
collection of Gallup polling in figure 3 for some reason excludes a 
May 1979 survey asking this question which found the options to cut 
taxes and expand services tied on 37 percent each.50 It is possible 
that this poll was unreliable, but it is also possible that very briefly 
around the election, with the increased focus on tax cuts, they 
became more popular. If so, it was short lived as a poll from 
December 1979 which asked the same question found a 19-point 
gap between tax cuts and service expansion.51 Crewe suggested, 
based on this polling, that the electorate had become less 
Thatcherite on key measures, including taxation, through the 
1980s.52 
 
Gallup Polls (London: Politicos, 2001), 238-240; Crewe, ‘Values: The Crusade That 
Failed’, 246; Crewe, ‘Has the Electorate Become Thatcherite?’. The preliminary 
wording was: ‘People have different views about whether it is more important to 
reduce taxes or keep up government spending. How about you? Which of these 
statements comes closest to your own view? ‘ 
49 King and Wybrow, British Political Opinion 1937-2000: The Gallup Polls, 238-
240; Crewe, ‘Values: The Crusade That Failed’, 246; Crewe, ‘Has the Electorate 
Become Thatcherite?’. 
50 Crewe, ‘Values: The Crusade That Failed’, 246. 
51 King and Wybrow, British Political Opinion 1937-2000: The Gallup Polls, 238-
240. 




Figure 4: Gallup tax cuts, status quo, or service expansion, 
1979-92 
Source: King, Anthony, and Robert J. Wybrow. British Political Opinion 1937-2000: 
The Gallup Polls. London: Politicos, 2001, p.238-240. 
Figure 5: Gallup tax cuts, status quo, or service expansion, 
1978-87 
Source: Crewe, I. M. ‘Values: The Crusade That Failed.’ In The Thatcher Effect 
edited by Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, 239-250. Oxford: Clarendon, 




Finally, the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey gave respondents 
three options each year from 1983:  
Reduce taxes and spend less on health, education and social benefits. 
Keep taxes and spending on these services at the same level as now. 
Increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social benefits.53  
It showed a similar trend to the Gallup polling — increasing support 
for higher spending through the 1980s and a fall in support for the 
status quo and tax cuts. However, it suggested that support for tax 
cuts was even lower, consistently below 10 percent, and that the 
preference for service expansion or maintaining current levels of 
spending mirrored each other, following, their analysis suggests, 
actual government spending (see fig. 6).54 The Gallup data pointed to 
a much more consistent majority for higher spending, a slightly 
higher number of respondents supporting tax cuts, and a much lower 
number selecting the status quo option. The reasons for these 
differences are not immediately clear, but neither indicate widespread 
support for tax cuts or opposition to spending from 1979 onwards.  
 




Figure 6: BSA tax cuts, status quo, or spending increases, 1983-
2000 
Source: Park, A., C. Bryson, E. Clery, J. Curtice, and M. Phillips. ‘British Social 
Attitudes: The 30th Report.’ London: NatCen Social Research, 2013. 
 
Other surveys showed a similar picture throughout the 1980s. The 
BBC election surveys in 1983 and 1987 also demonstrated a large 
majority in favour of maintaining spending versus tax cuts — 78 to 18 
percent in 1983 and 85 to 11 percent in 1987.55 The BES asked 
respondents to place themselves on a scale from ‘People who are 
convinced that we should up taxes a lot and spend much more on 
health and social services’ to ‘those who are convinced that we 
should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social 
services’ in 1983, 1986, and 1987. Unsurprisingly, the majority of 
people put themselves at the midpoint, but among those who did 
select a position on the scale there was a clear preference for 
 
55 Ivor Crewe. ‘BBC Election Survey, 1983’, Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive), 
SN 1852, 1984; Ivor Crewe. ‘BBC Election Surveys, 10-11 June, 1987’, Colchester, 
Essex: UK Data Archive), SN 2278, 1987. 
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increased taxes and spending.56  
 
A collection of Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) 
polling published in 1990 also showed significant support for 
increasing spending even if it meant tax increases. This asked 
respondents whether they would prefer a country with ‘a significantly 
higher tax rate for ordinary taxpayers in order to pay for generous 
support for the elderly and the poor’ or one that had ‘a significantly 
lower tax rate for ordinary taxpayers and provides only minimum 
support for the elderly and the poor’. 71 percent selected higher 
taxes and generous support while 15 percent selected lower taxes 
and minimal support. When the spending was going to the NHS, 
support increased to 78 percent.57  
 
The evidence after 1979 therefore seems fairly clear, and, particularly 
in the case of the BSA survey, increasingly methodologically reliable. 
It does not demonstrate widespread support for tax cuts, in fact the 
opposite. And while it indicates that support for tax cuts was 
decreasing through the 1980s, it does not imply that there was 
majority support for tax cuts in 1979, supposedly the high point of tax 
resistance. Heath et al suggest that people might have been more 
aware of direct tax cuts than indirect tax increases over the course of 
the 1980s and believed that taxes had fallen overall.58 It is also 
possible that people were satisfied with direct tax cuts despite 
 
56 A.  Heath, Roger Jowell, and J. Curtice. ‘British Election Panel Study, 1983, 
1986 and 1987’, Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive), SN 4000, 1999. 
57 Eric Jacobs and Robert  Worcester, We British: Britain under the Moriscope 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990), 26-28. They did not find significant 
partisan variation; 68 percent of Conservative voters said that they were willing to 
pay higher taxes to provide generous support to the elderly and the poor, and 73 
percent were willing to pay more for the NHS. 




increased indirect taxation. Even allowing for this, however, Heath et 
al argue:  
The Gallup data in particular suggest that the median member of the 
electorate was reasonably happy with the balance of taxation and 
spending in 1979…59  
Jonas Edlund, in a comparative study using International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP) data from 1992 also stated: ‘it is in Britain 
rather than in Sweden that we find the strongest support for 




One potential issue with these survey results is social desirability 
bias — the idea that people think they should want higher spending 
and be willing to pay higher taxes to fund it, but in reality are not. This 
bias is countered in other settings by comparing survey results to 
actual behaviour. This is difficult in relation to taxation and 
spending.61 One option might be to look at rates of emigration from 
the UK to lower tax countries. Rose and Karran suggested in 1987 
that this was minimal, although they pointed out that there were 
many other constraining factors in the decision to emigrate.62 
Similarly, rates of tax avoidance and evasion might be another 
source, but the Treasury even now only produces estimates of the 
 
59 Ibid., 45. 
60 Jonas Edlund, ‘Attitudes to Income Redistribution and Taxation in Sweden, 
Great Britain and the United States’, in The End of the Welfare State?: Responses 
to State Retrenchment, ed. Stefan Svallfors and Peter Taylor-Gooby (London: 
Taylor & Francis Group, 1999), 126. 
61 For a discussion of this in relation to the survey data referenced here see: Heath, 
Jowell, and Curtice, The Rise of New Labour: Party Policies and Voter Choices 47-
48. 
62 Rose and Karran, Taxation by Political Inertia: Financing the Growth of 
Government in Britain, 181-182. 
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amounts lost to tax avoidance/evasion, and these numbers are 
disputed. I was unable to find a source of historical tax avoidance 
data for the UK.  
 
Heath et al discussed this question and suggested that while bias 
remained an issue, the 1999 Milton Keynes referendum on council 
tax increases perhaps provides some validation of the survey 
findings. The Milton Keynes council asked voters to choose between 
three options: a 15 percent increase in council tax and some extra 
spending; a 9.8 per cent increase in council tax and no change in 
spending; or a 5 per cent increase in council tax with some cuts to 
spending on services such as education. With a turnout of 44.7 
percent (higher than local council elections in the same period) 23.6 
percent voted for the first option, 35 percent for the second option, 
and 30.05 percent for the third option.63 This does not suggest that 
there is no social desirability bias, but it does suggest that under 
some circumstances voters will choose to maintain spending, even if 
that means tax increases. 
Conclusion 
 
The survey evidence cannot provide a conclusive answer to the 
question of how popular attitudes to tax changed in Britain in the 
second half of the twentieth century. It suggests, however, that 
support for tax cuts if accompanied by spending cuts was at a low 
level from 1979 onwards, and significantly less popular than 
increasing taxation to raise spending on services. Tax cuts may also 
have been, if anything, becoming less popular through the 1980s.  
 





The evidence before 1979 is less clear. One possibility it presents is 
that support for tax cuts rose (from an already fairly high level) 
through the 1960s as support for increased spending fell; and then 
perhaps declined through the 1970s. Another possibility is that 
attitudes to spending have more salience than attitudes to tax, and 
that the cyclical rise and fall of support for spending increases was 
what was primarily changing, with attitudes to tax a secondary 
consequence. In this hypothesis increased spending through the 
1960s reduced support for additional spending and increased 
support for tax cuts because survey questions presented them as a 
binary, while relative spending cuts in the second half of the 1970s 
had the opposite effect. This theory, of ‘thermostatic’ change in 
attitudes to taxation and spending as a result of actual changes in 
spending levels, is advanced by the BSA analysis.64  
 
A final option, linked to the previous hypothesis, is that little changed 
in popular attitudes to tax over the period studied, with people willing 
to pay higher taxes to fund spending when they believed it was 
necessary but not when spending had recently increased. This option 
seems perhaps the most persuasive, but all could be valid 
interpretations. What the available evidence does not appear to 
support, however, is the idea that popular opposition to taxation 
significantly increased through the 1970s, or that people were highly 
 
64 See for example: Park et al., ‘British Social Attitudes: The 30th Report’, 35-36; J. 
Curtice, N. Hudson, and I. Montagu, ‘British Social Attitudes: The 37th Report’, 
(London: NatCen Social Research, 2020). See also: Edlund, ‘Attitudes to Income 
Redistribution and Taxation in Sweden, Great Britain and the United States’, 114; 
Stuart N. Soroka and Christopher Wlezien, Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public 
Opinion, and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Stuart N. 
Soroka and Christopher Wlezien, ‘Opinion–Policy Dynamics: Public Preferences 
and Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom’, British Journal of Political Science 
35, no. 4 (2005). 
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in favour of tax cuts in 1979. This suggests that prevailing ideas 
about the historical development of popular attitudes to tax may be 
inaccurate. The following chapters will look in more detail at other 






2. The 1949 Budget and 1950 General Election 
 
 
The 1940s and 1950s have traditionally been seen as the apex of 
popular consent to high taxation and spending, although this has 
been challenged in recent years.1 Both Daunton and Whiting suggest 
that there was some concern among Labour politicians about popular 
opposition to tax.2 Whiting, for example, cites Aneurin Bevan’s 
suggestion in his 1952 work In Place of Fear that taxpayers were 
‘Jekyll and Hyde’ in relation to taxes and spending, liking what the 
money was spent on but less keen on paying the taxes to fund it.3 
 
1 See for example: Daunton, Just Taxes, 17-18, 26-27, 194-228, 360-369; Whiting, 
The Labour Party and Taxation, 259-273; Whiting, ‘The Boundaries of Taxation’; 
Sloman, Transfer State: The Idea of a Guaranteed Income and the Politics of 
Redistribution in Modern Britain, 148-152; Cronin, The Politics of State Expansion: 
War, State and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain, 242-243. For some of the 
challenges see: Harrison, ‘The Rise, Fall and Rise of Political Consensus in Britain 
since 1940’; Kavanagh, ‘The Postwar Consensus’; Jones and Kandiah, The Myth 
of Consensus: New Views on British History, 1945-64; Kerr, ‘Postwar British 
Politics: From Conflict to Consensus’; Tomlinson, ‘Welfare and the Economy: The 
Economic Impact of the Welfare State, 1945-1951’; Whiteside, ‘Creating the 
Welfare State in Britain, 1945–1960’; Williamson, Conservative Economic 
Policymaking and the Birth of Thatcherism, 1964-1979 7-9. Williamson, Europe 
and the Decline of Social Democracy in Britain: From Atlee to Brexit 21-57. 
2 Daunton, Just Taxes, 18, 26-27, 194-228, 360-369; Daunton, ‘'A Kind of Tax 
Prison': Rethinking Conservative Taxation Policy, 1960--1970’, 290; Whiting, The 
Labour Party and Taxation, 259-273; Whiting, ‘The Boundaries of Taxation’. 
3 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 126; Aneurin Right Hon Bevan, In Place 
of Fear ed. Janet Baroness Lee of Asheridge Lee (London: Macgibbon & Kee, 
1961), 106-109. Aneurin (Nye) Bevan (1897-1960) grew up in a coalmining family 
in South Wales. He left school at fourteen to join his father and brother in the local 
colliery. In 1916 he became chairman of his local lodge and was a delegate to the 
conferences of the South Wales Miners’ Federation (SWMF). The SWMF, along 
with the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) financed the Central Labour College 
in London, which Bevan attended from 1919 to 1921. In 1929 he was elected MP 
for Ebbw Vale. From 1941 to 1945 he was also editor of Tribune. In 1945 Bevan 
joined Attlee’s cabinet as minister of health and housing and was integral to the 
formation of the National Health Service (NHS). In January 1951 he was moved to 
the Ministry of Labour and in April resigned over the imposition of charges on NHS 
glasses and dentures. In the 1950s he was heavily involved with, and the 
namesake for, a semi-organised grouping of MPs on the left of the party, the 
Bevanites. He died in July 1960. See: Dai Smith, ‘Bevan, Aneurin [Nye] (1897–
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However, overall, both identify the immediate post-war period as one 
of popular consent to taxation and spending compared to later 
decades.4  
 
The Labour government was in a difficult economic and political 
position in the late 1940s. Their commitment to full employment 
required the economy to be more actively managed than it had been 
before the war. Many wartime emergency controls were still in place 
but being steadily abolished, making tax more important as a tool for 
economic management. Inflationary pressures were increasing as 
controls were relaxed and people began to spend the money they 
had saved due to rationing and limited consumer production. Britain’s 
domestic dollar and gold reserves were also depleted. The economic 
environment started to become easier when the second round of 
Marshall aid arrived in 1948, but the pound was still devalued in 
September 1949.5 The government had to try to balance wage and 
dividend restraint while curbing consumption to control inflation. They 
believed that wage restraint required a perception that everyone was 
contributing and inequality decreasing.6  
 
To this end, the Labour government introduced several measures 
aimed at reducing inequality. The government abolished the excess 
 
1960)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2011, 
accessed on: 20 January at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/30740. 
4 Daunton, Just Taxes, 18, 26-27, 194-228, 360-369; Daunton, ‘'A Kind of Tax 
Prison': Rethinking Conservative Taxation Policy, 1960--1970’, 290; Whiting, The 
Labour Party and Taxation, 259-273; Whiting, ‘The Boundaries of Taxation’. 
5 See for example: Cairncross, Years of Recovery: British Economic Policy, 1945-
51 ; Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital, 91-134; Daunton, ‘Britain and Globalisation 
since 1850: iii. Creating the World of Bretton Woods, 1939-1958’; Daunton, Just 
Taxes, 216; Williamson, Europe and the Decline of Social Democracy in Britain: 
From Atlee to Brexit 24-42; Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain Rationing, 
Controls, and Consumption, 1939-1955. 
6 Daunton, Just Taxes, 199-202. 
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profits tax in 1946 but continued the National Defence Contribution at 
5 percent, in effect as a profits tax. In 1947 they differentiated it 
introducing a 12.5 percent rate on distributed profits against 5 
percent on retained profits, hoping to stimulate investment and 
encourage dividend restraint.7 There was a perception within the 
party at the end of the war that income inequality had decreased but 
wealth inequality had not.8 The 1946 budget increased the top rate of 
death duties on estates over £21,500 to 75 percent, rising to 80 
percent in 1950. Although capital taxes were discussed at various 
points between 1945 and 1949, in the end only a one-time capital 
levy on investment income was introduced in 1948.9 While instituting 
various elements of the Beveridge Report, the government also 
maintained food subsidies. This was despite opposition from 
economists and the Treasury, who argued that they were wasteful 
and distorted the economy. The 1949 budget fixed the level of 
subsidies so that future price increases fell on consumers.10 Transfer 
payments increased by 49 percent between 1946 and 1950. 
However, the redistributive effects of this increase were complicated, 
as healthy lower-income families containing drinkers and smokers 
transferred some of their income to other low-income families.11 
 
Labour had traditionally been opposed to indirect taxation but with 
increasing numbers of people paying income tax it was no longer 
clear that indirect taxes were worse on either equity or political 
 
7 Ibid., 196-209; R. C. Whiting, ‘Taxation Policy’, in Labour Governments and 
Private Industry: The Experience of 1945-1951 ed. H. Mercer, Neil Rollings, and 
Jim Tomlinson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992). 
8 Daunton, Just Taxes, 212. 
9 Ibid., 213-217; Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 75-79. 
10 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 100-102. 
11 ‘Editorial’, AEU Monthly Journal, April 1949 1949; Whiting, The Labour Party and 
Taxation, 66-67, 93-95. 
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grounds. By 1948 12 million people paid income tax, compared to 4 
million in 1938.12 Indirect taxes also produced significant revenue at 
a point when many figures in Labour thought that the limits of 
progressive direct taxation might have been reached in terms of 
economic effects and potential revenue. Indirect taxes increased 
from a third of revenue in 1945/6 to three-sevenths in 1949.13 To try 
to reduce the burden of indirect taxation on lower incomes, Labour 
introduced variable indirect tax rates, with higher rates on luxury 
items.14 Whiting argues that a feeling that the indirect/direct tax 
binary was now irrelevant led Labour to favour better-off workers in 
their tax policy, with reductions in income tax but an increasing 
proportion of indirect taxes.15  
 
The incentive effects of income taxation were a concern within both 
Labour and the civil service. Treasury (HMT) and Inland Revenue 
(IR) officials argued that income differentials were too small to 
encourage further effort, and advocated tax cuts for people on 
£5,000 to £10,000 a year. Senior Labour politicians were more 
concerned about incentives at the bottom of the income distribution. 
Dalton’s first post-war budget reduced the standard rate and 
increased personal allowances and earned income relief, taking 2 to 
2.5 million people out of income tax entirely. At the same time, he 
retained the existing surtax on incomes up to £10,000, with a further 
increase on large incomes.16 He claimed that this reduced the 
 
12 This was out of an overall population of just over 50 million individuals in 1948. 
See: Daunton, Just Taxes, 224; Office for National Statistics. ‘Mid-1851 to Mid-
2014 Population Estimates for United Kingdom’, 2015. 
13 Daunton, Just Taxes, 218-224. See also: Tomlinson, ‘Welfare and the Economy: 
The Economic Impact of the Welfare State, 1945-1951’. for a discussion of 
Labour’s politicians’ thoughts on the impact of tax on the economy. 
14 Daunton, Just Taxes, 218-221. 
15 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 100-102. 
16 (Edward) Hugh Neale Dalton, Baron Dalton (1887-1962) grew up around 
 
77 
maximum possible annual income differential from around £100,000 
to £6,500.17 National Insurance was not really discussed, although it 
was both regressive and rising, increasing from 5 percent of revenue 
in 1946 to 10.6 percent in 1950.18 
 
Several historians have identified what has been termed a middle-
class backlash in the late-1940s and early-1950s as middle-income 
voters abandoned the Labour party.19 This was partly about relative 
living standards; manual earnings rose 141 percent between 1937 
and 1949, compared to 88 percent for higher professionals.20 Savage 
argues that it was also linked to frustrations over the erosion of 
informal middle-class privileges.21 Whiting states that losses at the 
 
Windsor Castle where his father was a tutor and companion to George V and his 
brother. After Eton and Cambridge he became a barrister and worked as an 
academic at the LSE, publishing several books, before entering parliament as an 
MP in 1924 after four failed attempts to gain a seat. He quickly rose within the 
Labour party and was appointed under-secretary at the Foreign Office in 1929 but 
returned to the backbenches in 1931 on the formation of the National Government, 
before losing his seat later that year and returning to the LSE. Dalton regained his 
seat in 1935 and was appointed minister of economic warfare and given command 
of the Special Operations Executive in 1940. In 1942 he was moved to the Board 
of Trade and Attlee appointed him chancellor in 1945. His position weakened by 
financial crises in 1947, he resigned after accidentally leaking part of his budget 
plans to a journalist. He stood down as an MP in 1959. See: Ben Pimlott, ‘Dalton, 
(Edward) Hugh Neale, Baron Dalton (1887–1962)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, 2011, accessed on: 11 December at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/32697. 
17 Daunton, Just Taxes, 213-221; Whiting, ‘Taxation Policy’, 120-121. 
18 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 100-102. 
19 See for example: Cronin, The Politics of State Expansion: War, State and 
Society in Twentieth-Century Britain, 172-175; M. Savage, Identities and Social 
Change in Britain since 1940: The Politics of Method (Oxford Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 68-77; Ross McKibbin, Classes and Cultures England, 1918-1951 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 64-67. Labour also lost of women voters 
in this period, but this shift has not primarily been linked to taxation. See: 
Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain Rationing, Controls, and Consumption, 
1939-1955, 252-255. 
20 Savage, Identities and Social Change in Britain since 1940: The Politics of 
Method 68-69. 
21 Mass-Observation, ‘Directive Questionnaire October 1948’, University of 
Sussex), 1948., 83 cited in Savage, Identities and Social Change in Britain since 
1940: The Politics of Method 74-75. 
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1950 election were attributed by the Labour party mainstream to 
(particularly lower-) middle-class dissatisfaction about high taxation, 
and that the 1950 budget was designed to benefit that group 
specifically.22 However, the secondary literature also suggests that 
Labour were starting to be concerned about the attitude of their 
working-class voters towards services and taxation.23 Tomlinson 
argues that Labour felt that the working classes did not appreciate 
the full extent of their benefits and tried to emphasise social service 
benefits and subsidies.24 Green states, however, that Conservative 
politicians did not assume that their electoral position was secured. 
He argues that they had a materialist view of popular attitudes, 
assuming that the policies needed to win over more working-class 
voters would also lose them middle-class votes.25 
 
There is, therefore, evidence of some general concern within the 
Labour party about popular opposition to tax in the late 1940s in the 
secondary literature, perhaps suggesting some limits to the extensive 
consent that has previously been proposed. This chapter looks at 
whether individuals in the organisations studied assumed widespread 
popular opposition or consent to taxation in 1949-50. 
 
The Labour party 
 
 
22 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 102-103. 
23 See for example: ibid., 94. Jim Tomlinson, Democratic Socialism and Economic 
Policy: The Attlee Years, 1945–1951, Cambridge Studies in Modern Economic 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 263-283. 
24 Tomlinson, Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy: The Attlee Years, 1945–
1951, 263-283. 
25 E. H. H. Green, ‘The Conservative Party, the State and the Electorate, 1945-
1964’, in Party, State and Society: Electoral Behaviour in Britain since 1820, ed. 
Jon Lawrence and Miles Taylor (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1997). 
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The Labour Chancellor Stafford Cripps stated in his 1949 budget 
speech that people could not have their cake and eat it — services 
could not be paid for exclusively through redistribution and would 
continue to require high levels of taxation.26 Although Cripps reduced 
beer duty, he did not cut either income or purchase tax, and placed a 
ceiling on food subsidies, as well as making changes to inheritance 
tax that meant close family members had to pay more. The press 
reported that trade unions and Labour MPs were unimpressed, 
feeling that it was overly harsh, would not assist those struggling on 
low wages, and would not help Labour’s chances at the next 
election.27 MPs were apparently particularly enraged that Cripps had 
cut beer duty instead of purchase tax on essentials. The press did 
also report, though, that most MPs thought it was economically 
 
26 See for example: Guy Eden, ‘Cripps Faces Crisis: Socialist M.P.s Revolt against 
Misery Budget’, Daily Express, 7 April 1949; Parliamentary correspondent, 
‘Exultation, Then Dejection: Cold Douche for Labour Members’, Manchester 
Guardian, 7 April 1949; ‘Soak-the-Rich Era Has Ended’, Daily Mail, 7 April 1992; 
‘Having the Cake’, Financial Times, 8 April 1949; ‘Paying the Piper’, Economist, 9 
April 1949. Sir (Richard) Stafford Cripps (1889-1952) was a barrister and Labour 
politician. He initially felt he could not stand as an MP for Labour because of his 
class background (he had attended Winchester College and then Oxford) and 
periodic reliance on unearned income due to ill health, but was convinced by 
Herbert Morrison. He was invited to join Ramsay MacDonalds’s government as 
solicitor-general in 1930 and was parachuted into the safe seat of Bristol East in 
1931. Later that year Cripps declined to join the newly formed National 
Government and became a backbencher, moving significantly to the left from his 
previous centrist positions. His active opposition of the National Government led to 
him being expelled from the Labour party in 1939. When Labour won in 1945, 
however, he was appointed president of the Board of Trade and replaced Dalton 
as chancellor in 1947. Undermined by the 1949 devaluation (which was not 
actually decided by him as he was in a clinic in Zurich convalescing) and 
increasingly unwell, Cripps resigned as chancellor in October 1950. See: Peter 
Clarke and Richard Toye, ‘Cripps, Sir (Richard) Stafford (1889–1952)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, 2011, accessed on: 11 December at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/32630. 
27 See for example: Eden, ‘Cripps Faces Crisis: Socialist M.P.s Revolt against 
Misery Budget’, Daily Express, 7 April 1949; London Staff, ‘Cold Comfort for Trade 
Unions: Effect on Price Index’, Manchester Guardian, 7 April 1949; ‘Comment: 
Obstinate Budget’, Daily Mail, 7 April 1949; ‘Penny Off the Pint but up Go Butter, 
Cheese, Meat, Marge’, Daily Mirror, 7 April 1992. See also: Whiting, ‘Income Tax, 





Some Labour politicians did seem to think the budget was unpopular. 
Cripps at various points stated that he could have produced a more 
‘popular’ budget but that this would have been irresponsible.29 
Numerous regional organisers reported to the Labour National 
Executive Committee (NEC) that the budget had a negative impact 
on the local elections that followed it. Labour General Secretary 
Morgan Phillips, however, suggested this was just a convenient 
excuse:  
In some local Parties there is a tendency to blame the Budget and use it as 
an easy alibi. It may be true that unwarranted expectations had been 
raised … yet to take it as a complete explanation of our electoral defeats is 
both facile and inaccurate ... recent defeats for Labour in local elections 
cannot be regarded as evidence of changing trends in public opinion.30 
There are, of course, obvious reasons why the party leadership might 
have wanted to play down the role of the budget in local election 
 
28 See for example: Eden, ‘Cripps Faces Crisis: Socialist M.P.s Revolt against 
Misery Budget’, Daily Express, 7 April 1949; ‘"Hold-Position" Budget’, Daily 
Telegraph, 7 April 1949; Daily Mirror Political Correspondent, ‘Labour M.P.s Cheer 
Cripps's Defence of His Budget’, Daily Mirror, 8 April 1949; Parliamentary 
correspondent, ‘Collapse of Labour’s Budget Opposition: A Deflated Crisis ’, 
Manchester Guardian, 13 April 1949. 
29 ‘Letter from Stafford Cripps to George Woodcock, 25 April 1949’, MSS.292 
410.2/1, (TUC, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1949; Daily Mirror 
Political Correspondent, ‘Labour M.P.s Cheer Cripps's Defence of His Budget’, 
Daily Mirror, 8 April 1949; ‘"Hold-Position" Budget’, Daily Telegraph, 7 April 1949. 
30 ‘Report on the County Council Election Results by Morgan Phillips. N.E.C. April, 
1949’, (1900-06 and Labour Party since 1906 National Executive Committee 
minutes of the Labour Representation Committee, Archives of the British Labour 
Party. Series 1, Harvester Press), 1949. See also: Whiting, ‘Income Tax, the 
Working Class and Party Politics 1948–52*’, 205. Born in South Wales, Morgan 
Phillips (1902-1963) won the South Wales Miners’ Federation scholarship to the 
Central Labour College in London, where he remained, working his way up as a 
local Labour party officer, before joining Labour Headquarters as a propaganda 
officer in 1937. For a short period in 1939 he worked at the Ministry of Information, 
before serving as party organiser for the Eastern Counties from 1940-41 and then 
returning to Head Office to head up the Research Department in 1941. In 1944 he 
was selected as national (or general) secretary, remaining in that post until 1961. 
See: John Saville, ‘Phillips, Morgan Walter (1902–1963)’, Oxford Dictionary of 




defeats, and why local agents might have wanted to emphasise it. It 
does appear, however, that many Labour figures thought the budget 
was unpopular. 
 
It is, however, hard to separate discussions of taxes from prices and 
subsidies around the 1949 budget. Consumer prices were seen as a 
serious concern but were of course affected by indirect taxation.31 
Labour MPs and activists rarely specified which part of the budget 
they thought was unpopular. There are, nonetheless, some 
suggestions that Labour politicians thought that tax was unpopular.32 
In response to TUC representatives’ reports of members’ complaints 
about taxes on beer and cigarettes in 1948, Cripps had stated, for 
example:  
Everybody, of course, especially any Chancellor, would absolutely love to 
remit all the taxes, nothing could make him more popular in the country … 
I have had that [complaints] from every single person who has had any 
increased incidence of tax under this Budget. You always get it.33  
Deputy Prime Minister Herbert Morrison also argued in July 1949 
that: ‘Sooner rather than later the taxpayer will rebel verbally and at 
the ballot box’.34 Peter Sloman suggests that concern about 
 
31 Whiting, ‘Income Tax, the Working Class and Party Politics 1948–52*’, 205. For 
contemporary reporting see for example: Eden, ‘Cripps Faces Crisis: Socialist 
M.P.s Revolt against Misery Budget’, Daily Express, 7 April 1949; ‘"Hold-Position" 
Budget’, Daily Telegraph, 7 April 1949; Daily Mirror Political Correspondent, 
‘Labour M.P.s Cheer Cripps's Defence of His Budget’, Daily Mirror, 8 April 1949. 
32 ‘Meeting between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Representatives of the 
Trades Union Congress, Thursday, 22nd April, 1948’, MSS.292 410.2/1, (TUC, 
Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1948; Labour Correspondent, 
‘Pressure from Non-Communists: A Factor in the Expulsions’, Manchester 
Guardian, 19 May 1949. 
33 ‘Meeting between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Representatives of the 
Trades Union Congress, Thursday, 22nd April, 1948’, MSS.292 410.2/1, TUC, 
1948. 
34 ‘The Economic Situation: Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council, H 
Morrison, 21 July 1949’. The National Archives (TNA) PRO PREM8/1415, 1949. 
See also: Herbert Morrison, ‘The Recent General Election and the Next. 
Memorandum by Herbert Morrison. N.E.C., 22nd March, 1950’, Archives of the 
British Labour Party. Series 1, Harvester Press), 1950. Herbert Morrison (1888-
1965) was self-educated and became involved in the Labour movement as a 
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increasing taxes on low earners was one reason why Labour did not 
pursue a basic income scheme in the late 1940s.35  
 
As Whiting argues, the 1950 election raised similar concerns about 
popular, and particularly middle-class, attitudes to tax.36 Labour lost a 
significant number of MPs, leaving them with a very small majority 
and forcing them into another election the following year.37 Anthony 
Crosland wrote in Tribune in 1950, ‘the most important single issue 
which caused these people to swing Tory was probably the weight of 
taxation’ and ‘the only way we can quickly benefit them is by taxation 
relief, and this must be attended to in the coming budget’.38 Phillips 
 
circulation traveller for the Labour paper the Daily Citizen before being elected 
secretary of the of the London Labour Party in 1915. He was first elected as an MP 
in 1923. Despite attempting to oust Attlee, he served as deputy prime minister in 
the immediate post-war period. In 1949-50 he was one of those arguing for a policy 
of ‘consolidation’ or limiting nationalisation in favour of improvements in the existing 
public sector to maintain a broad base of electoral support. See: David Howell, 
‘Morrison, Herbert Stanley, Baron Morrison of Lambeth’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2011, accessed on: 11 November at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/35121. 
35 Sloman, Transfer State: The Idea of a Guaranteed Income and the Politics of 
Redistribution in Modern Britain, 86. 
36 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 102-103; Whiting, ‘Income Tax, the 
Working Class and Party Politics 1948–52*’, 205-206. 
37 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 102; Lukas  Audickas, Richard  
Cracknell, and Philip  Loft, ‘UK Election Statistics: 1918-2019: A Century of 
Elections. Briefing Paper Number Cbp7529, 18 July 2019’, (House of Commons 
Library, 2019). 
38 Crosland, ‘The People Who Didn't Vote Labour ’, Tribune, 10 March 1950. 
(Charles) Anthony Raven Crosland (1918-1977) was a Labour politician and writer. 
Initially a lecturer and then fellow in economics at Oxford, he was elected MP for 
South Gloucestershire in 1950. In the Commons he specialised in economics and 
was a close friend of Hugh Gaitskell. After the boundary of his seat was redrawn in 
1955 he stood instead for a seat in Southampton but lost. Crosland then focused 
on his writing. His most influential book was The Future of Socialism (1956), which 
came to be seen as the key theoretical work from the moderate left in this period. 
He re-entered parliament as the MP for Grimsby in 1959 and was appointed 
minister of state in the Department of Economic Affairs in 1964 before moving to 
become secretary of state for education and science a few months later. Crosland 
was transferred to the presidency of the Board of Trade in 1967 but was 
disappointed when he was not appointed chancellor a few months later. He ran 
unsuccessfully for leader in 1976 but was appointed to the Foreign Office in the 
Callaghan administration before his death in February 1977. See: Roy Jenkins, 
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also seemed more convinced than he had been in 1949 that tax had 
been a factor — he specified that he thought tax had been the 
biggest issue for middle-class workers, especially teachers.39   
 
However, none of the Labour election post-mortems consulted 
suggested that taxation had been the main factor.40 Morrison thought 
the majority of voters had understood that the Conservative promises 
on tax were unrealistic. He also stated that the widely reported tax-
free bonuses to two car company executives had been deeply 
unpopular, suggesting that perceptions of fairness, here seeming to 
mean equal treatment, were important to popular attitudes.41 Phillips 
put more emphasis on taxation but also highlighted the importance of 
winning over voters in rural areas.42 All of these contributions, of 
course, have to be seen within the individuals’ positions on key party 
divides, particularly around nationalisation.43 However, it seems 
 
‘Crosland, (Charles) Anthony Raven (1918–1977)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2015, accessed on: 6 January at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/30985. 
39 Morgan Phillips, ‘General Election Campaign Report. Personal Observations by 
the General Secretary. N.E.C. 22nd March, 1950’, Archives of the British Labour 
Party. Series 1, Harvester Press), 1950. 
40 R H S Crossman, ‘Memorandum on Problems Facing the Party by R.H.S. 
Crossman, M.P. N.E.C., April 26th, 1950’, ibid.; Herbert Morrison, ‘The Recent 
General Election and the Next. Memorandum by Herbert Morrison. N.E.C., 22nd 
March, 1950’, ibid.; Morgan Phillips, ‘General Election Campaign Report. Personal 
Observations by the General Secretary. N.E.C. 22nd March, 1950’, ibid. 
41 Herbert Morrison, ‘The Recent General Election and the Next. Memorandum by 
Herbert Morrison. N.E.C., 22nd March, 1950’, ibid. 
42 Morgan Phillips, ‘General Election Campaign Report. Personal Observations by 
the General Secretary. N.E.C. 22nd March, 1950’, ibid. 
43 See for example: Daunton, Just Taxes, 196-209; Whiting, ‘Taxation Policy’, 120-
139; Ben Jackson, ‘Revisionism Reconsidered: ‘Property-Owning Democracy’ and 
Egalitarian Strategy in Post-War Britain’, Twentieth Century British History 16, no. 
4 (2005); Ben Jackson, Equality and the British Left: A Study in Progressive 
Political Thought, 1900-64 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007); 
Tudor Jones, ‘Labour Revisionism and Public Ownership, 1951–63’, Contemporary 
Record 5, no. 3 (1991); Tomlinson, ‘Distributional Politics: The Search for Equality 
in Britain since the First World War’; Williamson, Europe and the Decline of Social 
Democracy in Britain: From Atlee to Brexit 53-55. 
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reasonable to conclude that there was some level of concern about 
popular opposition to tax in the Labour party, particularly in relation to 
middle-class voters, but that it was not generally believed to be the 
main cause of their defeat at the 1950 election.44 
 
None of the statements quoted above gave any evidence to support 
their assertions about popular attitudes. Labour ministers may have 
had access to the series of GSS polls on the economic situation 
conducted in the late 1940s. However, as the only question these 
asked about tax was which tax the respondent liked least, it is not 
clear they would have been particularly useful.45 The only Labour 
party research found was a report on election polling from 1950, 
which argued primarily that people did not vote on policies. It did 
suggest some opposition to taxation, particularly among middle- and 
upper-class respondents, but the report’s authors seemed reluctant 
to take these conclusions on board. At one point they stated, for 
example:  
We should remember, too, that when the public reacts against some 
feature of our programme or of our record, it may be that they understand 
it and do not like it - or it may be that they do not understand it … 
Research Services in February 1950 asked: "Would you be in favour of 
reducing the social services so that there could be a general reduction in 
taxation?" In all, 37 per cent replied Yes, including 56 per cent of the 
Tories, 40 per cent of the Liberals and 22 per cent of the Labour 
supporters. It is possible that some of the Labour supporters did not fully 
grasp the significance of the question. [Underline in original]46 
 
44 This is also suggested by the lack of detailed policy work on taxation in the 
archive in this period. 
45 Government Social Survey. ‘Survey of Knowledge and Opinion About the 
Economic Situation, December 1947’, RG 23/92, 1947; Government Social Survey. 
‘Survey of Knowledge and Opinion About the Economic Situation, February 1948’, 
RG 23/94, 1948; Government Social Survey. ‘Survey of Knowledge and Opinion 
About the Economic Situation, November 1948’, RG 23/103, 1948; Government 
Social Survey. ‘Survey of Knowledge and Opinion About the Economic Situation, 
July 1949’, RG 23/107, 1949. See also: Tomlinson, ‘Welfare and the Economy: 
The Economic Impact of the Welfare State, 1945-1951’, 213-215. for a discussion 
of these surveys generally 
46 ‘General Election 1950. Notes on the Findings of the Public Opinion Polls’, RD 
 
85 
They were potentially correct to question the respondents’ level of 
knowledge, but they did not appear eager to accept the results. No 
evidence of wider discussion of the report was found. Black has 
argued that key Labour figures in the 1950s were very reluctant to 
embrace polling, fearing that it might prove that people were not 
socialist and Labour did not represent their views, or drive Labour 
towards more populist positions.47 This reluctance to heed evidence 
of opposition to taxation could, therefore, have been part of this wider 
anxiety about polling. The underline of ‘Labour supporters’ may also 
point to strong assumptions about what their supporters’ views were, 
and a particular resistance to evidence that contradicted those pre-
existing ideas. 
 
As well as assumptions about how class and partisanship affected 
attitudes to tax, Labour discussions of popular attitudes were at times 
explicitly gendered. MPs’ anger at the cuts in beer duty over 
purchase tax in the 1949 budget was reportedly because the latter 
would have been more popular with the unions and ‘housewives’.48 
Similarly, Herbert Morrison’s denial that purchase tax pressed heavily 
on ‘the housewife’ was widely reported during the 1950 election.49 
The summary of polling around the 1950 election noted that working-
class women voted for Labour at a lower rate than men, but only 
suggested that they could hope the men in their lives would convince 
them:  
 
350 April 1950, (Labour Party, Labour Party Archive, People’s History Museum), 
1950. 
47 Lawrence Black, The Political Culture of the Left in Affluent Britain, 1951-64: Old 
Labour, New Britain?, Contemporary History in Context Series (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 167-177. 
48 ‘Budget Shock to Socialists’, Daily Telegraph, 9 April 1949. 
49 ‘"No Crushing Tax Burden"’, Financial Times, 22 February 1950; ‘Mr. Churchill’, 
Observer, 21 February 1950; ‘Vital Stage Reached in Election Campaign’, Times, 
21 February 1950. 
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… it is easy to picture the happy results that would follow if working men 
could only persuade their womenfolk to share their opinions.50 
Morrison concluded that working- and middle-class ‘housewives’ 
might have gone ‘wrong’ from Labour’s point of view at the 1950 
election and that ‘the needs of the consumer and the problems of the 
housewife must be recognised …’.51 Female Labour MPs’ views 
were reported in the press but not in a way that overtly challenged 
the image of women as primarily housewives. Lucy Middleton 
(Labour MP for Sutton), for example, criticised the decision to cut 
taxes on beer during the 1949 budget and stated that if they had 
asked women they could have told them what would have helped 
families, while Edith Summerskill (Fulham West) argued during the 
1950 election that it was Labour putting food in shopping baskets for 
housewives through subsidies.52 Although female Labour MPs’ lives 
challenged traditional gender norms, the way their voices were 
reported in the press again limited women’s interest to indirect 
taxation. 
 
Overall, Labour’s discussions about popular attitudes to tax seem to 
have been contested, which is unsurprising given the internal 
divisions within the party about nationalisation and the correct route 
 
50 ‘General Election 1950. Notes on the Findings of the Public Opinion Polls’, RD 
350 April 1950, Labour Party, 1950. 
51 Morrison, ‘The Recent General Election and the Next. Memorandum by Herbert 
Morrison. N.E.C., 22nd March, 1950’, 1950. This was, of course, not a new 
representation of female political participation — the idea of women as primarily 
consumers was dominant in the early-twentieth century with debates around free 
trade. It is interesting, however, that it remained dominant in relation to tax in 1949-
50. See: Frank Trentmann, Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption, and Civil 
Society in Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), particularly 51-
55. 
52 ‘Chancellor on Success of Government’s Policies: "Opposition Bitterly 
Disappointed"’, Manchester Guardian, 19 May 1949; ‘The "Shopping Basket" Poll’, 
Daily Telegraph, 15 February 1950. 
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to greater equality.53 Some Labour politicians were clearly concerned 
about popular opposition to tax in 1949-50. There may have been 
more internal support for the idea of middle-class opposition to high 
taxation than there was for evidence of Labour voters’ opposition, 
although Labour’s general antipathy to polling was also a factor. In 
any case, Labour politicians’ ideas about popular attitudes to tax 
were far from the traditional narrative of unprecedented consensus 
and support for high tax and spend in the immediate post-war period. 
Although they did presuppose a high level of support for services, 
they also assumed a significant level of popular opposition to 
taxation. 
 
The civil service 
 
Labour politicians, were also, of course, in communication with civil 
servants. Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise, and Treasury 
officials agreed that taxes were too high and would ideally be 
reduced.54 Popular opposition to taxation was one of the arguments 
advanced in favour of cuts. One IR memo in February 1950, which 
 
53 See for example: Daunton, Just Taxes, 196-209; Whiting, ‘Taxation Policy’, 120-
139; Jackson, ‘Revisionism Reconsidered: ‘Property-Owning Democracy’ and 
Egalitarian Strategy in Post-War Britain’; Jackson, Equality and the British Left: A 
Study in Progressive Political Thought, 1900-64; Jones, ‘Labour Revisionism and 
Public Ownership, 1951–63’; Tomlinson, ‘Distributional Politics: The Search for 
Equality in Britain since the First World War’; Williamson, Europe and the Decline 
of Social Democracy in Britain: From Atlee to Brexit 53-55. 
54 Daunton, Just Taxes, 224-227. For some examples see: ‘Income Tax Reliefs 
and Allowances, 17 December 1948’. The National Archives (TNA) T 171/398, 
1948; ‘Memorandum to Edward Bridges, 1 October 1948’. The National Archives 
(TNA) T 273/436, 1948; ‘Inland Revenue Note on Feasibility of Increased Direct 
Taxation, 15 February 1950’. The National Archives (TNA) T 171/400, 1950; ‘Note 
by the Board of Inland Revenue, 4 April 1950’. The National Archives (TNA) T 
273/442, 1950; ‘Purchase Tax: Memorandum by Board of Customs and Excise, 
September 1948’. The National Archives (TNA) T 171/398, 1948; ‘Budget 
Committee: Minutes of a Meeting Held in Sir Edward Bridges' Room at 3 p.m. on 
Monday, 1st January, 1950’. The National Archives (TNA) T 273/441, 1950. 
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argued for a cut in income tax as a ‘psychological stimulus’, also 
suggested that any increase in income tax would be ‘denounced as a 
further attack on the middle classes’ and would ‘be no more 
favourably received by the working man who is already sufficiently 
vocal about the incidence of income tax on his overtime’.55 In 1948 
the Board of Customs and Excise suggested that opposition to 
purchase tax was growing, stating: 
… there is a danger that under less inflationary conditions than those of to-
day it [purchase tax] may become so unpopular that it will be swept away 
by the force of opposition from the public or converted into a tax covering 
only the small field of recognised luxuries.56 
In 1950 another Customs and Excise memo argued that the weight 
of public criticism made changes to purchase tax essential but that 
any reform would probably have to be accompanied by a general cut 
in rates.57  
 
Popular attitudes were also used to argue for specific tax policies.58 
The authors of the 1948 IR memo justified their argument in favour of 
cuts to the standard rate of income tax rather than an increase in 
allowances by stating: 
We are convinced that most of the attack made on the income tax and 
most of the pleas for special treatment whether on the part of the 
industrialist, the manager or the worker, are primarily a reflection of the 
height of the rate.59  
In 1948, the Board of Trade also argued that putting even a small tax 
 
55 ‘Inland Revenue Note on Feasibility of Increased Direct Taxation, 15 February 
1950’. T 171/400, 1950. 
56 ‘Purchase Tax: Memorandum by Board of Customs and Excise, September 
1948’. T 171/398, 1948. 
57 ‘HM Customs and Excise: Purchase Tax, 16 February 1950’. The National 
Archives (TNA) T 171/400, 1950. 
58 See for example: ‘Income Tax Reliefs and Allowances, 17 December 1948’. T 
171/398, 1948; ‘Purchase Tax: Memorandum by Board of Customs and Excise, 
September 1948’. T 171/398, 1948; ‘Purchase Tax: Note by the Board of Trade, 3 
December 1948’. The National Archives (TNA) T 273/436, 1948. 
59 ‘Income Tax Reliefs and Allowances, 17 December 1948’. T 171/398, 1948. 
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on utility clothing would be regarded by the 'wage-earning public at 
large' as drastically at variance with the policy of wage and price 
stabilisation and was essentially unthinkable.60  
 
However, the assumption of popular support for tax cuts was not 
entirely unqualified; Edwin Plowden reported in 1950 that TUC 
General Secretary Vincent Tewson had said that while tax cuts would 
be nice they were not really going to help with wage restraint.61 An 
unsigned note made a similar point a few days later, while also 
arguing that any gratitude about income tax cuts only lasted a week 
or so.62 Comments also assumed that fairness was very important in 
 
60 ‘Purchase Tax: Note by the Board of Trade, 3 December 1948’. T 273/436, 
1948. 
61 ‘Report of a Meeting Held at 5.15 p.m. on Thursday, March 9th 1950, in the 
Room of the Minister of State’. The National Archives (TNA) T 273/441, 1950. 
Edwin Noel Auguste Plowden, Baron Plowden (1907-2001) was an industrialist 
and civil servant. After a Swiss boarding school, a brief period at Hamburg 
University, and Cambridge, Plowden became a commodity broker. Wanting to be 
useful during the war but too old to sign up he secured a junior post as a temporary 
civil servant in the Minister of Economic Warfare in 1938. He then moved to the 
Ministry of Aircraft Production where he got to know Stafford Cripps. Plowden was 
brought back to Whitehall by Cripps in 1947 as chief planning officer, responsible 
for economic planning. He became one of the most important civil service voices in 
the Treasury when Cripps was made chancellor later the same year and remained 
so until 1953 when he left, first to be adviser on atomic energy organisation, and 
then a year later to become chairman of the UK Atomic Energy Authority. He 
chaired the influential Plowden committee on control of public expenditure from 
1959 to 1961 before returning to the private sector in 1963, where he helped to set 
up the CBI. See: Peter Jay, ‘Plowden, Edwin Noel Auguste, Baron Plowden (1907–
2001)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2014, accessed on: 11 December 
at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/75432. Sir (Harold) Vincent Tewson (1898-
1981) was TUC general secretary from 1946 to 1960. Having left school at 
fourteen he became an office boy at the Headquarters of the Amalgamated Society 
of Dyers. Joining the Independent Labour Party he then became the youngest 
member of Bradford city council at twenty-five. In 1926 Tewson moved to London 
to join the TUC organisation department and in 1931 was appointed assistant 
general secretary which he remained until he became general sectary in 1946. 
See: Geoffrey Goodman, ‘Tewson, Sir (Harold) Vincent (1898–1981)’, ibid.Oxford 
University Press, 2004, accessed on: 6 January at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/31751. 
62 ‘Unsigned Note on Different Options for the Budget, 13 March 1950’. The 
National Archives (TNA) T 273/442, 1950. 
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how tax changes were received.63 Attendees at a January 1950 
meeting of the Budget Committee agreed that surtax cuts were 
desirable but argued that they could not be introduced without a 
balancing cut for low earners.64 In April 1950 the Board of Inland 
Revenue made a similar point about a cut in the standard rate of 
income tax.65 Although it was sometimes unclear whose reactions 
they were concerned about — politicians, the press, or the ‘public’ — 
comments generally assumed opposition to tax but not that this 
overrode all other considerations, in particular fairness.  
 
Civil service comments about popular attitudes were, like Labour’s, 
classed. The Board of Customs and Excise and the Board of Trade 
appear to have been most concerned with, as the Board of Trade 
termed them, the 'wage-earning public at large'.66 The IR, in contrast, 
was focused on middle-income taxpayers.67 In response to a letter 
the Labour MP R R Stokes wrote to the chancellor, the IR produced a 
note looking specifically at the burden of taxation on the middle class 
on the 12th of January 1950 (the day after the election campaign had 
been announced).68 Stokes raised concerns that the middle classes 
 
63 See for example: ‘Budget Committee: Minutes of a Meeting Held in Sir Edward 
Bridge's Room at 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 19th January, 1949’. The National 
Archives (TNA) T 273/436, 1949; ‘Budget Committee: Minutes of a Meeting Held in 
Sir Edward Bridges' Room at 3 p.m. on Monday, 1st January, 1950’. T 273/441, 
1950; ‘Note by the Board of Inland Revenue, 4 April 1950’. T 273/442, 1950; 
‘Memorandum from Robert Hall to Edwin Plowden, 18 May 1950’. The National 
Archives (TNA) T 171/427, 1950. 
64 ‘Budget Committee: Minutes of a Meeting Held in Sir Edward Bridges' Room at 3 
p.m. on Monday, 1st January, 1950’. T 273/441, 1950. 
65 ‘Note by the Board of Inland Revenue, 4 April 1950’. T 273/442, 1950. 
66 ‘Purchase Tax: Memorandum by Board of Customs and Excise, September 
1948’. T 171/398, 1948; ‘Purchase Tax: Note by the Board of Trade, 3 December 
1948’. T 273/436, 1948. 
67 ‘Income Tax Reliefs and Allowances, 17 December 1948’. T 171/398, 1948. 
68 Richard Rapier Stokes (1897-1957) was a Labour politician and engineer. He 
joined the family engineering firm, Ransomes and Rapier, out of Cambridge in 
1921, and became chairman and managing director. He was a longstanding 
advocate of Henry George’s doctrines on land reform and joined the Labour party 
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were being wiped out by high taxation and falling salaries relative to 
the working class. IR officials broadly agreed with his assessment — 
although they identified falling relative salaries as the main problem, 
they argued that the tax burden felt heavier to middle-income 
taxpayers and suggested cuts in income tax targeting the middle-
income ranges.69 Budget Committee meetings, which brought 
together officials from multiple departments, although led by the 
Treasury, also seem to have focused more on middle-class 
taxpayers.70 It should perhaps be noted that most civil servants 
would themselves have been on middle-class salaries, which might 
have driven a closer identification with middle-class taxpayers’ 
concerns.71 There is no firm evidence to support this idea, however, 
and ministerial and political priorities could also have driven this 
focus on middle-class taxpayers. 
 
Officials from various departments presented an image of popular 
attitudes to tax that was very similar to that laid out by Labour 
politicians. They emphasised popular opposition but did not suggest 
 
in 1934. He was defeated in Glasgow Central in 1935 but elected as MP for 
Ipswich at a by-election in 1938. Despite ‘having spent his career as a political 
eccentric’ he was appointed to the Ministry of Works in 1950, and became lord 
privy seal and minister of materials in 1951. He largely retired from public life after 
Labour’s 1951 defeat. See: Robert Crowcroft, ‘Stokes, Richard Rapier (1897–
1957)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2011, accessed on: 11 December 
at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/66094. 
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National Archives (TNA) T 171/400, 1950. 
70 ‘Budget Committee: Minutes of a Meeting Held in Sir Edward Bridge's Room at 3 
p.m. on Wednesday, 19th January, 1949’. T 273/436, 1949; ‘Budget Committee: 
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71 According to data from 1954 the average pay for an ‘administrative’ civil servant 
(the second highest category) in 1950 was £1,350 a year. Average annual 
earnings in 1950 were just over £300 a year. See: Guy Routh, ‘Civil Service Pay, 
1875 to 1950’, Economica 21, no. 83 (1954): 206; Gregory Clark, ‘What Were the 
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that this overwhelmed all other considerations. Fairness, in particular, 
was assumed to be key. Middle-income taxpayers appear to have 
received slightly disproportionate attention but the reasons for this 
are unclear. Overall, civil servants’ representations of popular 
attitudes to tax were very similar to Labour politicians and, likewise, 
did not suggest the perception of a widespread popular consensus in 
favour of contemporary tax levels. 
 
The Conservative party 
 
The Conservative party was relatively quiet in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1949 budget. When Conservative politicians did 
comment they commended Cripps’ realism, but suggested that he 
should have gone further and cut taxes to improve incentives.72 
Anthony Eden also suggested that people were disappointed that 
Labour had withheld the truth about the need for spending to be paid 
for, and that they should have been told sooner.73 He did not provide 
any evidence for this statement.  
 
 
72 See for example: ‘"Hold-Position" Budget’, Daily Telegraph, 7 April 1949; Our 
own representative, ‘Union 'Cannot Hold Wage Safety Valve'’, ibid., 8 April; Our 
own representative, ‘Budget Policy Approved by 302 to 3’, Daily Telegraph, 13 
April 1949. 
73 ‘"Hour of Reckoning": Mr. Eden and Government Expenditure’, Manchester 
Guardian, 9 April 1949; ‘Budget Shock to Socialists’, Daily Telegraph, 9 April 1949. 
(Robert) Anthony Eden, first earl of Avon (1897-1977) was prime minister from 
1955 to 1957. After Eton, active service during the First World War, and Oxford, he 
was elected MP for Warwick and Leamington in 1923. He entered the Cabinet for 
the first time as minister for League of Nations affairs in 1935 but was promoted to 
foreign secretary the same year, the youngest foreign secretary since 1851. He 
resigned in 1938 over the Roosevelt initiative but was reappointed by Churchill in 
1940 and held the post for the entirety of the war. He resumed it again in 1951 
before becoming Prime Minister in 1955. In 1957, after the Suez crisis, he resigned 
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(1897–1977)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 
2011, accessed on: 22 February at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/31060. 
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Later in 1949 the Conservative party did have one piece of evidence 
that hard truths might be popular. They were producing internal 
opinion summaries which rounded up both Gallup polling and reports 
from constituency agents throughout this period. The October 1949 
summary unusually included an appendix reproducing a letter from a 
self-described ‘floating voter’ who stated: 
… If the truth is not so nice, come out with it … Not one of the tens of 
thousands will vote Conservative if you leave statements like taxation must 
be reduced, hours must be increased, public expenditure must be 
drastically reduced, clarify them before the election or else you will not 
have a ghost of a chance, I know, I move amongst the men and women 
they FEAR.74 
Very few of the opinion summaries included appendices so it seems 
safe to assume that at least the individuals compiling it thought that 
the letter was interesting or important. However, another letter from 
the Conservative candidate for Darlington which was also circulated 
(more informally) in July 1949 suggested that the budget was one 
reason, along with the cost of living and dull food, that working-class 
opinion was turning against Labour.75 Despite both these 
interventions, the opinion summaries most often suggested that tax 
was not a major concern.76 
 
Conservative Central Office continued producing these summaries 
throughout 1950. Several suggested that tax cuts were electorally 
 
74 ‘Public Opinion Research Department: Confidential Supplement to Public 
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Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1949. 
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January 1949’, CCO 4/3/249, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian 
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(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1949. 
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popular.77 The January 1950 opinion summary, for example, reported 
that: 
According to the Gallup Poll the following are, in order of preference, the 
things which would draw the most votes for the Party promising them:- 
 1) Bring prices down - an easy first. 
 2) Reduce Taxation ) 
 3) Build Houses quickly ) equal seconds.78  
Another summary also reported that the 1950 budget was unpopular 
— people felt that the position of the low paid and pensioners had 
worsened and the petrol tax was considered ‘bad and 
unnecessary’.79  
 
However, tax continued to come low in the list of major issues and 
other opinion summaries, later in the year, suggested that people did 
not know, or care, very much about taxation.80 One summary in 
September 1950 stated, for example: 
… the following extract of a report from Cheshire illustrates the attitude of 
many:- "The prospect of increased tax was treated with indifference, the 
general reaction being that only the rich were affected.”81 
In October the Chairman of the Bath Conservative Association 
 
77 See for example: ‘Conservative Central Office: Public Opinion Summary No. 13. 
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Research Department: Reasons for Change in Voting Intention and Other Points of 
Most Appeal to the Electorate’, CCO 4/3/249, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, 
Bodleian Library), 1950; ‘Conservative Central Office: Public Opinion Summary No. 
15. April 1950’, CCO 4/3/249, Conservative Party Archive, 1950. 
78 ‘Conservative Central Office: Public Opinion Summary No. 13. January 1950’, 
CCO 4/3/249, Conservative Party Archive, 1950. 
79 ‘Conservative Central Office: Public Opinion Summary No. 15. April 1950’, CCO 
4/3/249, Conservative Party Archive, 1950. 
80 See for example: ‘Conservative Central Office: Public Opinion Summary No. 20. 
September 1950’, CCO 4/4/267, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian 
Library), 1950; ‘Conservative Central Office: Public Opinion Summary No. 21. 
October 1950’, CCO 4/4/267, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian 
Library), 1950; ‘Letter from G E Hughes, Bath Conservative Association, to Lord 
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advocated a publicity campaign to educate the man on the street 
about how cripplingly high taxation was on the wealthy:  
I have long felt that there is grave misunderstanding by the 'man-in-the-
street' on the subject of existing taxation … May I strongly urge that the 
Central Office publish at an early date a 4 page pamphlet setting out in 
pithy form the rates of income and surtax, emphasizing that no man to-day, 
if he pays his tax honestly, can have an income much in excess of £5000 a 
year.82   
Although the Conservative party was conducting significantly more 
research into attitudes to tax than Labour, it seems to have provided 
them with complex and sometimes contradictory information. Polling 
suggested support for tax cuts but minimal concern about taxation, 
while more anecdotal evidence suggested apathy about tax levels.  
 
There is very little evidence about how Conservative politicians and 
researchers interpreted this information, if at all, as few discussions 
about popular attitudes to tax were found outside of their opinion 
research. The press reported that the Conservatives focused heavily 
on taxation in the immediate run-up to the 1950 election, suggesting 
that they believed tax cuts were a vote winner or that high taxation 
was a problem for Labour.83 A note on policy by a party official in 
1948 also argued that tax cuts were the main tool they had for 
attracting voters: 
We cannot reduce prices — we cannot materially increase lower scale 
salaries — but we can reduce taxation by economies; also revise the basis 
of taxation … We must discuss this ad nauseam.84 
This could suggest that they were placing more emphasis on polling 
showing that tax cuts were popular than on suggestions that tax was 
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83 ‘Expenditure and Taxation’, Daily Telegraph, 22 February 1950. 
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not a major issue. However, Lockwood argues that the dominant 
Conservative attitude to popular opinion in the 1940s and 1950s was 
that they should be leading not following it, suggesting that polling 
was not particularly influential.85  
 
The proposal from Bath was not welcomed within Conservative 
headquarters, where it was felt that such a pamphlet would be seen 
as defending surtax payers, indicating that they were also concerned 
about fairness, again in terms of equal treatment.86 Turner also 
reports that Oliver Poole wrote to R A Butler in February 1949 that 
the public just did not believe that 'the Welfare State, which is what 
most of them want, will be better managed by Conservatives than 
Socialists'.87 At the party conference in 1948, in a debate on a 
resolution to cut indirect tax, Nigel Birch suggested that once you 
 
85 Charles Lockwood, ‘‘Action Not Words’: The Conservative Party, Public Opinion 
and ‘Scientific’ Politics, C.1945–70’, Twentieth Century British History  (2019). 
86 ‘Memorandum from the CPO to Mr Hay, 16 October 1950’, CCO 4/4/311, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1950. 
87 Oliver Poole, ‘Oliver Poole to R. A. Butler, 28 February 1949’, RAB H33/184-5, 
(R. A. Butler Papers, Trinity College, Cambridge), 1949. cited in: Turner, ‘A Land Fit 
for Tories to Live In: The Political Ecology of the British Conservative Party, 1944-
94’, 193. Oliver Poole (1911-1993) was the Conservative MP for Oswestry from 
1945 until 1950 when he became head of the Conservative Political Centre (CPC), 
a position he held until 1952 when he became joint treasurer of the Conservative 
party. He was the chairman of the party from 1955 to 1957 when he agreed to step 
down to deputy chairman, a position he held until 1964, with a brief hiatus in 
Conservative Central Office in 1963. See: Anne Pimlott Baker, ‘Poole, Oliver Brian 
Sanderson, First Baron Poole (1911–1993)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, 2004, accessed on: 12 November at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/53145.  R A Butler was Chancellor from 1951 to 
1955. He was elected to the safe Conservative seat of Saffron Walden in 1929, 
which he held until his retirement in 1965. Butler became president of the board of 
education in 1941 where he drove through the 1944 Education Act which made 
free secondary education a right. In 1945 he became chairman of the Conservative 
Research Department (CRD), a post he held until 1964. Butler was chancellor of 
the exchequer from 1951 to 1955 when he was replaced by Macmillan. He then 
became leader of the house, and in 1957 home secretary. After failing to become 
party leader in 1963 he was appointed foreign secretary and then moved to the 
House of Lords in 1965. See: Ian Gilmour, ‘Butler, Richard Austen [Rab], Baron 




started talking about specific cuts, reducing spending was not so 
popular.88 Like Labour politicians and civil servants, some 
Conservative figures clearly believed that service provision was 
fundamentally popular and perceptions of fairness important, even as 
other comments, and their electoral strategy, seemed to assume 
popular opposition to tax. This combination was nicely illustrated by a 
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Conservative discussions about attitudes to tax were also classed. 
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The additions to opinion summaries mentioned above generally 
focused on what the Bath Chairman termed the ‘man-in-the-street’.89 
However, who the ‘man-in-the-street’ represented was not entirely 
clear. Although the Conservative candidate for Darlington highlighted 
working-class voters, the 1948 policy note argued: 
… the floating vote is mainly middle class (incomes £700—£1200 per 
annum) … Our whole appeal must be in this direction.90  
Peter Sloman has also suggested that they rejected Juliet Rhys-
Williams basic income scheme because it would essentially 
redistribute income from middle to low and high earners.91 
Discussions of the ‘man-in-the-street’ do not, therefore, seem 
necessarily to indicate a focus on working-class taxpayers. It is also 
noticeable that, unlike in Labour discussions, women did not feature 
at all in the archival evidence consulted. 
 
The Conservative party were conducting significantly more research 
into popular attitudes to tax in 1949-50 than Labour, even if much of it 
seems to have been of fairly low quality. Their polling suggested that 
tax cuts were popular, but also that tax was not a major issue. The 
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anecdotal evidence they had also, however, suggested apathy and 
lack of knowledge about tax rates. It is hard to say conclusively what, 
if any, impact this had on their ideas. The party’s electoral strategy in 
1950 implied that they believed high taxation was unpopular. At the 
same time, comments suggested that services were popular, and 
perceptions of fairness were crucial. Although discussions were 
limited, there is little to suggest that Conservative politicians believed 
that there was widespread consent to high taxation in 1949-50; their 
ideas seemed broadly similar to those of Labour and the civil service.  
 
The Trades Union Congress 
 
The 1949 budget was highly unpopular with union members. The 
TUC received numerous letters from trades unions and councils 
protesting that the budget was anti-working class, increased the 
burdens on the low paid, and was more in line with Conservative 
policy than Labour’s manifesto promises.92 However, these letters 
generally focused on cost of living increases, fairness, and broken 
promises, rather than tax cuts. TUC officials resisted these criticisms, 
pointing out that the 1948 budget had included significant tax 
concessions for the low paid and that increased spending had to be 
paid for.93 This was despite the fact that they had been highly 
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unimpressed by the 1948 budget.94 They closely followed the line 
taken by the chancellor in a letter to the TUC explaining his 1949 
budget choices.95 Although editorials in the Economist and New 
Statesman argued that the budget would provoke wage claims from 
individual unions regardless of the TUC response, it did not seem, at 
least in the short term, to do so.96 While there does seem to have 
been anger about the 1949 budget within the trade union movement, 
it is not clear whether it was specifically related to taxation.  
 
TUC leaders were divided over how important their members’ 
opinions about the budget were. Letters from unions and councils 
were referenced at a meeting of the Economic Committee in April 
1949. There was general agreement that extensive tax concessions 
had been impossible, but that the chancellor had framed his budget 
poorly and it would make wage restraint more difficult.97 Attendees 
also discussed whether the TUC should simply represent its 
members’ opinions or draw its own policy conclusions. The minutes 
stated at one point: 
… other members thought that while the Budget was psychologically 
unfortunate the T.U.C. had higher responsibilities than that of merely 
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reflecting public opinion.98 
TUC officials’ responses to letters from individuals, unions, and 
councils suggest that this was potentially the dominant view; they 
consistently rejected suggestions from members that did not align 
with their policy preferences.99  
 
However, newspaper reports suggest that they did express members’ 
disappointment to the chancellor.100 They were also explicit with 
Cripps about the need for action on taxation, prices, profits, and 
subsidies to maintain wage restraint.101 It is noticeable, however, that 
while meeting with Cripps in 1948 the TUC representatives were at 
times dismissive of their members. One attendee stated: 
A week ago on Sunday Jim Bowman and I went to meet the most 
respectable element, if there be such, in the mining industry, the winding 
enginemen … I will admit they are the stupidest part of the coal industry. 
Those fellows were like a lot of children.102 
When TUC officials represented members views they suggested that 
the 1949 budget would make wage restraint more difficult. However, 
tax was only one of multiple issues highlighted. Their tone at times 
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also suggested that they were working with the chancellor to 
circumvent their members and they seemed reluctant to take any of 
their policy recommendations.    
 
Very little discussion of the 1950 election was found in the TUC 
archives, but the budget that followed provoked more debate. 
Although it only cut income tax, the TUC response was fairly positive. 
A memo stated that the income tax cuts would not help those under 
the tax threshold and would help the wealthy, while everyone would 
be hit by increased prices as the result of higher petrol taxes. 
However, it also argued that it would have been hard to benefit only 
the lowest-paid workers. It suggested that the chancellor was offering 
high-paid workers income tax cuts in return for wage restraint.103 
Participants at a meeting about the memo thought this was unlikely 
to succeed, suggesting that they did not think that income tax cuts 
were popular enough to dissuade middle to high earners from 
pushing for wage increases.104  
 
The TUC were also looking in more detail at income tax in early 
1950. A note in February summarised various reform schemes.105 
Officials were aware and wary of the fact that arguments about 
incentives and savings were often used to call for cuts on high 
earners, but were nonetheless concerned about incentive effects on 
low earners, particularly in relation to overtime.106 This, and the focus 
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on income tax, may have been driven by their members — they 
received numerous letters from unions and councils complaining 
about income tax on overtime in 1949-50.107 The TUC resisted calls 
for reduced tax on overtime, but on the grounds that they thought it 
was administratively impossible even if there were incentive 
effects.108 Despite members’ letters, they continued to advocate to 
government for indirect over direct tax cuts.109 
 
There was clearly a perception within the TUC in 1949-50 that tax 
cuts were popular. However, they were framed as only part of a wider 
range of policies necessary for wage restraint, which also included 
control of prices and profits and the maintenance of subsidies. TUC 
leaders expressed members’ support for purchase tax cuts to the 
chancellor, but also emphasised these other elements. It is not clear 
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how far members’ attitudes influenced TUC policies and 
representations to the chancellor. They did express some of their 
members’ views to the government, but they also strongly rejected 
calls from members for policy positions they did not support and did 
not always discuss their members with respect. Discussions within 
the TUC did not show unmitigated opposition to taxation, but instead 
a complicated picture involving equity, incentives, and the cost of 
living. At the same time, discussions clearly did not suggest a 
widespread consensus in support of contemporary tax and spending 
levels. 
 
The Federation of British Industries 
 
The FBI’s views on tax were much less regularly reported than the 
TUC’s, and they had a low profile in press reporting of the 1949 
budget. When they were visible, they argued that taxation was far too 
high and killing industry. Their representations to the chancellor 
ahead of the 1949 budget called for the abolition of the profits tax 
and a reduction in surtax. They also argued against high taxation on 
the grounds that it was inflationary and preventing investment.110  
 
Even fewer statements about attitudes to tax were found. The 
Telegraph reported that on his retirement in May, the head of the FBI 
stated that taxation was far too high and that people did not realise 
how high corporate taxation was.111 FBI Chairman Norman Kipping 
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also argued in a letter to Treasury official Edward Bridges later in 
1949 that the proposed increase in the distributed profits tax had 
aroused great resentment among firms and was already preventing 
investment.112 He suggested that a countervailing cut in the 
undistributed profits tax to balance the increase would still satisfy the 
unions but ‘do much to mollify Boards of Directors’.113 The FBI 
emphasised their own and members’ opposition to the level and 
structure of taxation in 1949, but the only comment found about wider 
popular attitudes suggested a lack of knowledge about corporate 
taxation. 
 
The FBI was more active around the 1950 budget. As in 1949, they 
argued that high taxation was damaging industry. In discussions 
about which proposals to submit ahead of the budget it was 
suggested that they should argue for tax cuts on the grounds that 
high taxation was inflationary and hitting incentives and 
investment.114 Despite this, there appears to have been some 
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uncertainty internally about the actual impact of taxation on 
businesses.115 During a meeting of the Home Economic Policy 
Committee, one participant advocated creating a panel of 
accountants to prove statistically that high taxation increased 
production costs. Several other participants expressed doubts about 
how difficult this would be to prove, and one pointed out that the FBI 
had given evidence to the Colwyn Committee in 1927 that tax did not 
significantly increase costs. They agreed to create a small expert 
committee to investigate whether taxes did increase costs and to 
what extent.116  
 
An interesting feature of FBI discussions in 1950 was officials’ 
apparent lack of concern about popular attitudes. In October 1950, 
the Taxation Panel met to discuss what they should advocate if it 
turned out that higher taxes were required to pay for rearmament. 
One attendee argued that the profits tax should be abolished and the 
entirety of the money needed to pay for this put on income tax. The 
Chairman questioned whether this was practical ‘in the light of the 
current political attack on profits’ and suggested that some mitigation 
might be needed for the ‘middle income range’, while another 
member questioned the benefit given that it would probably result in 
higher wage claims, but no one explicitly brought up the question of 
the popular response to such a policy.117 A report a month later 
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proposed raising income tax if increases were required but not 
abolishing the profits tax.118 Although these positions did represent 
members’ interests, the lack of concern about broader popular 
opinion is noticeable.  
 
Overall, the FBI expressed consistent opposition to the level of 
taxation and spending on the grounds that it was damaging the 
economy through its impact on incentives, investment, and inflation. 
Neil Rollings has highlighted the links between the FBI (and later 
CBI) and key neoliberal organisations from the mid 1950s to the mid 
1970s.119 However, this suggests that ideas about the economic 
impact of taxation that might now be associated with neoliberalism 
were present in the FBI even earlier. Internally, FBI officials seemed 
less certain that their claims about the economic impact of taxation 
were provable, or even true. They showed limited concern about 
popular attitudes or the wider public response to their proposals to 
increase personal taxation. Their clear message was, however, that 





The press was potentially a key participant in shaping public 
discourse around popular attitudes to tax. In the immediate aftermath 
 
21 Tothill Street, London, S.W.1’, MSS.200/F 3/D2/1/20, (Confederation of British 
Industry Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1950. 
118 ‘Memorandum from J Dunse to Members of the Taxation Panel, 4 November 
1950’, MSS.200/F 3/D2/1/20, (Confederation of British Industry Archive, Modern 
Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1950. 
119 Neil Rollings, ‘Cracks in the Post-War Keynesian Settlement? The Role of 
Organised Business in Britain in the Rise of Neoliberalism before Margaret 
Thatcher’, Twentieth Century British History 24, no. 4 (2013). 
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of the 1949 budget, newspapers focused on the anger of trade 
unions and Labour MPs and suggested that it would provoke wage 
claims or an internal party revolt.120 Most editorials were, however, 
positive about the budget itself, calling it brave, honest, and realistic 
and commending Cripps for telling the truth about the limits of 
redistribution and the need for services to be paid for.121  
 
Despite general support for the 1949 budget, the right-wing press, 
particularly, repeatedly expressed concern about the level of 
taxation.122 The Daily Mail, for example, stated: 
There is much that is crazy in the present financial set-up. But the craziest 
thing of all is to imagine that Britain can leap forward with a £3,308,000 
Budget round her neck, and with her people crushed under a 40 per cent 
level of taxation - the highest in the world.123  
On the other side of the political spectrum, the Guardian argued: 
… nothing can now remove the basic trouble that the Government has 
undertaken to spend 40 per cent of the people's income.124 
 
120 See for example: Eden, ‘Cripps Faces Crisis: Socialist M.P.s Revolt against 
Misery Budget’, Daily Express, 7 April 1949; Leslie Randall, ‘TUC Reply Will Be 
More Pay Demands’, Daily Mail, 7 April 1949; London Staff, ‘Cold Comfort for 
Trade Unions: Effect on Price Index’, Manchester Guardian, 7 April 1949; ‘Feared 
Effect on Wage Demands: Appeal to Chancellor’, Times, 8 April 1949; Geoffrey 
Wakeford, ‘Trade Union MP Tells Cripps: Trouble Soon’, Daily Mail, 8 April 1949; 
Our political correspondent, ‘Union 'Cannot Hold Wage Safety Valve'’, Daily 
Telegraph, 8 April 1949; ‘Sir Stafford and His Critics’, New Statesman, 16 April 
1949. 
121 See for example: ‘A Stern Budget’, Times, 7 April 1949; ‘Comment: Obstinate 
Budget’, Daily Mail, 7 April 1949; ‘After the Shock’, Daily Mirror, 8 April 1949; ‘Does 
Britain Believe in Labour?’, Economist, 16 April 1949; ‘Penal Servitude’, Financial 
Times, 7 April 1949; Lex, ‘What May Happen to-Day’, ibid.; ‘Comment: Impossible 
Task’, Daily Mail, 8 April 1949; ‘Budget in Perspective’, Spectator, 8 April 1949. 
122 Lex, ‘What May Happen to-Day’, Financial Times, 7 April 1949; ‘Penal 
Servitude’, ibid.; ‘Opinion: A Basic Right’, Daily Express, 23 April 1949; ‘Budget in 
Perspective’, Spectator, 8 April 1949; ‘Paying the Piper’, Economist, 9 April 1949; 
Financial Editor, ‘To-Day’s Budget Prospects: Footing the Growing Bill of 
Government Spending. Possibility of Some Novel Expedients ’, Manchester 
Guardian, 6 April 1949; ‘Comment: Impossible Task’, Daily Mail, 8 April 1949; Colin 
R. Coote, ‘Nationalisation with No Principle and No Limit’, Daily Telegraph, 20 April 
1949. 
123 ‘Comment: Impossible Task’, Daily Mail, 8 April 1949. 
124 Financial Editor, ‘To-Day’s Budget Prospects: Footing the Growing Bill of 
Government Spending. Possibility of Some Novel Expedients ’, Manchester 
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This idea was also prevalent around the 1950 election.125 The 
Telegraph, for example, compared the burden of taxation to the fall of 
the Roman Empire: 
A nation which has to contribute 40 per cent. of its income to the tax-
gatherer is condemned to utter frustration. There has been nothing like it 
since the declining days of the Roman Empire.126  
Although this opinion was more prevalent in the right-leaning papers, 
it was still present on the left.127 The Mirror, for example, published a 
sympathetic article in the aftermath of the election about the Duke of 
Marlborough being forced to open Blenheim Palace to the public 
because of the weight of crippling taxation.128 The only paper to 
refute the claim that tax was too high was the Herald, which argued 
that the performance of the economy showed that claims that high 
taxation was crushing industry were untrue.129  
 
 
Guardian, 6 April 1949. 
125 See for example: William Barkley, ‘Challenge These Blood Suckers’, Daily 
Express, 14 February 1950; ‘Opinion: Honey All the Way’, ibid., 6 February; ‘The 
Record ’, Daily Mail, 11 January 1950; ‘Losing All’, Daily Mail, 18 January 1950; 
‘Brooding on ‘Brass’’, Daily Mail, 21 February 1950; ‘Calm, Constructive 
Confidence’, Daily Telegraph, 23 February 1950; ‘Socialism and Democracy’, Daily 
Telegraph, 4 February 1950; ‘February 23rd’, Financial Times, 11 January 1950; 
‘Truth to Tell’, Financial TImes, 6 February 1950; ‘“Soak the Rich”’, Financial 
Times, 13 February 1950; ‘The Choice’, Manchester Guardian, 23 February 1950; 
Sterling, ‘Seen from the City: Election Paralysis’, Observer, 15 January 1950; ‘The 
Inescapable Issue’, Spectator, 3 February 1950; ‘Labour’s Claims’, Spectator, 20 
January 1950; ‘The Campaign Begins’, Times, 6 February 1950; ‘The Last Stage’, 
Times, 14 February 1950; ibid. 
126 ‘Calm, Constructive Confidence’, Daily Telegraph, 23 February 1950. See also: 
‘Expenditure and Taxation’, Daily Telegraph, 22 February 1950; ‘Socialism and 
Democracy’, Daily Telegraph, 4 February 1950; J. C. Johnstone, ‘Socialism Is No 
Friend of the Middle-Classes’, ibid., 9 February; ‘Facts for Floating Voters’, ibid., 21 
February; ‘Socialism and Defence’, New Statesman, 11 March 1950. 
127 See for example: ‘The Choice’, Manchester Guardian, 23 February 1950; 
Sterling, ‘Seen from the City: Election Paralysis’, Observer, 15 January 1950. 
128 ‘Sir Stafford Claims Success for Planning: High Taxes Needed for Fair Shares’, 
Manchester Guardian, 3 February 1950; Our parliamentary correspondent, 
‘Election Battle Opens’, Financial Times, 3 February 1950; Noel Whitcomb, ‘The 
Duke Packs Them in Palace - and Makes It a £250 Day’, Daily Mirror, 10 April 
1950. 




In both 1949 and 1950 centrist and right-leaning papers also 
suggested that the public were opposed to tax.130 The Economist 
argued in 1949, for example: 
It might be objected that the British people accepted each item in the bill 
separately, and that if the suggestion that the state should, in the name of 
their welfare, compulsorily spend 40 per cent of their incomes for them had 
ever been put to them as a general proposition, they might have taken a 
different line.131  
Some of the left-leaning papers agreed.132 The Guardian, for 
example, stated: 
The country is groaning under the weight of taxes. Demands for relief 
come from all sides.133 
In 1950 high taxes were often paired with nationalisation as the key 
electoral weaknesses for Labour.134 One Times article argued, for 
example:  
These are open chinks in the Labour armour, for all its apparent strength: 
the deep, unsatisfied longing of all taxpayers for lower taxes, and the 
widespread fear that, after all, the Labour Party may still be bent … on 
"nationalization for nationalization's sake."135 
 
130 See for example: ‘Penal Servitude’, Financial Times, 7 April 1949; ‘The Voice of 
Labour Again’, Spectator, 22 April 1949; ‘Budget in Perspective’, Spectator, 8 April 
1949; ‘Paying the Piper’, Economist, 9 April 1949; ‘The Campaign Begins’, Times, 
6 February 1950; ‘February 23rd’, Financial Times, 11 January 1950; ‘Mr. 
Churchill’, Observer, 21 February 1950; ‘Questions for Voters’, Times, 20 February 
1950; ‘The Conservative Case’, Times, 25 January 1950. 
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132 See for example: Financial Editor, ‘To-Day’s Budget Prospects: Footing the 
Growing Bill of Government Spending. Possibility of Some Novel Expedients ’, 
Manchester Guardian, 6 April 1949; ‘Penal Servitude’, Financial Times, 7 April 
1949; ‘Budget Day’, Times, 6 April 1949; ‘The Voice of Labour Again’, Spectator, 
22 April 1949; ‘Sir Stafford and His Critics’, New Statesman, 16 April 1949; ‘After 
the Shock’, Daily Mirror, 8 April 1949; ‘Retrenchment’, Manchester Guardian, 31 
January 1950; ‘Facts for Floating Voters’, Daily Telegraph, 21 February 1950; 
‘Labour’, Observer, 22 January 1950; ‘An End to Uncertainty’, Times, 11 January 
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133 Financial Editor, ‘To-Day’s Budget Prospects: Footing the Growing Bill of 
Government Spending. Possibility of Some Novel Expedients ’, Manchester 
Guardian, 6 April 1949. 
134 See for example: ‘The Campaign Begins’, Times, 6 February 1950; ‘February 
23rd’, Financial Times, 11 January 1950; ‘Mr. Churchill’, Observer, 21 February 
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Again, this was not limited to the conservative-leaning papers; an 
editorial in the Guardian argued: 
There is probably no one of any party or class who does not still think of 
some present taxes as temporary and cherish the hope that they will be 
drastically reduced … it is very doubtful whether anyone, if a rational 
choice could be made, would think the full range of expenditure worth the 
present broad-based taxes.136  
The New Statesman also argued in the aftermath of the budget that 
the petrol tax increases were bound to be unpopular ‘at a time when 
it was hoped that taxation had reached its top limit’.137 The lone 
exception to this was, again, the Herald, which argued that Labour’s 
success in the election showed that the Conservative attempt to 
bribe people with lower taxes had not worked, suggesting that people 
were more concerned with principles than self-interest.138 Overall, 
however, the papers strongly portrayed the public as opposed to the 
contemporary level and structure of taxation. 
 
They were, though, equally clear in 1949 that social services were 
very popular, and that spending cuts would be electorally 
damaging.139 The Observer, for example, stated that ‘no party could 
get a mandate’ for drastic cuts to the social services.140 In addition, 
although taxation was a prominent issue in newspaper coverage of 
the 1950 election, it was far from the only issue — there was also 
extensive reporting on the cost of living, foreign affairs, and housing. 
The Times, Telegraph, and Financial Times (FT) all reported in 
February 1950 that Conservative polling on key election issues 
showed that housing was far and away the most important, followed 
 
136 ‘Retrenchment’, Manchester Guardian, 31 January 1950. 
137 ‘The Motorists' Vote’, New Statesman, 29 April 1950. 
138 ‘The Nation's Verdict’, Daily Herald, 25 February 1950; Michael Foot, ‘Forward!’, 
ibid., 3 March. 
139 See for example: ‘Paying the Piper’, Economist, 9 April 1949; ‘Having the Cake’, 
Financial Times, 8 April 1949. 
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by the value of money, the cost of living, freedom from controls, and 
then reduced taxation.141   
 
Media discussions about attitudes to taxation were, like those in the 
other organisations studied here, classed. Although the left-leaning 
papers were generally relatively quiet in 1949 about who deserved 
tax relief, the right-leaning papers strongly advocated that it was 
middle-class taxpayers who needed and deserved tax cuts to relieve 
their disproportionate tax burden.142 The Daily Mail, for example, 
argued: 
This attitude should be contrasted with the patient acceptance by the 
middle classes of financial flaying by successive Chancellors. They have 
been soaked, squeezed, and skinned until there is little of substance left in 
them.143  
In 1950 several articles in right-leaning papers similarly argued that 
Labour was deceitfully trying to obtain middle-class votes despite 
having reduced their living standards through taxation and intending 
to continue doing so if they were re-elected.144 Even so, after the 
election only the New Statesman suggested that Labour had lost 
middle-class votes, attributing this to fears of further ‘levelling 
down’.145 It has also to be noted that although some articles 
 
141 Our parliamentary correspondent, ‘Party Leaders' Final Efforts in 
Constituencies’, Times, 22 February 1950; Our political correspondent, ‘Parties' 
Final Election Pleas’, Daily Telegraph, 22 February 1950; Our parliamentary 
correspondent, ‘Tories Focus on Taxes’, Financial Times, 22 February 1950. 
142 See for example: Financial Editor, ‘To-Day’s Budget Prospects: Footing the 
Growing Bill of Government Spending. Possibility of Some Novel Expedients ’, 
Manchester Guardian, 6 April 1949; ‘After the Shock’, Daily Mirror, 8 April 1949; 
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Financial Times, 7 April 1949; ‘An Injustice in the Budget’, Spectator, 22 April 1949; 
‘New Death Duties’, Financial Times, 5 May 1949. 
143 ‘Comment: No Boss Rule’, Daily Mail, 29 April 1949. 
144 See for example: ‘Opinion: False Pretences’, Daily Express, 19 January 1950; 
‘Fair - or Equal?’, Financial Times, 17 February 1950; ‘Zilliboy Shinbag's 
Programme-to-Suit-All-Tastes’, Daily Express, 1 February 1950. Johnstone, 
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advocated cuts for middle earners, most papers also gave a 
significant amount of coverage to the TUC and working-class 
grievances around taxation.146 It does not appear that Labour’s 
attempt to win back middle-class voters with income tax cuts at the 
1950 budget registered in the press either. The budget was criticised 
by all the papers studied here, apart from the Mirror and Herald, as 
failing to help middle-income or low-paid taxpayers.147 
 
Press discussions about attitudes to taxation were gendered in a 
similar way to Labour conversations. Women appeared fairly 
regularly but playing a very specific role — housewives concerned 
about prices, the cost of living, and the impact of purchase tax.148 
Some of this seems to have been driven by, or at least focused on, 
Labour concerns about ‘housewives’’ reaction to the decision to cut 
taxes on beer rather than purchase tax in 1949, and attempts to 
argue that purchase tax was not increasing prices for families during 
 
146 See for example: ‘The Housewives Speak’, Daily Express, 16 January 1950; 
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147 See for example: ‘At the Limit’, Economist, 22 April 1950; ‘Economic Realities’, 
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ibid., 24 April; ‘“This Is It”’, ibid., 25 April., 1950 #1063}‘To-Day’s Votes’, Times, 26 
April 1950; ‘At the Limit’, Economist, 22 April 1950; ‘Economic Realities’, 
Economist, 29 April 1950; ‘Opinion: Who Gets the Bonus?’, Daily Express, 10 June 
1950. 
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the 1950 election.149 Although these articles mostly appeared in the 
elite papers, there were some similar mentions in the popular 
dailies.150 The Daily Express, for example, published an article on the 
views of ‘housewives’. The women interviewed discussed a variety of 
issues. Several mentioned high taxes in general, support for 
services, and one the cost of living, but none highlighted purchase 
tax specifically.151 Nonetheless, press coverage of tax in 1949-50 
generally limited women’s concerns to purchase tax and shopping. 
 
The fact that representations of popular attitudes to tax were 
generally similar on both sides of the political media spectrum could 
suggest that there was a broad consensus about popular attitudes 
among journalists. This seems perhaps surprising given the political 
polarisation of the press. One possible explanation could be that 
these journalists were themselves part of a middle-class backlash 
against high taxation, if that was indeed taking place.152 There is, 
however, insufficient evidence to clearly support this. Whatever the 
cause, the press, even more so than the other sources discussed 
here, painted a picture of popular opposition to the level and 
structure of taxation, rather than consent.  
 
149 See for example: ‘May-Day Manifestos and Excuses’, Daily Telegraph, 2 May 
1949; ‘Budget Shock to Socialists’, Daily Telegraph, 9 April 1949; ‘Mr. Churchill’, 
Observer, 21 February 1950; ‘"No Crushing Tax Burden"’, Financial Times, 22 
February 1950. 
150 ‘Wives Look at the Budget’, Daily Mirror, 12 April 1949; ‘The Housewives 
Speak’, Daily Express, 16 January 1950. 
151 ‘The Housewives Speak’, Daily Express, 16 January 1950. 
152 I was not able to locate salary data for journalists for 1950, but in 1952 the 
chairman of Sunday Pictorial Newspapers Ltd stated that annual earnings for ‘a 
good sub-editor or reporter’ were £1300 a year. Average annual earnings in 1952 
were £375 a year. This would have put a ‘good’ reporter on almost 350 percent of 
average earnings but below the surtax threshold. See: ‘Sunday Pictorial 
Newspapers (1920) Ltd: Changed Conditions in the Newspaper Industry’, 
Manchester Guardian, 9 June 1952; Clark, ‘What Were the British Earnings and 






Discussions about popular attitudes to tax in the media, political 
parties, civil service, TUC, and FBI in 1949-50 generally represented 
the ‘public’ as opposed to current tax levels and supportive of tax 
cuts. This was particularly true of the press, which heavily 
emphasised popular opposition to taxation. This opposition was not 
unqualified; most discussions also assumed that services were highly 
popular and perceptions of fairness were critical. However, the 
dominant assumption was that tax was highly unpopular. 
 
Opposition to tax was presented as essentially universal, although 
assumptions about which taxes people wanted to be cut varied 
according to class, and, sometimes, gender. When they were 
mentioned, women were placed in a very specific and circumscribed 
role as ‘housewives’ who wanted purchase tax cuts. Working-class 
taxpayers were also assumed to prefer purchase tax cuts but, in 
general, middle-class taxpayers seemed to receive slightly more 
attention, particularly in the press.  
 
The press might have encouraged politicians to focus on middle-
class taxpayers and income tax. However, it is noticeable how few 
discussions the organisations studied appeared to be having with 
each other in relation to popular attitudes to taxation, with the 
exception of TUC and FBI budget representations. Only the 
Conservative party seemed to try to access evidence for popular 
attitudes and it is unclear whether this had any impact. The Labour 
government was receiving representations from the TUC and FBI, 
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among others, and had access to GSS surveys, but does not appear 
to have tried to use these to look at popular attitudes to tax. 
Discussions about popular attitudes to tax were insular and seemed 
to be based generally on subjective belief or limited, mostly 
anecdotal, evidence.  
 
Individuals in the organisations studied did not seem to believe that 
there was widespread consent to high taxation and spending. In 
contrast, they suggested significant popular opposition to tax. This 
should not be overemphasised or simplified, but, overall, the picture 
of popular attitudes to tax presented in elite discourse was far from 










3. The 1959 General Election and 1961 Budget 
 
 
By 1959 the Conservative party had been in power for almost a 
decade and had won two consecutive elections. Economically, Britain 
started this period still in the aftermath of the Second World War; 
rationing remained in place until 1954. By the early 1960s affluence 
was increasing, with rising consumer spending and living standards 
and unprecedentedly high growth rates. Full employment had 
become the norm.1 Middleton argues that the British economy, 
despite ‘stop-go’ macroeconomic policy, was exceptionally stable, 
both historically and comparatively.2 However, it is important not to 
fall into the trap of viewing this period as an unequivocal golden age, 
as emphasised by Selina Todd’s research on working-class 
experiences of affluence.3 The UK was still profoundly unequal, 
particularly in terms of wealth, and affluence was based on long 
hours in strenuous jobs and the expansion of credit systems like hire 
purchase.4  
 
‘Stop-go’ policies also fuelled macroeconomic instability, and growth 
rates, although unprecedented, were lower than those of competitor 
 
1 See for example: Bogdanor and Skidelsky, The Age of Affluence: 1951-1964 ; 
Offer, The Challenge of Affluence: Self-Control and Well-Being in the United States 
and Britain since 1950; Lowe, ‘Modernizing Britain’s Welfare State: The Influence 
of Affluence, 1957-1964’; Offer, ‘Consumption and Affluence, c. 1870-2010’. See 
Todd, ‘Affluence, Class and Crown Street: Reinvestigating the Post-War Working 
Class’. for an argument on the limits of affluence. 
2 Middleton, The British Economy since 1945: Engaging with the Debate, 40-43. 
See also Tomlinson, ‘Economic Policy’, 197. 
3 Todd, ‘Affluence, Class and Crown Street: Reinvestigating the Post-War Working 
Class’; Todd, The People: The Rise and Fall of the Working Class, 1910-2010, 
152-169. 
4 Todd, ‘Affluence, Class and Crown Street: Reinvestigating the Post-War Working 
Class’, 506; Lowe, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945, 284-295. 
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countries.5 This led to elite concern about whether Britain was in 
decline, which would be a feature of economic and political debate 
for several decades. Much of the current literature emphasises the 
relative nature of this decline, and theorises that this focus was 
actually the product of psychological distress about Britain’s loss of 
status as a post-imperial power amid decolonisation, another key 
context.6  
 
From the late 1950s there was an increasing focus on growth as the 
pre-eminent objective of economic policy and a shift to an economic 
policy that has been termed ‘Keynesian plus’. This was characterised 
by demand management, incomes policies, and strategic planning. 
Pemberton argues this was driven by academics and journalists, 
while others have suggested both this and the focus on decline were 
partially driven by the new availability of international statistics on 
growth rates. These changes sparked a review of tax policy inside 
the Treasury but did not translate into tax reform.7  
 
5 See for example: Pemberton, ‘Affluence, Relative Decline and the Treasury’; 
Rodney Lowe, ‘Modernizing Britain’s Welfare State: The Influence of Affluence, 
1957-1964’, ibid.; Middleton, The British Economy since 1945: Engaging with the 
Debate, 86-89; Tomlinson, ‘Inventing 'Decline': The Falling Behind of the British 
Economy in the Postwar Years’; Tomlinson, ‘Economic Policy’, 197. 
6 See for example: Broadberry and Crafts, ‘British Economic Policy and Industrial 
Performance in the Early Post-War Period’. Coates, The Question of UK Decline: 
State, Society and Economy; Middleton, The British Economy since 1945: 
Engaging with the Debate, 86-87, 136-138; Supple, ‘Fear of Failing: Economic 
History and the Decline of Britain’. Szreter, ‘British Economic Decline and Human 
Resources’; Tomlinson, ‘Inventing 'Decline': The Falling Behind of the British 
Economy in the Postwar Years’. Tomlinson, ‘The Decline of the Empire and the 
Economic ‘Decline’ of Britain’; Tomlinson, ‘De-Industrialization Not Decline: A New 
Meta-Narrative for Post-War British History’. 
7 See for example: A. Gamble and S. A. Walkland, The British Party System and 
Economic Policy, 1945-1983: Studies in Adversary Politics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), 69-71, 80-85; Middleton, The British Economy since 1945: 
Engaging with the Debate, 86-87; Hugh Pemberton, ‘Policy Networks and Policy 
Learning UK Economic Policy in the 1960s and 1970s’, Public Administration 78, 
no. 4 (2000): 784-788; Pemberton, ‘Affluence, Relative Decline and the Treasury’, 




Concern about the effect of the tax system on work incentives was a 
continuing preoccupation among politicians and the civil service. This 
was despite the fact that the Royal Commission on the Taxation of 
Profits and Income had found no evidence that income tax was 
damaging incentives.8 Incentive effects were always associated with 
income tax by politicians, a point that confused economists as 
economic theory did not suggest that income taxes would have a 
greater effect on incentives than any other form of tax.9 Whiting 
argues that ‘talk about “incentives” was a mask for political 
judgements about tax’.10 Whether genuine or strategic, expressions 
of concern about incentives were widespread. 
 
The Conservative government was initially keen to reduce profits 
taxation and abolish differential taxation as an incentive to 
investment. However, at first they actually increased the profits tax to 
politically offset the abolition of food subsidies. They considered a 
single corporate tax but this was opposed by the Treasury and IR on 
administrative grounds. The government therefore reduced the 
differentials between distributed and retained profits but left the 
system essentially intact.11 Instead, they played with depreciation 
allowances to try to reduce corporate taxation less visibly. Daunton 
 
Economy in the Postwar Years’; Tomlinson, ‘De-Industrialization Not Decline: A 
New Meta-Narrative for Post-War British History’, 4-6; Tomlinson, ‘It’s the 
Economy, Stupid! Labour and the Economy, Circa 1964’, 388. 
8 ‘Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income. Second Report’,  91-
124; Daunton, Just Taxes, 229-278; Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 117-
118. The commission had been set up under Labour before 1951 and reported 
between 1951 and 1953. 
9 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 95-97; J. A. Kay and M. A. King, The 
British Tax System, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 120-121. 
10 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 111-119. 




argues that such frequent changes left industry confused and states 
that ‘Structural stasis was linked with incessant tinkering’.12  
 
This structural stasis was not limited to corporate taxation. Although 
the Conservatives arrived in office ideologically predisposed to cut 
spending and personal taxes, in practice they increased spending, 
and did not institute significant tax reforms.13 Lowe portrays this as a 
principled decision, moving away from ideological preferences in the 
face of contradictory evidence.14 Daunton is more critical, arguing 
that, faced with political constraints on spending cuts and with a 
buoyant economy, the Conservative government settled on a 
strategy of a low, slow burn in which growth would facilitate tax cuts 
without the necessity of reducing spending. As a consequence, it 
failed to make any significant reforms to the tax system.15  
 
Glennerster attributes this to electoral concerns, arguing that 
Macmillan ‘was not prepared to support major attacks on the Welfare 
State or cuts that would be damaging electorally’, and so had little 
room for tax cuts.16 He also states that ‘People wanted lower taxes 
but they did not want their services reduced either’, though he does 
not discuss the evidence for this assertion.17 The Conservatives’ 
options for reforming taxation were also constrained, as Labour’s had 
been, by the need to ensure continued wage restraint to limit 
 
12 Daunton, Just Taxes, 247-256, 269-278. 
13 See for example: ibid., 229-237; Lowe, ‘Modernizing Britain’s Welfare State: The 
Influence of Affluence, 1957-1964’. 
14 Lowe, ‘Modernizing Britain’s Welfare State: The Influence of Affluence, 1957-
1964’. 
15 Daunton, Just Taxes, 229-237. 
16 Glennerster, British Social Policy: 1945 to the Present, 74. See also: Davies and 
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17 Glennerster, British Social Policy: 1945 to the Present, 87. 
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inflation. Both Daunton and Whiting suggest that politicians thought 
spending cuts would be unpopular and were wary of tax cuts for the 
wealthy lest they appeared the party of the rich.18 The Conservative 
government did cut the standard rate of income tax slightly, but most 
of this reduction was illusory as inflation had brought more people 
over the threshold.19 
 
From 1956, in particular, the government faced dissatisfaction from 
their grassroots and middle-class voters. This was expressed at party 
conferences and in disappointing by-election results, as well as 
through the formation of groups like the Middle Class Alliance (MCA) 
and the People’s League for the Defence of Freedom (PLDF).20 In 
the autumn of 1957, Oliver Poole and Lord Hailsham, the 
Conservative chairman and vice-chairman, referred to 'Poujadist' 
tendencies (the French anti-tax movement). Tax cuts did form part of 
the MCA’s demands, but it was only one element of their 
complaints.21  
 
Turner argues that this backlash pushed the Conservative 
government into focusing on what its middle-class supporters wanted 
until 1958, when a significant shift took place which was driven by 
CRD work on the electoral importance of working-class voters.22 
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19 Daunton, Just Taxes, 277-278. 
20 See for example: E. H. H. Green, Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative 
Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
220-227; E. H. H. Green, ‘Thatcherism: An Historical Perspective’, Transactions of 
the Royal Historical Society 9 (1999); Green, ‘The Conservative Party, the State 
and the Electorate, 1945-1964’, 182-186; Turner, ‘A Land Fit for Tories to Live In: 
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21 Green, Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth 
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Taylor also suggests that the Conservative party became increasingly 
focused on polling and attracting floating voters in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. Floating voters were identified as people on the border 
between the working and middle classes who had recently been 
drawn into the lower reaches of the income tax.23 This group was 
also the major constituency of the trade unions.24 This focus was not 
entirely new — Whiting argues that Butler’s 1952 budget, for 
example, attempted to split the working-class vote between those 
who paid income tax and those who did not.25 However, it seems to 
have intensified in the late 1950s. Turner suggests that it led at the 
1959 election to ‘the apotheosis’ of appeals to voters’ ‘material 
interests’.26 
 
Unlike the Conservative party, Labour remained fairly resistant to 
using polling in the 1950s. Black argues that this was due to the 
perception that they did not need polling to tell them what the people 
wanted, and also a concern that it might show that working-class 
voters were in fact fairly right wing and moving further to the right. He 
suggests that Labour politicians saw their role as educating people in 
what they should think, rather than representing what they did 
think.27  
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25 Ibid., 111-113; Whiting, ‘Income Tax, the Working Class and Party Politics 1948–
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26 Turner, ‘A Land Fit for Tories to Live In: The Political Ecology of the British 
Conservative Party, 1944-94’, 201. 
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Labour’s development of a comprehensive set of tax policies while it 
was in opposition from 1951 to 1964 was largely driven by Nicholas 
Kaldor and focused on his plans for a system built around a 
progressive expenditure tax.28 Like many aspects of Labour 
policymaking, these plans were influenced by internal divisions 
between members who favoured nationalisation and those who 
thought it was more productive to focus on taxing unearned wealth 
and equality of opportunity.29 Many Labour commentators in the 
1950s believed that the tax system was not producing equality. 
Disparities of wealth had not narrowed and income differentials 
before tax had started to widen again.30 Although nominal taxation 
was high, many middle-class taxpayers reduced their liability through 
tax allowances for pensions, insurance policies, and mortgage 
interest, and benefited from the welfare state as they no longer had 
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Taxation of Profits and Income from 1951, authoring the dissenting minority report, 
and was the joint architect of the Cambridge school of economics. See: A. P.  
Thirlwall, ‘Kaldor, Nicholas [Miklós], Baron Kaldor (1908–1986) 
’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004, 
accessed on: 18 December at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/39977. 
29 Daunton, Just Taxes, 281-289; Fielding, The Labour Party: Continuity and 
Change in the Making of ‘New’ Labour, 62-70; Steven Fielding, Labour and 
Cultural Change, ed. Steven Fielding and John W. Young, vol. 1, The Labour 
Governments 1964-70 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 87; 
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of Social Democracy in Britain: From Atlee to Brexit 53-55. 
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to pay for education or healthcare. Daunton suggests that these 
Labour figures may have had a point, arguing that the ‘“fiscal welfare 
state” was less redistributive than appeared at first sight’.31  
 
However, Fielding suggests that revisionist figures in Labour were 
already concerned that income tax could not be increased further.32 
As early as 1952 Roy Jenkins wrote that income tax had reached its 
limit in terms of significant redistribution from the rich, and that further 
increases in income taxes on the majority might undermine 
freedom.33 In 1956 Labour’s published social justice policy suggested 
that at current tax rates there was a danger of losing some 
professionals to other countries, even as it supported the principle of 
high progressive taxation in general.34 This directed the party 
 
31 Daunton, Just Taxes, 282. 
32 Fielding, The Labour Party: Continuity and Change in the Making of ‘New’ 
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was not offered a ministerial post until 1964 when he became minister of aviation 
after telling Wilson that he was considering leaving politics to become editor of the 
Economist. In November 1967 Wilson made him chancellor. He was elected 
deputy leader in 1970 but resigned in 1972 over EEC entry. Callaghan tried later to 
persuade him to return as chancellor but by that point he was committed to going 
to Brussels as EEC president where he remained until 1981. On his return to 
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Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2014, accessed 
on: 6 January at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/88739. 
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towards support for inheritance, capital gains, and wealth taxes, as 
well as the expenditure tax proposed by Kaldor.35 Daunton argues 
that Labour aimed to transform their reputation in this period from the 
party of high taxes to the party of fairer taxes.36 Crosland suggested 
another way in 1956, when he argued that growth would painlessly 
fund increased spending without the need for tax increases.37 This 
was the route that Hugh Gaitskell tried to take, unsuccessfully, at the 
1959 election.38 
 
Press coverage of the 1959 election 
 
Concerned that the Conservatives would attack them on their tax and 
spending policies, as they had done in 1955, Gaitskell promised 
towards the end of the 1959 election campaign that Labour would not 
 
35 Daunton, Just Taxes, 282-284. 
36 Ibid., 284-285. 
37 Crosland, ‘The Future of Socialism ’. See also: Tomlinson, ‘It’s the Economy, 
Stupid! Labour and the Economy, Circa 1964’, 338. 
38 Hugh Todd Naylor Gaitskell (1906-1963) was the leader of the Labour party from 
1955 to 1963. After Winchester College and Oxford, Gaitskell joined the Labour 
party around the general strike of 1926. In 1928 he was appointed to a lectureship 
in political economy at University College London and remained there until 1939, 
having become a reader and head of the department in 1938. Gaitskell was 
adopted as Labour candidate for Chatham in autumn 1932 but was defeated at the 
1935 election. During the war he worked for Hugh Dalton as a temporary civil 
servant in the Ministry of Economic Warfare from 1940 and at the Board of Trade 
from 1942. He was elected MP for South Leeds at the 1945 election and became 
minister of fuel and power in 1947. In February 1950 he was promoted to minister 
for economic affairs and then in October to chancellor. His decision to include NHS 
charges in the 1951 budget caused a political row and led to the resignations of 
Bevan and Wilson. Gaitskell succeeded Attlee as leader after the 1955 election. In 
the aftermath of defeat at the 1959 election Gaitskell decided to attempt to repeal 
clause 4, which committed the party to nationalisation. He was defeated on this 
and increasingly at odds with the leadership of the major unions. A challenge by 
Wilson for the leadership was unsuccessful in 1960 and Gaitskell managed to 
largely reunite the party before his death in January 1963. See: Brian Brivati, 
‘Gaitskell, Hugh Todd Naylor (1906–1963)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 




increase income tax and would fund spending increases through 
growth. A few days later, possibly by accident, documents 
accompanying a speech by General Secretary Morgan Phillips stated 
that Labour would not increase purchase tax either. The 
Conservatives painted these promises as irresponsible election 
bribes and they were widely seen as the turning point in a campaign 
that had seemed to be going Labour’s way.39 However, in their later 
assessment Butler and Rose concluded that the major issue had, 
once again, been economic competence: 
In so far as the income-tax and purchase-tax pledges lost votes, it was 
because they tended to bring to the surface latent doubts about the party’s 
financial capabilities.40 
 
Press discussions about tax had changed dramatically since the 
1950 election — the focus on the terrible burden of taxation and the 
urgent need for tax reductions, then so prominent, had almost 
entirely disappeared by 1959. The right-leaning press did attack 
Labour vociferously on their tax record and the costings of their 
manifesto promises.41 At times, the Express, particularly, appeared to 
be operating as the Conservative party’s unofficial advertising 
team.42 However, there were very few suggestions that the level of 
 
39 David Butler and Richard Rose, The British General Election of 1959 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), 59-62, 198-199; Fielding, Labour and 
Cultural Change, 1, 63-64. 
40 Butler and Rose, The British General Election of 1959 62. 
41 See for example: ‘The Economic Issues’, Economist, 12 September 1959; John 
Applebey, ‘Stable Prices Versus Hidden Costs’, Daily Telegraph, 2 October 1959; 
‘The 10s. Bribe’, Daily Mail, 23 September 1959; J. E. S Simon Q. C., ‘How Not to 
Vote: Mr Gaitskell's Albatross’, Spectator, 25 September 1959; Mark Bonham 
Carter, ‘The Rewards of Stupidity’, ibid. 
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personal taxation was currently too high, and those there were came 
almost exclusively from Labour politicians.43  
 
Press representations of popular opposition to tax also declined. 
None of the articles found in the right-leaning or centrist papers 
suggested that people were dissatisfied with the level of taxation or 
particularly wanted tax cuts, which is striking when compared to the 
large number in 1949-50.44 There were a few reports of polling which 
mentioned tax but it was not the focus.45 What discussions of popular 
attitudes there were in the right-leaning papers centred on fears 
about Labour increasing taxes if they were elected and the argument 
that voters disliked, or disbelieved, Labour’s promises not to increase 
income or purchase tax. In general, articles agreed that Labour’s 
arguments would not convince the electorate.46 The Economist, for 
example, argued: 
Among the floating voters of Britain there must be a few hundred 
thousands who do not really believe that Labour can increase spending by 
the amount it promises, fulfil Mr. Gaitskell's extraordinary pledge that a 
Labour government would never again increase income tax "under normal 
peacetime conditions," bring interest rates down, and avoid inflation, all at 
 
Daily Telegraph, 17 September 1959. 
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the same time.47 
 
The left-leaning papers discussed popular attitudes slightly more, but 
still very rarely.48 The only direct statement that people were opposed 
to taxation and wanted tax cuts came from the Guardian, which 
suggested immediately after the election that a cut in personal 
taxation ‘would please taxpayers everywhere’.49 The Mirror published 
a series of cartoons in which two men tried to conceal their winnings 
from the Inland Revenue while their local tax office pursued them, 
which again suggested opposition, though indirectly.50  
 
Two articles in the Guardian and New Statesman also suggested that 
taxation had been a factor in Labour’s defeat.51 The Guardian stated, 
for example:  
Labour's conversion to economic expansion and level taxation seemed 
almost too sudden. It will have to explain more fully and frequently how it 
intends to keep the country prosperous.52 
However, other articles highlighted prosperity and nationalisation as 
the key factors.53 Most articles about the election result and tax 
confined themselves to reporting Labour’s internal inquests.54 
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Despite the high profile of taxation during the campaign, journalists 
did not argue that it had been decisive in deciding the election result. 
 
Why press coverage had changed is hard to determine conclusively. 
One possibility is that it was a response to actual changes in tax 
levels. The standard rate of income tax had initially increased after 
1951 but then fell slightly (see fig. 7).55 However, Johnson et al argue 
that the standard rate is not a good reflection of actual income tax 
liability, as it does not take into account allowances, among other 
things. They produced a simulation to estimate effective tax rates — 
the actual proportion of a person’s income paid in tax.56 It indicates 
that effective income tax liability for industrial workers on average 
earnings actually increased from around 1953 onwards, although 
rates for single men dipped slightly ahead of the election in 1959 
(see fig. 8).57  
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Figure 7. Standard rate of income tax, 1945-2000 
Source: Mitchell, B. R. British Historical Statistics Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011, 645; Institute for Fiscal Studies. ‘Fiscal Facts: Tax and 
Benefits.’ Institute for Fiscal Studies, https://www.ifs.org.uk/tools_and_resources/
fiscal_facts.  
Figure 8: Standard and effective income tax rates for workers 
earning average incomes in the UK, 1949-1999 
Source: Johnson, Paul, Frances Lynch, and John Geoffrey Walker. ‘Income Tax 
and Elections in Britain, 1950–2001.’ Electoral Studies 24, no. 3, 400. 
 
The top marginal rate, however, fell from 97.5 percent in 1950 to 
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88.75 in 1959.58 Johnson et al’s simulation also indicates that the 
highest-income single taxpayers saw the most significant fall in their 
tax liabilities around 1959. Up to that point their tax liabilities had 
fluctuated but had not risen, as they had for those on lower incomes 
(see fig. 9).59 In 1960 the Conservative Research Department also 
suggested that those on incomes between £800 and £3000 per 
annum (approximately 150 to 600 percent of average income) had 
benefited most from their direct tax changes, while direct tax liability 
for those on the lowest incomes had increased.60 No significant 
changes were made to purchase tax, and although both income and 
purchase tax declined slightly as a percentage of GDP through the 
1950s, the decline was incredibly small.61 It does not appear, 
therefore, that press coverage was responding to an actual reduction 
in tax levels for the majority. 
 
58 Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 508-510. 
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Figure 9: Effective tax rates for a single man at various 
proportions of average earnings in the UK, 1949-99 
Source: Johnson, Paul, Frances Lynch, and John Geoffrey Walker. ‘Income Tax 
and Elections in Britain, 1950–2001.’ Electoral Studies 24, no. 3, 401. 
 
However, journalists were unlikely to have had access to detailed 
analysis of effective income tax rates and were presumably basing 
their reporting largely on headline rates and government statements. 
It seems plausible, therefore, that they could have thought that tax 
levels had fallen based on the cuts in the standard and marginal 
rates. That they may have been included in the group whose 
effective income tax rate had fallen could also have reinforced this.62 
 
The majority of the right-leaning papers were owned in this period by 
a small number of extremely wealthy families.63 Their material 
 
62 Salary data for 1959 was not available but reports in the Times suggested that in 
1962 the lowest paid national journalists were earning approximately 175 percent 
of average earnings. Our Labour correspondent, ‘Journalists Press Pay Claim’, 
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Rothermere family at the Daily Mail; and Lord Beaverbrook at the Daily Express. 
See: Curran and Seaton, Power without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and 
the Internet in Britain, 67; Roy Greenslade, Press Gang: How Newspapers Make 
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interests were clearly better served by Conservative tax policies and 
they therefore had an incentive to encourage their papers to endorse 
Conservative messaging on taxation. That this may have been a 
factor is perhaps supported by the fact that the Herald and Guardian 
were the only national papers examined here that were not owned or 
controlled by wealthy families, and they were also the only papers to 
state that there was popular opposition to taxation.64 However, the 
number of discussions of popular attitudes to tax was so small 
compared to 1949-50 that the general picture is clearly one of decline 
across the range of papers studied, regardless of ownership. 
 
A final possibility is that journalists had evidence suggesting that 
attitudes to taxation had changed. Opinion research was not 
extensive or methodologically rigorous in this period. Perhaps the 
most reliable survey evidence on attitudes to tax had been produced 
by the GSS for the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and 
Income, published in 1954.65 This did not suggest widespread 
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morale and evaluate government programmes. The WSS’s attempts to start 
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opposition to the level or structure of taxation, although the questions 
on attitudes to tax were limited.66 It could have contributed to an idea 
that people were not concerned about taxation. However, the results 
do not seem to have been widely reported; only one press report was 
found, in the Guardian, and that did not mention the findings on 
attitudes to PAYE.67 Polling reported during the 1959 election also 
suggested that tax was not a major concern.68 However, polls had 
shown broadly the same thing during the 1950 election and this had 
not prevented the papers from extensively focusing on popular 
opposition.69 
 
Press coverage of taxation and popular attitudes to tax had changed 
significantly by the 1959 election. Complaints about tax levels had 
declined drastically, appearing almost exclusively in relation to the 
threat of a tax rises under a Labour government. Representations of 
popular opposition to tax had also almost entirely disappeared. This 
was a major shift since 1949-50. Although effective income tax levels 
for the majority had not fallen, headline rates had been reduced, and 
effective rates had declined for those on higher incomes. Lack of 
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information about effective tax rates and a potential decline in their 
own, and contacts’, tax liabilities could have supported the idea that 
tax levels had fallen and opposition decreased. This did align neatly 
with the interests of most of the papers’ owners, but the shift seems 
too extensive to have been purely the result of owners’ preferences. 
The available evidence is insufficient to determine the cause of this 
shift, but the disappearance of representations of popular opposition 
does not appear to have been the result of any formal evidence that 
popular attitudes had changed. 
 
Political representations of popular attitudes to tax around 
the 1959 election 
 
Press coverage could also have been following politicians’ 
statements about taxation and popular attitudes. It is logical that the 
Conservatives would not have been arguing that taxes were currently 
far too high after eight years in power. Their manifesto promised to 
reduce the burden of taxation as far as possible, but Conservative 
politicians’ comments in the press were limited to statements that 
they had cut taxes in the past and Labour would increase them (see 
image 2 for an example of their election advertising).70 However, 
Gaitskell argued numerous times during the election campaign that 
taxes on earned income were too heavy. These comments were 
reported, but did not change the content of the papers’ opinion 
pieces, editorials and articles.71 While it seems plausible that the 
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right-leaning papers would have followed the Conservative party’s 
lead on taxes, the shift also appears in the left-leaning papers 
studied, despite Labour’s comments.72 It does not appear, therefore, 
that politicians’ statements entirely explain the disappearance from 
press reporting of the argument that tax was overly heavy. 
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Image 2: Conservative election poster, 1959 




The change in press discussions of popular attitudes to tax was not 
clearly mirrored in the political parties, TUC, or FBI in 1959 either. 
Their comments showed little change compared to 1949-50. 
Conservative politicians and researchers seem still to have believed 
that people thought taxation was too high. In late 1959 a crossed-out 
section in a draft on tax policy suggested they should look into how ‘it 
could be made clear that the tax burden is not as heavy as is often 
supposed’.73 Robert Hall, director of the economic section of the 
Cabinet Office, also reported in his diaries that the chancellor, Derick 
Heathcoat Amory, was ‘extremely depressed’ after the 1959 budget 
because it had ‘not made the Government more popular’. Hall 
suggested that ‘he did not allow for the fact that when everyone 
expects tax reductions, you don’t get much thanks’, implying that the 
chancellor expected tax cuts to be popular.74 Finally, a report on tax 
policy in January 1960 stated that an increase in taxation would be 
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‘most unfortunate’ and ‘undermine the whole of our argument from 
prosperity’.75 
 
However, Conservative politicians also continued to express concern 
about perceptions of fairness and assumed that the cost of living was 
an equally, or more, important issue.76 The former Financial 
Secretary Sir Jocelyn Simon suggested just after the 1959 election 
that they would probably have to accompany any cut in surtax with a 
tax on short-term capital gains, stating: 
The ordinary working man cannot understand why his overtime earnings 
should attract the full standard rate of tax, while a successful stock 
exchange speculation should escape tax free.77   
The Financial Secretary, Edward Boyle, agreed.78 The 1960 policy 
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report also stated that ‘Public opinion polls repeatedly show that the 
cost of living is far [sic] the most important political issue’.79   
 
As demonstrated by this comment, the Conservative party continued 
to consult surveys and more informal evidence of popular attitudes 
around 1959.80 In 1958, multiple letters were filed from individuals 
and party activists stating that they or others felt that taxes were too 
high.81 The Manchester Conservative Association forwarded a letter 
from the managing director of a large Manchester company in August 
1958, which stated that the Conservative party had let industry down, 
that they were over-taxed, and the 1958 reforms had increased taxes 
on their profits as well.82 A report on the Rochdale by-election in 
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1958, however, found that the cost of living was by far the most 
important reason people gave for their voting behaviour, while the 
‘level of taxation’ was near the bottom of the list. The report also 
stated that: 
As is normally found in public opinion work, the electorate were in favour of 
spending more on some items of public expenditure and at the same time 
were in favour of reducing taxation.83 
Internal Conservative polling suggested that tax cuts were popular 
but so were services, and that taxation was not a particularly 
important issue for voters. This was very similar to what their 
research had shown around 1950.84  
 
The Conservative Research Department did not seem convinced that 
tax had lost Labour the election either, although they did think that 
Labour’s promise not to increase taxes was a tactical error.85 James 
Douglas thought the Labour promises on taxation had been ‘crazy’ 
and that they had ‘panicked’. However, he also argued that attacking 
Labour on the cost of their policies had been dangerous as it 
potentially undermined their argument on prosperity — if the country 
was so prosperous, why couldn’t it afford increased spending?86 A 
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few weeks later Douglas argued that they had won the election 
almost entirely because Labour had failed to shake their ‘bogeyman’ 
image.87 Michael Fraser’s CRD report similarly played down the 
importance of taxation in the overall result, although, again, he 
thought it had been a good point for the Conservatives.88 The CRD 
assessment of the reasons for their 1959 victory was generally that 
Labour’s tax promises had been a mistake but largely unimportant 
compared to broader socio-economic trends which were shrinking 
Labour’s natural base.89 Overall, Conservative conversations about 
popular attitudes to tax in 1959 were very similar to those in 1949-50, 
despite the changes in their external statements about the levels of 
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Labour was focusing a significant amount of attention on tax policy 
before the 1959 election. Two working parties were set up, one 
focusing on tax avoidance and evasion and the other on profits and 
income taxation.90 Whiting suggests that the focus on avoidance and 
evasion was partly driven by electoral considerations, as it allowed 
them to unify working- and middle-class voters against those with 
unearned income who could avoid tax.91 Key Labour figures do seem 
to have thought that fairness, particularly in relation to avoidance and 
evasion, was crucial. The avoidance group’s report, written by P C 
Gordon Walker, argued, for example: 
I strongly urge that we feature an attack on tax avoidance in our pre-
election and election propaganda … It would coincide with a widespread 
feeling that take-over bids, expense accounts, etc. have reached 
unsavoury proportions.92  
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However, it also suggested that fairness could cut both ways: 
We must not appear mean and vindictive. We must not underrate the 
British sense of fairness even towards the rich.93  
Richard Crossman suggested in April 1959 that public ‘revulsion from 
a selfish egotistical Budget’ had been a major opportunity for Labour, 
which they had missed because many Labour MPs instincts on tax 
were the same as the Conservatives:  
Macmillan has made a major psychological and political blunder, 
completely misjudging the mood and moral sense of the British people … 
But the misjudgement on which it was based was, as usual, shared to a 
large extent by a large number of Labour M.Ps and members of the 
Shadow Cabinet. One has only to read the speeches made last Tuesday, 
where Labour Members were speaking off the cuff … to see that they were 
enormously impressed by the Budget concessions and only just mentioned 
the old age pensioners, the sick and the unemployed.94  
 
Crossman, of course, had his own stake in Labour’s internal 
ideological battles. However, key Labour figures did seem to think 
that tax cuts were popular. Gordon Walker went on to suggest in the 
avoidance report that a ‘broader official policy of widening the tax-
base and lowering marginal rates’ would ‘make more acceptable 
whatever we do about expenses’.95 He does not, therefore, seem to 
have thought concerns about fairness overrode the desire for tax 
cuts. Barbara Castle also made a strong assertion of popular 
opposition to income tax in her 1959 conference speech, stating: 
And when we try to attack these inequalities through the social services we 
find that the wage-earners they are designed to help have become their 
enemy because they have to carry the main burden of financing them 
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Finally, Crossman also reported in August that he had discussed 
Labour’s pensions scheme with Gaitskell, who had told him: 
“I shouldn’t worry about morals if I were you. What people want to hear is 
how little they will pay and how much they will get from our scheme”.97 
 
Labour’s strategy during the 1959 election seemed to combine this 
mix of tax cuts and fairness. Their manifesto argued that a 
combination of growth, a capital gains tax, and a crackdown on tax 
avoidance would pay for increased spending.98 During the campaign, 
Gaitskell promised to lift the ‘very heavy’ burden of taxation on ‘those 
who really earn their money properly, by the sweat of their hands and 
by their brains’. He was careful to stress that this included 
professionals.99 Gaitskell also, of course, promised not to increase 
income tax. Crossman suggested that this pledge was an attempt to 
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forestall Conservative attacks that Labour was going to increase 
taxation.100 He reported that Labour MPs and officials believed at the 
time that the pledge had been damaging and might have lost them 
the election, although he thought the purchase tax promise, though 
apparently accidental, might actually have improved things: 
… since ordinary people felt it was quite normal for Labour to reduce 
purchase tax on essentials, unlike their reaction to our income tax 
pledge.101  
He was also personally unsure whether the tax pledges would have a 
major impact: 
I deeply dislike Hugh’s behaviour … On the other hand, nothing I saw in 
Coventry … gave me any indication that, on that level, anybody was 
noticing what was going on!102 
 
By October 1959, Crossman thought that the tax promises had been 
important but at least in part because they had allowed the 
Conservatives to ‘revive all the other fears’ about Labour, such as 
nationalisation and foreign affairs.103 Press reports and opinion 
pieces by Labour figures referenced tax but also other issues, 
including prosperity, the decline of class identification, and 
nationalisation.104 The Herald, for example, reported that Labour MPs 
and party agents thought they had lost the election because of 
prosperity and taxes: 
Prosperity - the hire purchase way - won the election for the Tories. People 
with heavy commitments … feared that the Labour programme, though 
good, might be to [sic] ambitious and result in inflationary pressure or 
higher taxation.105  
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Gaitskell argued in his 1959 conference speech that taxation was not 
a factor, suggesting that the key issues were affluence and 
combating Conservative propaganda, particularly around 
nationalisation.106 Given that the income tax pledge was generally 
viewed as his mistake, Gaitskell did have an incentive to argue that it 
had not been a factor. In his defence, however, a note on Mark 
Abrams’s post-election survey the following year did not even 
mention tax, instead discussing the increasing numbers of voters 
identifying as middle class, home ownership, and nationalisation.107 
In Must Labour Lose?, the published version of Abrams’s survey, Rita 
Hinden suggested that Labour had lost because it was seen as a 
class party, nationalisation was unpopular, and the leadership was 
seen as weak and divided.108 In the immediate aftermath of the 
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election it seems that the majority view in the Labour party was that 
the tax pledges damaged Labour’s credibility, but were not the most 
important factor. Later studies seem to have placed even less 
emphasis on taxation. 
 
Apart from this post-election work by Abrams, there was, again, little 
evidence of attempts to access evidence of popular attitudes to tax in 
the Labour party around 1959. Whiting reports that David Worswick, 
one of the economists involved in the working party on profits and 
income taxation, recalled in 1995:  
… the decisive moment came when Douglas Jay made a powerful 
statement to the effect that ordinary people liked to have their tax 
payments behind them when they thought of spending, not still ahead of 
them. When an MP invokes the British working man or the people, the 
professional economist has no comeback, or did not in those days before 
polls on everything.109  
Although they had some evidence about popular attitudes in the 
aftermath of the election, in general, Labour politicians seemed 
willing to make definite statements about popular attitudes to tax with 
limited evidence. Overall, their comments were broadly similar to 
those in 1950 — they assumed widespread popular opposition to tax 
but also emphasised the importance of fairness.  
 
FBI and TUC representations of popular attitudes were almost non-
existent in 1959. In the case of the FBI this was not a marked shift 
since few comments on popular attitudes were found in 1949-50 
either. It was more of a change for the TUC. Ahead of both the 1958 
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and 1959 budgets, the TUC advocated purchase tax cuts over 
income tax cuts, supported income tax cuts only for low incomes, 
and strongly opposed cuts for high incomes, as they had in 1949-
50.110 However, no TUC representations of popular, or their 
members’, attitudes to tax were found.  
 
This does not seem to have been a response to changing attitudes 
among their membership; the TUC continued to receive letters from 
individuals, unions, and councils complaining about the level of 
taxation and advocating tax cuts.111 Most TUC references to popular 
attitudes to tax occurred in relation to wage restraint in 1949-50. The 
decline in representations of popular attitudes to tax may, therefore, 
have been primarily a strategic decision in relation to wage restraint. 
A memo from civil servant Robert Hall in August 1960 suggested he 
had little faith in the TUC’s ability to deliver wage restraint:  
The T.U.C. always tell us how important it is to lower prices, including 
purchase tax reductions … But they have never been in a position to 
promise anything in return for stable prices, even if the Government had 
been able and willing to offer these.112  
On the other hand, Daunton suggests the Conservatives became 
more concerned about wage restraint after the 1958 resignation of 
Peter Thorneycroft as chancellor.113 TUC arguments about attitudes 
 
110 ‘Press Release on 1958 Budget, 26 February 1958’, MSS.292 410.2/3, (TUC, 
MRC), 1958; ‘Trades Union Congress: Statement on the 1958 Budget, 13th May 
1958’, MSS.292 410.2/3, (TUC, MRC), 1958; ‘Trades Union Congress: The 
Economic Situation and the 1959 Budget. Econ. Ctee 5/8. 11th February 1959’, 
MSS.292 410.2/3, (TUC, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1959; 
‘Press Release on 1959 Budget, 8 April 1959’, MSS.292 410.2/3, (TUC, Modern 
Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1959. 
111 See for example: ‘Letter from F L Haxell, Electrical Trades Union to Vincent 
Tewson, 20 October 1958’, MSS 292 411.1/3, (TUC, MRC), 1958; ‘Letter from W H 
Tooes to L Murray, 15 January 1959’, MSS 292 411/2, (TUC, MRC), 1959; ‘Letter 
from P R Switzer, Southport Trades Council, 17 April 1959’, MSS 292 410.2/3, 
(TUC, MRC), 1959. 
112 ‘Memorandum from Robert Hall to Frank Lee, 30th August 1960’. The National 
Archives (TNA) T 230/590, 1960. 
113 Daunton, Just Taxes, 241n. See also: Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 
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to tax and wage restraint could therefore have declined as a result of 
either a lack of receptivity to those arguments, or because they 
believed there was already sufficient concern about wage restraint 
and they did not need to make explicit links with their members’ 
attitudes. However, with so few comments in either period, this could 
also simply be natural variation and it is hard to draw any firm 
conclusions. The TUC’s policy positions did not seem to have 
changed significantly, nor did communications from their members 
suggest any change in their attitudes to tax.   
 
Labour and Conservative politicians and researchers continued to 
assume popular opposition to tax increases, although again with a 
significant emphasis on fairness and an awareness that the cost of 
living was potentially a more important issue. TUC and FBI 
discussions of popular attitudes to tax had, perhaps, slightly declined, 
but they were also very limited in 1949-50 so it is hard to say whether 
this marked a real shift. Unlike in the national press coverage, 
discussions of popular attitudes to tax in the other organisations 
studied here did not seem to have changed significantly by 1959 
compared to 1949-50.  
 




155. George Edward Peter Thorneycroft (1909-1994) was a barrister and 
Conservative politician. He was elected MP for Stafford in 1938 and then 
Monmouth in 1945. He was president of the Board of Trade from 1951 to 1957, 
chancellor of the exchequer 1957-1958, minister of aviation 1960-1962, and 
minister of defence 1962 to 1964. He served as shadow home secretary from 1964 
to 1966. In 1966 he was made a peer, later serving as chairman of the party from 
1975 to 1981. See: Daunton, Just Taxes, 233n; Alan Howarth, ‘Obituary: Lord 
Thorneycroft’, Independent, 5 June 1994. 
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There were, however, some signs of change in ideas about popular 
attitudes to tax in the Conservative party and, to a lesser extent, the 
civil service around the 1961 budget. Lowe states that Conservative 
Research Department polling in the early 1960s suggested support 
for higher taxes over spending cuts among not just trade unionists 
but also the floating voters that their electoral strategy was targeting. 
He argues that this ‘transformed thinking within the CRD’ and states: 
Tax cuts were dropped as a policy priority for the first time in 1960 and 
replaced a year later by “adequacy of services”.114  
 
Key figures within the CRD did start to argue that people were now 
more concerned about services than tax cuts in late 1961.115 This 
shift seems to have happened fairly quickly. In August 1960 the 
Taxation Policy Committee’s report argued: 
One day, of course, we may reach a position where it would be foolish to 
expect any further reduction in the proportion of the national income taken 
in taxation. But there is still a widespread and not unreasonable feeling, 
both among our active Party workers and in influential sections of the 
Press, that we have not yet reached that position; that the burden of 
taxation is still too high … While the public and the Party will always accept 
an occasional standstill Budget with no more than a little grumbling, if the 
process of tax reduction is not resumed there is likely to be, to say the 
least, very considerable dissatisfaction among many of our supporters both 
in the House and throughout the country.116 
By November 1961, however, the committee’s report ahead of the 
1962 budget stated that they realised that ‘for a good many people, 
 
114 Lowe, ‘Modernizing Britain’s Welfare State: The Influence of Affluence, 1957-
1964’, 44-46. 
115 ‘Taxation Policy 1962. Final Draft, 1 November 1961’, CRD 3/7/26/3, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1961; ‘Taxation 1963, 10 
December 1962’, CRD 3/7/26/3, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian 
Library), 1962; ‘Letter from Brendon Sewill to James Douglas, 27 October 1961’, 
CRD 3/7/26/3, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1961. 
116 ‘Taxation Policy Committee. Draft Report, 30 August 1960’, CRD 3/7/26/2, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1960. It is also interesting 
that they seemed concerned about journalists’ attitudes given the coverage of the 
1959 election. This could suggest that the press coverage in 1959 was an anomaly 
or that the press was more critical of the Conservative government’s tax policy 
outside election campaigns. 
 
153 
the urgency has gone out of tax reduction’.117 A month earlier 
Brendon Sewill had written even more clearly to James Douglas: 
I think most people are now much less worried about taxation and much 
more worried about the adequacy of the public services and expenditure 
…118  
This shift seems to have been significant and rapid — Conservative 
researchers appear to have moved from assuming significant 
opposition to taxation to arguing that people cared more about 
spending than tax cuts within the space of a year.  
 
Party conference reports do not indicate that this shift was driven by 
changing attitudes in the Conservative grassroots; there had been 
numerous resolutions calling for tax cuts through the 1950s and 
these continued into the early 1960s.119 It is possible, however, that 
Conservative politicians’ and researchers’ social circles may have 
 
117 ‘Taxation Policy 1962. Final Draft, 1 November 1961’, CRD 3/7/26/3, 
Conservative Party Archive, 1961. Their report ahead of the 1963 budget made the 
point even more strongly: ‘Taxation 1963, 10 December 1962’, CRD 3/7/26/3, 
Conservative Party Archive, 1962. 
118 ‘Letter from Brendon Sewill to James Douglas, 27 October 1961’, CRD 3/7/26/3, 
Conservative Party Archive, 1961. Brendon Sewill joined the Conservative 
Research Department in 1952, was head of the Economic Section from 1959 to 
1964 and director from 1965 to 1970. From 1970 to 1974 he was special assistant 
to the chancellor of the exchequer. He appears to have had some links to the 
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA); Sewill wrote a book published by the 
organisation with Ralph Harris in 1975. See: Brendon Sewill, ‘Reflections on the 
Demise of Full Employment’, Contemporary Record 9, no. 3 (1995): 1n; Arnold 
Beichman, ‘The Conservative Research Department: The Care and Feeding of 
Future British Political Elites’, Journal of British Studies 13, no. 2 (1974): 110n; 
Ralph Harris and Brendon Sewill, ‘British Economic Policy, 1970-74: Two Views’, 
(London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1975). 
119 See for example: Conservative Party, ‘76th Annual Conference Llandudno’, 
(London: National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 1956), 69-76; 
Conservative Party, ‘77th Annual Conference Brighton’, (London: National Union of 
Conservative and Unionist Associations, 1957), 39-44; Conservative Party, ‘78th 
Annual Conference Blackpool’, (London: National Union of Conservative and 
Unionist Associations, 1958), 38-45; Conservative Party, ‘79th Annual Conference 
Scarborough’, (London: National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 
1960), 88-105; Conservative Party, ‘80th Annual Conference Brighton’, (London: 
National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 1961), 77-82; 
Conservative Party, ‘81st Annual Conference Llandudno’, (London: National Union 
of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 1962), 96-103. 
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been a factor. Like journalists, their social contacts were likely to 
include many people whose effective, and headline, tax liabilities had 
declined in 1959. This could have reinforced perceptions that 
opposition to the level of taxation had decreased. It is not, however, 
clear, why this change would have occurred in 1961, when effective 
income tax liabilities for the wealthy seem to have started to rise 
again slightly.  
 
There is more evidence that this shift might have been based on 
polling, as Lowe argues. Some of the limited polling available did 
seem to show a willingness to pay higher taxes for increased 
spending.120 A psephology group was set up in 1960 to look into 
opinion research and touched on taxation. The first report of the 
group’s work stated that young voters were prepared to pay more 
taxes for services: 
… this age group even more than its elders wants to see more money 
spent … They are prepared to see higher taxation to pay for these 
things.121  
The psephology group also met with Mark Abrams in 1960 to discuss 
a recent survey he had conducted for Socialist Commentary. This 
suggested significant support for spending increases, although 
Abrams stated that this could be a result of the small sample size.122 
A CRD note on the Abrams survey also did not seem overly 
impressed by its methodology.123  
 
120 The Data Archive, ‘Database of Selected British Gallup Opinion Polls, 1958-
1991’. 
121 ‘First Report by the Psephology Group to the Chairman of the Conservative 
Party Organisation, 15th October 1960’, CRD 2/21/6, (Conservative Party Archive, 
Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1960. cited in Taylor, ‘“The Record of the 1950s Is 
Irrelevant”: The Conservative Party, Electoral Strategy and Opinion Research, 
1945-64’, 96. 
122 ‘Psephology Group: Minutes of the 7th Meeting Fo the Psephology Group Held 
in Mr. Butler's Room on Monday, 18th July, at 3.30 p.m.’, CRD 2/21/6, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1960. 




It is not clear that polling was showing any significant difference in 
attitudes to tax compared to 1949-50 — the psephology group note 
from 1963 emphasised how little those issues which people 
considered important seemed to have changed through the 1950s.124 
Lockwood suggests that the CRD started giving increasing weight to 
polling evidence as Conservative support declined from 1961.125 This 
could suggest that the shift was that key figures within the CRD were 
paying more attention to polling by 1961 rather than that the findings 
of that polling had changed significantly. It is hard to determine 
conclusively whether polling drove this change in Conservative ideas 
because CRD comments about popular attitudes to tax did not 
reference polling or any other evidence. If it was driven by polling it 
seems to have been the result of changes in the party’s use of 
survey evidence, rather than any clear shift in what it suggested 
about popular attitudes to tax. 
 
One civil servant was making similar comments about changing 
popular attitudes to tax. Assistant secretary to the Treasury David 
Butt argued in two memos in January 1961 that as the country got 
richer people were happy to pay more for services.126 In the second 
 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1960. 
124 ‘Psephology Report Reviewed in the Light of Current (March 1963) Conditions’, 
CRD 2/21/6, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1963. 
125 Lockwood, ‘‘Action Not Words’: The Conservative Party, Public Opinion and 
‘Scientific’ Politics, C.1945–70’. 
126 ‘Memorandum from D M B Butt to R Clarke, 2 January 1961’. The National 
Archives (TNA) T 298/65, 1961; ‘Memorandum from D M B Butt to R Clarke, 12 
January 1961’. The National Archives (TNA) T 298/65, 1961. David Miles 
Bensusan-Butt, (1914-1994) was an economist and civil servant. He studied under 
Keynes at Cambridge before being recruited as private secretary to Professor F A 
Lindemann (later Viscount Cherwell), personal assistant to Churchill in the War 
Cabinet in 1938. His work on the inaccuracy of aerial bombing was considered 
particularly important. After the war he worked in the Economic Section of the 
Cabinet Office (which later moved to the Treasury) until 1962, when he left the civil 
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he stated, for example: 
My instinct is that we and Ministers will get in a mess if we don't accept 
that the public wants some services to expand as the economy expands 
and doesn't mind paying.127   
Butt provided no evidence for his arguments and it is unclear where 
this idea originated. He made these arguments significantly before 
they appeared in Conservative conversations. However, it is difficult 
to assess whether his arguments contributed to the shift in CRD 
views as no evidence of them being discussed was found. His were 
also the only civil service comments making this argument found 
around 1961. 
 
The far clearer message from civil servants to Conservative ministers 
around the 1961 budget was that they should be concerned about 
perceptions of fairness, again in terms of equal treatment. Civil 
servants on the Budget Committee agreed with the argument that tax 
cuts were needed to stimulate incentives and supported the priority 
placed on surtax reductions ahead of the 1961 budget. They 
repeatedly stressed, however, that surtax cuts would need to be 
offset by either cuts for low-income taxpayers or increases on 
companies or high earners. The committee favoured the introduction 
of a capital gains tax, which they believed would be both popular, fair, 
and efficient, though they accepted Chancellor Selwyn Lloyd’s 
argument that it was both administratively and politically 
impossible.128 The committee members seemed to get increasingly 
 
service. See: Simon Shorvon, ‘Obituary: David Bensusan-Butt’, Independent, 5 
April 1994. 
127 ‘Memorandum from D M B Butt to R Clarke, 12 January 1961’. T 298/65, 1961. 
128 ‘Budget Committee: Minutes of a Meeting Held in Sir Frank Lee's Room at 3 
p.m. on Wednesday, 15th June 1960’. The National Archives (TNA) T 171/515, 
1960; ‘Budget Committee: Minutes of a Meeting Held in Sir Frank Lee's Room at 
10 a.m. on Thursday, 22nd September 1960’. The National Archives (TNA) T 
171/515, 1960; ‘Budget Committee: Minutes of a Meeting Held in Sir Frank Lee's 
Room at 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 12th October 1960’. The National Archives (TNA) 
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concerned as it appeared that the chancellor was going to cut surtax 
without any offsetting measures. One meeting report in March 1961 
recorded: 
Sir Thomas Padmore said that … there was a danger that even the 
Government's supporters would feel that the Chancellor had gone too far if 
he did as he proposed.129  
Although Butt argued that people were becoming less concerned 
about taxation and more concerned about the condition of services, 
the dominant line coming out of the civil service was that tax reforms 
would not be acceptable if they were seen as unfair. 
 
T 171/515, 1960; ‘Note of a Discussion at Dinner on the 5th January 1961’. The 
National Archives (TNA) T 171/515, 1961; ‘Budget Committee: Minutes of a 
Meeting Held in Sir Frank Lee's Room at 4 p.m. on Tuesday, 10th January, 1961’. 
The National Archives (TNA) T 171/515, 1961; ‘Budget Committee: Minutes of a 
Meeting Held in Sir Frank Lee's Room at 4.15 p.m. on Tuesday, 31st January, 
1961’. The National Archives (TNA) T 171/515, 1961; Hall, The Robert Hall Diaries 
1954-1961, 260-261. The Board of Inland Revenue made similar arguments. See: 
‘Memorandum by the Board of Inland Revenue: Long-Term Programme of Tax 
Changes, 28 October 1960’. The National Archives (TNA) T 171/515, 1960. (John) 
Selwyn Brooke Lloyd, Baron Selwyn-Lloyd (1904-1978) was a barrister and 
Conservative politician. Initially a Liberal he broke with the party in 1931. In 1944 
he received an invitation from the Wirral Conservative Association to stand as their 
candidate despite not being a member of the Conservative party at the time, and 
was elected MP for the Wirral at the 1945 election. He was appointed minister of 
state at the Foreign Office in 1951 and then became minister of defence in April 
1955 and foreign secretary in December 1955. In 1960 he was made chancellor 
but was dismissed in 1962 after several unpopular policy changes including the 
1961 budget. Under Lord Home he was made lord privy seal and leader of the 
House of Commons. He was appointed speaker of the House of Commons in 1971 
before moving to the Lords in 1976. See: D. R. Thorpe, ‘Lloyd, (John) Selwyn 
Brooke, Baron Selwyn-Lloyd (1904–1978)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2011, accessed on: 18 December at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/31371. 
129 ‘Budget Committee: Minutes of a Meeting Held in Sir Frank Lee's Room at 4.40 
p.m. on Monday, 6th March, 1961’. The National Archives (TNA) T 171/515, 1961. 
See also: ‘Note by Sir Frank Lee on the Shape of the Budget, 9 March 1961’. The 
National Archives (TNA) T 171/515, 1961. Sir Thomas Padmore (1909-1996) was 
a civil servant. He joined the Inland Revenue in 1931 and transferred to the 
Treasury in 1934. He was principal private secretary to the chancellor from 1943 to 
1945 and was promoted second secretary in the Treasury in 1952 after Churchill 
had blocked a plan to promote him to cabinet secretary in 1951. Until 1962 he was 
largely in charge of personnel and management matters before moving to the 
Ministry of Transport as permanent secretary. See: Geoffrey Wardale, ‘Padmore, 
Sir Thomas (1909–1996)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 





Neither Selwyn Lloyd nor the wider Conservative party appear to 
have been unconcerned about perceptions of equity. Apart from 
anything else they believed, like Labour, that perceptions of fairness 
were key to achieving wage restraint.130 Ahead of the 1961 budget, 
the CRD recommended surtax cuts but also emphasised that they 
would be unpopular and should be combined with income tax cuts for 
low earners.131 When the Budget Committee argued that the 
chancellor should reduce the surtax threshold for both earned and 
unearned income, Selwyn Lloyd stated that he didn’t think he could 
do anything for unearned income after having increased the health 
stamp and prescription charges.132  
 
Despite this, Lloyd’s 1961 budget raised the surtax threshold for 
earned income from £2000 to £4000 and increased various indirect 
taxes, the NI NHS contribution and NHS charges, as well as the 
profits tax. It also gave the Chancellor the power to impose a 
surcharge on Customs and Excise duties and, temporarily, 
employers’ NI contributions to use as an economic regulator.133 Later 
 
130 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 117-118; Daunton, Just Taxes, 302-
303. 
131 ‘Taxation Policy 1961, 14 November 1960’, CRD 3/7/26/2, (Conservative Party 
Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1960; ‘Taxation Policy 1961. 2nd Draft, 23 
November 1960’, CRD 3/7/26/2, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian 
Library), 1960. 
132 ‘Budget: Inland Revenue Items. Note of a Meeting Held in the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer's Room at 4.30 p.m. on Tuesday, 28th February 1961’. The National 
Archives (TNA) T 171/515, 1961. 
133 Some of the NHS charges had first been introduced by Labour in 1951, when 
they caused a storm of protest within the party leading to the resignation of Nye 
Bevan. See: Daunton, Just Taxes, 225n, 266-267; Whiting, The Labour Party and 
Taxation, 105-106. Prescription charges were first introduced by the Conservatives 
in 1952, and they periodically increased all three charges between 1952 and 1961. 
See: Charles Webster, The National Health Service: A Political History (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 34-37; Daunton, Just Taxes, 225n, 266-267; 
Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 105-106. 
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in 1961 customs and excise duties were also raised by 10 percent. 
The failure to introduce a capital gains tax and the indirect tax and NI 
increases led to a significant backlash.134 The Budget Committee 
stated afterwards that it gave ‘appreciable concessions to the upper 
income groups but none at all for the lower income groups’.135 
Industry was also unimpressed by the increase in the profits tax. The 
opposition pushed Lloyd to announce that the government would 
introduce a short-term capital gains tax after all.136 Although 
Conservative politicians and researchers were clearly concerned 
about perceptions of equity, they still introduced a budget that was 
widely believed to be unfair. 
 
One explanation for this seems to lie in their priorities.137 A Taxation 
Policy Committee discussion of who was most deserving of tax cuts 
in June 1960 concluded: 
The worst pinch was in the £1000-2000 a year level, and perhaps a little 
above … In these cases there is not only an actual pinch, but a relative 
pinch in relation to the big rise in the standard of life of the working 
population since before the war.138 
James Douglas wrote in response: 
For the record I would like to say that I do not really agree with item 7  … 
My recollection was that we had decided that there was no really sound 
way in which we could determine where the shoe pinched most. We felt 
that from a political point of view, our supporters in the £1,000 to £2,000 
p.a. income bracket would be the people generating most pressure for tax 
reductions. We may well in fact have said something like what is recorded 
in the Minutes, but in black and white it looks a little blatant to say that the 
worst pinch was on people most obviously like the members of the 
 
134 Daunton, Just Taxes, 259-260. 
135 ‘Budget Committee: Minutes of a Meeting Held in Sir Frank Lee's Room at 4.00 
p.m. on Tuesday, 17th October, 1961’. The National Archives (TNA) T 171/592, 
1961. cited in Daunton, Just Taxes, 259-260. 
136 This came into effect in 1962. See: Daunton, Just Taxes, 259-260. 
137 Ibid., 258-259. 
138 ‘Taxation Policy Committee. Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Taxation Policy 
Committee Held at 24 Old Queen Street, at 3.30 p.m. on Thursday, 30th June, 
1960, with Covering Note by James Douglas’, CRD 3/7/26/2, (Conservative Party 




It is hard not to agree with him. Particularly given a note he wrote a 
few days later, which stated:  
The other thing that I think is striking is that right at the bottom end post-
war tax rates have hardly changed, indeed in real terms at the very earliest 
stages income tax is now actually higher than in 1946 … From a purely 
public relations point of view the main beneficiaries of post-war tax 
changes have been those in the £800 to £3,000 p.a. range. They are I 
think oblivious of this fact.140 
Given that Conservative politicians had this information, it is hard not 
to see their decision to cut surtax as either ideological, a strategic 
decision about retaining wealthy voters, or the product of conscious 
or unconscious bias. This was not a new focus for the Conservative 
party in 1960 — in 1957 Harold Macmillan had written to Michael 
Fraser: 
I am always hearing about the Middle Classes. What is it they really want? 
Can you put it down on a sheet of notepaper, and then I will see whether 
we can give it to them?141  
 
139 Ibid. 
140 ‘Changes in the Progressiveness of Taxation, 14 July 1960’, CRD 3/7/26/2, 
Conservative Party Archive, 1960. 
141 ‘Letter from Harold Macmillan to Michael Fraser, 17 February 1957’. The 
National Archives (TNA) PREM 11/1816, 1957. (Maurice) Harold Macmillan, first 
Earl of Stockton (1894-1986) was prime minister from 1957-1963. He was the son 
of Daniel Macmillan, co-founder of the publishing firm. After Eton, Oxford, and 
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year later. Macmillan was a moderate Conservative promoting Keynes’s ideas and 
supporting Lloyd George’s call for a ‘New Deal’. He was heavily defeated in 
Stockton at the 1945 election but was subsequently selected for the safe seat of 
Bromley which he won at a by-election later that year. Macmillan was made 
minister for local government and planning in 1951, charged with enacting the 
Conservative manifesto promise of building 300,000 houses a year which he 
achieved in 1953. When Eden became prime minister he was moved to foreign 
secretary. He was then unwillingly transferred to the Treasury as chancellor in 
1955. In 1957 Macmillan was unexpectedly chosen to replace Eden as prime 
minister instead of R A Butler despite having come out of the Suez crisis with his 
reputation severely damaged. Macmillan’s government was weakened by 
resignations and scandals, including the Profumo affair, and he decided to resign in 
1963 recommending Lord Home as his successor. See: H. C. G.  Matthew, 
‘Macmillan, (Maurice) Harold, First Earl of Stockton (1894–1986)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2011, accessed on: 7 
January at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/40185. 
 
161 
It is, however, important context for the 1961 budget decisions. 
 
Similar explanations could be advanced in respect of civil service 
support for surtax cuts. It is noticeable that at a Budget Committee 
meeting in September 1960, one attendee used his experience 
working in the City to argue that it was the starting point of surtax that 
was the issue not the top rate.142 In the same meeting Sir Robert Hall 
argued that ‘it was reasonable to assume that those who earned the 
largest salaries were of the greatest productive value to the 
community’.143 
 
Labour discussions did not seem to have changed, although 
conversations about popular attitudes to tax in the party do not seem 
to have been extensive around 1961, which could perhaps in itself 
suggest less concern about popular opposition. The comments that 
were found continued to highlight the importance of fairness. In a 
1961 memo about the findings of the 1959 working parties, Labour 
MP Douglas Houghton argued that the way to change Labour’s 
image as the party of high taxation was to recast themselves as the 
party of fair taxation, though he did not specify exactly what this 
meant.144 Douglas Jay also argued in his 1962 book Socialism in the 
 
142 ‘Budget Committee: Minutes of a Meeting Held in Sir Frank Lee's Room at 10 
a.m. on Thursday, 22nd September 1960’. T 171/515, 1960. 
143 Ibid. Hansard recorded in 1960 that a ‘principal’ civil servant was earning on 
average £2,375 a year, while an executive officer was earning £1,140. The average 
salary was £545. That put an executive officer on over 200 percent of average 
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Prices Then? (New Series)’; Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 69. 
144 ‘Finance & Economic Policy Sub-Committee. Taxation of Profits and Income 
Proposals for Reform: Memorandum by Douglas Houghton, M.P., April 1961’, RD 
139 April, (Labour Party, Labour Party Archive, People’s History Museum), 1961. 
(Arthur Leslie Noel) Douglas Houghton (1898-1996) was general secretary of the 
Inland Revenue Staff Federation (IRSF), which he helped to found, from 1922 to 
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New Society that tax avoidance would link manual workers and 
salary earners against those with unearned income.145 
 
However, when Crossman reviewed Jay’s book he expressed 
scepticism that a focus on avoidance would negate opposition to high 
taxation and suggested that the business community would not pay 
high taxes without complaint.146 He suggested that Jay had a 
‘masochistic passion for high taxation’.147 In his 1961 memo 
Houghton also suggested that Labour was seen as the party of high 
taxation and that capital taxation was fundamentally unpopular if 
people’s savings were taxed.148 A year later, in a memo about capital 
 
and educated at a grammar school, he joined the IR in 1915. Houghton had 
become well known before his election as a contributor to the BBC Home Service 
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Government and then promoted to lord president of the council and leader of the 
House of Commons in 1966. From 1968 to 1970 Crossman was minister at the 
Department of Health and Security and after the 1970 defeat editor of the New 
Statesman, from which he was dismissed in 1972. Posthumously he was 
particularly famous for his political diaries, which were the first to provide a detailed 
insight into the internal workings of the Cabinet. See: Anthony Howard, ‘Crossman, 
Richard Howard Stafford (1907–1974)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2011, accessed on: 6 January at 
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gains tax, Houghton advocated caution, stating again that Labour 
was seen as the party of heavy taxation and that: 
It has been our view that precise definition is undesirable in public 
utterances on what Labour would do about taxation … The Chancellor's 
own venture into this field should not be allowed to tempt us to go too far in 
threatening the wrath to come.149  
 
It is unclear what evidence these statements were based on, if any. 
Although Tomlinson states that the 1959 election defeat made 
Labour more willing to use polling to look at popular attitudes and 
follow the results, this does not appear to have translated into 
attempts to access evidence of attitudes to tax.150 Abrams’s survey 
after the 1959 election showed 50 percent of respondents expressing 
qualified or unqualified support for raising taxes to fund spending 
increases versus 40 percent who expressed opposition.151 However, 
these findings did not appear to have any obvious impact on Labour 
discussions. It is noticeable as well that the conclusions in Must 
Labour Lose? were perhaps more tentative than might have been 
expected from the findings: 
To lop a few pence off the income tax has been considered a powerful 
political card. But it seems as if people could be persuaded otherwise - if 
the purposes were made clear.152 
Labour politicians’ comments about popular attitudes to tax around 
1961, though limited, seemed fairly similar to those in 1959 — 
assuming that fairness was key but also that there was a significant 
 
139 April, Labour Party, 1961. 
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151 Abrams, Rose, and Hinden, Must Labour Lose? , 19. 
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level of popular opposition to tax. Statements also again appeared to 
be largely based on individuals’ personal beliefs about popular 
attitudes, with little reference to evidence. 
 
One TUC statement potentially reflected the changing ideas in the 
Conservative party around 1961. Ahead of the 1961 budget the TUC 
statement to the chancellor, also distributed as a press release, 
stated:  
They [the General Council] consider that, if a choice must be made 
between increasing social service charges and increasing direct taxation in 
order to finance improvements in the social services - or a higher level of 
public investment — the community should and would be prepared to 
accept an increase in direct taxation.153  
There were a few conditions applied to this: that low incomes were 
protected; purchase tax was cut; benefits were increased; and a 
capital gains tax was introduced.154 Depending on who ‘the 
community’ referred to, this suggested that TUC members or the 
public more generally would support increased income tax to fund 
spending. This was not necessarily as much of a change as it first 
appeared; the TUC had advocated increases in the standard rate of 
income tax with similar conditions for several years in the early 
1950s. However, these comments had not included such an explicit 
declaration of ‘community’ attitudes.155  
 
This statement did not seem to reflect any change in attitudes within 
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154 ‘Trades Union Congress: The Economic Situation and the 1961 Budget. Econ. 
Ctee 5/2. 8th February 1961’, MSS.292B 410.2/1, (TUC, MRC), 1961. 
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their membership. The TUC continued to receive a large number of 
letters from trades unions and councils advocating income tax cuts or 
increased personal allowances.156 As in 1949-50, they pushed back 
against these calls, in this case largely on the grounds that increased 
personal allowances actually helped the wealthy most.157 It is, of 
course, possible that higher-income members were over-represented 
in those writing to the TUC, and that officials were accounting for this 
in advocating purchase, rather than income, tax cuts. However, 
resolutions on tax passed at the annual conference also 
overwhelmingly focused on income tax in the early 1960s, lending 
weight to the idea that this did potentially represent members’ 
preferences.158  
 
TUC officials and members seemed more aligned on the 1961 
 
156 See for example: ‘Letter from K E Fowell, King's Lynn Trades Council, 16 May 
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MRC), 1961; ‘Letter from F H Martin, Wolverhampton, Bilston & District Trades 
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budget. It was highly unpopular with union members; letters 
complained particularly about its unfairness and argued that the 
payroll tax would damage employment levels.159 The TUC was also 
scathing, issuing a press release stating that it would not help 
incentives or growth and that the increased NHS charges would ‘be 
strongly resented by the great majority of ordinary citizens’.160 
Meeting the chancellor after the budget, TUC representatives 
suggested that cutting surtax for high earners would make it much 
harder for them to persuade their members to hold back from wage 
claims.161 Given that the Conservative government ended up 
introducing a short-term capital gains tax a year later, Whiting’s 
argument that the TUC, through concerns about wage restraint, was 
influential in determining Conservative policy on capital gains feels 
more plausible than the content of the 1961 budget might have 
suggested.162  
 
The TUC suggested once in 1961 that ‘the community’ was willing to 
pay higher taxes for services. However, they also continued to 
advocate for indirect tax cuts and protection for low incomes. Letters 
and conference resolutions suggested that this did not represent the 
views of their most vocal members, at least; they consistently 
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advocated income tax cuts. No other such statements were found 
around 1961, although the TUC had also advocated income tax 
increases in the early 1950s. The TUC also reacted strongly against 
the 1961 budget and their comments implied that perceptions of 
fairness were crucial. This isolated statement therefore provides a 
possible, but probably unlikely, source for the perception among 
Conservative researchers that tax cuts had become less of a 
concern.  
 
The FBI was, surprisingly, not particularly pleased with the 1961 
budget, arguing that it was much less fair than the reforms they had 
proposed. It was suggested, however, that they should not look a gift 
horse in the mouth and that few other chancellors were going to be 
willing to look at surtax so it would be ‘ungracious’ not to welcome 
it.163 FBI officials appeared, if anything, slightly more concerned 
about popular attitudes to tax in 1961 than they had been in 1949-50. 
Again, however, a very limited number of discussions of popular 
attitudes were found, so it is hard to draw firm conclusions. In 
October 1961 a report suggested that people did not currently 
understand how burdensome the corporate tax system was, an idea 
carried over from 1950. It also, however, stated that the level of 
taxation made ‘all tax-paying sections of the community unhealthily 
tax conscious’.164  
 
An FBI committee on the balance of the fiscal system reported in 
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1961 in favour of shifting the burden of taxation away from direct tax 
and onto indirect taxes.165 However, a year later a report about their 
representations for the 1963 budget stated that broadening the 
purchase tax and particularly putting it onto necessities, would be 
‘politically’ unacceptable.166 It is unclear whether ‘politically’ here 
referred to popular attitudes or politicians’ views. An undated note on 
capital gains, most likely from 1961, argued:  
The present Government's income policies are more likely to be successful 
if labour sees the property-owner's capacity to increase his spending 
power … diminished by taxation of any capital profit accruing from, for 
example, selling securities … There is also little doubt that public opinion is 
in favour of a tax on the lines proposed by the Chancellor.167 
This suggested a view that fairness was important to ‘labour’ 
attitudes. However, again, it is not entirely clear who they were 
referring to in referencing ‘public opinion’.  
 
The FBI’s representations of popular attitudes to tax seemed similar 
to Labour’s — assuming that people were generally opposed to any 
increase in their taxation but also concerned about fairness. They did 
not suggest that opposition had decreased or that people were now 
more concerned with services. However, with so few references to 
popular attitudes to tax, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about 
their ideas. 
 
Conservative politicians and researchers continued to emphasise the 
importance of fairness to popular attitudes around 1961, like the 
other organisations studied here, but they still instituted a budget that 
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was widely considered to be unfair. Despite the backlash against the 
budget, by late 1961 Conservative researchers suggested on several 
occasions that people were now less concerned about tax levels, and 
willing to pay higher taxes to fund service provision. It is not clear 
what drove this change. Ideas about popular attitudes to tax 
remained broadly constant in the Labour party and FBI. One civil 
servant made similar statements earlier in the year, as did a single 
TUC statement before the 1961 budget. The civil service, in general, 
however, strongly emphasised the importance of fairness to popular 
attitudes to tax.  
 
There is no evidence to suggest whether the lone civil service voice 
asserting declining opposition influenced Conservative ideas or not. 
The TUC’s statement that ‘the community’ would support direct tax 
increases to pay for spending could have contributed to changing 
Conservative ideas. However, it was an isolated comment and the 
TUC continued to advocate tax cuts for those on low incomes. 
Although Conservative polling had been showing very similar levels 
of concern about taxation since 1949-50, Beers and Lowe’s 
suggestions that they started to pay more attention to survey 
evidence in general and that this changed ideas within the CRD are 
persuasive.168 It is hard to confirm this conclusively, however, as few 
Conservative comments about popular attitudes to tax referenced 
polling or other evidence.  
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The period between the 1959 election and 1961 budget was a 
complicated one in terms of discussions of popular attitudes to tax. 
Ideas appeared to be shifting in the press and Conservative party but 
less so in the other organisations studied. Although the 1959 election 
campaign focused heavily on tax, few in the press, Labour, or 
Conservative parties thought tax had been the major cause of 
Labour’s defeat. The idea that tax was cripplingly high and people 
were crying out for tax cuts had disappeared from press coverage by 
the election, after being so prominent in 1950. This shift was not 
clearly reflected in any of the other organisations studied in 1959. 
Labour and Conservative politicians and researchers continued to 
frame popular attitudes as essentially opposed to tax increases and 
supportive of tax cuts, but also concerned with fairness. Slightly 
fewer TUC discussions of popular attitudes to tax were found, but 
they continued to argue for tax cuts for low earners and their policy 
positions had not changed significantly. Communications from union 
members did not suggest any decline in opposition to the levels or 
structure of taxation. The FBI still showed limited interest in popular 
attitudes to tax, but did demonstrate slightly more concern about 
what would be considered fair or at least acceptable than they had in 
1950. 
 
It is unclear why press representations changed. The only group for 
whom effective income tax rates had significantly fallen was higher-
income taxpayers, and the limited polling available suggested that 
little had changed in popular attitudes themselves. The right-leaning 
press might have attacked tax levels and emphasised popular 
opposition to tax less with a long-term Conservative government in 
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office. However, the shift also occurred in the left-leaning papers, 
despite Labour consistently arguing that taxation was too high, 
particularly on low earners. Without access to detailed analysis of the 
tax system it seems plausible that journalists took the headline 
income tax cuts at face value and assumed that taxes had fallen and, 
perhaps, that opposition had therefore decreased. That many 
national journalists’, and probably most of their social contacts’, tax 
liabilities had fallen could also have reinforced this idea.  
 
Ideas about popular attitudes to tax in the Conservative Research 
Department changed dramatically between 1960 and late 1961, with 
a new suggestion that tax cuts were no longer a major issue and that 
people preferred service improvements. One civil servant and a 
single TUC statement suggested similar ideas. However, most civil 
service comments emphasised the importance of fairness. Ideas 
about popular attitudes to tax did not appear to have changed in the 
Labour party or FBI.  
 
The TUC statement provides a possible, but probably unlikely, 
source for the idea that attitudes had changed within the 
Conservative party. It appears to have been an isolated suggestion 
and the general tone of TUC communications did not change; they 
continued to advocate tax cuts for those on low incomes. Conference 
reports did not show any evidence that attitudes had changed within 
the Conservative grassroots either. As with the press, the reduction in 
the tax liabilities of those in Conservative politicians’ and researchers’ 
social circles might have encouraged the idea that tax was no longer 
as much of an issue and opposition had decreased. However, it is 
not clear why Conservative ideas would have changed in 1961, when 
effective income tax rates for high earners were actually slightly 
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increasing again.  
 
More plausible, perhaps, is the suggestion that Conservative 
researchers started to pay more attention to polling about popular 
attitudes. It is not clear that what their polling showed had changed, 
but the weight that they gave to its findings may have done. Labour 
was seemingly less interested in survey evidence. Mark Abrams’s 
1959 study suggested fairly widespread willingness to pay higher 
taxes to fund increased spending but this does not seem to have had 
any major impact on Labour ideas. The difference in Labour and 
Conservative ideas about popular attitudes to tax around 1961 could, 
therefore, have been the result of how much attention they were 
paying to survey evidence. It is hard, however, to draw any definite 
conclusions as few references to polling were found in discussions of 
attitudes to tax.  
 
1959-61 emerges as a moment of flux, with perceptions and 
representations of popular attitudes to tax becoming more diverse 
across the organisations studied. There were more signs of 
perceived consent and consensus around a policy of high taxation 
and spending than there had been in 1949-50. However, these 
changes seemed primarily to be the product of shifts in the 
organisations themselves. There was little evidence to suggest any 
actual change in popular attitudes to tax. The decline in perceptions 
of popular opposition to tax in some organisations also does not fit 
with a theory of steadily increasing opposition to tax through the post-
war period. At the least, it suggests that ideas about popular attitudes 





4. The 1964 General Election and 1965 Budget 
 
 
Labour won a narrow majority at the 1964 election after thirteen 
years of Conservative government. Various explanations have been 
suggested for Labour’s success. The Conservative reputation for 
economic competence was severely weakened after the sterling 
crisis in July 1961 and the Profumo scandal further damaged their 
reputation. It was also argued that after such a long period of 
Conservative rule there was a general desire for a change.1 Although 
tax did feature in campaign debates and the Conservatives again 
attacked Labour on their tax and spending plans, this time as a 
‘menu without prices’, tax does not seem to have been a major 
campaign issue.2 National Opinion Polls (NOP) polling in the last 
week of the campaign found that the cost of living was by far the 
most important issue, while tax was not mentioned.3 Even so, the 
cost of living seems to have been a relatively low-profile campaign 
issue, though whether the country was in economic crisis or not was 
an important debate.4 Butler and King, in their assessment of the 
election campaign stated: 
Although the tax system was hardly a campaign theme, Conservatives 
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argued strenuously that a Labour victory would mean higher taxes while 
many on the Labour side echoed Mr. Wilson’s Gravesend speech with its 
attack on ‘legal but anti-social’ tax swindles …5 
Despite this, they concluded that the most important election issue 
was the feeling of the need for a change.6 Davies and Sloman 
suggest that Conservative attacks on Labour’s tax policies were not 
enough to overcome concerns about the state of the economy.7 
 
Labour inherited an overheated economy as a result of the 
Conservative government’s attempts to stimulate growth. This was 
paired with continuing balance of payments and sterling issues and a 
severe trade deficit. These issues necessitated help from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on multiple occasions between 
1960 and 1964, although on much easier terms than later loans. 
Inflation also remained a perennial concern.8 The incoming Labour 
government considered an immediate devaluation, but rejected it in 
favour of trying gently to deflate the economy without provoking a 
recession.9 They did, however, announce an increase in the standard 
rate of income tax from 38.75 to 41.25 percent.10 The prime minister, 
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Harold Wilson, and chancellor, James Callaghan, also decided to 
announce their planned capital gains and corporation taxes in 
advance to try to reduce opposition to the income tax increases and 
boost support for wage restraint among the unions.11  
 
This decision backfired, unsettling financial markets and resulting in a 
run on sterling. The prospect of having to borrow more if economic 
conditions worsened, along with prolonged lobbying, led to significant 
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concessions on both taxes before the 1965 budget. Perhaps the 
most obvious of these was that the rate of capital gains tax was set 
at 30 percent, below the standard rate of income tax, undermining 
part of its rationale.12 This did not prevent parliamentary opposition, 
however, and the reforms were further weakened before they were 
passed. This was despite the fact that the plans were not necessarily 
particularly radical — the Conservative government had considered 
introducing both the capital gains and corporation taxes while in 
office and had introduced a short-term capital gains tax in 1961.13  
 
The 1965 budget was still, as described by Richard Crossman, ‘the 
most complicated fiscal reform for thirty years’.14 Kaldor was central 
to the development of the reforms, which closely followed his 
memorandum of dissent to the report of the Royal Commission on 
Taxation and Income in 1955.15 The 1965 budget introduced only 
part of the package worked out in opposition, however, omitting the 
wealth and gift taxes that Kaldor had originally proposed. The 
parliamentary conflict blunted the appetite in the Parliamentary 
Labour Party (PLP) for introducing the further planned reforms and 
left Labour’s tax package incomplete.16 Daunton argues that the 
changes failed to increase either revenue or economic growth and 
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did not deal with the fact that income tax on low earners was rising.17 
Whiting is less critical, suggesting that the wealth tax would have 
provoked much fiercer opposition, and that in any case the trade 
unions were less supportive of it than a capital gains tax.18 He does, 
though, maintain that the reforms were far less radical than they 
appeared, and were actually designed to reinforce the system of high 
direct taxation instituted by Attlee, agreeing that they failed to tackle 
the issue of high income tax on low incomes.19 
 
Electoral defeat in 1964 led to a policy review within the Conservative 
party. A policy group on future economic policy, with a sub-
committee on taxation, was set up in 1965.20 This aimed to find a 
way to increase incentives and efficiency, and reduce the reliance on 
progressive direct taxation, while not provoking conflict with the 
unions about wage restraint.21 The Conservative Research 
Department became increasingly influential, particularly after Edward 
Heath became leader as he had strong links with the department.22 
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lost the 1974 election and was defeated by Margaret Thatcher at a leadership 
election in 1975. He remained an MP until 2001 but his antipathy for Thatcher 
prevented him from playing a role in any of her governments. See: Douglas Hurd, 
‘Heath, Sir Edward Richard George [Ted] (1916–2005)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
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The 1964 election defeat also accelerated changes in the 
Conservative party’s approach to gauging public opinion. Lockwood 
suggests that the Conservatives responded to their declining popular 
support after 1961, and even more so after their electoral defeats in 
1964 and 1966, by increasingly looking to polling and sociological 
theory to explain voter behaviour. Led by contemporary sociological 
trends, and links with academics, the idea spread that support for the 
party was in ‘secular’ decline due to social trends, and that voters 
were broadly instrumental — supporting the party that best advanced 
their material interests.23  
 
Outside the political parties there was a revival of left-wing concern 
about poverty. The idea that it had been eliminated by the welfare 
state was challenged by social science researchers who 
‘rediscovered’ poverty. This was partly the result of a shift towards 
defining poverty as relative rather than absolute, but was also driven 
by the increasing availability of statistics on income distribution. 
Researchers like Richard Titmuss, Peter Townsend, and Brian Abel-
Smith realised that automatic benefits were not adequate and many 
people were failing to draw the means-tested benefits they were 
entitled to.24 The Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) was founded in 
 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2012, accessed on: 3 February at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/95228. 
23 Lockwood, ‘‘Action Not Words’: The Conservative Party, Public Opinion and 
‘Scientific’ Politics, C.1945–70’. 
24 Lowe, ‘The Rediscovery of Poverty and the Creation of the Child Poverty Action 
Group, 1962–68’, 603-605; Lowe, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945, 140-
147; Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 174-179. Particularly influential was 
the publication of The Poor and The Poorest by Abel-Smith and Townsend in 1965: 
Abel-Smith and Townsend, The Poor and the Poorest: A New Analysis of the 
Ministry of Labour’s Family Expenditure Surveys of 1953-54 and 1960. Richard 
Morris Titmuss (1907-1973) was a leading social policy academic and Labour 
advisor. The son of a farmer and later haulage contractor, Titmuss left school at 
fourteen to become an office boy and then clerk. He was elected to the chair of 
social administration at the LSE in 1950 having taught himself from library books 
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1965 and received a lot of media coverage for its proposal that there 
should be either a large increase in family allowances or a negative 
income tax.25 These academics were sceptical about the idea that 
the state was always a force for good, emphasising the ways in 
which those in poverty were marginalised and ignored.26  
 
The 1960s were a period of rapid social and cultural change, with the 
liberalisation of sexual laws and norms, rising affluence, youth 
 
and written a book in the evenings, Poverty and population (1938). This led to his 
invitation to join the group of historians commissioned to write the official histories 
of the Second World War and Ministry of Health and then his appointment to the 
LSE chair where he wrote extensively on health and other social policy issues. He 
was also a Labour party advisor. See: A. H. Halsey, ‘Titmuss, Richard Morris 
(1907–1973)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 
2004, accessed on: 3 February at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/31763; John 
Stewart, Richard Titmuss: A Commitment to Welfare, 1st. ed. (Bristol: Policy Press, 
2020). Peter Brereton Townsend (1928-2009) was a sociologist and campaigner. 
Brought up largely by his grandmother, Townsend won a scholarship to University 
College School and then Cambridge. He wrote extensively about poverty and, 
along with Brian Abel-Smith, set up the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG). See: 
Howard Glennerster, ‘Townsend, Peter Brereton (1928–2009)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2012, accessed on: 3 February at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/102310. Brian Abel-Smith (1926-1996) was an 
economist, social policy analyst, and political adviser. Distantly related to the royal 
family he was nonetheless a committed socialist and joined the Labour party at the 
age of eighteen. He remained active in the Labour party and Fabian Society 
through his time at Cambridge studying economics. Hugh Dalton met him during a 
visit and saw him as a potential future MP, encouraging him to campaign and write 
political pieces. In 1953 he was invited to become the research assistant for the 
enquiry into the cost of the NHS where he was co-supervised by Richard Titmuss. 
Abel-Smith moved to LSE to work under Titmuss, along with Peter Townsend. 
Known as the ‘titmice’ they conducted wide ranging surveys of poverty and welfare 
in Britain. Abel-Smith was also a Labour adviser, initially informally, and then as 
one of the first ‘special advisers’, supporting Richard Crossman part time from 
1968-70. Between 1974-79. He also advised Barbara Castle, David Ennals, and 
Peter Shore. See: Sally Sheard, The Passionate Economist: How Brian Abel-Smith 
Shaped Global Health and Social Welfare (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2014); Peter 
Townsend, ‘Smith, Brian Abel- (1926–1996)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2006, accessed on: 3 February at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/60482. 
25 Lowe, ‘The Rediscovery of Poverty and the Creation of the Child Poverty Action 
Group, 1962–68’, 606-609; Pat Thane and Tanya Evans, Sinners? Scroungers? 
Saints?: Unmarried Motherhood in Twentieth-Century England (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 124-131, 161-167. 
26 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 177. 
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cultural power, feminism, and the decline of the power of the 
church.27 Immigration became a more prominent political issue, and 
there was a spate of restrictive immigration legislation encouraged by 
the press.28 Immigration controls also started to feature in party 
manifestos from the mid 1960s.29 While these social and cultural 
 
27 See for example: Hampshire, Citizenship and Belonging: Immigration and the 
Politics of Demographic Governance in Post-War Britain; Jeremy Morris, ‘The 
Strange Death of Christian Britain: Another Look at the Secularization Debate ’, 
The Historical Journal 46, no. 4 (2003); P. Panayi, ‘Immigration, Multiculturalism 
and Racism’, in Twentieth-Century Britain: Economic, Cultural and Social Change, 
ed. Julie-Marie Strange, Francesca Carnevali, and Paul Johnson (Harlow: 
Pearson/Longman, 2007); Scott, ‘The Household Economy since 1870’; Pat 
Thane, Unequal Britain: Equalities in Britain since 1945 (London Continuum, 
2010). See also: Callum G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding 
Secularisation 1800-2000 (London: Routledge, 2001); David Clark, Marriage, 
Domestic Life and Social Change: Writings for Jacqueline Burgoyne (1944-88) 
(London: Routledge, 2015); Hera Cook, The Long Sexual Revolution: English 
Women, Sex, and Contraception 1800-1975 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005); Grace Davie, Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Paul Gilroy, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack: The 
Cultural Politics of Race and Nation Routledge Classics ed. ed. (London: 
Routledge, 2002); S. J. D. Green, Religion in the Age of Decline: Organisation and 
Experience in Industrial Yorkshire, 1870-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996); S. J. D. Green, The Passing of Protestant England: Secularisation 
and Social Change, C.1920-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); 
Lesley A. Hall, Sex, Gender and Social Change in Britain since 1880, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Lawrence, ‘Class, ‘Affluence’ and the Study of 
Everyday Life in Britain, C . 1930–64’; Jane Lewis, Women in Britain since 1945: 
Women, Family, Work and the State in the Post-War Years (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1993); Hugh McLeod, The Religious Crisis of the 1960s (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007); Offer, ‘Consumption and Affluence, c. 1870-2010’; Kathleen Paul, 
Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era (London: Cornell 
University Press, 1997); Wendy Webster, Imagining Home: Gender, ‘Race’ and 
National Identity, 1945-64 (London: Routledge, 2007); J. Wolffe, Religion and 
Secularization, ed. Julie-Marie Strange, Francesca Carnevali, and Paul Johnson, 
2nd ed., Twentieth-Century Britain: Economic, Cultural and Social Change 
(Harlow: Pearson/Longman, 2007). 
28 See for example: Roberta E. Bivins, Contagious Communities: Medicine, 
Migration, and the NHS in Post-War Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015); Gilroy, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race 
and Nation ; Hampshire, Citizenship and Belonging: Immigration and the Politics of 
Demographic Governance in Post-War Britain; Panayi, ‘Immigration, 
Multiculturalism and Racism’; Paul, Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in 
the Postwar Era ; Webster, Imagining Home: Gender, ‘Race’ and National Identity, 
1945-64. 
29 See for example: Labour Party, ‘The Labour Party Manifesto: The New Britain’, 
(1964); Conservative Party, ‘Conservative Party Manifesto: Prosperity with a 
Purpose ’, PUB 155/12, (Archive Conservative Party Archive, Bodleian Library), 
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changes were welcomed by many, they also provoked a series of 
what Stuart Hall termed ‘moral panics’ around crime, immigration, 
unmarried mothers, drugs, layabouts, hippies, punks, football 
hooligans and youth culture.30  
 
1964-5 was a moment of transition both in the political parties and in 
British culture. Labour was in government for the first time in more 
than a decade and had to deal with a difficult economic climate while 
attempting to fulfil its promises around reform, equality, and 
modernisation. Labour leaders had to decide how much of their 
ambitious tax reform programme they were going to attempt to 
institute with such a small majority. The Conservatives, on the other 
hand, were out of office for the first time in over a decade with space 
to interrogate their policy positions and the reasons for their defeat.  
 
The Conservative party 
 
Conservative party strategy ahead of the 1964 election suggested 
that earlier statements that taxes were not that important to voters 
had not eliminated the idea that a tax cut ahead of an election might 
be helpful.31 A CRD Taxation Policy Committee (TPC) report ahead of 
the April 1964 budget stated: 
People are quite prepared to enjoy a reduction of taxation so long as they 
can do so with a clear conscience … A reduction in the standard rate of 
 
1964. 
30 See for example: Hall et al., Policing the Crisis, particularly 218-223, 303-308; 
Moran, ‘‘Stand up and Be Counted’: Hughie Green, the 1970s and Popular 
Memory’, 175-178; Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton, ‘Introduction. The 
Benighted Decade? Reassessing the 1970s’, in Reassessing 1970s Britain ed. 
Lawrence Black, Hugh Pemberton, and Pat Thane (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2013), 3-14. 
31 Clark and Dilnot, ‘British Fiscal Policy since 1939’, 387-388; Tomlinson, 
Managing the Economy, Managing the People: Narratives of Economic Life in 
Britain from Beveridge to Brexit, 39-40. 
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income tax is the simplest and most generally appreciated relief that can 
be given. Previous reductions were, however, made in 1955 and 1959 and 
the coincidence would not go unnoticed. The economic case for such a 
reduction would thus have to be impregnable.32 
Despite concern that people might see cuts as an election bribe, tax 
cuts were clearly seen as popular and taxes were cut in the spring 
1964 budget as they had been ahead of the 1955 and 1959 
elections.33  
 
Conservative assessments of the election result did not, however, 
generally suggest that taxation was particularly important. A CRD 
summary and two notes by Nigel Lawson broadly agreed with Butler 
and King’s later verdict that it was felt to be time for a change, that 
they had lost trust on economic management after the 1961 budget 
and recession, and that their reputation had been further hit by 
scandals including the Profumo affair.34 The Economic Section’s 
report suggested that their drawn-out costing of Labour’s policies had 
bored people and argued that they should have talked more about 
 
32 ‘Taxation Policy Committee 1963. The 1964 Budget, 14 October 1963’, CRD 
3/7/26/3, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1963. 
33 Ibid. 
34 ‘Conservative Research Department. Report on General Election 1964’, CRD 
2/48/95, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1964; Nigel 
Lawson, ‘The Next General Election, 19 October 1964’, CRD 2/48/86, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1964; Nigel Lawson, 
‘Thoughts on a Close Election, 23 October 1964’, CRD 2/48/86, (Conservative 
Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1964; Butler and King, The British 
General Election of 1964. Nigel Lawson (1932 -) was chancellor from 1983-1989. 
Educated at Westminster School and then Oxford he was initially a journalist and 
was appointed editor of the Spectator in 1966. He stood as a Conservative 
candidate for the first time in 1970 but did not win and was sacked from the 
Spectator. Lawson did become Conservative MP for Blaby in 1974. He was made 
energy secretary in 1981 and chancellor in 1983. He resigned in 1989 after the 
‘Lawson boom’ forced him to double the interest rate to 25 per cent and he fell out 
with Thatcher over the poll tax and the European monetary system. He moved to 
the Lords in 1992. See: Dennis Kavanagh and Christopher Riches, ‘Lawson, Nigel,’ 
A Dictionary of Political Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),  
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199569137.001.0001/ac
ref-9780199569137-e-423; Andy McSmith, ‘Nigel Lawson Profile: The Eurosceptic 
Leading the Battle against Brussels’, Times, 2 October 2015. 
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the cost of living, since polling suggested it was far and away the 
most important issue.35  
 
The most interesting of these assessments, and the only one to 
discuss taxation in any detail, was the second, longer, note by 
Lawson. He broadly agreed with the other reports’ arguments about 
the key reasons behind their defeat. Lawson also, however, 
suggested that the Conservatives had lost middle-income voters who 
felt squeezed and believed that the Conservatives were the party of 
the ‘capital gains classes’. Central to this, he argued, was the failure 
to tax profits from land, particularly in London and the South East.36 It 
is interesting to see Lawson, later one of Margaret Thatcher’s 
chancellors, arguing that they should have proposed a land tax. It 
potentially highlights again the importance of perceptions of fairness 
in Conservative ideas about popular attitudes to tax in this period.37 It 
could also, however, have been primarily an attack on Keith Joseph 
who had vacillated about whether to tax land speculators ahead of 
the election, leading to a vague sentence in the manifesto suggesting 
they would look at options that did not affect the price or supply of 
land.38 However, Lawson did explicitly state that he thought fairness 
overrode material self-interest in this case: 
People felt so strongly about this issue [taxing land profits] that they were 
in a mood to pay slightly more for their houses in the knowledge that the 
community was benefiting rather than pay slightly less for the benefit of 
sharks …39 
 
35 ‘General Election October 1964. Economic Section Report, 23 October 1964’, 
CRD 2/48/86, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1964. 
36 Lawson, ‘Thoughts on a Close Election, 23 October 1964’, CRD 2/48/86, 
Conservative Party Archive, 1964. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett, Keith Joseph (Chesham: Acumen, 2002), 
129-130. 
39 Lawson, ‘Thoughts on a Close Election, 23 October 1964’, CRD 2/48/86, 




Despite the strategic decision at the 1964 budget, several comments 
around the election reiterated the idea that people wanted spending 
increases over tax cuts.40 At a meeting of the Cabinet Economic 
Policy Committee in July 1963 it was reported that: 
In discussion the view was expressed that a large section of public opinion 
now expected the social services to require additional expenditure, and 
there was wider recognition nowadays that such demand must be matched 
by a greater willingness to pay the bill. The appeal of a policy of tax 
reductions might thus be dwindling.41  
The 1964 Taxation Policy Committee report also stated: ‘Tax 
reduction is now fairly low on most people's order of priorities’.42 
Finally, a CRD note on public opinion in January 1965 argued that 
the electorate knew that taxation would increase under Labour but 
blamed this, and other issues, on mistakes by the Conservative 
government and accepted tax rises as a price worth paying for 
improvements in social services.43  
 
At the same time, however, a few figures started to express concern 
that popular opposition to the level of taxation might increase in the 
near future. In April 1964 the chancellor, Reginald Maudling, stated, 
 
40 ‘Cabinet Economic Policy Committee. Minutes of a Meeting of the Committee 
Held in the Large Ministerial Conference Room, House of Commons, S.W.1., on 
Tuesday, 9th July, 1963, at 5.00 p.m.’. The National Archives (TNA) CAB 
134/1697, 1963; ‘Taxation Policy Committee 1963. The 1964 Budget, 14 October 
1963’, CRD 3/7/26/3, Conservative Party Archive, 1963; ‘The Prospects for 
Taxation, 1964-67: Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury and Paymaster General, April 1964’. The National 
Archives (TNA) CAB 129/117, 1964; ‘Notes on the First Meeting of Sub-Group A of 
the Policy Committee on Future Economic Policy, 19 March 1965’, CRD 3/7/6/10, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1965. 
41 ‘Cabinet Economic Policy Committee. Minutes of a Meeting of the Committee 
Held in the Large Ministerial Conference Room, House of Commons, S.W.1., on 
Tuesday, 9th July, 1963, at 5.00 p.m.’. CAB 134/1697, 1963. 
42 ‘Taxation Policy Committee 1963. The 1964 Budget, 14 October 1963’, CRD 
3/7/26/3, Conservative Party Archive, 1963. 
43 ‘Public Opinion, 18 January 1965’, CCO 20/27/2, (Conservative Party Archive, 
Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1965. 
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for example:  
Most of our colleagues would probably agree that the present rates of 
taxation, direct and indirect, are not so onerous as to subject us to great 
pressure to reduce them … But a steady rise in tax rates, which is the 
most likely outcome for the Government during the next four or five years, 
could bring this to the front, and give rise to strong pressures … We 
sometimes say that people are ready to accept higher rates of tax to pay 
for public expenditure -- but so far they have not had to make this choice 
…44  
A record of the first meeting of the sub-committee on taxation in 
March 1965 also reported that they felt that so far growth had 
allowed a rising proportion of GNP to be taken by tax and public 
spending, but continued: 
It was felt that the time might now be near when people would no longer be 
so ready to pay more in taxation to finance bigger social programmes. The 
demand would grow for bigger public spending combined with some lower 
tax rates.45 
 
Despite suggestions that increasing opposition was still in the future, 
discussions among the sub-committee after the election defeat 
showed some caution about the reaction to the tax changes they 
 
44 ‘The Prospects for Taxation, 1964-67: Memorandum by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and Paymaster General, April 
1964’. CAB 129/117, 1964. Reginald Maudling (1917-1979) was chancellor from 
1962-1964. After failing to win a seat at the 1945 election he joined the 
Conservative parliamentary secretariat, which merged with the CRD in 1948. He 
was elected MP for Barnet at the 1950 election, a seat he represented until his 
death in 1979. He was part of the One Nation group of Conservative MPs. In his 
maiden speech he stated that the country could not ‘tax ourselves into prosperity’. 
In 1952 he was appointed economic secretary to the treasury and in 1959 
president of the Board of Trade. In 1962 he was appointed chancellor. Maudling 
ran for the party leadership in 1965 but was defeated by Heath. Although he had 
wanted to return to the Treasury, he accepted the Home Office in 1970 but 
resigned two years later when the police began investigating a former business 
associate of his for corruption. His later years as an MP were marred by 
controversy over his business relationships and allegations of impropriety. See: 
Robert Shepherd, ‘Maudling, Reginald (1917–1979)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2008, accessed on: 4 February at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/31428. 
45 ‘Notes on the First Meeting of Sub-Group A of the Policy Committee on Future 




were considering, particularly the wealth tax.46 Draft reports in 
autumn 1965 suggested, for example, that major changes to the tax 
structure, and particularly any shift from direct to indirect taxation, 
could really only be made when taxes were being cut generally or 
when there was a crisis.47 William Rees-Mogg, Times journalist and 
Heath supporter, argued in June 1965 that the wealth tax would 
offend various groups and hit Conservative supporters as well as 
potentially splitting the party.48 He stated:  
If anyone doubts that a wealth tax is politically explosive it should be 
remembered that Mr Callaghan, after toying with the idea, was forced to 
 
46 See for example: ‘Policy Group on Future Economic Policy Sub Group A 
(Taxation). Draft Report (Part 1), 23 September 1965’, CRD 3/7/6/10, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1965; ‘Policy Group on 
Future Economic Policy Sub Group A (Taxation). Draft Report (Part 3), 26 October 
1965’, CRD 3/7/6/10, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1965; 
‘Policy Group on Future Economic Policy. Comments by Mr William Rees-Mogg on 
Sub-Group A's Interim Report to the Main Group on Personal Taxation, 28 June 
1965’, CRD 3/7/6/9, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1965; 
‘Policy Group on Future Economic Policy. Minutes of the Third Meeting Held in 
Committee Room 7 at the House of Commons on Wednesday, 30th June’, CRD 
3/7/6/9, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1965; 
‘Memorandum from John Cope to Brendan Sewill on a Two Way Topic on Taxation 
Reform, 21 October 1965’, CRD 3/7/26/43, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, 
Bodleian Library), 1965. 
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Rees-Mogg (1928-2012) was a journalist and newspaper editor. After 
Charterhouse and Oxford he joined the Financial Times in 1951. At the same time 
he worked as a speechwriter for Anthony Eden and stood unsuccessfully as the 
Conservative candidate for the safe Labour seat of Chester-le-Street in 1956 and 
1959. He joined the Sunday Times in 1960, becoming editor in 1967, but resigned 
in 1981 after unsuccessfully supporting a failed takeover bid from an independent 
consortium. He then became deputy chairman of the BBC (1981-6) and chairman 
of the Arts Council (1982-9) and Broadcasting Standards Council (1988-93). He 
was made a life peer by Margaret Thatcher in 1988. From 1986 he was also a 
columnist, first for the Independent then Times, Sunday Times, and Mail on 
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2012)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2016, 
accessed on: 4 February at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/105894. 
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drop it because of the general fear and resentment it aroused.49   
Rees-Mogg also suggested that a capital gains increase would be 
less unpopular because it was payable 'at a point when the taxpayer 
did not so much mind paying' and 'because it was already enacted 
and therefore to a certain extent accepted by the public’, adding that 
new taxes were 'always more unpopular' than existing taxes.50 He 
did not provide evidence for these assertions. Patrick Jenkin also 
stated that he thought it would be politically difficult because some 
people would pay more tax than their income and ‘Many people and 
not merely those directly concerned would regard this as basically 
unjust’.51  
 
However, by December 1965 Jenkin stated that he found the tax 
package ‘increasingly attractive politically and intellectually’.52 A 
 
49 ‘Policy Group on Future Economic Policy. Comments by Mr William Rees-Mogg 
on Sub-Group A's Interim Report to the Main Group on Personal Taxation, 28 June 
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50 ‘Policy Group on Future Economic Policy. Minutes of the Seventh Meeting Held 
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Baron Jenkin of Roding (1926-2016) was a Conservative politician. At Cambridge 
he became a close friend of Geoffrey Howe and after working as a lawyer and 
secretary to the chemical division of the Distillers’ Company, he was elected 
Conservative MP for Wanstead and Woodford in 1964. Jenkin supported Heath in 
his leadership campaign and was made financial secretary to the Treasury in 1970, 
then chief secretary to the Treasury in 1972. In 1979 he became secretary of state 
for health and social services, although he had not supported Thatcher in her 
leadership campaign, and in 1981 secretary of state for industry, preparing 
nationalised industries for privatisation. In 1983 Jenkin became environment 
secretary but was sacked in 1985 after failing in his fight to abolish the Greater 
London Council. He was made a Baron in 1987. See: Simon Heffer, ‘Jenkin, 
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https://doi.org/10.1093/odnb/9780198614128.013.111631. 
52 ‘Policy Group on Future Economic Policy. Minutes of the Seventh Meeting Held 
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report of a meeting about the proposals at the Swinton discussion 
weekend also recorded mixed, but generally fairly optimistic, views 
about the popular reaction to a wealth tax: 
Mr. Stacey said that he thought that if the capital tax were in the Manifesto 
it would lose us the election but that the electorate was in fact ready for a 
radical approach to these matters. Mr Sharples said the Party should not 
be frightened of the proposals and he thought it would go down well in his 
constituency … Mr. Amery thought that some votes would be lost in his 
constituency and others gained … Mr. Carr thought the proposal would go 
well in winnable seats … Mrs. Doughty thought many would welcome the 
ending of the unearned income differential and that the public as a whole 
would like the whole new conception of taxation.53  
At a meeting a few days later it was reported that the 'politicians 
present at Swinton had felt the electoral disadvantages of the 
scheme were slight’.54 The suggestion that the electorate was ready 
for a radical change to the tax system was interesting, as was the 
fact that some Conservative politicians thought that a wealth tax 
might be popular.  
 
None of these statements provided any evidence for why they 
believed particular tax changes would be popular or unpopular, 
although Conservative politicians and researchers did have various 
potential sources of evidence. Conference proceedings did not 
suggest that opposition to tax was increasing among the 
Conservative grassroots — one resolution in 1965 commended the 
Conservative attempts to amend the 1965 budget and encouraged 
them to continue their efforts to ensure the tax system was ‘used to 
encourage enterprise and initiative, savings and investment’.55 
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However, there had also been several resolutions criticising tax 
policy in the early 1960s.56  
 
The Conservative Political Centre (CPC)’s two-way movement was 
also set up in 1965 to sample attitudes among local parties, who 
were encouraged to create groups which would be sent a monthly 
discussion topic and then feed back on their thoughts. The groups 
seem to have been attended by only the most committed activists; 
Norton estimates that around 1 percent of party members took part in 
a CPC group, or somewhere between 3500 and 7500 people.57 Their 
views were not, therefore, necessarily representative. There were 
three two-way movement briefs relating to tax in 1965. Reports of the 
responses included few quotes or statistics so it is hard to get a real 
sense of what the groups were actually saying. Even so, the reports 
suggested opposition to the level of taxation and support for 
spending cuts, particularly to social services. Some groups also 
showed concern that cuts in income taxes might lead to increased 
taxes on wealth, suggesting that wealth taxation was unpopular with 
some participants.58 At the same time, however, CPC responses 
demonstrated concern about fairness. Groups regularly expressed 
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Conservative Party, ‘80th Annual Conference Brighton’, 77-82. There does not 
appear to have been a published report of the 1964 conference. 
57 Philip Norton, ‘Mass Conservatism: The Conservatives and the Public since the 
1880s’, in Mass Conservatism : The Conservatives and the Public since the 1880s, 
ed. Stuart Ball, Ian Holliday, and William Hague (London: Routledge, 2002), 186-
187. 
58 ‘CPC Two-Way Movement. Summary of Reports: No. 3 Taxation and Incentive 
(March 1965)’, CCO 4/9/112, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian 
Library), 1965; ‘CPC Two-Way Movement. Summary of Reports: No. 5 the Social 
Services (May 1965)’, CCO 4/9/112, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian 
Library), 1965; ‘CPC Two-Way Movement. Summary of Reports: Working Paper 
No. 1 - a Stake in the Country, 22 December 1965’, CCO 4/9/112, (Conservative 
Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1965. 
 
190 
anxiety about the impact of tax changes on low incomes, for example 
arguing that tax cuts should go to low- and middle-income groups 
rather than high earners.59 CPC responses could have suggested 
both opposition and the importance of fairness. However, they 
showed significant current, not future, opposition to the level of 
taxation. No evidence was found of the results being discussed in 
relation to attitudes to tax, making it hard to assess what, if any, 
impact they might have had. 
 
It does not seem likely that anxiety about future opposition to tax was 
being driven by polling. As it had done previously, external polling 
showed general support for tax cuts but also that tax was not a major 
issue.60 The 1963 BES survey showing support for tax cuts does not 
seem to have been published until 1969, and even then the tax 
findings were not emphasised.61 The IEA published the results of 
surveys with Mass Observation in 1963 and 1965, arguing that 
people wanted the ability to opt out from taxpayer-funded services 
and increased selectivity.62 However, the surveys were 
methodologically dubious and potentially biased — apart from 
anything else they interviewed only married, working-age men. This 
 
59 ‘CPC Two-Way Movement. Summary of Reports: No. 3 Taxation and Incentive 
(March 1965)’, CCO 4/9/112, Conservative Party Archive, 1965; ‘CPC Two-Way 
Movement. Summary of Reports: Working Paper No. 1 - a Stake in the Country, 22 
December 1965’, CCO 4/9/112, Conservative Party Archive, 1965. 
60 National Opinion Polls, ‘Political Bulletin - November, 1963’, CCO 4/9/392, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1963; ‘Poll Summaries No. 
10: Gallup Political Index No. 49, 17 March 1964’, CRD 2/48/107, Conservative 
Party Archive, 1964. 
61 David Edgeworth Butler, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral 
Choice ed. Donald Elkinton Stokes (London: Macmillan, 1969). 
62 ‘Choice in Welfare: First Report on an Enquiry Conducted by Mass Observation 
into the Extent of Knowledge and Preference in State and Private Provision for 
Education, Health Services and Pensions’; Harris and Seldon, ‘Choice in Welfare 
1965: Second Report on an Enquiry Conducted by Mass-Observation into the 
Extent of Knowledge and Preference in State and Private Provision for Education, 
Health Services and Pensions ’. 
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bias was recognised by the Conservative Steering Committee in 
1963, which stated that it was ‘really a propaganda exercise rather 
than a genuine social survey’.63 Even taking the results at face value, 
more respondents chose higher taxes and increased spending than 
any other option for all the services covered in 1963 and for 
education in 1965. For health and pensions higher taxes and 
contracting out had converged by 1965. The 1965 survey was also 
not published until October. It seems unlikely, therefore, that in 1964 
and early 1965 these surveys would have suggested that opposition 
to tax might increase in the near future.  
 
The Conservative party had also started to commission their own 
surveys by 1964. Michael Fraser had suggested that they should do 
so in November 1963, and interestingly, stated that traditionally they 
had used the views reflected by MPs, the press, and local parties to 
assess what issues voters were concerned about, but that this could 
be unreliable and surveys would give more direct information.64 This 
indicates that despite the significant number of polling summaries 
produced from the 1950s onwards, Fraser still felt in 1963 that they 
 
63 ‘Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Steering Committee Held at 10.30 a.m. on 
Friday 26th July, 1963 at Admiralty House’, SC 1, (Conservative Party Archive, 
Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1963. See also: ‘"Choice in Welfare" Institute of 
Economic Affairs Survey, 24th July 1963’, SC 1, (Conservative Party Archive, 
Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1963. No evidence was found of the 1965 survey being 
discussed, although this is not conclusive. The Treasury were also unimpressed 
with the 1963 survey: ‘"Choice in Welfare" 1963: Treasury Examination of 
Publication by Institute of Economic Affairs Limited’. The National Archives (TNA) T 
227/1788, 1963; ‘Memorandum from J. E. Hansford to D. J. S. Hancock, 29 August 
1963’. T 227/1788, 1963; ‘Memorandum from C. S. Bennett to J. F. Embling, 12 
November 1963’. The National Archives (TNA) T 227/1788, 1963; ‘"Choice in 
Welfare": Commentary by a Treasury Group’. T 227/1788, 1964. For background 
see: Christopher Muller, ‘The Institute of Economic Affairs: Undermining the Post‐
War Consensus’, Contemporary British History 10, no. 1 (1996): 95-96; Andrew 
Denham and Mark Garnett, British Think-Tanks and the Climate of Opinion 
(London: UCL Press, 1998), 72. 
64 ‘Memorandum from Michael Fraser to Lord Blakenham, 25 November 1963’, 
CCO 20/27/1, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1963. 
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were not using enough survey evidence and could confirm the 
impression that many earlier comments were not supported by 
significant evidence. It also highlights the importance of the press in 
Conservative ideas about popular attitudes and how many of their 
‘traditional’ sources of evidence for voters’ attitudes were mediated 
through elite groups.  
 
Whether as a result of Fraser’s intervention or not, a survey was 
conducted with NOP in 1964 on Conservative voters who had 
defected since the last election, asking what they found attractive 
and unattractive about the parties. High local taxation was mentioned 
fairly often in relation to the Conservatives, and higher taxation in 
general was mentioned in relation to Labour.65 However, tax was not 
referenced in internal memos about the findings and at least one 
CRD researcher was unimpressed by the methodological design of 
these attractive/unattractive questions.66 Another NOP survey was 
produced in 1965 looking at what kind of political language and 
phrases were most attractive to voters. It found that words 
associated with fairness and security were much more popular than 
those associated with dynamism — respondents chose fair shares 
over rewarding talent or merit by 10 to 7, for example.67 Most 
interesting was the commentary on the survey’s findings by James 
Douglas and Peter Bocock, which stated: 
It is obvious that this [a preference for fair shares] is a characteristic that is 
 
65 National Opinion Polls, ‘Electors Attitudes. Final Report’, CCO 180/11/1/2, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1964. 
66 ‘N.O.P "Defectors" Survey, 3 March 1964’, CRD 2/48/107, (Conservative Party 
Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1964; ‘Second Thoughts on N.O.P. 'Defectors' 
Survey, 4 March 1964’, CRD 2/48/107, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, 
Bodleian Library), 1964. The researcher was likely James Douglas but the memo 
was only initialled not signed. 
67 ‘Political Phraseology: Comments on N.O.P. Survey by James Douglas and 
Peter Bocock, 11 October 1965’, LCC 1/2/3, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, 
Bodleian Library), 1965. 
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strongly linked to social class. (unfortunately the AB and C1 classes added 
together amount to less than a third of the electorate) ... The answers more 
than confirm the impression already given by the survey, of an electorate 
more interested in the well-being of everybody (including the mediocrities) 
than in differential payment for ability.68 
The findings came as a shock to Douglas and Bocock, and 
suggested to them that their ideas about popular attitudes were 
systematically biased: 
The results of this survey were frankly a surprise to both of us. It also gives 
one a rather unpleasant shock to realise that the way our instinctive 
judgments were off-target can, on the evidence of the survey, all too easily 
be explained by what one knows to be the bias in our own range of 
contacts:- too much middle-class, too much weight on men in their thirties 
and forties, overweighting of the home counties.69 
Their surprise at the importance of fairness, despite its consistent 
recurrence in conversations about popular attitudes to tax since 
1949, suggests very little active investigation or consideration of 
popular attitudes to tax. That their ideas seemed to be systematically 
biased also again indicates the potential importance of social 
contacts in political ideas about attitudes to tax. 
 
Conservative discussions of popular attitudes to tax in 1964-5 
reiterated the early 1960s idea that opposition to tax was not a major 
issue. Assessments of their defeat in the 1964 election did not 
highlight tax as a key concern, and in discussions about future policy 
after the election it was even suggested that a wealth tax might be 
popular. However, at the same time various comments suggested 
that the assumption of a level of opposition to tax continued. They 
 
68 Ibid. Peter Bocock (1942-2007) joined the CRD in 1965 after finishing his 
education at Charterhouse and Oxford. He joined the World Bank in 1968. Heath 
brought him back to work in the Central Policy Review Staff, a kind of internal think 
tank based in Downing Street, in 1971, but he struggled under its head, Victor 
Rothschild, and returned to the World Bank in 1974. See: ‘Peter Bocock’, Times, 
20 December 2007. 
69 ‘Political Phraseology: Comments on N.O.P. Survey by James Douglas and 
Peter Bocock, 11 October 1965’, LCC 1/2/3, Conservative Party Archive, 1965. 
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introduced a tax cut just before the 1964 election and several 
comments suggested that there might be opposition to tax reform, 
whether because of increases or perceptions of unfairness.  
 
What was influencing these ideas was unclear. The party had new 
evidence from the CPC programme of opposition to the 
contemporary level of taxation within their grassroots, but this 
suggested current rather than future opposition and there is no 
evidence of this information being discussed in relation to attitudes to 
tax. Internal polling activities were also being expanded but were not 
primarily focused on attitudes to tax and do not appear to have 
clearly influenced ideas apart from suggesting how little Conservative 
researchers knew about popular attitudes, how limited and reliant on 
elite sources their previous attempts to access popular attitudes had 
been, and how likely it was that their views of popular attitudes were 
systematically biased by their social contacts. 
 
The civil service 
 
One source for Conservative concern about future opposition to tax 
could have been senior civil servants, some of whom were making 
similar comments in the lead-up to the 1964 election.70 In February 
1964 Treasury official Richard Clarke suggested that future tax 
increases might provoke popular opposition, although he was 
 
70 Richard Clarke. ‘Taxes, Expenditure and Resources: 1964-1967, 24 Feburary 
1964’, The National Archives (TNA) T 171/790, 1964; ‘Memorandum from Burke 
Trend to Alec Douglas-Home, 8 April 1964: The Prospects for Taxation, 1964-
1967’. The National Archives (TNA) PREM 11/4778, 1964; ‘Minutes of a Meeting 
Held in Sir William Armstrong's Room on Wednesday, 15th April, 1964 at 11.00 
a.m.’. The National Archives (TNA) T 171/790, 1964; ‘Minutes of a Meeting Held in 
Sir William Armstrong's Room on Thursday, 30th April, 1964 at 3.30 p.m.’. The 
National Archives (TNA) T 171/790, 1964. 
 
195 
somewhat equivocal about how likely this was:  
Perhaps at some stage in the process of rising taxes there would be a 
reaction of public opinion against public expenditure, but this is slow to 
happen … The public cannot be said to be “prepared to accept” rising 
taxes in order to get improved public services, for no deliberate choice can 
ever be made.71  
Like Maudling, he suggested that there was no current opposition but 
did not rule out future hostility: 
It is not easy to detect any general public discontent with the level of 
central government taxes. But this may be because the impact of rising 
public expenditure … has been reflected in increased national insurance 
contributions (and health stamp) and in local rates rather than in central 
government taxes.72 
The Cabinet Secretary, Burke Trend, also suggested that increasing 
central taxes could provoke opposition in a memo to Prime Minister 
Alec Douglas-Home in April 1964: 
Whereas in the past the Government’s spending policies have been 
financed by taxing growing wealth at reducing rates, the finance for 
existing policies in future will involve taxing growing wealth at increasing 
rates. 2. Treasury Ministers point out two implications of this - … (ii) There 
may be resistance from taxpayers, as there is already from ratepayers.73 
 
71 Clarke. ‘Taxes, Expenditure and Resources: 1964-1967, 24 Feburary 1964’, T 
171/790, 1964. Sir Richard William Barnes Clarke (1910-1975) was a journalist 
and civil servant. He graduated from Cambridge at the height of the depression in 
1932 and ended up at the Financial News which later merged with the Financial 
Times, where he devised the ordinary share index, now the FTSE index. He moved 
into the civil service at the start of the war and then joined the Treasury in 1945 
remaining there for the next twenty-one years. Between 1946 and 1952 he chaired 
the Official Programmes Committee which was responsible for attempts to deal 
with the balance of payments. Between 1958 and 1966 he was instrumental in 
establishing the Public Expenditure Survey Committee, designed to ensure a more 
systematic approach to public spending. See: Samuel Goldman, ‘Clarke, Sir 
Richard William Barnes (1910–1975)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2008, accessed on: 4 February at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/30938. 
72 Clarke. ‘Taxes, Expenditure and Resources: 1964-1967, 24 Feburary 1964’, T 
171/790, 1964. 
73 ‘Memorandum from Burke Trend to Alec Douglas-Home, 8 April 1964: The 
Prospects for Taxation, 1964-1967’. PREM 11/4778, 1964. Alexander Frederick 
[Alec] Douglas-Home, fourteenth Earl of Home and Baron Home of the Hirsel 
(1903-1995) was prime minister from 1963-1964. After Eton and Oxford he stood 
unsuccessfully for Coatbridge at the 1929 election but was successful at Lanark in 
1931, which he held on and off until 1951 when he became the Earl of Home and 
entered the Lords. Despite this, he received his first Cabinet appointment in 1955 
as commonwealth secretary before controversially becoming foreign secretary. 




The assertion that there was not currently resistance does not seem 
to mean that civil servants thought the public loved taxes — Treasury 
official D J S Hancock stated bluntly in November 1963, for example: 
‘We know people do not like paying taxes’.74 The previous emphasis 
on fairness seemed to have declined somewhat, but was also still 
occasionally mentioned. At a Treasury meeting in April 1964 it was 
suggested, for example, that if inflation increased it would most likely 
increase pressure for tax cuts, but also that a capital gains tax might 
be the price for wage restraint.75  
 
It is hard to determine conclusively where this idea that opposition to 
tax might increase was coming from. It could have been that concern 
about future opposition to central taxation was prompted by 
opposition to local taxation. However, local and central taxation were 
generally clearly separated in discussions, as the above comments 
demonstrate. The civil service did not seem to be conducting any 
research into popular attitudes to tax. A 1965 note on ‘public opinion’ 
almost exclusively discussed the press, suggesting perhaps a similar 
approach to popular attitudes to that described as ‘traditional’ in the 
Conservative party by Fraser.76 Like the CRD, officials were aware of 
 
during the conference. Macmillan recommended Home and he became prime 
minister in 1963, disclaiming his peerage. He resigned as leader of the party in 
1965. He returned to the Foreign Office in 1970 and then on defeat in 1974 re-
entered the House of Lords. See: Douglas Hurd, ‘Home, Alexander Frederick 
[Alec] Douglas-, Fourteenth Earl of Home and Baron Home of the Hirsel (1903–
1995)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2014, 
accessed on: 4 February at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/60455. 
74 ‘Memorandum from D. J. S. Hancock to C. S. Bennett, 1 November 1963’. The 
National Archives (TNA) T 227/1788, 1963. 
75 ‘Minutes of a Meeting Held in Sir William Armstrong's Room on Thursday, 30th 
April, 1964 at 3.30 p.m.’. T 171/790, 1964. 
76 ‘Note on Public Opinion’. The National Archives (TNA) EW 4/35, 1965; 
‘Memorandum from Michael Fraser to Lord Blakenham, 25 November 1963’, CCO 
20/27/1, Conservative Party Archive, 1963. 
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the 1963 IEA survey but unimpressed by its methodological quality.77 
A Treasury report stated, for example: 
The Central Statistical Office were consulted about the validity of the 
survey and were very critical about the wording of the questions used, the 
presentation of the results and the choice of the sample of people 
interviewed … These replies from other departments confirmed our own 
view that it was very doubtful whether any conclusions of importance about 
public attitudes to taxation and the social services could be drawn from this 
survey.78  
In any case, as discussed above, the survey suggested that the most 
popular option in 1963 was increased taxation and spending. This 
belief that popular opposition to tax might have been about to 
increase does not, therefore, seem to have been based on any 
evidence of popular attitudes. It may have been transmitted to 
Treasury officials and the Cabinet Secretary by Conservative 
politicians, or vice versa. The fact that it was only found in comments 
by senior civil servants, who were most likely to have contact with 
ministers, perhaps supports this. It is also possible, however, that 
officials were simply seeing the necessity for more visible tax 
increases in the future and drawing similar conclusions to 
Conservative politicians about the probable impact on popular 
 
77 See for example: ‘Choice in Welfare: First Report on an Enquiry Conducted by 
Mass Observation into the Extent of Knowledge and Preference in State and 
Private Provision for Education, Health Services and Pensions’. ‘Memorandum 
from J. E. Hansford to D. J. S. Hancock, 29 August 1963’. T 227/1788, 1963; 
‘Memorandum from C. S. Bennett to J. F. Embling, 12 November 1963’. T 
227/1788, 1963; ‘"Choice in Welfare": Commentary by a Treasury Group’. T 
227/1788, 1964. Again no evidence was found of the 1965 survey being discussed. 
However, the next survey after that, published in 1971, was again examined by the 
Treasury, although in less detail. This perhaps suggests that the party in 
government may have had an impact on the attention given to IEA publications by 
civil servants. See: Harris and Seldon, ‘Choice in Welfare 1965: Second Report on 
an Enquiry Conducted by Mass-Observation into the Extent of Knowledge and 
Preference in State and Private Provision for Education, Health Services and 
Pensions ’; Harris and Seldon, ‘Choice in Welfare, 1970: Third Report on 
Knowledge and Preference in Education, Health Services and Pensions’; 
‘Treasury/Department of Health and Social Security Joint Working Party on 
Financing the National Health Service’. The National Archives (TNA) T 227/3288, 
1971. 
78 ‘"Choice in Welfare": Commentary by a Treasury Group’. T 227/1788, 1964. 
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attitudes to tax. 
 
Very few civil service comments about popular attitudes to tax were 
found from 1965. An undated note from the Department of Economic 
Affairs (most likely from 1965) suggested similar ideas about 
increasing opposition, stating: ‘Straight increases of tax within the 
present framework are likely to meet increasing resistance’.79 
However, it also emphasised current opposition among industrial 
leaders, noting: 
As regards direct taxation, there is a general feeling among the leaders of 
industry that direct taxation is too high and too progressive with adverse 
effects on incentive, and with the danger of making people more interested 
in how to pay less tax than in how to produce more income by greater 
effort.80  
If this was written in 1965 its focus on industry seems logical given 
the backlash against the budget. Fairness was again also highlighted 
— a Treasury paper in January 1965 argued that any cut in 
employers’ NI contributions without a concomitant cut for employees 
would be very unpopular.81  
 
Senior civil servants were making similar comments to Conservative 
politicians about the potential for increasing opposition to tax 
increases in the lead-up to the 1964 election. As in the Conservative 
party, the source of this idea is unclear. It does not appear to have 
come from polling and while it may have been transmitted from 
Conservative politicians, it could also simply have been the result of 
similar assumptions about popular attitudes and the response to 
 
79 ‘Indirect Taxation: Note by the Department of Economic Affairs, N.D. (Likely 
1965)’. The National Archives (TNA) T 320/455. 
80 Ibid. 
81 ‘Replacement of National Insurance Contributions by a Major Extension of 
Indirect Taxation: Note by the Secretaries, 13 January 1965’. The National 
Archives (TNA) T 320/455, 1965. 
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increasing taxation. Few comments were found in 1965 but those 
that were perhaps again suggested concern about increasing 
opposition, as well as contemporary opposition from industrial 
leaders. This was logical given the backlash to Labour’s tax reforms. 
Comments also continued to emphasise the importance of fairness in 
both 1964 and 1965, if slightly less than they had around the 1961 
budget. However, given the content of the 1961 budget compared to 
the 1965 budget this is also perhaps unsurprising. 
 
The Labour party 
 
Although by 1964 the idea that opposition to tax was not a major 
problem had become more common in the civil service, it does not 
appear to have spread to the Labour party. Labour politicians and 
researchers seemed fairly concerned about current opposition to tax 
in 1964-5. Although they had worked out a comprehensive tax reform 
plan, the Labour manifesto at the 1964 election did not set this out in 
detail, stating only that they would make the tax system fairer, 
introduce a capital gains tax, and crack down on tax evasion and 
avoidance.82 Pemberton suggests that this: 
… stemmed from its [Labour’s] loss of the 1959 general election and the 
widespread view that the party's pledges on income tax and purchase tax 
had contributed to defeat.83  
As discussed in the previous chapter, it is not clear that key Labour 
figures unanimously agreed that tax had cost them the 1959 election 
in its immediate aftermath. This idea could have emerged later, 
although it did not appear in the sources consulted here. It seems 
plausible though that if there was a general belief that tax had been a 
 
82 Dale, Labour Party General Election Manifestos, 1900-1997, 105-125. 




negative for them during the 1959 and previous elections then 
Labour would be concerned about opposition to tax ahead of the 
1964 election. Labour politicians also, unsurprisingly, appeared 
concerned about the reaction of higher earners to their tax policies in 
the run-up to the 1964 election. The second draft report of their 
working party on taxation in March 1964, for example, suggested that 
capital gains and wealth taxes would be ‘easier to introduce’ if they 
were mitigated by cuts to surtax and new allowances for saving.84  
 
However, Labour discussions about popular attitudes to tax around 
the 1964 election, as previously, also emphasised fairness, 
particularly in relation to wage restraint.85 One note in January 1964, 
for example, suggested that people needed to see parity of 
sacrifice.86 The draft reports of the working party on tax, written in 
February and March 1964, also argued that a general recasting of 
the tax system to make it fairer, using a wealth tax and excess profits 
levy, would create ‘a new climate of social justice which would make 
an incomes policy more acceptable’.87 In general, Labour comments 
about popular attitudes to tax around the 1964 election did not seem 
dissimilar to those expressed around 1950 and 1959.  
 
84 ‘Working Party on Taxation. Draft Report on Taxation and Incomes Policy 
(Second Revision), March 1964’, NEC 102 March, (Labour Party, Labour Party 
Archive, People’s History Museum), 1964. 
85 ‘Taxation Working Party. The Taxation Implications of an Incomes Policy, 
January 1964’, NEC 102 January (Labour Party, Labour Party Archive, People’s 
History Museum), 1964; ‘Taxation Working Party. A Note on the Wealth Tax by 
Thomas Balogh, January 1964’, NEC 102 January (Labour Party, Labour Party 
Archive, People’s History Museum), 1964; ‘Working Party on Taxation. Draft 
Report on Taxation and Incomes Policy, February 1964’, NEC 102 February, 
(Labour Party, Labour Party Archive, People’s History Museum), 1964. 
86 ‘Taxation Working Party. The Taxation Implications of an Incomes Policy, 
January 1964’, NEC 102 January Labour Party, 1964. 
87 ‘Working Party on Taxation. Draft Report on Taxation and Incomes Policy, 
February 1964’, NEC 102 February, Labour Party, 1964; ‘Working Party on 
Taxation. Draft Report on Taxation and Incomes Policy (Second Revision), March 




Fewer discussions were found in 1965, perhaps because Labour was 
now in government. What comments there were seemed again to 
assume popular opposition to tax.88 Crossman, for example, 
recorded in his diaries that he had suggested that they should have 
got ‘all the imposts, all the unpopularities’ into the autumn 1964 
budget in one go.89 George Brown, then head of the newly created 
Department of Economic Affairs and in charge of incomes policy, 
argued that the budget would not help wage restraint and might even 
harm it, writing in a memo to Wilson in March 1965: 
It adds up on balance to an extremely negative package; is punishing to 
ordinary folk even where there is little case for being so; and is wholly 
irrelevant to our real needs … It is really just a “soak ‘em” package … The 
most likely outcome is that if the man-in-the-street feels this package 
presses too harshly on him he will meet it by making bigger wage 
demands on some pretext or other; and far from that contributing to our 
policy aims it will do precisely the opposite.90 
Tony Benn did not comment on popular attitudes in relation to the 
 
88 See for example: Crossman, ‘The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Vol.1, Minister of 
Housing, 1964-66’, 50-51; ‘Memorandum from George Brown to Harold Wilson, 19 
March 1965’. The National Archives (TNA) T 171/801, 1965; Tony Benn, ‘Out of 
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budget in his diaries but he did record in January 1965 that he had 
attended a meeting in his constituency at which there was a storm of 
criticism which ‘broadened out into a general attack on the bank rate, 
rising income tax, foreign policy and the lot’.91 Private comments by 
Labour politicians about attitudes to tax found in 1965, therefore, 
implied, or explicitly stated, that tax increases were unpopular. 
 
Backbench Labour MPs also occasionally used popular attitudes to 
tax to support their positions during the 1965 budget debate.92 Harold 
Lever, one of the Labour MPs who criticised the budget most 
strongly, was scornful about the idea that PAYE taxpayers were 
‘tantalised or tormented’ by capital gains being untaxed, implying that 
fairness was not a major consideration.93 However, later he stated 
 
91 Benn, ‘Out of the Wilderness: Diaries 1963-67’, 206. 
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Treasury in 1967 before joining the Cabinet in 1969 as paymaster-general and 
deputy at the Ministry of Technology. After a stroke in 1972 Wilson was unwilling to 
appoint him to a major department so from 1974 to 1979 he served as economic 
 
203 
that there had been ‘widespread public concern’ about close 
companies.94 Given that the average person would surely not have 
been familiar with the tax arrangements of close companies, this 
raises some questions about who the ‘public’ he was referring to 
was. A different view of popular attitudes was put forward by Jack 
Diamond, who stated: 
Some of the speeches that we have heard from time to time may sound 
perfectly well in certain establishments where right hon. Gentlemen 
opposite move … but I would invite them to come to a factory in my 
constituency, make that same speech in the canteen, and then see what 
the workers—who have had every proper pennyworth of tax deducted from 
their wages day in and day out, year in and year out—think of the propriety 
of allowing a certain amount of tax avoidance, as has been said from time 
to time.95 
While Diamond’s comments seemed broadly in line with most 
discussions of popular attitudes to tax, Lever’s seemed either 
 
advisor to the prime minister. See: Edmund Dell, ‘Lever, (Norman) Harold, Baron 
Lever of Manchester (1914–1995)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2005, accessed on: 4 February at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/58077. 
94 H. C. Deb. 713 col. 682, 24 May 1965. The definition of close companies is 
complex but broadly they are companies which are wholly or largely controlled by 
five or fewer participators or exclusively by the directors. See: HM Revenue and 
Customs, ‘HMRC Internal Manual Company Taxation Manual: Close Companies’, 
2020, accessed on: 27 April at https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-
manuals/company-taxation-manual/ctm60060. 
95 H. C. Deb. 716 col. 238, 12 July 1965. cited in Whiting, The Labour Party and 
Taxation, 166. John [Jack] Diamond (1907-2004) was an accountant and Labour, 
and then later Social Democratic Party (SDP), politician. He ran his own 
accountancy firm and had numerous other business interests. Involvement with 
social work in London led him towards socialism and he joined the Fabian Society 
in the 1930s but did not stand for parliament until 1945 when he became MP for 
Blackley (Manchester). He lost his seat in 1951, but won a seat in Gloucester at a 
by-election in 1957. Diamond was made chief secretary to the Treasury in 1964 
and was one of the Treasury team for the 1965 budget. He lost his seat in 1970 
and was made Baron Diamond. He then chaired the Royal Commission on the 
Distribution of Income and Wealth from 1974, which ended up as a casualty of the 
1979 election, reporting after the result and being largely ignored. He was involved 
in the creation of the SDP in 1981 and was leader of the SDP peers from 1982 to 
1988. He re-joined Labour in 1995 after Blair’s election. See: David Marquand, 
‘Diamond, John [Jack], Baron Diamond (1907–2004)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2011, accessed on: 18 December at 




implausible or as if they referred in reality to elite attitudes.  
 
As in earlier periods, no evidence was cited for these statements. 
The Labour party does appear to have been paying more attention to 
polling internally in 1964-5, including producing polling summaries 
and commissioning polling by Mark Abrams.96 This is in line with 
previous research; both Black and Wring have demonstrated how 
polling became more important to the Labour party throughout the 
1960s.97 Very little of this seems to have focused on tax, however. 
Abrams conducted two surveys, in 1963 and 1964, which asked 
whether respondents thought that a future Labour or Conservative 
government would increase, maintain, or reduce taxation.98 These 
found that small majorities thought Labour would increase taxes and 
large majorities thought the Conservatives would not change them.99 
However, polling summaries after the 1965 budget found that it had 
been popular, particularly the attack on business expenses, and that 
people generally thought that it was tough but fair.100  
 
 
96 See for example: ‘Campaign Committee. Opinion Polls, June 1963’, RD 481 
June, (Labour Party, Labour Party Archive, People’s History Museum), 1963; Mark 
Abrams, ‘Survey of Target Electors, June 1963’, ABMS 3 132, (The papers of Mark 
Abrams, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1963; Mark Abrams, ‘Second 
Survey of Marginal Constituencies, March 1963’, ABMS 3 131, (The papers of 
Mark Abrams, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1963; Mark Abrams, ‘Study 
of Public Opinion: General Report, March 1964’, ABMS 3 150, (The papers of Mark 
Abrams, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1964. 
97 Black, The Political Culture of the Left in Affluent Britain, 1951-64: Old Labour, 
New Britain?, 186-187; Wring, The Politics of Marketing the Labour Party, 64-80. 
98 Abrams, ‘Second Survey of Marginal Constituencies, March 1963’, ABMS 3 131, 
The papers of Mark Abrams, 1963; Abrams, ‘Study of Public Opinion: General 
Report, March 1964’, ABMS 3 150, The papers of Mark Abrams, 1964. 
99 Abrams, ‘Second Survey of Marginal Constituencies, March 1963’, ABMS 3 131, 
The papers of Mark Abrams, 1963; Abrams, ‘Study of Public Opinion: General 
Report, March 1964’, ABMS 3 150, The papers of Mark Abrams, 1964. 
100 ‘Home Policy Committee. State of the Nation: Opinion Polls II, February 1965’, 
RD 8 February, (Labour Party, Labour Party Archive, People’s History Museum), 
1965; ‘Home Policy Committee. State of the Nation: Opinion Polls V, May 1965’, 
RD 25 May, (Labour Party, Labour Party Archive, People’s History Museum), 1965. 
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It is unclear how much impact this expanded polling had. It 
suggested that Labour’s concern about popular opposition to tax 
ahead of the 1964 election was probably justified, but no comments 
linking polling and the manifesto choices were found. Diamond’s 
comments seemed in line with the survey findings, but polling 
suggested that both Lever and Brown’s assessments of attitudes to 
the 1965 budget were inaccurate, particularly in relation to fairness. 
There is also the question of whether Labour politicians actually 
wanted information about popular attitudes to tax, or were simply 
using them mechanistically to support their policy preferences. There 
were too few comments about popular attitudes to draw any clear 
conclusions about this. However, it is notable that Benn seemed 
unwilling to take his constituents’ comments on board in January 
1965, stating that they were ‘unaware of the critical economic 
situation’ and ‘emerged as a most short-sighted group’.101 In general, 
Labour MPs’ and ministers’ comments about popular attitudes to tax 
in 1964-5 often seemed to be based largely on subjective beliefs 
rather than evidence.   
 
Labour discussions of popular attitudes to tax in 1964-5 did not 
appear to have changed significantly. Unlike Conservative politicians 
and researchers and senior civil servants they did not argue that tax 
was no longer a major issue. Instead, they expressed concern about 
opposition to tax and continued to emphasise fairness, particularly in 
relation to wage restraint. Although the party had significantly 
expanded its use of polling, it is not clear that this was influencing 
Labour politicians’ comments, which, though not common, appeared 
still to be largely based on their own subjective views and were not 
 
101 Benn, ‘Out of the Wilderness: Diaries 1963-67’, 206. 
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always in line with their poll findings.  
 
The Trades Union Congress 
 
One potentially important source for Labour ideas about popular 
attitudes to taxation in 1964-5, particularly given the focus on wage 
restraint, was the TUC. The TUC welcomed both the autumn 1964 
and 1965 budgets.102 Their press release on the autumn budget 
suggested that increased income taxes would be unpopular with 
those affected but did not seem overly concerned: 
Unpopular as the sharp increase in income tax will be with the minority 
who will be affected, it reflects on the one hand the underlying gravity of 
the situation and, on the other, a determination to carry out radical and 
progressive changes in the whole tax structure.103 
Similarly, a draft statement on the 1965 budget stated that although 
the capital gains tax had ‘naturally enough, attracted considerable 
criticism from those who have previously enjoyed what is virtually a 
source of tax-free income’ they were confident that this would not 
prevent the chancellor from pressing ahead.104 This could, of course, 
have been an attempt to encourage Callaghan not to abandon the 
reforms. However, in general, TUC comments in 1964-5 suggested 
that there would be opposition from taxpayers whose liabilities 
increased. 
 
They made very few comments about their members’ attitudes. An 
 
102 ‘Trades Union Congress: The Budget. Econ. Ctee 3/1. 20th November 1964’, 
MSS.292B 410.2/1, (TUC, MRC), 1964; ‘Press Release on November 1964 
Budget, 11 November 1964’, MSS.292B 410.2/1, (TUC, MRC), 1964; ‘Press 
Release on 1965 Budget, 6 April 1965’, MSS.292B 410.2/1, (TUC, MRC), 1965. 
103 ‘Press Release on November 1964 Budget, 11 November 1964’, MSS.292B 
410.2/1, TUC, 1964. 
104 ‘Trades Union Congress: The Economic Situation. Econ. Ctee 7/7. 10th 
February 1965’, MSS.292B 410.2/1, (TUC, MRC), 1965. 
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internal report stated that the autumn budget aimed to ‘create a 
climate of opinion that will make an incomes policy acceptable’, and 
hoped that increased NI benefits, capital gains tax, and increased 
progressivity in income tax would be welcomed by trade unionists. It 
did not, however, comment on how likely it thought this was.105 The 
only comment found in 1965 that was close to a statement on 
popular attitudes to tax came during a meeting with the chancellor 
after the budget. A TUC representative stated that whatever 
‘happened to wages would depend on what happened to prices’. It is 
interesting that he emphasised prices rather than taxation. He went 
on to say that he ‘agreed there had to be some change in the whole 
approach to taxation’, but did not specify what that reform should be, 
or suggest whether members supported such a change.106  
 
Although a superficial examination of the archived letters from 
members, unions, and councils to the TUC in this period suggests 
that they were receiving slightly fewer letters than in previous years, 
this is not conclusive, and those they did receive argued almost 
exclusively for lower taxes.107 There were no resolutions on tax at the 
 
105 ‘Trades Union Congress: The Budget. Econ. Ctee 3/1. 20th November 1964’, 
MSS.292B 410.2/1, TUC, 1964. Incidentally, the phrasing used in their internal 
report emphasises the links between the TUC and Labour on taxation as the 
wording was almost identical to that used by Labour’s working party on tax (see 
above). See: ‘Working Party on Taxation. Draft Report on Taxation and Incomes 
Policy, February 1964’, NEC 102 February, Labour Party, 1964; ‘Working Party on 
Taxation. Draft Report on Taxation and Incomes Policy (Second Revision), March 
1964’, NEC 102 March, Labour Party, 1964. 
106 ‘Trades Union Congress: Report of a Meeting between the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and the Economic Committee Held at the Treasury on Monday, 3rd 
May, 1965, at 3pm’, MSS.292B 410.2/1, (TUC, MRC), 1965. 
107 See for example: ‘Letter from T J Smith, National Union of Printing, Bookbinding 
& Paper Workers to George Woodcock, 11 August 1964’, MSS.292B 411.1/9, 
(TUC, MRC), 1964; ‘Letter from R C B Stillman to the Secretary of the TUC, 18 
August 1964’, MSS.292B 411.1/1, (TUC, MRC), 1964; ‘Letter from Gwen Wicks to 
George Woodcock, 14 January 1965’, MSS.292B 411.1/1, (TUC, MRC), 1965; 
‘Letter from Hugh Kelly, Plumbing Trades Union to George Woodcock, 5 March 
1965’, MSS.292B 411.1/9, (TUC, MRC), 1965; ‘Letter from R Barnett, National 
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1964 conference although there had been two in 1963: one calling 
for increased tax allowances, which was not passed, and one calling 
for the TUC not to cooperate with an incomes policy that did not 
include price controls and control of profits through taxation, which 
was.108 A motion in 1965 also expressed concern about rising prices, 
low pay, and the unfair burden of both direct and indirect taxation on 
low-paid workers. The debate about the motion mostly focused on 
whether or not they could trust the new Labour government.109 It is 
possible that support for tax cuts had lessened slightly in the TUC 
membership in the immediate aftermath of the 1964 election but 
there is insufficient evidence to determine whether or not this was the 
case. TUC members still displayed significant opposition to the level 
of structure of taxation and concern about equity.  
 
As previously, in 1964-5 the TUC made few comments about popular 
attitudes to tax. Although they suggested that there might be 
opposition to Labour’s tax reforms from those who saw their taxes 
increased, TUC statements did not suggest any real concern about 
this. No clear representations of members’ attitudes to tax were 
found either. Communications from members suggested that 
opposition to tax might have declined slightly in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1964 election, but this was not conclusive and 
communications and resolutions continued to suggest significant 
opposition to contemporary tax levels and concern about fairness. 
TUC comments about attitudes to tax remained consistent with 
 
Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers to George Woodcock, 2 September 1965’, 
MSS.292B 411.1/10, (TUC, MRC), 1965. 
108 ‘A Value Added Tax, August 1963’, MSS.292B 411.25/1, (TUC, MRC), 1963; 
‘Congress Motion 61: Income Tax - Personal Allowances’, MSS.292B 411.1/9, 
(TUC, MRC), 1963; Trades Union Congress, TUC Report, 1963 (London: TUC, 
1963), 393-396, 463-464. 
109 Trades Union Congress, TUC Report, 1965 (London: TUC, 1965), 476-496. 
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earlier discussions and TUC officials do not appear to have been 
suggesting that their members’ attitudes to tax had changed in 1964-
5. 
 
The Federation of British Industries and Confederation of 
British Industry 
 
FBI discussions of popular attitudes to tax were also limited in 1964-
5.110 FBI officials did, however, represent their members as highly 
opposed to the 1965 budget. A draft letter to Callaghan in May 1965 
stated: 
Industry is deeply worried about the Finance Bill. I have never previously 
known so widespread or so heavy a foreboding that measures are being 
adopted which will undermine the stability of business and jeopardise the 
possibilities of growth.111  
This was an unusually explicit statement of members’ views. The 
letter also reported that this feeling was ‘not confined to prominent 
large companies in special situations’ but went ‘deep and wide’.112 A 
draft of a speech to be given at the Accountants’ Hall in Glasgow in 
March 1963 also argued for a shift to indirect tax because people felt 
overburdened by direct taxes:  
If there is a lesson to be learned from such comparisons, it is that, when 
total taxes exceed 30% of G.N.P. and over 50% of that total comes from 
direct taxation, the taxpayer feels that he is heavily taxed. The lesson for 
the U.K. would therefore seem to be that the burden of direct taxes should 
be lightened and the contribution of indirect taxes to tax revenue should be 
increased …113 
 
110 The FBI merged with the British Employers’ Confederation and the National 
Association of British Manufacturers to form the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI) on the 30th of July 1965. 
111 ‘Draft Letter to James Callaghan, 21 May 1965’, MSS.200/C 3/ECO/16/3, 
(Confederation of British Industry Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of 
Warwick), 1965. 
112 Ibid. 
113 ‘Speech - Aspects of Taxation in the U.K. And E.E.C. To Be Given at 4.30 p.m. 
At Accountants' Hall, 220 St. Vincent Street, Glasgow, 7th March, 1963’, 
MSS.200/C 3/ECO/16/1, (Confederation of British Industry Archive, Modern 
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The speech did not provide any evidence that people felt overtaxed 
above 30 percent of GNP. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
FBI appeared to shy away, internally, from advocating a switch from 
direct to indirect taxation ahead of the 1963 budget because 
proposals to tax necessities were 'politically unacceptable’.114 
‘Politically unacceptable’ in this context could have been a synonym 
for unpopular or it could have referred to politicians’ attitudes. Ahead 
of the 1964 budget the FBI did call for a shift to indirect taxation — as 
well as cuts in profits and income taxes — although they justified this 
on grounds of increasing prosperity, rather than popular attitudes.115 
With such limited comments, however, it is difficult to determine 
whether their ideas about popular, or political, attitudes to tax had 
changed, or whether they had simply concluded that they were no 
longer such an obstacle. 
 
An internal CBI discussion in 1966 suggested that fairness was 
important to popular attitudes as well. A meeting in June 1966 
concluded that their best option might be to advocate a cut in the 
standard rate of income tax, as a reduction of taxes on unearned 
income specifically, which was their main aim, would be ‘politically’ 
difficult.116 It also reported that the Taxation Panel thought that the 
idea of advocating a 20 percent corporation tax rate was totally 
unrealistic, stating: 
Even if public opinion would support such a low rate of tax on company 
profits, it would completely distort the relationship between U.K. Company 
 
Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1963. 
114 ‘Minutes of the Meeting of the Taxation Committee Held at the FBI Offices on 
Tuesday, 9th October, 1962, at 11 a.m.’, MSS.200/F 3/E7/1/5, Confederation of 
British Industry Archive, 1962. 
115 ‘The Budget, 1964, 13 December 1963’, MSS.200/F 3/E7/1/5, (Confederation of 
British Industry Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1963. 
116 ‘Economic Committee and Taxation Panel Joint Meeting, June 13th 1966’, 
MSS.200/C 3/ECO/16/4, (Confederation of British Industry Archive, Modern 
Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1966. 
 
211 
taxes and those applying overseas.117 
Again, it is unclear whether ‘politically difficult’ meant unpopular or 
simply referred to political conditions. In either case, they did not 
seem to think that people would accept significant cuts to corporation 
tax. 
 
The FBI’s own communications about tax appeared to have become 
less negative. They strongly opposed the income tax increases in the 
1965 budget, arguing that if taxes had to be raised they should be 
raised on goods, not companies or ‘those whose efforts are most 
likely to increase production and exports’, declaring that it would 
make top rates ‘absurdly high’. They also continued to advocate tax 
cuts.118 However, they proposed only technical changes to the 
corporation and capital gains tax proposals.119 This could have been 
a tactical decision, but internal memorandums and meetings also 
recorded limited opposition to the principles of the reforms, again 
focusing on small changes that could be made to reduce businesses’ 
liability.120 Similarly, although the draft speech suggested that those 
earning over £1000 per annum were comparatively very heavily 
taxed, and proposed various ways taxation could be improved, it was 
broadly positive about the British tax system, suggesting that the 
grass only appeared greener in other countries. It also stated that 
 
117 Ibid. 
118 ‘The Budget 1965, 7 December 1964’, MSS.200/F 3/E7/1/6, (Confederation of 
British Industry Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1964. 
119 Ibid. See also: ‘Draft Letter to James Callaghan, 21 May 1965’, MSS.200/C 
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Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1964; ‘Minutes of the 
Meeting of the Taxation Panel Held at the FBI Offices on Wednesday, 17th 
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although a wealth tax would reduce investment there were some 
arguments in favour of its introduction.121  
 
FBI/CBI discussions of popular attitudes to tax may have increased 
very slightly by 1964-5 but they remained rare. Tax changes were 
often also referred to as ‘politically’ difficult, but whether this actually 
referred to politicians’ views or wider attitudes is unclear. The 
comments they did make suggested popular and industrial opposition 
to tax increases, but also that cuts to wealthy taxpayers’ liabilities 
and a shift to indirect tax might be unpopular. No evidence was cited 
to indicate what these comments were based on. No signs were 
found of any investigation of attitudes to tax. The Taxation and 
Economic Committees were made up of prominent businessmen and 
representatives from Britain’s largest companies; perhaps, like many 
of the other elite groups studied here, their ideas about attitudes to 
tax were primarily based on personal experience and their social 
spheres, which may well have overlapped with those of politicians 
and senior civil servants. With so few discussions it is hard to draw 
definite conclusions about the FBI/CBI’s ideas about attitudes to tax. 
However, although they did suggest some opposition to the level and 
structure of taxation they did not seem to be thinking, or asserting, 




Another potential source of ideas about popular attitudes to tax was, 
of course, the press. Although articles in the right-leaning papers 
 
121 ‘Speech - Aspects of Taxation in the U.K. And E.E.C. To Be Given at 4.30 p.m. 
At Accountants' Hall, 220 St. Vincent Street, Glasgow, 7th March, 1963’, 
MSS.200/C 3/ECO/16/1, Confederation of British Industry Archive, 1963. 
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strongly criticised the corporation and capital gains taxes, press 
discussion of the 1965 budget largely focused on the economic 
situation and whether the budget would do enough to reassure 
foreign investors and stabilise the pound.122 The idea that tax was 
overly burdensome did reappear to a limited extent. Articles argued 
that high taxation was killing incentives and investment, and might 
push talent to leave Britain.123 One Guardian editorial argued, for 
example: 
As things now are, hardworking individuals have far too little inducement to 
save and invest. Their incomes are so heavily taxed that they cannot easily 
acquire shares, and if they do become shareholders they are then 
penalised as such. The total effect of our present system of taxation, 
aggravated by Mr Callaghan, is militantly anti-capitalist.124 
Interestingly, one Mirror article explicitly pushed back against this 
idea just before the budget, arguing: 
Britain is far from being the most heavily taxed nation on earth. Chancellor 
James Callaghan has already told us that income tax will go up by 6d. To 
8s. 3d. In the £. Some top economists have suggested he ought to put it 
up by ANOTHER SIXPENCE if he wants to tackle our economic problem. 
Many industrialists fear he may also clap extra duty on SMOKE and 
DRINKS and push up PURCHASE TAX as well. Even so, it is doubtful 
whether Britain will be paying more in taxation after this Budget than the 
other important countries of Europe. For most of them are far more heavily 
taxed than we are.125 
This perhaps suggests that they thought this attack was a serious 
threat. However, in general, the idea that tax was overly burdensome 
 
122 See for example: ‘Overspending’, Times, 1 April 1965; ‘What Mr. Callaghan 
Should Do’, Financial Times, 3 April 1965; Robert Heller, ‘The Economy’, 
Observer, 11 April 1965; Peter Jenkins, ‘Economic Growth Plans Unharmed: 
Budget 'Strikes Right Balance'’, Guardian, 7 April 1965; Kenneth Fleet, ‘Doctor 
Callaghan’s Dilemma’, Sunday Telegraph, 4 April 1965; F. W. Paish, ‘The Budget I 
Would Like to See’, Financial Times, 5 April 1965; ‘Socialist Answer’, Daily 
Telegraph, 7 April 1965; Harold Wincott, ‘Ruminations before the Budget’, 
Financial Times, 6 April 1965. 
123 See for example: ‘Opinion: How to Earn a £3,500 Rise’, Daily Express, 1 April 
1965; Frederick Ellis, ‘Under the Clock’, ibid., 15 April; John Grigg, ‘Success Is the 
Spur’, Guardian, 22 April 1965; Margot Naylor, ‘Who Is Being Tax Squeezed?’, 
Observer, 23 May 1965. 
124 Grigg, ‘Success Is the Spur’, Guardian, 22 April 1965. 




was far less prevalent than it had been in 1949-50, despite criticism 
of the 1965 budget and its unprecedented reforms.  
 
Comments about popular attitudes to tax also reappeared to some 
extent but were still much less prevalent than they had been in 1949-
50. Most commentators suggested that the budget would be, or was, 
unpopular.126 Despite the article above, the Mirror, for example, ran 
an opinion piece by ‘Cassandra’, journalist William O’Connor, 
suggesting that people were ‘weeping throughout the land’ at the tax 
increases, and that people at least liked to see their money before it 
was taken away by the government.127 The Express argued that 
voters had already been depressed by the income tax increases and 
now found themselves burdened by more.128 An Economist editorial 
also pointed out:  
Mr Callaghan now becomes the eighth British Chancellor since the war to 
have made a net increase in taxes in his budget, and thereon hangs an 
interesting reflection. One of the other seven, Sir Stafford Cripps in 1948, 
raised them by a mere £49 million net. The other six … all had one thing in 
common. They ceased to be Chancellors of the Exchequer within nine 
months - except for Mr Selwyn Lloyd, who lasted a year. Deflationary virtue 
by itself, does not usually bring political reward.129  
It was not entirely clear whether they were suggesting that Callaghan 
would be punished by voters or his own party, but the broader 
message of these articles was clear — tax increases were unpopular 
and politically dangerous.  
 
The Mirror and New Statesman were the only publications to suggest 
that the public would, or at least should, be supportive of the budget, 
 
126 See for example: Jon, ‘"Don't Tell Me He's Slapped a Tax on This Too!"’, Daily 
Mail, 7 April 1965; Cassandra, ‘Watch the Money Go By’, Daily Mirror, 7 April 1965; 
‘Is Virtue Enough’, Economist, 10 April 1965; ‘Opinion: The Price of Mr. Callaghan’, 
Daily Express, 7 April 1965. 
127 Cassandra, ‘Watch the Money Go By’, Daily Mirror, 7 April 1965. 
128 ‘Opinion: The Price of Mr. Callaghan’, Daily Express, 7 April 1965. 
129 ‘Is Virtue Enough’, Economist, 10 April 1965. 
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and they focused on the indirect tax increases specifically. The same 
day as the opinion piece above, the Mirror ran an editorial arguing 
that indirect tax increases were a small price to pay and more than 
offset by the attacks on capital: 
The wage-earners can't really complain - not when they see what he has 
done to bust tax-avoiding rackets … Smoking and drinking is going to be 
dearer. But let's be realistic. Sixpence on a king-size packet of fags, four 
bob on a bottle of Scotch, or a penny on the pint, isn't the end of the world 
… Nobody can say this is a Budget in which the rich get all the pleasure 
and the poor get all the blame.130 
The New Statesman was not quite as effusive, but suggested that 
people would accept the indirect tax increases as at least now it was 
clear that the wealthy were sharing the burden.131  
 
There was not much other discussion of the popularity of the 
individual tax changes. One Observer opinion piece argued that the 
corporation tax was not going to be popular with the electorate, while 
the capital gains tax might be with some changes: 
… modifications, including a lower rate and the equitable quid pro quo of 
reduced surtax, would probably mean that the bulk of the electorate 
approved the measure [capital gains tax]. I don’t think the same thing can 
be said about the corporation tax - and not only because its implications 
are not understood. Mr Callaghan and his colleagues are perhaps 
unfortunate in trying to reform the company tax system at a time when 
taxes are rising.132  
More convincingly, perhaps, an FT article suggested that it would be 
hard to interest the public in either the capital gains or corporation tax 
changes.133 Despite suggestions of popular opposition, polling 
showed that Labour increased their lead over the Conservatives after 
the budget announcements.134 The Telegraph’s report of this polling 
 
130 ‘The Racket-Busting Chancellor’, Daily Mirror, 7 April 1965. 
131 ‘What Follows the Budget?’, New Statesman, 9 April 1965. 
132 Naylor, ‘Who Is Being Tax Squeezed?’, Observer, 23 May 1965. 
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questioned how long the British public would be fooled by Labour. It 
went on to commend a new scheme by Geoffrey Howe for insurance-
based welfare, stating: 
This is the main way in which the Conservative party can create a policy 
which will reduce taxation. And this is what the British people will be 
looking for when this Budget starts to bite.135  
 
Where groups were specified, the middle class was by far the most 
commonly mentioned — only the Mirror and New Statesman 
published articles that seemed focused specifically on working-class 
taxpayers.136 The Telegraph stated, for example:  
Labour's distorted vision of social justice amounts in the end to an attack 
upon the middle classes.137 
Another article in the Financial Times slightly petulantly concluded 
that a 35-year-old ‘executive’ with two children should just 'move to a 
provincial town where he could live near his work, give up smoking, 
turn to soft drinks and decide to send his children to State schools’ as 
a result of the budget changes.138 This was mostly a feature of 
articles in the right-leaning papers but the Guardian also ran a piece 
reporting that middle-class pensioners would lose out due to the 
changes: 
Oil shares are the classic old-age pension of the middle class … Since last 
autumn through the threat of the tax changes now announced in the 
Budget they have already lost about a quarter of their capital. Now they 
stand to lose more than a third of their income as well. Can this have been 
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Comments about middle-class attitudes did not always emphasis 
opposition. The Financial Times suggested that middle-class voters 
would not quickly abandon the Labour party, even though the budget 
could clearly be presented as anti-middle class.140 A Spectator article 
also suggested that the proposed crackdown on expense claims 
would be popular with middle-class voters, particularly groups like 
teachers and doctors, who felt that:   
… up in the wicked city there are directors and ad-men and even 
journalists who, without so much as a diploma to their names, are knocking 
back vintage claret while the teacher gets custard slopped over him in the 
school canteen.141  
 
This focus on middle-class taxpayers could have been a response to 
them being more affected by Labour’s reforms. Effective income tax 
rates for a single man on 400 percent of average earnings increased 
significantly in 1965, but at most other income levels the increase 
was gentler and a continuation of earlier trends. In fact, the only other 
income group to see a sharp increase in effective income tax liability 
was single men at 75 percent of average earnings (see fig. 9, p. 
136).142 It is not clear, therefore, that middle-income taxpayers were 
more affected than other groups by the 1965 budget. The capital 
gains and corporation tax changes would have had an impact on 
wealthy taxpayers’ liabilities, so if when articles said ‘middle class’ 
they actually meant ‘high income’ this could still have been a factor. 
The decline of left-leaning newspapers and the fall in the perceived 
value of working-class readers as advertising became more 
 
139 ‘Shell after the Budget: Dividend Cut Inevitable?’, Guardian, 15 April 1965. 
140 Butt, ‘The Budget Marks a Watershed’, Financial Times, 9 April 1965. 
141 Watkins, ‘After the Budget’, Spectator, 9 April 1965. 




important to papers’ business models might also have had an effect; 
the Herald, for example, closed in 1964.143 
 
Despite significant parliamentary opposition, the 1965 budget was 
not as high profile in the press as might have been expected. 
Although articles in the right-leaning papers criticised the reforms, 
attention largely focused on the general economic situation and 
whether the budget was the correct approach. The ideas that tax was 
too high and that people were opposed to taxation reappeared to a 
limited extent. Where popular attitudes were discussed, articles 
suggested opposition to the budget and tax more generally, possibly 
fuelling, or at least chiming with, political concerns about the potential 
for increased opposition to taxation. However, press emphasis on the 
level of taxation and popular opposition was still significantly less 
than it had been in 1949-50. It is possible, but far from definite, 
therefore, that press reporting could have contributed to concern 





The belief in the Conservative party and, to a much lesser extent, the 
civil service in the early 1960s that popular opposition to tax had 
declined seemed to have become more widespread within those 
organisations by 1964. However, both Conservative politicians and 
senior civil servants were also expressing concern by 1964-5 that 
 
143 Curran and Seaton, Power without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the 
Internet in Britain, 88-95; Hirsch and Gordon, Newspaper Money: Fleet Street and 
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opposition would increase in the near future. This concern did not 
seem to be driven by the TUC or FBI, later CBI. The former made 
few comments about popular attitudes, and although their 
membership continued to express opposition to the levels and 
structure of taxation, if anything, this seemed to have slightly 
decreased since the early 1960s. There was also no evidence of the 
TUC stating that its members were opposed to taxes. The FBI’s 
discussions of attitudes to tax seemed to have increased slightly; 
they stated that their members were very concerned about the 1965 
tax reforms. On the other hand, while they opposed the income tax 
increases in the 1965 budget, they did not fundamentally challenge 
the corporation or capital gains taxes, proposing only small technical 
changes. FBI comments about popular attitudes to tax remained 
rare, and despite the assertion in 1963 that people would support a 
shift to indirect tax, generally also assumed that cuts in high earners’ 
or corporate taxation and increases in indirect taxation would be 
unpopular.  
 
Civil servants’ ideas may have been influenced by Labour politicians, 
as comments in the civil service in 1965 generally focused on 
contemporary opposition to Labour’s planned reforms from 
industrialists, rather than future opposition. Labour’s perceptions of 
popular attitudes to taxation seemed to have remained broadly 
constant — assuming popular opposition to tax increases and 
support for cuts, but also that fairness was key. Like civil servants 
they expressed some concern about opposition to their reforms from 
wealthy taxpayers. Given the significant opposition and lobbying 
ahead of the budget this seems entirely logical.144 Comments about 
 
144 Daunton, Just Taxes, 290-293; Pemberton, ‘Taxation and Labour's 
Modernisation Programme’; Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 159-165,173. 
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taxation being too high and popular opposition did reappear in the 
press but to a limited extent and far less than in 1949-50. Press 
discussions could have been a factor in Conservative ideas, however 
there is no way to conclusively confirm this as no discussions of 
press representations of popular attitudes to tax were found.  
 
Survey results did not appear to suggest that attitudes had changed. 
Statements about popular attitudes to tax in the organisations studied 
here seemed, in general, largely to be based on personal beliefs and 
assumptions. The CRD response to internal polling in 1965 
suggested that their preconceptions about popular attitudes to tax 
might be systematically biased by their personal characteristics and 
social sphere. While Labour was expanding polling in other areas, 
they do not appear to have felt that they needed more information 
about popular attitudes to tax. No evidence was found of Labour 
researchers critically questioning their evidence for popular attitudes 
or potential bias, unlike their Conservative counterparts. 
 
The decline in Conservative, civil service, and press emphasis on 
popular opposition to tax around 1960 appeared by the middle of the 
decade potentially to have been an anomaly. Although their concerns 
about, and representations of, popular opposition to tax had not 
returned to anywhere near the levels of 1949-50, there was clearly 
some anxiety about the potential for future opposition to tax 
increases in the Conservative party, in particular. At the same time, 
Labour, TUC, and FBI discussions did not display concern about 
increasing opposition. Their comments were much more consistent 
— suggesting varying levels of current popular opposition to tax but 




5. The 1970 General Election 
 
 
In 1966 the Beatles released Taxman: 
Let me tell you how it will be 
There's one for you, nineteen for me 
'Cause I'm the taxman, yeah, I'm the taxman 
Should five per cent appear too small 
Be thankful I don't take it all 
'Cause I'm the taxman, yeah, I'm the taxman 
If you drive a car, I'll tax the street 
If you try to sit, I'll tax your seat 
If you get too cold, I'll tax the heat 
If you take a walk, I'll tax your feet 
'Cause I'm the taxman, yeah, I'm the taxman.1 
 
Two months earlier the Kinks had released their number one single 
Sunny Afternoon, which started: “The tax man's taken all my dough 
…”.2 The Conservative party’s concern about increasing popular 
opposition to tax seemed to be confirmed. However, Taxman was not 
the most high profile of the songs on Revolver and was not released 
as a single, while the complaint about high taxation in Sunny 
Afternoon shied away from an explicit attack on the Labour 
government and could be read as a parody of the out-of-touch elite.3 
Apart from the Guardian’s description of Taxman as showing George 
Harrison’s ‘natural acquisitiveness’, neither songs’ comments about 
tax were reported in the press.4 This duality was representative of 




1 The Beatles, Taxman (1966). 
2 The Kinks, Sunny Afternoon (1966). 
3 Thomas M. Kitts, Ray Davies: Not Like Everybody Else (London: Routledge, 
2008), 73-74. 
4 Edward Greenfield, ‘Thinking Pop’, Guardian, 15 August 1966. 
 
222 
By the time Taxman was released, Labour had returned to 
government with a larger majority but they did not introduce the 
remaining elements of their tax package. The 1966 budget instead 
introduced the Selective Employment Tax (SET), which taxed 
employment in service industries. It aimed to even out the taxation of 
manufacturing and services, and make exports more competitive. 
Kaldor had originally proposed VAT but was opposed by officials on 
the grounds of administrative complexity and a lack of conviction that 
it would improve export competitiveness. SET was a poor 
replacement. It did not bring in significant revenue and caused 
controversy within the government about the autocratic nature of its 
development and announcement.5 After this Labour’s fiscal policy 
stalled. They were forced into devaluation in 1967 and Callaghan 
resigned. The incoming chancellor, Roy Jenkins, agreed with the 
Inland Revenue that there was a limit to how much change the civil 
service could reasonably absorb and blocked the proposed wealth 
tax. Instead a special charge was introduced in 1968, which was a 
one-time tax on wealth similar to the special contribution introduced 
by Cripps in 1948.6  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Daunton argues that the 
reforms of 1965 and 1966 produced little revenue and did not 
stimulate economic growth. Whiting is less critical, but both agree 
that Labour’s reforms stayed within a pre-existing structure based on 
high direct taxation and failed to deal with the issue of high direct 
taxation on low incomes.7 Between 1955 and 1964, and again 
between 1965 and 1974, the percentage of total tax revenue raised 
 
5 Daunton, Just Taxes, 293-298. 
6 Ibid., 285-301, 304-305; Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 183-195. 
7 Daunton, Just Taxes, 285-305. 
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from companies halved and the effectiveness of inheritance tax was 
eroded by increasing avoidance. By 1970 approximately one-fifth of a 
subsistence pension was taken in indirect taxes. The reduced rates 
of income tax were also gradually withdrawn from 1962, so that by 
1970 people who crossed the threshold had to pay the full standard 
rate. When Labour came into office in 1964 the threshold for income 
tax payment was 78.1 percent of the average earnings of an adult 
male worker. By the time they left this had dropped to 56.1 percent.8  
 
Although Labour’s reforms improved living standards for the lowest 
income groups through benefit increases, they resulted in high and 
increasing tax liability for most low- and middle-income taxpayers. 
Real incomes were reduced as a result of the budgets of 1964 and 
1965, which increased income tax, NI, and consumption taxes. 
These, and later decisions, were in part the result of continuing 
economic difficulties related to sterling and the balance of payments 
deficit. However, Whiting argues that they also represented an 
ideological decision in favour of spending on social services over tax 
reductions.9 This left a system where instead of redistribution from 
rich to poor there was limited redistribution from average-income 
taxpayers to a relatively small number below them.10  
 
Concern on the left about poverty and inequality continued. 
Contemporary figures suggested that the top 1 percent of the 
population owned a third of national wealth, while 5 percent owned 
 
8 Ibid., 299-300; Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 183-189. 
9 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 168-169. See also: David Butler and 
Michael Pinto Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970 (London: 
Macmillan, 1971), 1-46. 
10 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 171-184. 
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75 percent.11 Work by Feinstein and Atkinson in 1996 and 2000, 
respectively, suggested that these figures had been overestimations, 
but nonetheless concerns grew in the late 1960s about whether 
Labour’s tax and welfare policies were creating equality or 
eradicating poverty.12 During the 1970 election CPAG let the press 
misinterpret their cautious conclusion that Labour policies had not 
increased equality as that they had made the poor poorer. Labour 
went into the 1970 election facing criticism from both left and right.13 
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the Conservative party embarked 
on a comprehensive policy review exercise after their defeat in 1964. 
The resulting goal was an ‘opportunity state’ which would increase 
incentives and encourage a wider distribution of wealth. They hoped 
that reducing direct taxation would increase risk taking and make the 
economy more dynamic.14 These aims were thwarted by ideological 
and electoral considerations. The proposed wealth tax was rejected 
as un-conservative, while a payroll tax was abandoned and replaced 
with VAT because of administrative difficulties and their promise to 
repeal SET.15 In the end, the Conservatives settled on a plan to shift 
from direct to indirect taxation by introducing VAT and cutting the top 
rate of income tax to 75 percent. This would be neutral in revenue 
terms but left them open to criticism as favouring the wealthy.16 
 
11 Ibid., 190-193. 
12 Atkinson, ‘Distribution of Income and Wealth’; Feinstein, ‘The Equalizing of 
Wealth in Britain since the Second World War’; Whiting, The Labour Party and 
Taxation, 176-193; Daunton, Just Taxes, 299-300. 
13 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 176-184; Daunton, Just Taxes, 299-
300. 
14 Daunton, Just Taxes, 302-328; Williamson, Conservative Economic 
Policymaking and the Birth of Thatcherism, 1964-1979 31-36, 60-70. 
15 Daunton, Just Taxes, 302-328. Williamson, Conservative Economic 
Policymaking and the Birth of Thatcherism, 1964-1979 31-36, 60-70. 
16 Daunton, Just Taxes, 302-328. Williamson, Conservative Economic 




Cultural change continued, and moral panics intensified.17 Although 
the Race Relations Act attempted to legislate against racist violence, 
further restrictive immigration legislation was also passed in this 
period, and Enoch Powell made his ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in April 
1968.18 Huret has suggested that in the United States, concerns 
about cultural change were connected to shifting attitudes to 
taxation.19 This connection has not been made for the UK, but many 
historians have identified the late 1960s as the beginning of 
increasing opposition to state spending and taxation.20 In elite circles 
this has been linked to neoliberalism and a network of American and 
British think tanks, most notably the IEA.21 Recent work has 
emphasised their links with the media and British industry, including 
 
Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970, 126-128, 150-151. 
17 Hall et al., Policing the Crisis, particularly 218-223, 303-308. 
18 Ibid., particularly 235-243. See also: Panayi, ‘Immigration, Multiculturalism and 
Racism’; Paul, Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era ; 
Gilroy, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and 
Nation  
19 Huret, American Tax Resisters, 210-217, 232-235. 
20 See for example: Daunton, Just Taxes, 3-5, 335-338; Fielding, The Labour 
Party: Continuity and Change in the Making of ‘New’ Labour, 69-72; Whiting, The 
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2010’. 
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Economic Counter-Revolution, 1931-1983; Radhika Desai, ‘Second-Hand Dealers 
in Ideas: Think-Tanks and Thatcherite Hegemony’, New Left Review  (1994); Ben 
Jackson, ‘The Think-Tank Archipelago: Thatcherism and Neo-Liberalism’, in 
Making Thatcher's Britain, ed. Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe: 
Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics particularly 134-179; Philip 
Mirowski. ‘The Political Movement That Dared Not Speak Its Own Name: The 
Neoliberal Thought Collective under Erasure’,2014; Green, ‘Thatcherism: An 
Historical Perspective’; Lowe, ‘Modernizing Britain’s Welfare State: The Influence 
of Affluence, 1957-1964’, 41-42; Manfred B. Steger and Ravi K. Roy, 
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the CBI.22 However, it has also been argued that their influence has 
been overstated, and that the change in economic ideas among 
British elites was predominantly an internal process dependent on a 
broader political consensus and external events.23  
 
Whether driven by internal or external forces, the Conservative party 
did start to move away from their 1950s policy of maintaining and 
increasing public spending, and towards a programme that 
emphasised independence and freedom from the state.24 This 
transformation should not be overstated; once the economy started 
to decline in 1971 the Conservative government quickly reverted to 
Keynesian techniques, including effectively nationalising the aircraft 
section of Rolls Royce.25 Some have also argued it should be seen 
as a longer process, as liberal market ideas that had been present 
but marginalised within the party in the 1950s became more 
influential again.26 Within Labour, the idea spread that the limits of 
 
22 See for example: Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the 
Economic Counter-Revolution, 1931-1983, 325; Jackson, ‘The Think-Tank 
Archipelago: Thatcherism and Neo-Liberalism’; Parsons, The Power of the 
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Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of 
Neoliberal Politics particularly 134-179, 233-234; Tomlinson, Managing the 
Economy, Managing the People: Narratives of Economic Life in Britain from 
Beveridge to Brexit, 73-74. 
23 See for example: Davies and Davies, The City of London and Social Democracy: 
The Political Economy of Finance in Britain, 1959 - 1979, particularly 140-180; 
Williamson, Conservative Economic Policymaking and the Birth of Thatcherism, 
1964-1979 5-7, 13-15, 34-36, 44-49. 
24 Lowe, ‘Modernizing Britain’s Welfare State: The Influence of Affluence, 1957-
1964’. 
25 Beckett, When the Lights Went Out: What Really Happened to Britain in the 
Seventies 40-42; Fielding, Labour and Cultural Change, 1, 217-219. 
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Ideas in the Twentieth Century, 220-229; Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe: 
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Williamson, Conservative Economic Policymaking and the Birth of Thatcherism, 
1964-1979 particularly 27-36. 
 
227 
tax and spending had been reached, and key revisionist figures 
became convinced that the route to increased spending was through 
growth, as this would painlessly increase revenues. This was not a 
new development; these concerns had been present since the 
1950s, but they increased in importance.27  
 
As Daunton and Whiting argue, there were clearly changes in the 
structure of taxation which made increasing opposition seem more 
likely, particularly the rising levels of income tax on average incomes. 
However, as previously discussed, although the shift in popular 
attitudes to tax in this period is widely referenced, the evidence for it 
is limited.28 This chapter will examine whether there was a perception 
that popular opposition to tax was increasing in the years leading up 
to the 1970 election in the organisations studied and, if so, whether it 
was seen as a new development and what evidence it was based on. 
 
The Labour party 
 
It is not clear that Labour politicians thought that popular opposition 
to tax was increasing in the years leading up the 1970 election. 
Douglas Jay was the only one to suggest this, stating in January 
1970: 
In the U.K. in the years immediately ahead, further progress must come 
mainly through capital taxes rather than through taxes on income … any 
further pressure for still more progressive taxation on earned incomes 
would meet with strong popular resistance. It is a crucial new fact, not fully 
understood, that in a world of gradually falling money values, direct 
taxation, if rates are left where they are, takes a steadily increasing 
 
27 Fielding, The Labour Party: Continuity and Change in the Making of ‘New’ 
Labour, 69-70; Crosland, ‘The Future of Socialism ’; Jenkins, ‘Equality’. 
28 Daunton, Just Taxes, 335-336, 368-369; Whiting, The Labour Party and 
Taxation, 183-189. See also: Lowe, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945, 284-
295; Sloman, ‘Short ‘Where’s the Money Coming From?’: Tracing the History of 
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proportion of all but the lowest income.29 
It should be noted, however, that he argued that this meant they 
should look at capital taxes, not refrain from any tax increases at all. 
Perceptions of contemporary opposition to taxation did seem 
widespread, even at the very top of the party.30 Butler and 
Duschinsky stated in their summary of the 1970 election: 
Mr Wilson had a very simple view of the electorate … Perhaps the most 
basic influence of all was the sound of “half-crowns jingling in pockets” … 
If, for instance, it [the party organisation] insisted on including a penal 
proposal such as a wealth tax in the election manifesto, it would damage 
the Prime Minister’s chances of reassuring the floating voter’.31 
Tony Benn echoed the idea that Wilson primarily believed that voters 
were driven by short-term self-interest in reporting a Cabinet meeting 
in June 1967: 
Then in Cabinet we came to discuss public expenditure and Harold 
declared his view that we wanted more money for people and less money 
for the social services. That was his theory of the ‘jingle of cash in your 
pocket’ and he was beginning to respond to the criticism about high 
taxation under the Labour government.32 
 
Other Labour politicians made strong statements about the extent of 
popular opposition as well.33 Benn reported a meeting of the Cabinet 
 
29 ‘Tax Policy in the 1970's by Douglas Jay, M.P.’, NEC 102 (Labour Party, Labour 
Party Archive, People’s History Museum), 1970. 
30 See for example: Benn, ‘Out of the Wilderness: Diaries 1963-67’, 503; Tony 
Benn, ‘Office without Power: Diaries 1968-72 ’, (London: Arrow, 1990), 62-63; R. 
H. S. Crossman, ‘The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Vol.3, Secretary of State for 
Social Services, 1968-70’, (London: Hamilton 1977), 628-629; Ronald Butt, 
‘Change of Theme’, Times, 2 October 1969; ‘Minutes of a Party Meeting Held on 
Tuesday, 16th December 1969 at 10.30 a.m. In Room 10’, Parliamentary Labour 
Party papers, 1968/69-1993/94 Party meetings - Minutes for 1969/70 session, 
Microform Academic Publishers), 1969; ‘Preliminary Position on Taxation. 
Proposals by A. Thompson’, Re. 599 March, (Labour Party, Labour Party Archive, 
People’s History Museum), 1970. 
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32 Benn, ‘Out of the Wilderness: Diaries 1963-67’, 503. 
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562 January, (Labour Party, Labour Party Archive, People’s History Museum), 
1970; ‘Preliminary Position on Taxation. Proposals by A. Thompson’, Re. 599 
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and National Executive in April 1968: 
Tony Crosland said … socialism wasn’t and never had been popular with 
the voters’ and we have in fact asked people to pay for the improvements 
in their own social services, which was the last thing they intended.34  
Richard Crossman recalled that at a meeting of the Management 
Committee at Chequers in September 1969: 
He [Roy Jenkins] then made a statement about the N.E.C. document on 
economic strategy, which includes a demand for a wealth tax and a whole 
series of other new taxes. What a disaster, he said, that this should give 
the impression that we have old-fashioned ideas of restriction and heavy 
taxation, when it is really taxation that is our difficulty. I must say Roy is 
right … Roy lectured us, saying that we have gone beyond the limits of 
taxation, and it is true.35  
Some argued that the answer was a shift to indirect taxes, which they 
suggested were less unpopular.36 George Brown stated during the 
1969 conference, for example: 
It may be that we should be thinking very hard about how to relate what 
folk have to pay more to what they spend than to what they earn; that may 
be part of the answer to the complaints we meet …37 
Labour politicians made strong assertions of popular opposition to 
the structure and level of taxation in the years leading up to the 1970 
election but, with the exception of Jay’s comment, did not suggest 
that opposition had increased. 
 
As previously, assertions of popular opposition to tax were balanced 
 
34 Benn, ‘Office without Power: Diaries 1968-72 ’, 62-63. Benn stated: ‘I thought it 
was a very good contribution’. ⁠ 
35 Crossman, ‘The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Vol.3, Secretary of State for Social 
Services, 1968-70’, 628-629. 
36 See for example: ‘Report of the 68th Annual Conference of the Labour Party’,  
(The Labour Party, 1969), 233. cited in Butler and Duschinsky, The British General 
Election of 1970, 121-123; ‘Future Taxation Policy’, NEC 102 (Labour Party, 
Labour Party Archive, People’s History Museum), 1969; ‘TUC Economic Review 
1969 Chapter 5: Capital, Growth and Equality. Report of a Meeting between the 
Economic Committee and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Held at the Treasury 
on Friday, December 13, 1968 at 11 a.m.’, MSS.292B 410.2/4, (TUC, MRC), 1969; 
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by the assumption that fairness and other issues were important 
too.38 At the meeting in April 1968 Benn recorded that Ian Mikardo 
suggested that without ‘fair taxation’ an incomes policy ‘would never 
work’.39 He did not specify what ‘fair taxation’ meant. However, the 
Social Policy Advisory Committee explicitly stated in June 1967: 
Income tax is commonly supported because it charges "each according to 
his ability", and this principle is defended even by non-socialists…40 
Healey continued in his conference speech: 
In this new situation, if we are to persuade the majority to pay for social 
reform we must appeal to morality and not to class interest.41 
Although Healey clearly assumed opposition to income tax, it seems 
that he believed moral appeals might work even as, perhaps, the 
importance of class solidarity declined. Crossman reported that 
 
38 See for example: Benn, ‘Office without Power: Diaries 1968-72 ’, 62-63, 279-
283; ‘Social Policy Advisory Committee. An Expenditure Tax’, Re. 170 June, 
(Labour Party, Labour Party Archive, People’s History Museum), 1967; Denis 
Healey, ‘Britain in a Changing World’, Socialist Commentary, November 1969; 
Crossman, ‘The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Vol.3, Secretary of State for Social 
Services, 1968-70’, 845-852. 
39 Benn, ‘Office without Power: Diaries 1968-72 ’, 62-63. Ian Mikardo [known as 
Mik] (1908-1993) was the child of Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe and was 
brought up in Portsmouth. He left school at 15 and moved from job to job until he 
attended a seminar on ‘scientific management’ in 1931. He spent the rest of the 
1930s as a management consultant and then worked as an administrator in the 
aircraft-building industry during the war. Both he and his wife, Mary, were active in 
the Labour party and the Zionist workers’ movement from the early 1930s and in 
1944 he was selected as the Labour candidate for Reading, then a Conservative 
seat. The same year he became well known within the party after moving a 
resolution at the party conference committing them to extensive nationalisation, 
which was passed despite the opposition of the leadership. In Reading he 
pioneered an approach to targeting voters by dividing them into ‘fors’, ‘againsts’, 
and ‘don’t knows’, which was subsequently known as the ‘Reading system’ and 
used by all the parties. In 1945 he was elected MP for Reading. He was part of the 
Bevanite wing of the party and was not made a minister under Attlee, apparently 
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(1908–1993)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 
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another meeting of the management committee in May 1970 had 
focused on whether they should opt for a giveaway budget or 
something cautious. While some advocated tax cuts, others argued 
that perceptions of economic competence were more important.42 
Benn recalled that at a Cabinet and NEC meeting to plan the general 
election manifesto launch in March 1970 Wilson stated that he 
thought prices would be the biggest single issue of the election.43 At 
times Labour politicians also straightforwardly argued that their 
colleagues were overstating popular opposition to tax increases. 
Benn recorded that at a Cabinet meeting in January 1968, despite 
his comment a few months later, Crosland stated that the chancellor 
was trying to cut spending by too much and should be prepared to 
increase taxes and was supported by George Brown.44 In discussion 
at a Cabinet meeting in July 1969 it was suggested: 
While the level of taxation ought not to be significantly increased in next 
year's Budget, some increase would be acceptable and could be 
presented as an inevitable consequence of over-generous wage and 
salary increases. The public reaction to an increase in taxation should not 
be exaggerated.45 
 
In practical terms, the Labour government did not actually cut 
taxation and did increase spending.46 Although Crossman reported in 
September 1969 that Jenkins argued that Labour were seen as the 
party of high taxation, in conversations with civil servants before the 
 
42 Crossman, ‘The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Vol.3, Secretary of State for Social 
Services, 1968-70’, 845-852. 
43 Benn, ‘Office without Power: Diaries 1968-72 ’, 279-283. 
44 Ibid., 11-16. 
45 ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet Held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1. on 
Thursday, 3rd July, 1969, at 10 a.m.’. The National Archives (TNA) CAB 
128/44/31, 1969. 
46 Daunton, Just Taxes, 285-301, 304-305; Whiting, The Labour Party and 
Taxation, 168-189. See also: Butler and Duschinsky, The British General Election 
of 1970, 1-46. 
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1969 budget his comments emphasised fairness.47 At a meeting in 
February Jenkins stated that he thought that it would be difficult to 
include tax concessions for close companies and high earners 
without an increase in corporation tax, but that he would consider 
whether it might be a useful concession to have in hand for future 
wage negotiations.48 A few weeks later, Jenkins said that he thought 
it was unlikely that he was going to be able to increase the limit for 
earned income relief but that this might be easier to present if it 
coincided with changing tax rates into decimals.49  
 
Few Labour comments about popular attitudes to tax cited any 
evidence. However, Denis Healey made a speech at a Socialist 
Commentary meeting during the 1969 party conference in which he 
stated: 
When I go into these Labour Clubs on a Saturday night, four out of five 
complaints are that income tax is too high and that we should not pay out 
so much in family allowances.50  
 
47 Crossman, ‘The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Vol.3, Secretary of State for Social 
Services, 1968-70’, 628-629; ‘Budget Committee. Minutes of a Meeting in the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer's Room, 2nd Floor, Treasury Chambers, on Monday 
6th January 1969 at 10.15 a.m.’. The National Archives (TNA) T 171/1293, 1969; 
‘Budget Committee. Minutes of a Meeting in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's 
Room, Second Floor, Treasury Chambers, on Monday, 17th February 1969 at 5.00 
p.m.’. The National Archives (TNA) T 171/1293, 1969; ‘Budget Committee. Minutes 
of a Meeting in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Room, Second Floor, Treasury 
Chambers, on Monday, 3rd March 1969 at 5.00 p.m.’. The National Archives (TNA) 
T 171/1293, 1969. 
48 ‘Budget Committee. Minutes of a Meeting in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's 
Room, 2nd Floor, Treasury Chambers, on Friday 31st January 1969 at 3.00 p.m.’. 
The National Archives (TNA) T 171/1293, 1969. 
49 ‘Budget Committee. Minutes of a Meeting in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's 
Room, Second Floor, Treasury Chambers, on Monday, 17th February 1969 at 5.00 
p.m.’. T 171/1293, 1969. 
50 Healey, ‘Britain in a Changing World’, Socialist Commentary, November 1969. 
Denis Winston Healey, Baron Healey (1917-2015) was chancellor from 1974 to 
1979. The son of an engineer and a schoolteacher he won a scholarship for 
Bradford Grammar School and then Oxford. He was initially uninterested in politics 
but joined the Communist Party in 1937, believing it was the most serious 
opposition to Hitler. Healey was selected as the Labour candidate for the safe 
Conservative seat of Pudsey and Otley while still on active service during the war 
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Butler and Duschinsky also state that George Brown’s speech at the 
conference: 
… was referring to the complaints received by ministers and by the Chief 
Whip when, for the first time in years, they toured the regions to rally the 
party workers. They found that even active Labour supporters were 
complaining that their income tax was too high.51 
I have, unfortunately, been unable to find further information about 
this trip. Resolutions received from constituency parties by the Home 
Policy Committee between 1967 and 1969 did not suggest opposition 
to tax within local parties was either particularly widespread, or 
significantly increasing, although this is far from conclusive 
evidence.52 There is some evidence that Labour activists’ attitudes 
were contributing to Healey and Brown’s concerns about popular 
opposition to tax but this is not visible in the archives. It is therefore 
difficult to assess how important it was.  
 
and was only narrowly beaten 1945. Having come to the attention of senior Labour 
politicians after a speech at the annual conference the same year he was invited to 
apply for the job of international secretary where he was influential in shaping the 
Labour party’s post-war foreign policy. He was elected MP for Leeds South East at 
a by-election in 1952 and held various positions as the youngest member of the 
shadow cabinet while Labour was in opposition. He was then defence secretary 
1964-70, shadow chancellor 1972-4, and chancellor from 1974-9. He was defeated 
in the leadership campaign the following year but was deputy leader from 1980 to 
1983. He was made a life peer in 1992. See: Giles Radice, ‘Healey, Denis 
Winston, Baron Healey (1917–2015)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2019, accessed on: 18 April at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/odnb/9780198614128.013.109840. 
51 Butler and Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970, 121-123. 
52 ‘Home Policy Committee. Resolutions Received from 3rd May - 2 June, 1967’, 
Re. 157 June, (Labour Party, Labour Party Archive, People’s History Museum), 
1967; ‘Home Policy Committee. Resolutions Received from 6the - 30th June, 
1967’, Re. 180 July, (Labour Party, Labour Party Archive, People’s History 
Museum), 1967; ‘Home Policy Committee. Resolutions Received from 29th 
December, 1967 - 5th February 1968’, Re. 250 February, (Labour Party, Labour 
Party Archive, People’s History Museum), 1968; ‘Home Policy Committee. 
Resolutions Received from 9th February - 4th March, 1968’, Re. 268 March, 
(Labour Party, Labour Party Archive, People’s History Museum), 1968; ‘List of 
Resolutions Received by the Secretary During the Period 17th June to 15th July, 
1969’, Liason committee meetings - Minutes for 1968/69 session, Microform 
Academic Publishers), 1969; ‘List of Resolutions Received During the Period 11th 
October 1969 to 14th November, 1969’, Liason committee meetings - Minutes for 




Labour politicians also had access to polling. Although Wring and 
Black state that the party’s internal polling was expanding in this 
period, it does not seem to have focused on tax.53 The Labour 
government did have the civil service at their disposal, however. The 
Government Social Survey sent several extracts of Gallup polling 
about taxation to the Treasury in 1969. These suggested that income 
tax was one of the most unpopular taxes, but also that a wealth tax 
was the second most popular option after a gambling tax if increases 
were needed.54  
 
Butler and Stokes published their BES survey results in 1969 but did 
not include the tax findings.55 On the contrary, they focused on social 
services and emphasised the significant support for increased 
spending in 1963, and how important this had been in moving voters 
towards Labour. They suggested that the desire for additional 
spending had been partially satisfied by spending increases between 
1964 and 1966, but did not discuss whether this indicated any 
increase in support for tax cuts.56 They also reported that taxation 
was chosen as the most important issue by only 5 percent of 
respondents.57 The publication was widely reported in the 
 
53 Black, The Political Culture of the Left in Affluent Britain, 1951-64: Old Labour, 
New Britain?, 172-187; Wring, The Politics of Marketing the Labour Party, 64-80. 
54 ‘Letter from Linda Dixon, Government Social Survey Librarian, to Mr Griffiths, 
Head of Information Division, HMT, 24 March 1969’. T 328/367, 1969; 
‘Memorandum from H M Griffiths, Head of Information Division, HMT, to Mr 
Hancock, 12 November 1969’. T 328/367, 1969. 
55 Butler, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice 343-349. 
Butler and Stokes published their results suggesting increased support for tax cuts 
through the late 1960s in 1974, but they had not been published in 1969. ⁠ Butler and 
Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice. 
56 Butler, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice 343-349. 
57 Social welfare, for example, was selected by 25 percent of respondents and 
housing by 24 percent. 
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broadsheets but the only article to reference the findings on taxation 
and spending was by Samuel Brittan who argued:  
Any genuine willingness to push up benefits at the expense of post-tax 
income has, however, almost certainly evaporated by now.58  
This would appear to have been his own supposition. The report as it 
was published in 1969 did not clearly suggest increasing opposition 
to tax increases. 
 
Mark Abrams also published a widely reported study in early 1969 
under the title The Lost Labour Voter.59 Abrams surveyed a sample 
of people who had not voted Conservative at the 1966 election, 
stating: 
Particularly striking is the fact that, when asked what they preferred - 
‘increased social services along with higher taxes’ or ‘less social services 
with no increase in taxes’, many more non-Conservative voters preferred 
the former to the latter … It seems, however, that this may no longer be a 
vote winner; probably because it has become a built-in part of people’s 
expectations. But equally the results suggest that the Conservatives are 
unlikely to gain many votes by pinning on Labour a threat of higher 
taxation in order to improve social services, or by promising to reduce 
taxation through cutting them.60 
However, it went on: 
Of the issues handled ‘particularly badly’, the ex-Labour group singled out 
 
58 Samuel Brittan, ‘The Political Parties, the Classes and the Economy’, Financial 
Times, 14 May 1970. For other reporting see for example: Richard Marsh, ‘Outlook 
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Forthcoming Book’, Guardian, 23 September 1969; Robert McKenzie, ‘Why the 
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reporting see for example: ‘Labour Has Lost Hald Its Voters, Says Survey’, Daily 
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Pensions and Nationalisation of the Docks’, Guardian, 31 January 1969; A staff 
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60 Abrams, ‘The Lost Labour Voter’, Socialist Commentary, February 1969, 21. 
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‘the cost of living’, ‘social benefits - unfair allocation’ … and ‘personal taxes 
too high’ … there were fewer ex-Labour voters than constant Labour who 
preferred more social services and higher taxes; they would rather have 
less services and no tax increase.61 
Some of these survey findings could have increased concern in 
Labour about popular opposition to tax but others could have allayed 
it and none, as published, clearly suggested that opposition to tax 
was increasing. 
 
It is unclear how much impact they may have had. No archival 
references to either survey were found, although Nora Beloff stated 
that Butler and Stokes’s was ‘standard reading for party strategists’, 
while Abrams had close links with Labour.62 There are some 
indications that Labour ministers might have been more interested in 
polling in the years leading up to the 1970 election.63 Having 
expressed dissatisfaction with the Gallup polling forwarded by the 
GSS, in November 1969 Jenkins asked them to ‘conduct a more 
 
61 Ibid. 
62 Nora Beloff, ‘Callaghan and Grossman Like 'Scalded Cats' on Race’, Observer 
15 March 1970; Taylor, ‘“The Record of the 1950s Is Irrelevant”: The Conservative 
Party, Electoral Strategy and Opinion Research, 1945-64’; Whiting, The Labour 
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63 See for example: ‘Budget Committee. Minutes of a Meeting in the Chancellor of 
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1969 at 3.00 p.m.’. T 171/1293, 1969; ‘Memorandum from D J S Hancock to 
Douglas Wass, 18 November 1969’. The National Archives (TNA) T 328/367, 
1969; ‘Memorandum from W D Pattinson to D J S Hancock and Douglas Wass, 18 
November 1969’. The National Archives (TNA) T 328/367, 1969; ‘Memorandum 
from D J S Hancock to Douglas Wass, 30 December 1969’. The National Archives 
(TNA) T 328/367, 1969; ‘Memorandum from Richard Crossman to Judith Hart, 27 
June 1968’. The National Archives (TNA) T 227/2592, 1968; ‘Memorandum from 
Kenneth Robinson to Richard Crossman, 3 July 1968’. The National Archives 
(TNA) T 227/2592, 1968; ‘Memorandum from A J Phelps to Nick Jordan-Moss, 2 
July 1968’. The National Archives (TNA) T 227/2592, 1968; ‘Memorandum from 
Nick Jordan-Moss to R Gedling, 3 July 1968’. The National Archives (TNA) T 
227/2592, 1968; ‘Letter from R Willis, Inland Revenue, to R Gedling, 9 July 1968’. 
The National Archives (TNA) T 227/2592, 1968; ‘Memorandum from A J Wiggins to 
A J Phelps, 26 July 1968’. The National Archives (TNA) T 227/2592, 1968; 




professional inquiry into the relative popularity of different taxes’.64 
He wanted the results in time for the budget, which was not possible, 
and the GSS’s suggestion of adding a question to an NOP survey 
was rejected for fear of leaks. However, Jenkins asked them to 
proceed with planning a future survey, stating that he thought it 
surprising that it had not been done before.65 Crossman also tried to 
initiate a survey on attitudes to NI reform with the GSS in 1968, 
which had apparently originally been suggested by Thomas Balogh. 
This received a significant amount of pushback from officials who 
argued it was too late in the day, and Crossman eventually 
abandoned it. However, Judith Hart, minister of social security, 
continued to champion it to Jenkins who was noncommittal.66 Neither 
 
64 ‘Memorandum from D J S Hancock to Douglas Wass, 18 November 1969’. T 
328/367, 1969. 
65 ‘Memorandum from W D Pattinson to D J S Hancock and Douglas Wass, 18 
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Hart won a scholarship to the London School of Economics. After graduating she 
became a researcher for the Ministry of Health and ran unsuccessfully for Dorset 
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elected MP for Lanark in 1959 and was appointed joint parliamentary under-
secretary of state for Scotland in 1964. In 1966 she was made minister of state at 
the Commonwealth Office and then a year later was appointed minister of social 
security, where she was expected to implement spending cuts that her 
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survey ended up taking place, but it seems that some Labour 
ministers and advisers were interested in more survey evidence of 
popular attitudes to tax.67 It is not clear, however, how much attention 
they were paying to the results they already had. 
 
Douglas Jay was the only Labour politician to suggest that popular 
opposition to tax was increasing in the years leading up to the 1970 
election. Other comments were consistent with earlier periods; some 
argued that people were highly opposed to tax increases, but others 
reiterated the importance of fairness or emphasised other issues.68 
Again, few statements referenced any evidence. Some reported 
opposition in the Labour grassroots, which could have contributed to 
perceptions of opposition. However, this does not appear in the 
archival record. The survey evidence Labour had did not clearly 
suggest opposition was increasing. Several Labour ministers 
expressed interest in evidence of popular attitudes to tax, and even 
proposed two GSS surveys, but there is nonetheless little indication 
that the survey evidence available had any impact on their ideas.  
 
The civil service 
  
Ideas about popular attitudes to tax in the civil service did not appear 
 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2008, accessed on: 9 
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‘Social Policy Advisory Committee. An Expenditure Tax’, Re. 170 June, Labour 
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to have changed significantly either, although discussions of popular 
attitudes do not seem to have been particularly common. Several 
comments suggested that income tax had increased and that people 
felt it was too high, but did not clearly state that this was leading to 
increased opposition.69 The strongest assertion of popular opposition 
to tax levels came in an Inland Revenue paper from July 1968: 
In the field of personal taxation, the almost universal complaint is that the 
rates of tax are too high. No other issue attracts as much public attention.70 
At a budget committee meeting in March 1969 it was argued that 
extending the purchase tax to ‘convenience food’ would provoke 
‘severe political difficulties’ and have a negative impact on wages 
policy. It was suggested that this should be done ‘when there was 
revenue to give away’. It was also asserted that ‘there was a strong 
body of opinion in favour of a shift from direct to indirect taxation’ but 
who was included in this was not specified, nor was any evidence 
cited.71 
  
Other comments suggested less concern about opposition to tax 
increases or emphasised the importance of fairness. Customs 
officials at the budget meeting argued for the extension of purchase 
tax to convenience foods, for example, on the grounds that: 
There had been great hesitation over the extension of the tax to 
confectionary etc. in 1962, but there was now no complaint from the public 
 
69 ‘Note of a Meeting Held in Sir William Armstrong's Room on 26th October 1967’. 
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Room, Second Floor, Treasury Chambers, on Monday, 3rd March 1969 at 5.00 
p.m.’. T 171/1293, 1969. 
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at all about this.72 
At a budget meeting in February 1969 it was also suggested that 
increasing corporation tax might be an ‘important factor’ in securing 
union consent to an incomes policy.73 Fairness was perhaps less 
prominent than in some previous periods but comments about 
popular attitudes to tax were, in general, limited. It is also possible 
that with a Labour government civil servants might have felt less 
need to emphasise fairness. 
 
Discussions about the Gallup polling circulated by the GSS, and the 
plans for surveys into attitudes to tax and NI, suggested that officials 
were not necessarily enthused about obtaining evidence of popular 
attitudes.74 In July 1968, opposing Crossman’s proposed survey, one 
Treasury official stated, for example: 
We already know that there is a great deal of public ignorance about these 
matters, and, to be blunt about it, this sometimes helps us, - for example in 
enabling us to raise contribution rates without encountering immediate 
pressure for corresponding tax reductions. However carefully the questions 
are framed, there is a risk that sleeping dogs may be aroused - with the 
usual consequence.75  
An IR official even questioned whether it was correct to consider 
popular attitudes: 
It is questionable whether it would be right to decide on policy for a new 
earnings-related pension scheme on the basis of what people think, or do 
not think, about the existing scheme.76  
 
72 Ibid. 
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In 1968, Treasury official Kenneth Berrill was keen on the idea for a 
survey into attitudes to NI; he described himself as the 'odd man 
out’.77 In 1969, in relation to Jenkins’s survey, W D Pattinson also 
suggested that inconvenient survey results could be discarded: 
But is the exercise worth doing … with the risk of getting results which 
show that the Chancellor has chosen courses which are likely to be 
unpopular? I don't think we should allow ourselves to be too frightened by 
this last possibility: inconvenient poll results can always be shrugged off.78 
 
77 ‘Memorandum from Kenneth Berrill to David Serpell, 5 July 1968’. The National 
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242 
Someone, possibly Douglas Wass, had written 'Vox populi, vox dei!’ 
on the Gallup polling that prompted Jenkins’s suggestion of a further 
survey.79 Given the exclamation mark, and the other comments about 
popular attitudes found, it seems most likely that this was in jest. 
 
Officials seemed no more enthusiastic about external polling, which a 
participant at one meeting argued had ‘a not wholly satisfactory 
methodology’.80 They were also unimpressed by academics, who 
they thought were not necessarily more knowledgeable and whose 
advice about tax was often 'infected by political commitments'.81 
Officials did acknowledge that more evidence was needed. In July 
1968 the Treasury official cited above admitted: 
It is, of course, true that our knowledge of the public attitudes to these 
matters is deficient …82  
At a meeting about the Jenkins survey, it was also asserted that 
successive chancellors had made budget decisions 'partly on the 
basis of their own beliefs about public attitudes to various taxes’, 
suggesting again that many politicians’ ideas in this period were 
based on their subjective views.83 Evidence of popular attitudes 
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seems to have been viewed by officials as probably needed but 
potentially dangerous, although if so it could, of course, be ignored. 
 
Civil servants had suggested in the mid-1960s that opposition to 
taxation would increase in the near future. Some officials’ comments 
in the years leading up to the 1970 election did suggest popular 
opposition to tax levels, but others argued this was overstated or 
highlighted the importance of fairness. This combination echoed 
discussions in the civil service in 1949-50. Officials were not 
suggesting, as they had done in the early 1960s, that opposition to 
tax was not a major issue, but neither were they arguing, as they had 
done in the mid 1960s, that opposition was about to increase. Civil 
servants had access to Gallup polling and acknowledged that 
evidence of attitudes was necessary to supplement chancellors’ 
subjective beliefs, but nonetheless strongly resisted attempts to 
initiate GSS surveys and seemed to regard evidence of popular 
attitudes as potentially disruptive or damaging. 
 
The Conservative party 
 
The proposed GSS survey into attitudes to tax was dropped after the 
1970 election.84 This did not seem to be because the Conservative 
party was uninterested in popular attitudes to tax; it conducted two 
internal surveys into attitudes to taxation with the Opinion Research 
Centre (ORC) in 1967 and 1969.85 Their results should be treated 
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Archives (TNA) T 328/488, 1970. 
85 Opinion Research Centre, ‘A Survey on: Attitudes to Taxation. Carried out For: 
Conservative Central Office, 2 July 1967’, CCO 180/9/10/1, (Conservative Party 
Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1967; ‘Poll Summaries - Opinion Research, 
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with caution as evidence for popular attitudes; the ORC’s founder 
had been a Conservative adviser and the surveys had various 
methodological issues.86 ORC surveys also seemed often to be 
framed with the assumption that lower taxes were good. In perhaps 
the most explicit example, the report of one survey in May 1970 
stated: 
Of the few people who expected a good budget about half thought it would 
be good because there was an election imminent (they didn't really answer 
the question: Some said, understanding it correctly, that taxes would be 
reduced) [italics added].87 
 
Attitudes to Taxation, 14 July 1967’, CRD 3/7/26/19, (Conservative Party Archive, 
Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1967; Opinion Research Centre, ‘A Survey on: Taxation. 
Carried out For: Conservative Central Office, 18 May 1969’, CCO 180/9/10/2, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1969. ORC also conducted 
surveys on various other subjects in this period. See for example: ‘Summaries of 
Public Opinion Poll Surveys Mainly Conducted by the Opinion Research Centre, 
Produced by the Conservative Research Department, Jun 1967-Mar 1973’, CCO 
20/27/7, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1967-1973; 
‘Opinion Research: Post-Conference Attitudes, 21 November 1968’, CCO 20/27/7, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1968. 
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Profumo Affair. In 1965 he was seconded to Conservative Central Office as a 
‘special tactical assistant’ to the party chairman. In 1967 he left to found the ORC 
with Humphrey Taylor. It became a leading research company producing polls for 
various papers and the Conservative party. ORC became part of the Harris market 
research group and Thompson left in 1979 to found a new company called Opinion 
Research and Communication doing surveys for companies during the industrial 
disputes of the 1980s. See: ‘Tommy Thompson’, Times, 14 February 2011. In a 
letter sent to the CBI in 1978 Thompson seemed to reveal a clear political bias: ‘If 
we get another Government committed to nationalising the banks, insurance 
companies, and twenty or so leading companies, plus direction of investment, I am 
quite certain it will weaken private enterprise fatally and we shall all go tumbling 
down into the abyss. I know, beyond doubt, from all my research, that this is not 
what the great mass of the public wants. But equally, unless public opinion is 
brought to bear … there is more than an even chance of disaster … I want to bring 
public opinion to bear at the crucial time’. See: ‘Letter from T F Thompson, ORC, to 
Sir John Methven, 9 January 1978’, MSS.200/C 3/DG3/8, (Confederation of British 
Industry Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1978. 
87 Opinion Research Centre, ‘The Budget - before and after, May 1970 ’, CCO 




The ORC surveys asked whether respondents thought it was more 
important to ‘cut taxation’ or ‘improve the social services’ and found 
majorities for cutting taxes — 51 to 39 percent in 1967 and 59 to 34 
percent in 1969. Responses were highly partisan, with Conservative 
supporters choosing tax cuts by 60 to 33 percent in 1967, while 
Labour and Liberal supporters were almost evenly divided.88 By 1969 
the majority for cutting taxes among Conservative supporters had 
grown at 69 to 25 percent; Labour supporters now showed a majority 
for improving services, by 50 to 42 percent.89 This question is not 
comparable to the later BSA data, for example, as the question 
wording implied that it was possible to maintain services at the same 
standard with lower taxes. Given this, it was perhaps surprising that 
cutting taxes was not more popular. It also did not include a status 
quo option, which was often the most popular selection in later 
surveys.90   
 
The surveys suggested that income tax was most unpopular followed 
by purchase tax, but, unlike the Gallup polling, did not include a 
wealth tax in the options for increases. They also asked whether 
respondents thought it would be a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ idea for the 
government to cut income tax and increase taxes on ‘things you buy 
in the shops’. In both cases a majority of respondents said that it 
would be a bad idea, although this fell from 66 to 54 percent between 
 
88 Labour supporters chose tax cuts by 46 to 43 percent and Liberals by 48 to 45 
percent. 
89 Opinion Research Centre, ‘A Survey on: Attitudes to Taxation. Carried out For: 
Conservative Central Office, 2 July 1967’, CCO 180/9/10/1, Conservative Party 
Archive, 1967. Opinion Research Centre, ‘A Survey on: Taxation. Carried out For: 
Conservative Central Office, 18 May 1969’, CCO 180/9/10/2, Conservative Party 
Archive, 1969. ‘Lib. & Others’ showed a wider majority for cutting taxation — 50 to 
42 percent — than they had in 1967, although this category may have changed. 
90 See for example: Park et al., ‘British Social Attitudes: The 30th Report’, 35-36. 
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1967 and 1969.91 In 1967, 68 percent of respondents thought it was 
more important ‘to make sure that everybody is taxed fairly according 
to their ability to pay’, as opposed to 29 percent who thought it was 
more important to have a system which ‘does not discourage people 
from working hard’.92 This question was not repeated in the 1969 
survey. 
 
A summary of the 1967 survey ran through the main findings and 
concluded that appeals based on self-interest would be more 
effective than those referencing incentives, connected opposition to 
indirect tax increases to concern about prices, and highlighted how 
little difference there was in people’s views of the parties in relation to 
tax. This last point seemed to surprise the authors — it was 
annotated with an exclamation mark.93 At the monthly survey 
meeting in July 1967 participants agreed that the survey was very 
useful and Tommy Thompson suggested that the only way to make 
an impact with people on tax was to choose a few phrases and 
repeat them again and again; it was agreed that he would come up 
with some.94 No other discussion was found. An unsigned and 
undated summary of the 1969 survey drew similar conclusions but 
also stated that concern about taxation, particularly around income 
 
91 Opinion Research Centre, ‘A Survey on: Attitudes to Taxation. Carried out For: 
Conservative Central Office, 2 July 1967’, CCO 180/9/10/1, Conservative Party 
Archive, 1967; Opinion Research Centre, ‘A Survey on: Taxation. Carried out For: 
Conservative Central Office, 18 May 1969’, CCO 180/9/10/2, Conservative Party 
Archive, 1969. 
92 This did not vary significantly according to party allegiance. ⁠ Opinion Research 
Centre, ‘A Survey on: Attitudes to Taxation. Carried out For: Conservative Central 
Office, 2 July 1967’, CCO 180/9/10/1, Conservative Party Archive, 1967. 
93 ‘Opinion Research: Attitudes to Taxation, 17 July 1967’, CCO 20/27/7, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1967. 
94 ‘Public Opinion Monthly Survey Meeting: Note of Meeting Held at 11.00 a.m. on 
Wednesday 19th July, 1967, in Room 106 at 32 Smith Square’, CCO 20/27/3, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1967. 
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tax, had risen sharply since 1967, ignoring the polarisation that 
seemed to have occurred.95 The ORC report on the survey had made 
the same argument.96 Despite this apparently significant finding, 
again no further discussion of the survey was found. 
 
Other internal surveys touching on taxation in the late 1960s 
suggested that taxation was now seen as the second most important 
issue after keeping the cost of living down.97 One survey in 
November 1969 on policies for the election found that cutting income 
tax was popular but that increasing spending on various services 
received comparable support.98 Conservative politicians, like Labour, 
had access to the published surveys by Butler and Stokes and Mark 
Abrams.99 Iain Macleod, at least, was aware of the BES data, as he 
wrote an article about it in 1969. He did not, however, mention the tax 
or spending findings, and no other discussions were found.100 
Overall, surveys seem to have been providing the Conservatives with 
a mixed picture of popular attitudes to tax in the late 1960s. The 1969 
ORC survey argued that opposition to tax had increased since 1967. 
In general, the surveys suggested that tax had become a more 
 
95 ‘Opinion Research: Taxation’, CCO 20/27/4, (Conservative Party Archive, 
Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1969. 
96 Opinion Research Centre, ‘A Survey on: Taxation. Carried out For: Conservative 
Central Office, 18 May 1969’, CCO 180/9/10/2, Conservative Party Archive, 1969. 
97 See for example: ‘Opinion Research: General Issues Survey, 9 February 1968’, 
CCO 20/27/7, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1968; 
‘Opinion Research: General Issues Survey, 2 April 1969’, LCC 1/2/16, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1969; ‘Opinion Research: 
Political Attitudes Regarding Money, 29 January 1969’, CCO 20/27/7, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1969; ‘Opinion Research: 
Specific Issues Survey, 31 December 1969’, CCO 20/27/7, (Conservative Party 
Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1969. 
98 Opinion Research Centre, ‘A Survey on: Key Election Issues. Carried out For: 
Conservative Central Office, November 1969’, CCO 180/11/4/2, (Conservative 
Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1969. 
99 Butler, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice 343-349; 
Abrams, ‘The Lost Labour Voter’, Socialist Commentary, February 1969. 
100 Iain Macleod, ‘The Private World of Political Science’, Times, 30 October 1969. 
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important issue for voters; that Conservative supporters increasingly 
supported tax cuts over spending increases, but the opposite was 
true for Labour voters; and that fairness was important. While this 
mix was not a significant shift from the findings of earlier polling it 
could perhaps have suggested to researchers that tax had become 
more important to voters and that opposition to tax had increased. 
 
However, it is not clear that this extensive survey activity had any 
significant impact on discussions; few comments about attitudes to 
tax mentioned the findings.101 James Douglas wrote a note about 
polling in January 1970 but apart from suggesting that a ‘loose’ 
budget would be initially popular but the effects would dissipate 
quickly, it barely mentioned tax and highlighted economic 
competence as the most important factor.102 Discussions in the 
Economic Policy Group around the development of the Conservative 
tax package almost never referenced evidence of popular attitudes. 
The exception was one note which advocated cutting family 
allowances because ORC polling from 1968 had suggested that they 
were highly unpopular as they were seen to going to those who did 
not need them.103 No discussion was found of the suggestion that 
 
101 For the exceptions see: Brendon Sewill, ‘Saving and Ownership, 3 January 
1969’, CRD 3/7/26/38, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 
1969; James Douglas, ‘Thoughts on the Polls, 8 January 1970’, CRD 3/9/93, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1970; ‘Memorandum from 
James Douglas to Michael Fraser, 26 January 1970’, CRD 3/9/93, (Conservative 
Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1970; ‘Economies in Government 
Expenditure’, CRD 3/7/26/38, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian 
Library), 1970. 
102 Douglas, ‘Thoughts on the Polls, 8 January 1970’, CRD 3/9/93, Conservative 
Party Archive, 1970. See also: ‘Memorandum from James Douglas to Michael 
Fraser, 26 January 1970’, CRD 3/9/93, Conservative Party Archive, 1970. 
103 ‘Economies in Government Expenditure’, CRD 3/7/26/38, Conservative Party 
Archive, 1970. For the development of the tax package see for example: ‘Future 
Economic Policy Group - Sub-Group A on Taxation’, CRD 3/7/6/10, (Conservative 
Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1965; ‘'The Tax Package' (A) - the 
Development of out Thought in Opposition; the Main Proposals and Our 
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opposition had increased. 
 
The Conservative party also had evidence of its activists’ attitudes to 
tax through the CPC three-way movement and party conferences. 
Tax does not seem to have been a major CPC focus in this period — 
only one tax directive was found, from March 1970. The responses 
suggested that concern about fairness had decreased. While 
participants in the middle of the decade were generally not in favour 
of reducing taxes on the rich, they now advocated a move towards 
indirect tax and a focus on tax cuts for the wealthy, not low earners. 
Interestingly, this was justified in terms of economics: 
A bold approach was looked for, and it was strongly felt that greatest relief 
for the biggest payer made economic sense and should be shown to make 
political sense too, with less concentration on the lower end of the tax 
scale alone by the raising of allowances.104 
The groups also showed continuing support for spending cuts and 
expressed frustration that their previous arguments for cuts had not 
been listened to.105 From 1965 to 1970 every party conference saw a 
resolution calling for tax reform.106 In 1967 and 1968 these included 
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105 Ibid. 
106 Conservative Party, ‘83rd Annual Conference Brighton’, 102-107; Conservative 
Party, ‘84th Annual Conference Blackpool’, (London: National Union of 
Conservative and Unionist Associations, 1966), 19-26; Conservative Party, ‘85th 
Annual Conference Brighton’, (London: National Union of Conservative and 
Unionist Associations, 1967), 70-74; Conservative Party, ‘86th Annual Conference 
Blackpool’, (London: National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 
 
250 
calls for a shift towards indirect taxation.107 It seems, therefore, as 
though attitudes to tax in the Conservative grassroots might have 
become more negative, or at least less concerned with fairness. 
However, unlike Labour politicians, no evidence was found of 
Conservative politicians or researchers discussing grassroots’ 
attitudes to tax.  
 
1968-9 also featured the first instances found of communication 
about popular attitudes to tax from individuals linked to think tanks.108 
In 1969 D R Myddelton wrote to the CRD attaching a paper he had 
written for the Economic Research Council, which argued: 
Most people have no idea how a progressive tax works, nor how it differs 
in principle from a proportional tax. It is therefore absurd to claim that there 
is popular pressure for keeping surtax. I suspect that most people think it 
only fair that those with larger incomes should pay more tax than those 
with smaller incomes. I do myself. But I very much doubt if popular opinion 
goes further than this … I like to put this as a blunt alternative: which would 
you prefer of the following alternatives: (a) everyone in the country to have 
a higher after-tax income than now, but with a greater degree of inequality 
than now? Or (b) everyone in the country to have a lower after-tax income 
than now, but with a lesser degree of inequality than now? ... I accept 
those who prefer (b) will not want surtax abolished; but how big a 
proportion of the whole population seriously would prefer (b)?109 
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No evidence was found of Myddelton’s letter being discussed. 
Perhaps more importantly, A R Prest, an LSE economist who wrote 
for the IEA through the 1960s and 1970s, was also involved in 
discussions about the development of the tax package.110 However, 
 
Cserne and Magdalena Małecka (London: Routledge, 2019). David Roderic 
Myddelton is an academic accountant who was chairman of the IEA from 2001 to 
2015. He was educated at Eton and Harvard Business School. From 1972 to 2005 
he was a professor at the Cranfield School of Management, where he is now an 
emeritus professor. He has published extensively for the IEA and served on their 
board from 1994 until 2015, before becoming a life vice president after retiring. 
See: ‘D.R. Myddelton Emeritus Professor of Finance and Accounting’, Cranfield 
School of Management, 2019, accessed on: 2nd July at 
https://www.som.cranfield.ac.uk/som/p17261/People/Faculty/Emeritus-
Professors/D-R-Myddelton#; ‘Trustees’, Institute of Economic Affairs, 2020, 
accessed on: 6 March at https://iea.org.uk/trustees/. The Economic Research 
Council was founded in 1943 as the Joint Council for Economic and Monetary 
Research by, among others, Juliette Rhys-Williams. It states that it ‘is dedicated to 
extending the reach of economic education, debate and leadership’. See: ‘Mission 
and History’, Economic Research Council, 2020, accessed on: 6 March at 
http://ercouncil.org/about-the-erc/mission-and-history/; Chris Cook, Sources in 
British Political History 1900-1951 Vol.5: Guide to Private Papers Etc. Of Selected 
Writers Etc (Macmillan, 1978), 167; Peter Barberis, John McHugh, and Mike 
Tyldesley, Encyclopedia of British and Irish Political Organizations: Parties, 
Groups, and Movements of the Twentieth Century, ed. Peter Barberis (London: 
Pinter, 2000), 83-84. 
110 ‘Economic Policy Group: Minutes of the Twenty-Seventh Meeting, Held in the 
Leader of the Opposition's Room at the House of Commons, on Thursday, 11th 
July 1968, at 6.00 p.m. ’, CRD 3/7/6/3, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, 
Bodleian Library), 1968; ‘Economic Policy Group: Minutes of the Twenty-Fifth 
Meeting, Held in the Leader of the Opposition's Room at the House of Commons, 
on Thursday, 13th June 1968, at 6.00 p.m. ’, CRD 3/7/6/3, (Conservative Party 
Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1968; ‘Economic Policy Group. Comments on 
Tax Report by Professor Prest, 24 February 1969’, CRD 3/7/6/4, (Conservative 
Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1969; ‘Economic Policy Group: Minutes of 
the Thirty-Third Meeting, on Monday, 6th January 1969, at 2.15 p.m. ’, CRD 
3/7/6/4, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1969. Alan 
Richmond Prest (1919-1984) was economist at Cambridge (1949-64), Manchester 
(1964-70) and the LSE (1970-84) where he was Chair of Economics. See: ‘Prest, 
Alan Richmond, 1919-1984, Economist’, JISC Archives Hub, accessed on: 10 
February at https://archiveshub.jisc.ac.uk/data/gb97-prest; ‘Obituary—Alan 
Richmond Prest ’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 3 (1985). 
For his work with the IEA see for example: A. R. Prest, The Future of Purchase 
Tax (London: Published for the Institute of Economic Affairs by Barrie & Rockcliffe, 
1961., 1961); A. R. Prest, Financing University Education: A Study of University 
Fees and Loans to Students in Great Britain (Institute of Economic Affairs, 1966); A 
R Prest, Social Benefits and Tax Rates, IEA Research Monographs 22 (London: 
Institute of Economic Affairs, 1970); A. R. Prest, How Much Subsidy?: A Study of 
the Economic Concept and Measurement of Subsidies in the United Kingdom 
(London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1974); A R Prest et al., The State of 
 
252 
despite his IEA links, he repeatedly argued that the tax package was 
too favourable towards the wealthy and that this might be the ‘subject 
of very fierce criticism’.111 Individuals with links to right-wing think 
tanks were communicating some ideas about attitudes to tax to the 
Conservative party in the late 1960s but Prest, who was far more 
involved than Myddelton, emphasised fairness rather than popular 
opposition.  
 
Despite the ORC survey summaries and CPC reports suggesting 
that opposition might have increased, Conservative researchers and 
politicians did not seem to think so. They were also not arguing, as 
they had in 1964-5, that it was imminently about to increase. Heath 
said in January 1969 that he thought the 'present mood of the 
country was much more willing to accept change [in relation to tax] 
than it had been a year or two ago’ but did not argue that opposition 
had increased.112 Comments did often assume contemporary 
opposition.113 A 1968 memo from James Douglas to Heath 
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suggested that middle-class taxpayers losing out relatively in relation 
to taxes and services would only be politically tolerable if the rate of 
growth was high enough, and the rate of inflation low enough, that 
even they would be better off overall.114 In 1970 Sewill also wrote a 
memo which suggested that opposition to VAT might dampen support 
for income tax cuts: 
I think there is a danger that all the public fuss and indignation that would 
be caused by the introduction of a VAT might tend to over-shadow the 
reductions of direct taxation which we are counting to create a new 
mood.115  
This comment could have been influenced by the survey findings on 
a shift to indirect taxation but made no mention of them. The fact that 
party conferences suggested support for a shift to indirect tax does 
not appear to have influenced Sewill’s views.116  
 
Exactly whose opposition Conservative politicians and researchers 
were concerned about was not always clear. Some comments, like 
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Douglas’s, focused specifically on middle-class voters.117 The report 
of an EPG meeting about the tax package in June 1969, for example, 
also recorded: 
Mr Heath said that he was ‘particularly concerned about the combination of 
burdens which would fall on the middle classes, who provided much of our 
electoral support.118 
At another meeting Macleod stated that one of the ‘main reasons for 
the unpopularity of SET’ was the ‘burden it placed upon service 
industries’.119 This seemed more plausible if it referred to business 
owners, or at least elite taxpayers. Concern about the ‘political’ 
difficulties of introducing a wealth tax seemed mostly to focus on the 
reaction within the party rather than more widely.120 Macleod also 
argued, however, that a wealth tax ‘would incur the hostility of all our 
Press, including "The Times”’, given Rees-Mogg’s opposition to a 
wealth tax in earlier discussions on the tax package.121 When 
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comments specified whose attitudes were being discussed they most 
often seemed to refer to elite taxpayers or commentators. 
 
Other comments also questioned how much opposition there really 
was, and highlighted the importance of fairness and other issues, 
particularly prices.122 A 1967 CRD brief on income tax argued that 
people thought they were more highly taxed than they were but 
generally acclimatised to whatever the level of tax was at the time.123 
Maudling suggested in July 1968 that any tax policy that would 
increase prices was 'exceedingly dangerous in political terms’, 
particularly when it came to women voters, ‘to whom prices are 
always by far the most important factor’.124 In January 1970 Douglas 
also argued that economic competence was more important than tax 
cuts.125 Like Prest, various Conservative politicians and advisors 
raised concerns that the proposed tax package was unbalanced and 
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would be criticised.126 Joseph suggested in July 1968 that the 
package was not ‘morally defensible’ without the wealth tax.127 In 
another meeting the same month Cockfield argued that 'people in 
this country believed it was intrinsically right that capital gains should 
be taxed'.128 Maudling disagreed but also based his argument on 
fairness: 
One could make quite a strong emotional case against taxing the capital 
gains of a man who had built up his own business.129 
 
Increasing evidence of popular attitudes to tax did not, therefore, 
seem to have changed Conservative politicians’ and researchers’ 
ideas. The survey findings that a shift to indirect tax was unpopular 
and fairness important did not prevent what ended up being a highly 
unbalanced tax package. As previously, the focus on middle-class or 
elite attitudes may perhaps have been a factor in this. No further 
comments about CRD researchers’ potential bias were found after 
those in 1965, though the ORC surveys could perhaps suggest that 
this was taken on board. Conservative ideas about popular attitudes 
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to tax seem, as before, to have been largely a closed system. 
Brendon Sewill stated in retrospect about this period that: 
One has to admit that the aim [of the 1965-70 policy exercise] was not 
entirely to acquire knowledge: in part it was to make the Party look 
intellectually respectable.130 
The suggestions of increasing opposition in survey reports and 
among the party grassroots do not appear to have impacted 
discussions. As previously, they assumed a level of popular 
opposition to tax, but not one that overrode all other issues or 
concerns about fairness. If anything, Conservative politicians and 
researchers appeared slightly less concerned about increasing 
opposition to tax than they had been in the mid 1960s.  
 
The Confederation of British Industry 
 
The CBI made at least one comment in 1966-7 suggesting that 
opposition to the tax system was increasing. In 1966 a note 
proposing a review of the tax system with the government and TUC 
stated: 
The fiscal changes of the past two years have greatly intensified 
dissatisfaction with our system of taxation and the desire of fundamental 
reform.131 
However, this suggested opposition had increased in the mid 1960s 
as a result of Labour’s tax reforms, rather than in the late 1960s in 
response to rising tax levels, as has previously been suggested. 
Similarly, although it did not specify who was dissatisfied, the fact 
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that this was the CBI, and that it referred to Labour’s reforms, 
perhaps suggests it referred to their members, or industrialists, rather 
than attitudes more widely.  
 
Other comments suggested contemporary, but not increasing, 
opposition. In January 1967, Director General John Davies laid out 
various arguments in favour of cutting the standard rate of income 
tax ahead of a meeting with the chancellor. He suggested that the 
CBI argue that it would help to ensure wage restraint and encourage 
‘confidence’ that the Government was committed ‘adequately to 
remunerate risk investment' and restrict spending.132 He also stated: 
There is a very great measure of concern about the level of government 
spending and the impression gains ground that new taxes such as S.E.T. 
launched for deflationary purposes are retained to finance Government 
expenditure.133 
Ahead of the 1969 budget, the CBI recommended cuts in various 
direct taxes and a shift to indirect taxation. In arguing for surtax cuts 
they stated that they had not gone into the arguments in depth 
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because they were ‘not only familiar but now widely accepted by 
informed opinion’.134 With the exception of the comment on wage 
restraint, CBI statements about opposition to tax generally seemed to 
refer to ‘informed opinion’ rather than popular attitudes more widely. 
 
Comments that did appear to refer to a wider public did not seem as 
convinced of opposition, highlighting support for services, lack of 
knowledge, and concerns about fairness.135 For example, an 
attendee at a January 1967 Economic Committee meeting argued 
that the government should emphasise spending was a choice and 
suggested the problem was ‘one of increased taxation, because of a 
more positive social conscience …’.136 A report of the wealth tax 
working party in 1969 argued that experience abroad showed that 
wealth taxes were unpopular, but also stated that some people 
thought that it was fair to take a portion of wealthy taxpayers' capital 
every year and that they recognised that this had an ‘emotional 
appeal’ and was ‘even credited with such qualities as equity …’.137 
CBI officials also seemed unconvinced that their perceptions of what 
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was fair were shared by others. The report argued that the idea that 
a wealth tax was fair was not 'the kind of opinion’ that could ‘be 
refuted’, while their representations ahead of the 1969 budget stated 
that fairness was important and that they thought high income tax 
rates and surtax were unfair, but fairness meant ‘different things to 
different people’.138 
 
One CBI comment was found that asserted that opposition to the tax 
system had increased by 1966. However, this situated the increase in 
the mid 1960s rather than the late 1960s, as has previously been 
suggested, and the comment linked it clearly to Labour’s tax reforms 
rather than rising taxes on the majority. Other discussions suggested 
contemporary opposition but generally in relation to elite attitudes. 
Comments that more clearly referenced wider popular attitudes 
highlighted fairness, and seemed unconvinced that this meant the 
same thing that it meant to CBI officials. CBI comments about 
attitudes to tax seemed, if anything, to decline towards the end of the 
decade, although, as in previous periods, they were limited in 
general. Overall, CBI comments suggested perhaps that elite 
opposition to taxation had increased in the middle of the decade as a 
result of Labour’s tax reforms, but it was not clear that they thought, 
or suggested, that opposition had increased more widely towards the 
end of the decade. 
 
The Trades Union Congress 
 
The TUC seemed to be paying more attention to tax policy in the 
 
138 Ibid.; ‘1969 Budget Representations’, MSS.200/C 3/DG1/57, Confederation of 
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lead up to the 1970 election, producing an internal report on personal 
tax in late 1969.139 The report did not seem to propose anything 
radically different to their existing policy positions, nor did it make any 
comments about popular attitudes.140 It was, however, heavily 
criticised by C T H Plant, General Secretary of the Inland Revenue 
Staff Federation (IRSF).141 Plant stated that there was increasing 
opposition to direct tax, and continued: 
From a TUC and Labour Party point of view it is quite ludicrous having 
taxation so high that it is being severly[sic] criticised and evaded by their 
own supporters (quite apart from others) …142  
This comment was by far the strongest statement about popular 
opposition to high taxation found in TUC conversations up to this 
point. However, Plant also argued for unifying income tax and surtax 
to show taxpayers the rate of tax on high incomes more clearly, 
suggesting that he also felt that perceptions of fairness were a 
factor.143 Plant was a member of the TUC General Council but the 
memo from a colleague at the Inland Revenue he attached to the 
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letter was scathing about the TUC report and in return was annotated 
with angry handwritten corrections and retorts, indicating that Plant 
and other TUC leaders also did not necessarily see eye-to-eye on tax 
policy.144 No similar comments were found from other TUC officials, 
suggesting that Plant’s statements may not have been representative 
of general ideas or had any significant impact. 
 
TUC leaders did seem perhaps slightly more concerned about 
popular attitudes to tax in this period. Several comments suggested 
that people were poorly informed about the tax system and that this 
was leading them to think that taxes were higher than they were, 
although the comments did not explicitly state this was leading to 
opposition.145 They were also concerned about the possible 
response to their wealth tax proposals.146 An extract from a meeting 
of the Economic Committee in November 1969 recorded:  
… it was argued that an emphatic commitment to a wealth tax on the part 
of the General Council might have undesirable political consequences in 
the pre-election period … This would be so unless, for example, the 
proposal could be linked to a promise to[sic] tax cuts for the lower-paid; 
however, it was recognised that there was unlikely to be much scope in the 
foreseeable future for re-distributing the proceeds of a wealth tax. It was 
therefore essential that the important social principle underlying the 
General Council’s wealth tax proposal - namely to provide a guaranteed 
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share for workpeople in the growth of corporate wealth - should be spelled 
out in the document.147 
This again combined the assumption that tax cuts were popular with 
the idea that fairness was important. 
 
The majority of letters from individual members, as in previous 
periods, complained about taxation being too high, usually on them 
personally.148 Letters seemed to contain factual errors relatively 
regularly, which could have contributed to TUC officials’ perception 
that the public was poorly informed about the tax system.149 Although 
they often received prompt replies, the responses did not suggest 
that the TUC took these letters particularly seriously, and there was 
little indication that they influenced TUC tax policy positions.150 
Communications from union members suggested popular opposition 
to the level of taxation, but this had been true consistently since 
1949.  
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Like the Conservatives, the TUC received some material from right-
wing think tanks in the late 1960s.151 In 1969 Labour MP Douglas 
Houghton sent a booklet he had produced with the IEA on family 
allowances, advocating clawback. It stated that he expected 
complaints from high earners about the policy, but otherwise did not 
discuss popular attitudes.152 Plant recommended an IEA pamphlet, 
Policy for Poverty, to which Anthony Christopher, his Assistant 
General Secretary at the IRSF, had contributed.153 It stated that 
people were not willing to pay as much in taxes as they would 
voluntarily spend on services, citing another IEA paper, and also 
argued that ‘heavy expenditure’ had ‘provoked growing resistance to 
further taxation’.154 Although Houghton’s paper was circulated 
internally, no discussion of either of these publications was found.155 
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The IRSF appears to have had links with the IEA and to have been 
communicating some of their ideas about popular opposition to tax. 
However, there was no clear evidence to suggest that this had any 
impact on TUC ideas. 
 
TUC discussions about popular attitudes to tax seem to have 
remained fundamentally consistent, with the exception of Plant’s 
comment. The majority of TUC statements about popular attitudes to 
tax assumed opposition but also continued to emphasise fairness. 
While the TUC seemed perhaps slightly more concerned about 
popular opposition to high taxation than they had in previous periods, 
the dominant impression was one of continuity rather than change in 
both their conversations and communications from their members.  
 
The 1970 election 
 
Conversations about popular attitudes to tax did not change 
significantly around the 1970 election. Although Labour had been 
consistently behind in the polls since 1966, when the economy began 
to improve in 1969 their polling recovered and by the time Wilson 
called the election they were ahead. Polling generally showed Labour 
leads of various sizes. By the end of the campaign there was a 
consensus that Labour were going to win comfortably. This may not 
have been entirely misleading; other polling indicated that it was only 
late in the campaign that some voters were swayed by the 
Conservative argument that the economy was about to collapse 
again.156 Tax was a feature of the debate, with Labour questioned 
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about the omission of a wealth tax from their manifesto, and the 
Conservatives about the lack of a firm commitment on VAT, which 
they had left out for fear of appearing regressive.157 Conservative 
advertising attacked Labour on tax but in relation to the general 
theme of broken promises (see image 3).158 Tax has sometimes been 
discussed as one of the reasons that Labour lost but generally only 
as part of a wider failure to manage both the economy and 
expectations around redistribution and equality.159 Butler and 
Duschinsky concluded that Labour, despite their recovery in the polls, 
had fundamentally failed to ‘heal the scars’ left by the economic 
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Image 3: Conservative election poster, 1970 





Labour post-mortems barely mentioned tax.161 At a Parliamentary 
Labour Party (PLP) meeting about the election result, earlier failures, 
particularly around devaluation and Vietnam, were most often 
mentioned. Speakers suggested that they had moved too far to the 
right, and lost touch with their base and the unions.162 The only time 
tax was mentioned was when Douglas Jay argued that in the future 
they needed to strongly support direct taxation and deal with tax 
avoidance to improve the distribution of wealth.163 The interim 
organisational report to the NEC reported that there was a feeling 
that Labour had not differentiated themselves from the Conservatives 
enough or put forward their policies adequately. It suggested that 
Labour had been doing well until the last week when Conservative 
attacks began to make an impact.164 Interestingly, the report also 
stated that they were 'well aware from our canvass records and from 
Opinion Polls authorised by the Party, that one of our chief worries 
was the women's vote’, arguing that Conservative propaganda about 
prices and the ‘shopping basket’ had hurt them with women voters.165 
In general, however, tax was not a major feature of Labour 
discussions about the 1970 election defeat. 
 
The only Conservative post-mortem on the election found, a CRD 
report written by Brendon Sewill, was fairly gloomy about the election 
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campaign, and suggested that tax had been a negative for the 
Conservatives. Sewill stated that they had recognised when 
discussing their policies at Selsdon that although they were the right 
policies they were unlikely to be electorally popular 'since they 
involved higher prices, higher rents, and to some extent redistribution 
of income’. He reported that the press had only focused on their tax 
policies in the manifesto and had not found them credible and stated: 
We recognised that to announce a large number of specific cuts in 
government expenditure to make way for less specific reductions in 
taxation might help credibility but not popularity.166 
Similarly, Sewill recounted that although they had prepared a 
document setting out their economic plans, they had decided not to 
publish it because although it would increase credibility it would ‘open 
our tax proposals to criticism as being too regressive’.167 Overall, 
Sewill attributed Labour’s relative success to the feeling that the 
Conservatives were out of touch with ordinary people. The CRD were 
obviously concerned about popular reactions to their tax proposals 
during the election campaign, but they seem to have assumed 
spending cuts were unpopular and that perceptions of fairness were 
important, rather than that promises of tax cuts would always be 
popular.  
 
There were few election post-mortems mentioning tax in the press, 
and those there were did not suggest that it had been a major factor 
in the Conservative victory. They generally focused instead on 
Labour’s internal divisions, poor campaign, and patchy record in 
government.168 However, complaints about the Labour government’s 
 
166 Brendon Sewill, ‘Conservative Research Department Report on the 1970 
General Election, 17 July 1970’, CRD 3/9/85, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, 
Bodleian Library), 1970. 
167 Ibid. 
168 See for example: ‘What Future for Labour?’, Guardian, 20 June 1970; Alan 
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performance during the campaign did often focus on tax. The idea 
that tax was too high had become slightly more prevalent again, 
although it was largely confined to the right-leaning papers.169 These 
argued that on top of ruining the economy, Labour had put up taxes 
to unbearable levels.170 A Daily Mail editorial, for example, argued: 
The British people suffered freeze and squeeze. They felt the scourge of 
penal taxation and the straitjacket of restriction … MR CALLAGHAN, 1966: 
'I do not foresee the need for severe increases in taxation.' In that same 
year he clapped on another £258 million in taxes - part of the £3,000 
million extra imposed by the Labour Government - or £3 10s. a week on 
every family.171  
Arguments that taxes were too high were still, however, far less 
common than they had been in 1949-50. 
 
There was, however, some discussion of popular attitudes to tax. 
Most of this assumed opposition.172 The Observer, for example, 
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Midlands’, Times, 30 June 1970. 
169 See for example: ‘Comment: Is Working a Crime?’, Daily Mail, 14 May 1970; 
‘Comment: The 10 Vital Days That Will Settle the Destiny of This Nation’, Daily 
Mail, 8 June 1970; John Cockcroft, ‘A Test of Economic Faith’, Daily Telegraph, 1 
June 1970; ‘Heath Hammers It Home’, ibid., 2 June; ‘The Ted and Harold Show?’, 
Spectator, 23 May 1970; ‘Opinion: Wanted - Straight Answers’, Daily Express, 30 
May 1970; ‘Opinion: Where the Blame Lies’, Daily Express, 16 June 1970. The 
Times was the only one of the centrist and left-wing papers where articles arguing 
that taxes too high were found: ‘One Last Word’, Times, 9 June 1970; Lord 
Shawcross, ‘The Hard Facts of Britain's Economic Illness’, ibid., 16 July. 
170 See for example: ‘Comment: Is Working a Crime?’, Daily Mail, 14 May 1970; 
‘Making Sense of the Big Dipper’, Spectator, 16 May 1970; James McMillan, 
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The cash needs of the Welfare State are expanding faster than the 
willingness of the taxpayer to meet the bill …173  
A Daily Mail article also asserted: 
If people want tax cuts - and they do, and anyway they are necessary to 
infuse some enthusiasm - then some of the sheltered pet policy of the past 
decade will have to go.174  
Richard Rose, writing for the Times, also suggested that higher 
wages and inflation bringing people into income tax might increase 
working-class support for the Conservatives.175 Polling on the most 
important issues was widely reported and generally showed taxation 
in second place after the cost of living.176 There were even a few 
lengthier pieces where journalists and academics wrote in depth 
about the survey findings.177 However, assertions of popular 
opposition did not generally seem to be based on survey results. 
 
The only individual to explicitly challenge the idea of popular 
opposition to tax was New Statesman journalist William Gregory, who 
stated that previous surveys had always shown a preference for 
spending over tax cuts, and suggested that if polling asked that 
question, instead of just asking if people wanted tax cuts, it might get 
a different answer.178 In another article he also argued that the 
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177 Brittan, ‘The Political Parties, the Classes and the Economy’, Financial Times, 
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William Gregory, ‘All over Bar the Voting?’, New Statesman, 12 June 1970. 
178 William Gregory, ‘Marketing Backlash?’, New Statesman, 19 June 1970. The 
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Conservatives’ focus on tax cuts might actually be damaging their 
campaign.179 These comments could perhaps have been based on 
the Abrams’s polling discussed above, although the articles did not 
specify which polling they were referring to.180  
 
Some other articles were also more equivocal in their coverage of 
popular opposition to tax. The FT published an article arguing that 
polling suggested that people were still in favour of both the welfare 
state and mild redistribution of wealth.181 Several papers, on both 
sides of the political spectrum, also suggested that the 
Conservatives’ tax policies had frightened voters, and were one of 
the reasons why they would probably lose. Other articles stated that 
people were struggling to believe that the party could deliver tax cuts 
without spending cuts.182 Most articles emphasised popular 
opposition to tax, but this was not universal, and did not seem to 
translate into a belief that the Conservatives’ tax policies were 
necessarily popular. 
 
Despite polling showing that tax was a more important issue to voters 
at the 1970 election, neither the political parties nor the press 
seemed to think it had been a major issue or particularly important to 
 
which included comments about voting Conservative because of high taxation, but 
otherwise did not engage with the issue. See: ‘How the New Voters Will Mark Their 
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the Conservatives’ success. The press emphasis on popular 
opposition to tax had perhaps increased slightly since 1965, but still 




The suggestion from historians that the late 1960s was the moment 
when popular opposition to tax started to increase significantly is not 
clearly evident in the organisations studied here. The occasional 
comment suggested opposition was increasing but, overall, 
comments seemed strikingly similar to earlier periods. In the Labour 
party, Douglas Jay suggested that opposition had increased but other 
comments maintained their consistent combination of popular 
opposition alongside concerns about fairness. The same was true in 
the CBI and civil service. Conservative politicians had survey 
evidence and communications from their activists that could have 
suggested that opposition to tax had increased but this does not 
appear to have translated into any change in Conservative ideas 
about popular attitudes. The TUC, meanwhile, seemed slightly more 
concerned about popular opposition to contemporary tax levels but 
did not suggest that it had increased and continued to emphasise 
fairness. 
 
The general consensus in the sources examined here was that tax 
had barely any impact on the result of the 1970 election. The right-
leaning papers argued that tax was too high and that there was 
popular opposition to tax, backed up by polling in some cases. 
However, neither popular opposition nor the level of taxation were 
stressed to the level that they had been in 1949-50. Newspapers also 
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argued that Heath’s tax plans might not be attractive to voters, 
suggesting that cutting income tax was not the only consideration, 
and for the first time an article explicitly refuted the idea of popular 
opposition.  
 
The available evidence for popular attitudes had increased 
significantly. Surveys suggested that tax was a more important issue 
to voters than it had been at any of the elections previously studied; 
that income tax was unpopular but so was a shift towards indirect tax 
or spending cuts; that a wealth tax was popular; and that attitudes to 
tax were becoming increasingly partisan. Different organisations had 
particular parts of this evidence, or none at all, and it was of varying 
quality, but in each case there was little evidence that it had any clear 
impact on discussions about popular attitudes to tax. There was also 
evidence of think tanks communicating arguments about popular 
opposition to tax for the first time, but, again, this did not obviously 
influence conversations in any of the organisations studied. It was 
suggested that Labour concern about opposition to tax was driven by 
communications from their activists, but this is not evident in the 
archival record. In contrast, attitudes in the Conservative grassroots 
did seem perhaps to have changed, but this did not appear to have 
had any clear impact on conversations within the party.  
 
Some of the organisations studied seemed more concerned about 
popular opposition to tax in the late 1960s but others seemed less 
concerned than they had been in the middle of the decade. Although 
the increasing amount of survey evidence about popular attitudes to 
tax suggested that it had become a more important issue, it does not 
appear that individuals in most of the organisations studied here 
thought that opposition had increased significantly; the continuities 
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6. The 1976 Budget and the 1979 General Election 
 
 
The 1970s have generally been portrayed in both academic and 
popular discussions as a decade of crisis, remembered for miners’ 
strikes, the three-day week, high inflation, and the ‘winter of 
discontent’.1 Some recent work has challenged this, arguing for a 
more balanced view of the decade, or even that the idea of crisis was 
used, if not created, as a way to delegitimise the post-war social 
contract.2 Almost all works agree that the perception of crisis was 
real, if potentially overblown.3 It has been seen as a symptom of 
anxiety about social change and Britain’s diminished international 
position, as well as of middle-class distress at the loss of economic 
and cultural privileges.4 Black and Pemberton characterise it as a 
 
1 See for example: Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-2000; Lowe, The Welfare 
State in Britain since 1945. For a summary of this narrative see: Robinson et al., 
‘Telling Stories About Post-War Britain: Popular Individualism and the ‘Crisis’ of the 
1970s’., particularly 2-3; Black, ‘An Enlightening Decade? New Histories of 1970s’ 
Britain’. 
2 See for example: Lawrence Black, Hugh Pemberton, and Pat Thane, eds., 
Reassessing 1970s Britain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013); 
Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton, ‘The Winter of Discontent in British Politics’, 
The Political Quarterly 80, no. 4 (2009); Hay, ‘Narrating Crisis: The Discursive 
Construction of the ‘Winter of Discontent’ ’; Colin Hay, ‘The Winter of Discontent 
Thirty Years On’, The Political Quarterly 80, no. 4 (2009); Moran, ‘‘Stand up and Be 
Counted’: Hughie Green, the 1970s and Popular Memory’; Beckett, When the 
Lights Went Out: What Really Happened to Britain in the Seventies ; Turner, 
Crisis? What Crisis?: Britain in the 1970s ; Saunders, ‘'Crisis? What Crisis?' 
Thatcherism and the Seventies’; Robinson et al., ‘Telling Stories About Post-War 
Britain: Popular Individualism and the ‘Crisis’ of the 1970s’; Tomlinson, Managing 
the Economy, Managing the People: Narratives of Economic Life in Britain from 
Beveridge to Brexit, 64-65; Hay, ‘Narrating Crisis: The Discursive Construction of 
the ‘Winter of Discontent’ ’; Turner, Crisis? What Crisis?: Britain in the 1970s ; 
Tomlinson, Managing the Economy, Managing the People: Narratives of Economic 
Life in Britain from Beveridge to Brexit, 73-74, 187-205. 
3 See for example: Black and Pemberton, ‘The Winter of Discontent in British 
Politics’; Black and Pemberton, ‘Introduction. The Benighted Decade? 
Reassessing the 1970s’, 3-5; Nick Tiratsoo, ‘‘You’ve Never Had It So Bad’: Britain 
in the 1970s’, in From Blitz to Blair: A New History of Britain since 1939 ed. Nick 
Tiratsoo (London: Phoenix, 1998), 182-190. 
4 Black and Pemberton, ‘Introduction. The Benighted Decade? Reassessing the 
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form of ‘moral panic’, where concern about economic conditions and 
cultural change mingled with fears of a socialist takeover.5 Moran, 
however, suggests that it should be seen as primarily an elite 
phenomenon, with far less relevance to the lives of most people.6  
 
There is no doubt that the 1970s were an economically challenging 
decade. The incoming Heath government introduced VAT, reduced 
the standard rate of income tax, raised earned income relief for 
higher incomes, and cut estate duty. The aim was to boost the 
economy and increase efficiency, but by 1972 unemployment had 
increased to over 1 million. The reflationary budget of 1972 then went 
too far, possibly due to forecasting errors, leading to the ‘Barber 
boom’, which caused unsustainably high growth, a public sector 
deficit unprecedented in the 1950s and 1960s, and deterioration in 
the balance of payments.7 The 1973 budget was criticised as a 
budget for the rich. Instead of refuting this the government argued for 
the pre-eminent importance of efficiency over equity, which Daunton 
suggests opened the door to Thatcher’s rhetoric later in the decade.8 
 
Economic difficulties were exacerbated by the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system from 1971. Britain joined the EEC’s exchange 
 
1970s’, 9-14; Tiratsoo, ‘‘You’ve Never Had It So Bad’: Britain in the 1970s’, 187-
190; ibid., particularly 176-178. 
5 Black and Pemberton, ‘Introduction. The Benighted Decade? Reassessing the 
1970s’, 3-14. See also Hall et al., Policing the Crisis, 303-308; Moran, ‘‘Stand up 
and Be Counted’: Hughie Green, the 1970s and Popular Memory’, 175-178. 
6 Moran, ‘‘Stand up and Be Counted’: Hughie Green, the 1970s and Popular 
Memory’. 
7 Daunton, Just Taxes, 302-328; Williamson, Conservative Economic Policymaking 
and the Birth of Thatcherism, 1964-1979 60-63, 66-70, 80-85; Tiratsoo, ‘‘You’ve 
Never Had It So Bad’: Britain in the 1970s’, 164-168; Michael J. Artis and David 
Cobham, ‘The Background’, in Labour’s Economic Policies 1974-1979 ed. David 
Cobham, Michael J. Artis, and David P. Cobham (Manchester: Manchester 
University, 1991), 2-5. 
8 Daunton, Just Taxes, 302-328. 
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rate ‘snake’ in May 1972 but by the end of June had left and the 
pound was floating. This was billed as temporary, but was in fact 
driven by concerns that the government would not be able to hold 
sterling at a new devalued rate either.9 Heath managed to bring 
Britain into the EEC in January 1973, despite political and public 
scepticism, but the first OPEC oil shock hit the already weakened 
economy in October 1973. Although the Heath government 
attempted a modest deflation in early 1974, they were unable either 
to force or convince the unions to engage in wage restraint. The 
1973-4 miners’ strike prompted a snap election under the heading 
‘Who governs Britain?’, which did not get the answer Heath was 
looking for.10  
 
The incoming Labour government initially prioritised the social 
contract, promising increased spending in return for wage restraint. 
The party was divided between those who were convinced that they 
should be accelerating redistribution and state expansion, and those 
who felt that their policies were already out of touch with the 
electorate’s desire for private consumption and, in particular, home 
ownership.11 Tax policy was also fundamentally constrained by the 
 
9 Martin Daunton, ‘Britain and Globalisation since 1850: iv the Creation of the 
Washington Consensus’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 19 (2009): 
16-23; Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital, 136-184; Harold James, International 
Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods (Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund, 1996), Book; Clark and Dilnot, ‘British Fiscal Policy since 1939’, 
388-390; Middleton, The British Economy since 1945: Engaging with the Debate, 
90-93; Needham, ‘Britain’s Money Supply Experiment, 1971–73’; Tomlinson, 
‘Economic Policy’, 197-199. 
10 Tiratsoo, ‘‘You’ve Never Had It So Bad’: Britain in the 1970s’, 164-168; Beckett, 
When the Lights Went Out: What Really Happened to Britain in the Seventies 80-
87; Black and Pemberton, ‘Introduction. The Benighted Decade? Reassessing the 
1970s’. 
11 Tomlinson, Managing the Economy, Managing the People: Narratives of 
Economic Life in Britain from Beveridge to Brexit, 67-68; Gareth Stedman Jones, 
Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832-1982 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 239-256; Daunton, Just Taxes, 
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need to satisfy the TUC.12 The 1974 budgets increased food 
subsidies, cut VAT, and trailed the future introduction of wealth and 
capital transfer taxes.13 However, inflation was accelerating rapidly; 
the average wage increase rose from 13.5 percent in the first quarter 
of 1974 to 18 percent by the third. Healey introduced his first 
deflationary budget in April 1975, raising taxes by £1.25 billion and 
cutting spending by a similar amount. The TUC were broadly 
supportive and agreed to a voluntary flat rate limit on wage 
increases.14  
 
However, the balance of payments and industrial outlook were still a 
concern. During 1976 fiscal policy was tightened on a number of 
occasions, despite rising unemployment. This failed to prevent a 
sterling crisis in March, prompted by the Bank of England selling 
sterling in an already falling market. Wilson retired soon after and 
was replaced by Callaghan. The April 1976 budget made tax cuts 
and spending increases conditional on limiting wage increases to 3 
percent, but failed to stop further exchange rate falls. The 
government decided to turn to the IMF and accept monetary targets 
and public expenditure cuts. Most of the IMF’s requirements were 
 
331-332. 
12 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 215-216. 
13 Artis and Cobham, ‘The Background’, 7-9; Tomlinson, Managing the Economy, 
Managing the People: Narratives of Economic Life in Britain from Beveridge to 
Brexit, 65-66. The government let the wealth tax go to a Select Committee where it 
could be quietly killed, having been convinced by Treasury concerns about the 
likely impact on financial confidence. See: Daunton, Just Taxes, 328-332; 
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and Wealth (Diamond Commission) to look at ways to reform inheritance tax, but it 
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steps that the government was already taking, and the major aim 
was to reassure financial markets. This succeeded, and in the end 
only half of the agreed loan was used.15 In 1977 unemployment and 
inflation fell, and the balance of payments and sterling improved. 
However, Labour remained divided and wage agreements were 
fragile.16 In 1978 Callaghan announced a limit of 5 percent on pay 
increases without significant union consultation. This proved 
impossible to enforce in the private sector. When it was implemented 
in the public sector it led to the ‘winter of discontent’ strikes. Labour 
was defeated in the Commons and lost the election that followed.17 
 
The Conservative party had elected Margaret Thatcher as leader in 
1975, embarking on a rhetorical strategy that, Tomlinson argues, 
melded decline with neoliberal ideas, and, as Sutcliffe-Braithwaite 
and others have pointed out, had a strong moral element.18 Whether 
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this should be seen as a real change or a continuation of earlier 
Conservative ideas has been debated.19 The Conservatives did, 
however, increasingly stress the dangers of inflation, arguing that it 
was the result of social democracy and a manifestation of British 
decline, and placed less emphasis on full employment. Trade unions 
were cast as a central villain and it was implicitly argued that 
monetarism would free the government from their grip.20  
 
This transformation in Conservative thinking was not primarily driven, 
or supported, by changing ideas within British academia; it remained, 
with a few exceptions, opposed to the Thatcherite project.21 Right-
wing think tanks have been identified by some as the key influence, 
particularly the IEA and the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), which 
was founded in 1974.22 Others have suggested that their role has 
been overstated, and that the process took place almost entirely 
 
19 See for example: Jackson and Saunders, ‘Introduction: Varieties of 
Thatcherism’; Williamson, Conservative Economic Policymaking and the Birth of 
Thatcherism, 1964-1979 ; Neil Rollings, ‘Between Business and Academia in 
Postwar Britain: Three Advocates of Neoliberalism at the Heart of the British 
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University Press, 2017). 
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Thatcherism and Neo-Liberalism’; Williamson, Conservative Economic 
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‘Modernizing Britain’s Welfare State: The Influence of Affluence, 1957-1964’, 41-
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within the Conservative party itself, supported by changing ideas in 
the media and civil service.23 It was reinforced by prominent media 
figures, particularly financial journalists like Samuel Brittan and Peter 
Jay.24 Their commentary was important because it influenced opinion 
in financial markets and affected judgements about the credibility of 
economic policy.25  
 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) was also set up in 1971 and 
gained in influence through the 1970s. It was not ideologically 
aligned with groups like the IEA and CPS — its first Director, Dick 
Taverne, had been a Labour MP — but many of its tax proposals 
were in line with reforms being discussed on the right; Taverne 
expressed support for top income tax rates of 50 or 60 percent in 
1975, when the top rate was 83 percent.26 The IFS set up the Meade 
Committee in 1975, an ambitious attempt to review the entire tax 
 
23 See for example: Davies and Davies, The City of London and Social Democracy: 
The Political Economy of Finance in Britain, 1959 - 1979, particularly 140-180; 
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system, and funded another study by John Kay and Mervyn King. 
Both reports were published in 1978 and proposed comprehensive 
reforms. Kay and King advocated a lifetime expenditure tax, among 
other things, while Meade’s committee linked this with higher income 
tax thresholds and benefits.27 The authors portrayed their schemes 
as neutral and technical but they assumed both that a minimum 
standard of living should be provided for everyone, and that some 
level of inequality was acceptable as a way to promote efficiency and 
incentives. They were, therefore, major reforms that did not fit neatly 
into the ideology of either party.28 Nonetheless, they had a long-
lasting impact on conversations about tax policy, and Williamson 
argues that the proposal for an expenditure tax gave further 
credibility to the switch from direct to indirect taxes, as did support for 
cutting marginal income tax rates.29  
 
As covered in the introduction, the working assumption of most 
historical discussions of attitudes to tax has been that both elite and 
popular opposition to taxation increased through the 1960s and 
1970s, but the evidence for a change in popular attitudes is limited.30 
 
27 Chick, ‘Short Reforming the Structure of Direct Taxation: The Political and 
Administrative Response to the Meade Report (1978)’; Chick, ‘Incentives, 
Inequality and Taxation: The Meade Committee Report on the Structure and 
Reform of Direct Taxation (1978)’; Daunton, Just Taxes, 333-335; Kay and King, 
The British Tax System; Institute for Fiscal Studies, The Structure and Reform of 
Direct Taxation (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978). 
28 Daunton, Just Taxes, 333-335. See also: Chick, ‘Short Reforming the Structure 
of Direct Taxation: The Political and Administrative Response to the Meade Report 
(1978)’; Chick, ‘Incentives, Inequality and Taxation: The Meade Committee Report 
on the Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation (1978)’. 
29 Williamson, Conservative Economic Policymaking and the Birth of Thatcherism, 
1964-1979 63-70. See also: Chick, ‘Short Reforming the Structure of Direct 
Taxation: The Political and Administrative Response to the Meade Report (1978)’; 
Chick, ‘Incentives, Inequality and Taxation: The Meade Committee Report on the 
Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation (1978)’. 
30 Daunton, Just Taxes, 3-5, 335-338, 368-369; Offer, Why Has the Public Sector 
Grown So Large in Market Societies?: The Political Economy of Prudence in the 
UK, c. 1870-2000; Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 186-189. See also: 
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Butler and Kavanagh’s assessment of the 1979 election, published in 
June the following year, did highlight tax as a key issue, but it placed 
more emphasis on Labour’s track record in government and the 
events of the winter of 1978. It also highlighted that Gallup polling 
suggested that it was ‘plain’ that a majority were willing ‘to accept the 
tax burden involved in maintaining existing social services’, and 
noted that the first Conservative budget in 1979 was the ‘most 
unpopular budget since Gallup started sampling budget reactions’.31 
The previous chapter suggests that there was no widespread 
perception in the organisations studied that opposition to tax was 
increasing significantly in the late 1960s. This chapter will explore 
whether this had changed by the late 1970s.  
 
The Conservative party 
 
In 1977 three comments by Conservative politicians or researchers 
did suggest that opposition to tax might have increased as a result of 
fiscal drag.32 An unsigned note in the Taxation Policy Group (TPG) 
 
Fielding, The Labour Party: Continuity and Change in the Making of ‘New’ Labour, 
69-72; Lowe, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945, 295-299; Offer, The 
Challenge of Affluence: Self-Control and Well-Being in the United States and 
Britain since 1950, 7-8; Offer, ‘British Manual Workers: From Producers to 
Consumers, c. 1950–2000’, 541-543; Offer, ‘Consumption and Affluence, c. 1870-
2010’; Sloman, Transfer State: The Idea of a Guaranteed Income and the Politics 
of Redistribution in Modern Britain, 148-153; Sloman, ‘Short ‘Where’s the Money 
Coming From?’: Tracing the History of Manifesto Costings in UK Elections, 1955-
2019’; Williamson, Conservative Economic Policymaking and the Birth of 
Thatcherism, 1964-1979 63-66. 
31 David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1979 
(London: Macmillan, 1980), 340-342. 
32 ‘Some Thoughts on Increased Allowances Versus Reduction in Basic Rate’, 
CRD 4/4/152, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1977; ‘Policy 
Group on Taxation: Minutes of a Meeting of the Tax Policy Group Held in the 
Norman Shaw Building on 15th June, 1977’, CRD 4/4/153, (Conservative Party 
Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1977; ‘Taxation Policy Group: Progress Report, 




folder argued, for example: 
I do not think it has been possible to bring so many millions into the tax 
bracket for the first time, and at such a high marginal rate, without inflicting 
massive discontent.33 
It also stated that people were ‘fed up with high taxes’ and that ‘all 
who pay tax at the higher levels are aghast at the amount of tax they 
pay compared with their counterparts overseas. There is massive 
evidence of that’. It did not specify what this evidence was.34 The 
group’s progress report similarly argued in June 1977: 
Indeed we believe that this [cutting income tax] would now be widely 
accepted by the public partly because inflation has continued to make our 
tax rates more onerous and more out of line with other countries; and 
partly because, now that almost everyone finds themselves paying income 
tax at 35%,- there is general acceptance of the need to get income tax 
down - even if it means shifting some of the burden on to indirect taxes.35  
It seemed to suggest that the results of fiscal drag might overwhelm 
implied opposition to cuts for high earners or a shift to indirect tax. In 
discussing this report TPG Chairman David Howell also suggested 
that:  
… the introduction spell out more clearly the underlying changes in political 
attitudes which now made it possible to go much further than previously, 
e.g. the much higher proportion of people paying standard rate tax and the 
high cost of Revenue collection.36  
 
33 ‘Some Thoughts on Increased Allowances Versus Reduction in Basic Rate’, 
CRD 4/4/152, Conservative Party Archive, 1977. After defeat in both 1974 
elections Thatcher appointed Keith Joseph as policymaking coordinator and he set 
up a series of groups including the Taxation Policy Group (TPG). Participants 
included David Howell, Geoffrey Howe, Barry Bracewell-Milnes, Samuel Brittan, 
John Chown, Tim Boswell, Peter Cropper and Brendon Sewill. 
34 Ibid. 
35 ‘Taxation Policy Group: Progress Report, June 1977’, CRD 4/4/153, 
Conservative Party Archive, 1977. 
36 ‘Policy Group on Taxation: Minutes of a Meeting of the Tax Policy Group Held in 
the Norman Shaw Building on 15th June, 1977’, CRD 4/4/153, Conservative Party 
Archive, 1977. David Arthur Russell Howell, Lord Howell of Guildford (1936-) spent 
a year at the Treasury (1959-60) after being educated at Eton and Cambridge. He 
then became a lead writer for the Daily Telegraph until 1964. In 1966 Howell was 
elected MP for Guildford, a seat he held until he joined the Lords in 1997. He held 
a number of ministerial posts including secretary of state for energy (1979-81) and 
secretary of state for transport (1981-3). He was deputy leader of the opposition 
from 2005 to 2010. See: ‘The Rt Hon Lord Howell of Guildford’, MPs and Lords, 
Gov.uk, 2021, accessed on: 13 February at 
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However, these were the only comments found that suggested 
opposition to tax had increased and they were found exclusively in 
TPG materials from 1977. Of course, it is possible that other 
statements were missed, but numerous other comments about 
popular attitudes to tax were also found, none of which suggested 
opposition had increased. 
 
In general, Conservative comments about attitudes to tax did not 
appear to have changed significantly. As previously, comments 
strongly asserted popular opposition to the level and structure of 
taxation.37 Keith Joseph suggested in April 1975, for example, that 
without spending cuts there would be ‘a tax and rate payers’ revolt if 
 
https://www.gov.uk/government/people/lord-howell-of-guildford; ‘Lord Howell of 
Guildford’, MPs and Lords, UK Parliament, 2021, accessed on: 13 February at 
https://members.parliament.uk/member/993/career. 
37 See for example: Keith Joseph, ‘Notes Towards the Definition of Policy (Paper 
by Sir Keith Joseph)’, LCC 1/3/6, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian 
Library), 1975; ‘Memorandum from Anne Bulloch to Chris Patten, 2 June 1975’, 
CRD 4/4/145, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1975; 
‘Taxation Policy Group: Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Group Held at 10.00 
a.m. on Tuesday 2nd October in the Conservative Research Department’, CRD 
4/4/146, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1975; ‘Letter from 
David Howell MP to Keith Joseph, 29 October 1975’, CRD 4/27/18, (Conservative 
Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1975; ‘Memorandum from Tim Boswell to 
Nigel Forman, 8 December 1975’, CRD 4/4/147, (Conservative Party Archive, 
Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1975; Samuel Brittan, ‘Policy Group on Tax: A Comment 
on Chairman's Interim Report to Shadow Cabinet’, CRD 4/4/145, (Conservative 
Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1975; ‘Some Thoughts on Increased 
Allowances Versus Reduction in Basic Rate’, CRD 4/4/152, Conservative Party 
Archive, 1977; Chris Patten, ‘General Election Planning, 1 July 1977’, THCR 
2/6/1/250, (The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, Churchill 
Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1977; George Cardona, ‘Government Expenditure 
and Revenue: Conservative Plans for the Next Five Years, 27 July ’, CRD 4/4/153, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1977; Andrew Rowe, ‘The 
General Election, 3 January 1978’, CRD 4/30/5/17, (Conservative Party Archive, 
Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1978; ‘Tax Campaign Group: Minutes of the 1st Meeting, 
Held on Friday 27th January 1978 in Room 106 at the Central Office’, CRD 
4/4/154, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1978; 
‘Memorandum from Geoffrey Howe to Lord Thorneycroft, 7 September 1978’, 
THCR 2/1/3/9, (The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, Churchill 
Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1978. 
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one has not already occurred by the time we arrive’.38 Geoffrey Howe 
also wrote in August 1976 that the ‘attack on high direct taxes’ had ‘a 
wide shop-floor appeal’.39 The party started planning for a possible 
general election in 1977 and tax cuts were highlighted by several 
 
38 Joseph, ‘Notes Towards the Definition of Policy (Paper by Sir Keith Joseph)’, 
LCC 1/3/6, Conservative Party Archive, 1975. Keith Sinjohn Joseph, Baron Joseph 
(1918-1994) was a leading Conservative politician. After Harrow, Oxford, and 
service during the war Joseph became both a barrister and an Oxford fellow. He 
was narrowly beaten at the 1955 election but was elected MP for Leeds North-East 
at a by election the following year, one of only two Jewish Conservative MPs. He 
was parliamentary secretary to the minister of housing and local government 
(1955-61) and minister of state at the Board of Trade (1961-2) while maintaining 
his business interests as director, chairman, and then deputy chairman of Bovis 
Ltd. Joseph was then secretary of state for social services from 1970 to 1974. 
Although initially supportive of the mixed economy and the welfare state, from 1964 
he became more involved with the IEA. He increasingly advocated free market 
economic policies and in 1974 established the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS). 
Thatcher was expected to make him her shadow chancellor in 1975 but instead left 
him in charge of policy and research. In 1979 he became secretary of state for 
industry and then secretary of state for education and science from 1981. He 
became a peer in 1986. See: Brian Harrison, ‘Joseph, Keith Sinjohn, Baron Joseph 
(1918–1994)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 
2011, accessed on: 18 April at https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/55063; Denham 
and Garnett, Keith Joseph. 
39 Geoffrey Howe, ‘Party Strategy, Policy and Organisation, 1 August 1976’, THCR 
2/1/3/9, (The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, Churchill Archives 
Centre, Cambridge), 1976. (Richard Edward) Geoffrey Howe, Baron Howe of 
Aberavon (1926-2015) was chancellor from 1979 to 1983. He won a scholarship to 
Winchester College and then studied law at Cambridge where he was active in 
Conservative politics. After graduating he worked as a lawyer while contesting the 
safe Labour seat of Aberavon unsuccessfully in 1955 and 1959 and founding the 
Bow Group in 1951. Howe was elected MP for Bebbington in 1964 but lost it at the 
1966 election. He became legal correspondent for the Sunday Telegraph and 
served on various committees. He also joined the Mont Pelerin Society in 1968. At 
the 1970 election he was elected again for Reigate and then Surrey East in 1974, 
which he held until 1992. He joined the Cabinet as minister for trade and consumer 
affairs in 1972-4. Howe unsuccessfully challenged Thatcher for the leadership but 
was appointed shadow chancellor. He was key in developing the Conservative’s 
economic policy positions in opposition. Howe was chancellor from 1979 to 1983 
when he moved to the Foreign Office. His relationship with Thatcher broke down in 
1989 over European issues, and particularly the exchange rate mechanism. He 
became leader of the Commons and deputy prime minister but resigned in 
November 1990, attacking Thatcher strongly. Heseltine challenged for the 
leadership and Thatcher resigned nine days later. See: Peter Riddell, ‘Howe, 
(Richard Edward) Geoffrey, Baron Howe of Aberavon (1926–2015)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2019, accessed on: 13 
February at https://doi.org/10.1093/odnb/9780198614128.013.110802. 
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memos as potentially attractive to voters.40 Howe argued to 
Thorneycroft in September 1978 that the 'tax cut package’ was ‘of 
central importance and must be pushed for all that it's worth’.41 In 
February 1979, Thatcher herself even stated clearly: ‘In my view the 
average person and a lot of non-average as well, wants “tax cuts and 
order”’.42 However, comments assumed opposition to tax in previous 
periods as well. 
 
As previously, the emphasis on opposition to tax was also 
accompanied by the idea that perceptions of fairness were as, if not 
more, important.43 As in the late 1960s, concern was expressed that 
the policy group was being pushed towards a package that would be 
seen as unfairly favouring the wealthy, and it was assumed that cuts 
 
40 See for example: Cardona, ‘Government Expenditure and Revenue: 
Conservative Plans for the Next Five Years, 27 July ’, CRD 4/4/153, Conservative 
Party Archive, 1977; Patten, ‘General Election Planning, 1 July 1977’, THCR 
2/6/1/250, The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, 1977; Rowe, 
‘The General Election, 3 January 1978’, CRD 4/30/5/17, Conservative Party 
Archive, 1978; ‘Memorandum from Geoffrey Howe to Lord Thorneycroft, 7 
September 1978’, THCR 2/1/3/9, The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS 
THCR, 1978. 
41 ‘Memorandum from Geoffrey Howe to Lord Thorneycroft, 7 September 1978’, 
THCR 2/1/3/9, The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, 1978. 
42 Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography. Volume One, Not 
for Turning (London: Penguin Books, 2014), 403. 
43 See for example: ‘Taxation Policy Group: Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the 
Group Held at 10.00 a.m. on Tuesday 2nd October in the Conservative Research 
Department’, CRD 4/4/146, Conservative Party Archive, 1975; ‘Memorandum from 
Tim Boswell to Nigel Forman, 8 December 1975’, CRD 4/4/147, Conservative 
Party Archive, 1975; ‘The Politics of Taxation’, CRD 4/4/153, (Conservative Party 
Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1975; ‘Policy Group on Taxation: Second 
Interim Report, 16 June 1976’, THCR 2/6/1/159, (The Papers of Baroness 
Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1976; ‘Policy 
Group on Taxation: Minutes of a Meeting of the Tax Policy Group Held in the 
Norman Shaw Building on 15th June, 1977’, CRD 4/4/153, Conservative Party 
Archive, 1977; Rowe, ‘The General Election, 3 January 1978’, CRD 4/30/5/17, 
Conservative Party Archive, 1978; ‘Memorandum from Peter Cropper to Adam 
Ridley, 18 December 1978’, CRD 4/27/48, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, 
Bodleian Library), 1978; ‘Memorandum from Peter Cropper to Adam Ridley, 13 




for low to medium incomes or increases in other taxes on high 
earners would be needed if the top rate or capital taxes were to be 
cut.44 Howe suggested in August 1976, for example, that income tax 
cuts were ‘a useful container for the less attractive, but necessary, 
policies for allowing profits to grow, cutting taxes on better-off and so 
on’.45 A 1975 note titled ‘Politics of Taxation’ stated explicitly: 
In the reality of the actual world in which we live there is little doubt that the 
tax system which would be regarded as democratically just would be one 
which bore increasingly heavily on higher incomes.46 
The TPG’s interim report in July 1975 similarly argued that incentive 
arguments had not ‘cut much ice’ and that they should focus on 
fairness.47 In December 1978, Cropper suggested that of their tax 
policies: 
Only the first of these, “reducing the burden of taxation for all the people,” 
could be regarded as having a wide appeal among the readers of the 
popular press. All the other items in our policy will involve measures which 
the malevolent will attack as “favouring the rich”.48 
Early in 1978 Andrew Rowe had similarly suggested:  
 
44 See for example: ‘Taxation Policy Group: Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the 
Group Held at 10.00 a.m. on Tuesday 2nd October in the Conservative Research 
Department’, CRD 4/4/146, Conservative Party Archive, 1975; ‘Memorandum from 
Tim Boswell to Nigel Forman, 8 December 1975’, CRD 4/4/147, Conservative 
Party Archive, 1975; ‘Economic Reconstruction Group: Minutes of the 8th Meeting 
Held at 11.00 a.m. In Interview Room D at the House of Commons on Thursday 
6th November 1975’, THCR 2/6/1/37, (The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM 
FRS THCR, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1975; John Chown, 
‘Discussion Memorandum: Tax Reform, 8 December 1975’, CRD 4/4/147, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1975; ‘Leader's 
Consultative Committee. Minutes of the 117th Meeting Held at 3.00 p.m. on 
Monday, 21st June 1976, in the Leader's Room at the House of Commons’, THCR 
2/6/1/159, (The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, Churchill 
Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1976; ‘Some Thoughts on Increased Allowances 
Versus Reduction in Basic Rate’, CRD 4/4/152, Conservative Party Archive, 1977. 
45 Howe, ‘Party Strategy, Policy and Organisation, 1 August 1976’, THCR 2/1/3/9, 
The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, 1976. 
46 ‘The Politics of Taxation’, CRD 4/4/153, Conservative Party Archive, 1975. This 
may have been authored by Peter Cropper. 
47 ‘Policy Group on Taxation: Chairman's Interim Report to the Shadow Cabinet, 23 
July 1975’, THCR 2/6/1/157, (The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS 
THCR, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1975. 
48 ‘Memorandum from Peter Cropper to Adam Ridley, 18 December 1978’, CRD 
4/27/48, Conservative Party Archive, 1978. 
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Our line here [on tax] is simple and likely to be popular but we must 
concentrate on the benefits to the average wage-earner. The fact that 
some firemen get more on social security than at work makes our case for 
tax reform. Huge paper increases for top bosses destroy its appeal.49  
Conservative politicians clearly still believed in the late 1970s that 
fairness was an important factor in attitudes to tax. 
 
Other issues were also emphasised. Tax was rarely selected by the 
strategy memos as the most important potential election issue.50 
Howe argued in June 1977 for differentiating between the 'essentially 
political drama associated with any reduction in top tax rates, and the 
mass resentment possible if prices were raised too suddenly’, 
suggesting that he believed prices were more of an issue than 
fairness.51 The policy group eventually proposed a 75 percent top 
rate on investment income and a 60 percent top rate on earned 
income, after Lawson’s suggestion of 25 percent and 40 percent as 
 
49 Rowe, ‘The General Election, 3 January 1978’, CRD 4/30/5/17, Conservative 
Party Archive, 1978. Andrew John Bernard Rowe (1935-2008) was a liberal 
Conservative politician. Educated with scholarships at Eton and Oxford he spent 
five years as a Scottish Office civil servant and another seven lecturing in social 
administration at Edinburgh University before joining Conservative Central Office 
as director of community affairs in 1975. He left in 1979 after falling out with 
Thorneycroft. In 1983 he was elected MP for Mid-Kent which he held until his 
retirement in 2001. See: ‘Andrew Rowe: Europhile MP Who Served as Aide to 
Edward Heath’, Independent, 9 March 2009; Edward Pearce, ‘Andrew Rowe: 
Politician Far Removed from the Stereotype of a Conservative MP’, Guardian, 26 
November 2008. 
50 See for example: Patten, ‘General Election Planning, 1 July 1977’, THCR 
2/6/1/250, The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, 1977; Chris 
Patten, ‘Implementing Our Strategy, 21 December 1977’, THCR 2/6/1/250, (The 
Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, Churchill Archives Centre, 
Cambridge), 1977; Rowe, ‘The General Election, 3 January 1978’, CRD 4/30/5/17, 
Conservative Party Archive, 1978; Angus Maude, ‘Themes, 16 February 1978’, 
CRD 4/30/5/16, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1978; 
Chris Patten, ‘Some Thoughts on Strategy in the Run-up to the Election, 25 May 
1978’, THCR 2/6/1/250, (The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, 
Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1978. 
51 ‘Policy Group on Taxation: Minutes of a Meeting of the Tax Policy Group Held in 




the only two rates was dismissed as ‘politically unrealistic’.52  
 
Meetings during the 1979 election campaign itself did not suggest 
that Conservative politicians and researchers thought their tax 
policies were overwhelmingly popular.53 There was concern about 
whether their policies were credible, particularly in terms of how 
income tax cuts would be paid for.54 Towards the end of April Patten 
reported that their answers on how they were going to pay for income 
tax cuts ‘had not been got over entirely successfully’.55 Post-election 
polling suggested that many voters remembered their tax policies but 
only 5 percent said they were the reason they had voted 
Conservative.56 Overall, three Conservative comments suggested 
that opposition to tax had increased, but they appeared for only a 
very short amount of time in 1977; both before and after discussions 
were consistent with earlier periods. 
 
 
52 Williamson, Conservative Economic Policymaking and the Birth of Thatcherism, 
1964-1979 66-70. 
53 See for example: ‘Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Chairman's Office on 
Tuesday, 10th April 1979’, CRD 4/30/5/18, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, 
Bodleian Library), 1979; ‘Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Chairman's Office on 
Monday, 24th April 1979 at 9.00 pm’, CRD 4/30/5/18 (Conservative Party Archive, 
Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1979; ‘Minute of a Meeting Held at 9.30 am in the 
Chairman's Office on Monday, 9th April 1979’, CRD 4/30/5/18, (Conservative Party 
Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1979; ‘Minutes of a Meeting Held in the 
Chairman's Office on Thursday, 26th April 1979 at 8.00 pm’, CRD 4/30/5/18 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1979; ‘Working Lunch 
Minutes, 27 April 1979’, CRD 4/30/5/17, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, 
Bodleian Library), 1979. 
54 ‘Minute of a Meeting Held at 9.30 am in the Chairman's Office on Monday, 9th 
April 1979’, CRD 4/30/5/18, Conservative Party Archive, 1979; ‘Minutes of a 
Meeting Held in the Chairman's Office on Thursday, 26th April 1979 at 8.00 pm’, 
CRD 4/30/5/18 Conservative Party Archive, 1979; ‘Working Lunch Minutes, 27 
April 1979’, CRD 4/30/5/17, Conservative Party Archive, 1979. 
55 ‘Working Lunch Minutes, 27 April 1979’, CRD 4/30/5/17, Conservative Party 
Archive, 1979. 
56 Opinion Research Centre, ‘A Survey on the Electoral Climate Immediately after 
the Election - May 1979’, CCO 180/11/5/18, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, 
Bodleian Library), 1979. 
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Johnson et al’s analysis suggests effective income tax rates peaked 
for all income groups in 1977 (see fig. 9, p. 136).57 The March 1977 
budget cut the standard rate from 35 to 33 percent, contingent on 
wage restraint, while the October budget increased thresholds and 
allowances.58 In December 1978 Cropper suggested that the party 
had missed the boat in hitting Labour on taxation as ‘basic taxation’ 
had been falling for two years.59 It is, therefore, possible that 
comments asserting that opposition to tax had increased 
disappeared after 1977 because income taxes had started to fall. 
This does not, however, explain why they only emerged in 1977. 
 
Although few Conservative comments about popular attitudes to tax 
referenced polling, it could, nonetheless, have been a factor.60 In 
 
57 Johnson, Lynch, and Walker, ‘Income Tax and Elections in Britain, 1950–2001’, 
400-402. 
58 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, 251-254. The first 1977 budget also 
saw the Rooker-Wise amendment which indexed income tax allowances so they 
would rise with inflation. 
59 ‘Memorandum from Peter Cropper to Adam Ridley, 18 December 1978’, CRD 
4/27/48, Conservative Party Archive, 1978. Peter Cropper (1927-) was a 
Conservative economic adviser and director of the CRD. After Hitchin Grammar 
School and Cambridge Cropper was at the CRD 1951-3 and 1975-9, before 
becoming special adviser to the chief secretary to the Treasury. In 1982 he 
returned to the CRD as director, a post he held for two years, before serving as 
special adviser to the chancellor from 1984 to 1988. See: Moore, Margaret 
Thatcher: The Authorized Biography. Volume One, Not for Turning 352n. Keith 
Britto (1949-2018) was a Conservative party expert on psephology and opinion 
polling. He was based in the CRD 1974-1980 and 1993-5, and in Conservative 
Central Office 1980-93. In 1981 he founded the Marketing Department with Chris 
Lawson and was deputy director from 1984 to 1986. From 1986 to 1989 he was 
deputy director of the Special Services Department under Chris Lawson. See: 
‘Guide to Holdings: Britto, Keith (B. 1949)’, Archives Centre, Churchill College 
Cambridge, 2021, accessed on: 13 February at 
https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/guide-holdings/#BRITTO; ‘Britto, 
Keith, 1976-1989’, Bodleian Archives & Manuscripts, Bodleian Libraries, Oxford, 
2021, accessed on: 13 February at 
https://archives.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/repositories/2/archival_objects/163086. 
60 For a comment that did reference polling see: ‘Memorandum from Lord 
Thorneycroft to the Members of the Consultative Committee and Opposition Front 
Bench Spokesmen, 27 July 1977’, THCR 2/6/1/160, (ORC, Churchill Archives 
Centre, Cambridge), 1977. 
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October 1975 Howell wrote to Keith Joseph to ask for help gathering 
information about ‘public reactions to various aspects of the taxation 
system’.61 He seemed to have a fairly clear idea of what he wanted 
the results to show, stating: ‘First, we need as much ammunition as 
we can get to reinforce the case against CTT [capital transfer tax]’.62 
The CRD did conduct another survey into attitudes to tax with the 
ORC in 1976, whether as a result of Howell’s request or not. It found 
that a majority of respondents did not support cutting taxes if it meant 
service cuts, including a majority of Conservative supporters. The 
exact question was not recorded but seems to have been different 
from that asked in the 1960s, as it explicitly referenced spending 
cuts. The findings are not, therefore, comparable, but did not seem to 
suggest that opposition had increased. Cutting income tax was 
popular and two thirds of respondents thought that they paid a higher 
percentage of their income in tax than two years previously, although 
they were less sure about the previous twenty years. A majority also 
thought that a switch to indirect taxation was unfair.63  
 
This seems to have aroused more interest than the 1960s surveys.64 
The conclusions drawn from it were, however, perhaps surprising. A 
meeting about its findings in December 1976 involving Howe, Howell, 
and various CRD researchers, among others, suggested that it 
showed: 
… a distinct shift in attitudes and a much more widespread awareness of 
 
61 ‘Letter from David Howell MP to Keith Joseph, 29 October 1975’, CRD 4/27/18, 
Conservative Party Archive, 1975. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Opinion Research Centre, ‘Attitudes to Taxation. Carried out For: Conservative 
Central Office’, CCO 180/9/10/5, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian 
Library), 1976. 
64 ‘Taxation Survey. Report on a Meeting, 1 December 1976’, CRD 4/27/18, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1976; ‘Comments 
Received on Draft Questionnaire on Public Attitudes to Taxation, June 1976’, CRD 
4/27/18, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1976. 
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the heavy income tax burden, and consequent disincentives to work. Old 
attitudes to income tax - i.e. "that it was paid by them" still co-existed with 
this new awareness.65 
They interpreted the fact that a majority did not want taxes cut if it 
meant spending cuts as showing that ‘a large proportion of the 
electorate have not faced up to the real nature of the choices 
involved’.66 They did accept that people thought a shift to indirect tax 
was unfair and concluded that they should handle it carefully, but in 
general seemed to interpret the results as supportive of their policy 
positions even when this did not appear to be the most natural 
conclusion.67 The report’s covering note seemed more obviously in 
line with the findings, stating: 
It is clear that there is a need for a great deal more public education about 
taxation. The public still largely think of taxes as being paid by the rich. 
Income tax is the most unpopular tax … but more would oppose than 
approve most of the more obvious means of reducing it, such as a switch 
from direct to indirect taxation, reductions in public services, charging for 
services that are now free etc.68 
The survey did not seem to suggest that opposition was increasing, 
but it was interpreted in that way by some key individuals involved 
with the TPG, and could, therefore, have contributed to the 
perception that opposition had increased.   
 
Another ORC survey was conducted in February 1978. This showed 
a similar picture to the 1976 survey. If anything, respondents seemed 
again to have become more positive about tax; although 75 percent 
thought British people paid more tax than those in other countries, 
 
65 ‘Taxation Survey. Report on a Meeting, 1 December 1976’, CRD 4/27/18, 
Conservative Party Archive, 1976. Present at the meeting were Geoffrey Howe, 
Angus Maude, David Howell, James Douglas, John Lindsey, Adam Ridley, Peter 
Cropper, David Nicholson and Keith Britto. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 ‘Taxation Survey Report’, CRD 4/27/18, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, 
Bodleian Library), 1976. The note was unsigned. 
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two thirds thought taxes had been reduced in the past two years.69 In 
addition, while a majority thought tax rates were too high, particularly 
the top rate on earned income, a larger majority than in 1976 stated 
that they did not want tax cuts if it meant cuts to services. The report 
stated: 
Where comparisons are available the standing of the Conservative party 
on taxation issues and Electoral sympathy for its broad tax policies are 
less favourable than they were two years ago …Overwhelmingly, Electors 
resist the idea of lower taxes with lower levels of public services and 
amenities.70 
Less discussion of these results was found. Keith Britto accepted the 
report’s conclusions but Peter Cropper argued strongly against 
them.71 Interestingly, although Cropper maintained this position, by 
December 1978 he was also arguing that they could not expect 
people to support their tax plans, which would be attacked as 
favouring the rich: 
We cannot count on mass support for what we need to do on the tax front, 
and it is foolish to start looking for it now.72 
It seems possible, therefore, that the 1978 survey quickly quashed 
the idea that opposition had increased. However, it does not seem to 
have prompted significant discussion and why its conclusions were 
accepted while the similar 1976 findings were interpreted very 
differently is unclear. 
 
 
69 Opinion Research Centre, ‘A Survey on Taxation. Prepared for Conservative 
Central Office (Research Dept.), February 1978’, CCO 180/9/10/7, (Conservative 
Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1978. 
70 Ibid. 
71 ‘Letter from D K Britto to John Hanvey, ORC, 13 April 1978’, CRD 4/27/48, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1978; Peter Cropper, ‘The 
ORC Survey of Taxation, 10 April 1978’, CRD 4/27/48, (Conservative Party 
Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1978. 
72 ‘Memorandum from Peter Cropper to Adam Ridley, 13 December 1978’, CRD 
4/27/48, Conservative Party Archive, 1978; ‘Memorandum from Peter Cropper to 




Butler, Adonis, and Travers suggest that party conferences were key 
in shaping Conservative ideas about popular attitudes to the poll 
tax.73 Howe also stated in his memoirs that at the 1978 conference 
they ‘had to convince the party that we had a detailed and workable 
response to their central anxieties, most notably on taxation’.74 He 
recalled that he wrote and performed the following song at the Welsh 
party conference in 1978: 
They’ll keep a taxman on the hillsides, 
They’ll put up rates in all the vales, 
If you come home to Labour Wales. 
We’ll make a tax cut on the hillsides, 
We’ll pay a bonus in the dales,  
When you come home to Tory Wales.75 
However, conference resolutions did not clearly suggest increasing 
opposition. There were perhaps slightly more motions demanding, or 
commending, tax cuts in the late 1970s than there had been in the 
1960s, but still fewer than there had been in the 1950s.76 Motions in 
the 1970s did, however, less commonly mention fairness or 
maintaining services compared to earlier resolutions, and more often 
mentioned benefit fraud.77 Party conferences could have contributed 
 
73 Butler, Adonis, and Travers, Failure in British Government: The Politics of the 
Poll Tax, 246-253. 
74 Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (London: Pan, 1995), 102. 
75 Ibid., 99. 
76 See for example: Conservative Party, ‘74th Annual Conference Blackpool’, 
(London: National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 1954), 59-66; 
Conservative Party, ‘78th Annual Conference Blackpool’, 38-45; Conservative 
Party, ‘79th Annual Conference Scarborough’, 88-105; Conservative Party, ‘85th 
Annual Conference Brighton’, 70-74. 
77 See for example: Conservative Party, ‘73rd Annual Conference Margate’, 
(London: National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 1953), 43-49; 
Conservative Party, ‘78th Annual Conference Blackpool’, 38-45; Conservative 
Party, ‘79th Annual Conference Scarborough’, 88-105; Conservative Party, ‘88th 
Annual Conference Blackpool’, (London: National Union of Conservative and 
Unionist Associations, 1970), 48-54; Conservative Party, ‘92nd Annual Conference 
Blackpool’, (London: National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 
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to a perception that opposition had increased, but this is far from 
conclusive and there is no obvious reason why they would have 
given this impression in 1977, specifically. 
 
CPC groups demonstrated significant opposition to tax but, again, it 
was not clear that this had increased since 1970.78 The groups were 
also divided about a shift to indirect tax and concerned about the 
party being seen as for the rich alone if they did not consider 
redistribution.79 In 1975 they were asked how they could persuade 
the electorate of the need for lower taxes on capital and wealth. The 
report stated: 
The general consensus of opinion was that for too long the British public 
has been brainwashed about the evils of capitalism … Some groups 
doubted if it would ever be possible to persuade voters to support lower 
taxation on higher incomes - at least until massive unemployment 
convinced them of the need for incentives to create new industries in the 
private sector …80 
In 1977, however, groups suggested that people would accept higher 
 
78 ‘CPC Three-Way Contact. Political Contact Programme. Discussion Paper No. 
31. March 1970. Taxation’, CCO 4/10/81, Conservative Party Archive, 1970; ‘CPC 
Three-Way Contact. Political Contact Programme. Summary of Reports on Topic 
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Contact. Conservative Political Centre - Political Contact Programme. Summary of 
Reports Received from Discussions Groups on on Topic Number 80, 
February/March 1977, Taxes for Tomorrow’, CCO 4/10/81, (Conservative Party 
Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1977; ‘CPC Three-Way Contact. Conservative 
Political Centre - Political Contact Programme. Summary of Reports Received from 
Discussions Groups on on Topic Number 78, October/November 1976, Controlling 
Public Expenditure’, CCO 4/10/81, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian 
Library), 1977. 
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rate and spending cuts as long as their own taxes were cut.81 One 
report in January 1977 also stated: 
Several groups said that … there must be sustained propaganda to tell 
people that they, the people, pay for town hall extravagances … out of 
their rates and taxes. The political climate must be changed from 'what can 
they do for me?' to 'what is it going to cost me?'.82 
CPC groups therefore showed opposition to tax but it was not clear 
that their opposition had increased. They appeared more convinced 
by 1977 that people might support top rate cuts as long as they 
benefited personally, but did not suggest an overwhelming change in 
attitudes. As in previous periods no evidence was found of these 
responses being discussed, so what impact they might have had is 
unclear. 
 
There was some limited evidence of think tank involvement in these 
discussions.83 Most notably the TPG included Barry Bracewell-
Milnes, Samuel Brittan, and John Chown in 1975.84 Although they 
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appear to have attended as individuals, they had links to various 
think tanks, including the Mont Pelerin Society and the IFS.85 
Interestingly, however, the comments they made about popular 
attitudes to tax emphasised fairness, not opposition.86 In May 1975 
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Barry Bracewell-Milnes argued, for example: 
The traditional Conservative approach to taxation has emphasised the 
importance of incentives, leaving the Labour Party to concentrate on 
fairness, equity and "social justice". This is a recipe for political disaster. 
Arguments about incentives cannot be proved and apparently carry little 
weight with the electors. It is not an accident that Labour's tax policy has 
won all along the line.87  
In discussing the 1976 ORC survey, Howe referenced the 1971 IEA 
survey on choice in welfare, suggesting it showed that charging for 
services was not as unpopular as those on the left thought. However, 
he also argued that people were afraid of ending up paying the whole 
cost of treatment themselves again and no other discussion of those 
surveys, or other think tank publications, was found.88 Think tanks’ 
interventions therefore seemed limited, and did not clearly suggest 
increasing opposition to tax.  
 
Conservative politicians and researchers involved with the TPG 
suggested in 1977 that opposition to tax had increased due to fiscal 
drag. However, comments either side of this were consistent with 
earlier discussions. Why this idea appeared for this short window is 
hard to determine conclusively. Internal surveys did not clearly 
suggest opposition had increased, but the 1976 ORC survey was, 
nonetheless, interpreted as showing that by some individuals and so 
could had been a contributing factor. The fact that taxes started 
falling from 1977 could explain why the findings of the 1978 survey’s 
similar results were interpreted differently. Party conferences and 
CPC reports suggested opposition but not clearly increasing 
opposition, and no discussions of activists’ attitudes to tax were 
found. Think tank interventions also seemed minimal. In general, 
 
87 Bracewell-Milnes, ‘Conservative Party Fiscal Options (Paper by Dr. Bracewell-
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Conservative discussions appear, once again, to have been 
predominantly insular. Three statements suggested increasing 
opposition in 1977 but, overall, there was far more continuity in their 
discussions than change.  
 
The Labour party 
 
Labour party conversations showed a similar, but not identical, 
pattern. Only two comments were found that implied that popular 
opposition to the level of taxation had increased and these were less 
explicit than Conservative statements. First, Healey argued in a 
Cabinet meeting in November 1975 that ‘high income tax rates were 
generating hostility to public expenditure among the Labour Party's 
own supporters’ and that he ‘did not believe such cuts [in spending] 
would be unpopular with the country, certainly compared with the 
alternative of substantial increases in income tax’.89 Secondly, a 
Cabinet meeting in October 1977 concluded: 
Much of the current dissatisfaction with the level of tax was the result of 
inflation in the last four years rather than of the tax system itself.90 
These comments implied that opposition had increased, again due to 
fiscal drag, but did not state this as explicitly as Conservative 
comments, and no other comments suggesting increasing opposition 
were found. 
 
Although the first comment was made in 1975, Labour conversations 
did seem to mirror Conservative concern about increasing opposition 
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in 1977 to an extent; statements emphasising popular opposition 
seemed more prevalent in that year.91 In his budget speech Healey 
stated that he was convinced that ‘working people throughout the 
country’ wanted income tax cuts.92 In July he asserted that there was 
‘a widespread feeling that the tax burden is now intolerably high at all 
points on the income scale’.93 The Cabinet agreed in May to bow to 
Liberal pressure to abandon the planned petrol tax increases 
because they were generally unpopular even with government 
supporters.94 The same month it was argued that restricting 
mortgage interest relief would ‘be likely to prove a political incubus in 
present circumstances’.95 A majority of the Cabinet opposed the 
move because of concerns about the ‘political objections’.96 Outside 
the Cabinet, Jeff Rooker stated, while arguing for the Rooker-Wise 
amendment – which ensured that personal allowances increased 
with inflation and on which the government was defeated thanks in 
part to the support of Nigel Lawson – that ‘Hon. Members realised 
the importance of the issue because in their surgeries every week 
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people are asking "Why do I pay so much tax?”’.97 
 
However, even in 1977 representations of popular opposition to tax 
were contested. Some questioned whether tax cuts were really more 
popular than spending.98 Fairness was also emphasised; it was 
argued in the discussion about restricting mortgage relief that: 
The case in equity for the proposal was so strong that it should not be 
supposed that it would be unpopular with the electorate generally.99 
Healey actually supported the proposal because although it would hit 
young middle-class taxpayers hard it ‘was a reasonable compromise 
between equity and political reality’.100 Various comments also 
suggested that prices and inflation were more important than tax.101 
At a PLP meeting in June, Alex Lyon said that he did not think 
anything could be done about tax cuts 'on a scale meaningful to 
ordinary people in the run-up to the General Election’ and that ‘Prices 
had far more impact’.102 Lena Jeger agreed that 'prices were the 
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principle preoccupation in her constituency’.103 A Home Policy 
Committee report in July 1977 similarly suggested: 
If we are to have any chance of success [at a General Election] the tide of 
public resentment about the Government's economic performance must 
soon begin to show a dramatic improvement. There is little doubt that the 
single most important economic variable in this sense is the annual rate of 
increase in retail prices.104 
Perceptions of popular opposition to contemporary tax levels in the 
Labour party did seem to be particularly prevalent in 1977, yet even 
then they remained contested.  
 
As in the Conservative party, Labour discussions around the 1976 
budget were broadly consistent with earlier periods. They took place 
in the context of discussions about what balance of tax increases and 
spending cuts should be introduced to try and deal with the economic 
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situation.105 The most prominent figure in these discussions was the 
chancellor, Denis Healey, who argued strongly for spending and tax 
cuts.106 In March 1975 he suggested, for example, that any increase 
in taxes would damage wage restraint and that the public were not 
particularly concerned about spending cuts.107 The Cabinet agreed to 
put most of the emphasis on spending cuts rather than tax 
increases.108 
 
However, this seems to have been agreed by a small majority; other 
Labour politicians suggested that spending cuts were more 
unpopular or perceptions of fairness crucial.109 In November 1975, 
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for example, Crosland argued that indirect tax increases would be 
more acceptable to the unions and public in general than spending 
cuts.110 A research department memo on the presentation of the 
incomes policy in August 1975 also asserted: 
If ordinary working people are to accept the policy of restraint it is essential 
that the better off should be seen to be bearing their full share of the 
burden.111  
Healey stated in March 1976 that there were 'strong political 
arguments for taking action on fringe benefits particularly if higher 
rate thresholds were to be raised’.112 One of Healey’s special 
advisors, Adrian Ham, wrote to him in March 1976 that he was ‘rather 
concerned at the distributional aspects’ of the direct tax package as it 
gave more to higher-income taxpayers and would make it hard for 
the TUC to defend their support for the government’s economic 
policies.113 Although Labour was divided about what economic policy 
to pursue in 1975-6, discussions about popular attitudes to tax were 
broadly consistent with those in previous periods. 
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The increase in emphasis on opposition in 1977 also seemed short 
lived. Few discussions of popular attitudes to tax were located for 
1978-9. Those that were found were varied. At a Cabinet meeting in 
March 1978 Healey argued against big spending increases, but other 
members suggested that ‘the public, and the Party and the TUC, 
would expect some increases in public expenditure as well’ and it 
was agreed that there would be some spending increases.114 Healey 
also pushed back against the CBI’s portrayal of managerial 
opposition to tax levels in a meeting in May 1978, stating, among 
other things, that ‘taxation was not a reason why people were leaving 
engineering jobs’.115 In addition, while many attendees at the PLP 
meeting ahead of the 1979 budget pressed for an expansionary 
budget to win them the election, and others said that if pensioners 
had to pay tax again ‘all Members' surgeries would be full of 
complaints’, Giles Radice argued that they had to raise some 
taxes.116  
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At the PLP meeting discussing the 1979 election defeat one 
participant suggested that 'There was concern about social security 
"scroungers" and the high level of taxation’. However, most 
attendees argued that Labour had lost the working class, young 
people, and the trade unions over the pay policy and by abandoning 
Labour’s traditional values.117 Tax was not discussed during the short 
debate about the election at the Annual Conference, although one 
MP did state again that people had complained about ‘scroungers’.118 
Comments emphasising fairness seemed perhaps to have declined 
in 1978-9, but with so few comments found it is hard to know whether 
this was representative or significant. It appeared, however, that the 
emphasis on popular opposition to tax declined after 1977; Labour 
politicians did not seem to view taxation as the most important issue 
either before or after the 1979 election.  
 
Unlike the Conservative party, it seems unlikely that polling had a 
major impact on Labour ideas about popular attitudes to tax in this 
period. Little sign was found of attempts to obtain evidence of 
attitudes to tax within the party or through the civil service. No effort 
seems to have been made to revive the survey that was being 
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planned when Labour lost the 1970 election.119 During a meeting with 
the CBI in May 1978, the chancellor referred to ‘a recent ORC poll’ 
which showed that ‘two-thirds thought that a fall in living standards 
was a necessary part of getting inflation down’, but no other evidence 
of this poll was found.120 Healey also expressed interest in a survey 
of CBI members in November 1976, but it is unclear whether this 
happened.121  
 
Resolutions from local constituency parties did not suggest 
increasing opposition. Although several resolutions were found 
advocating tax increases on the wealthy or opposing spending cuts, 
none were found calling for tax cuts, and tax did not seem to be a 
major focus.122 Unlike in the late 1960s, no references to grassroots 
attitudes to tax were found either. Think tanks did not appear at any 
point during discussions. At a meeting with the chancellor in May 
1976, a CBI representative stated that ‘there was an unprecedented 
feeling of bitterness among members’, but referenced wage restraint 
and inflation as well as taxation.123 Healey also stated in his 1977 
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budget speech that the CBI were advocating tax cuts.124 However, 
the CBI’s views carried little weight in Cabinet discussions about an 
increase in the employers’ NI surcharge in July 1976, and Healey 
dismissed the CBI’s representation of managerial opposition to 
taxation in May 1978.125 One CBI comment did, therefore, imply that 
opposition might have increased, but Healey did not seem that 
convinced of this in 1978 and, in general, the CBI’s view was not 
often referenced in relation to attitudes.  
 
Unsurprisingly, given the focus on wage restraint, the TUC was by far 
the most commonly mentioned organisation in relation to attitudes to 
tax. Several comments suggested union support, or pressure, for tax 
cuts, but others implied that they were equally opposed to spending 
cuts, or cared more about fairness.126 At a Cabinet meeting in July 
1976 it was reported, for example, that the TUC had indicated that 
increases in income tax and indirect taxes would be very bad for the 
pay policy, but that cuts to things like food subsidies could be equally 
explosive, and that they had managed to secure support for the pay 
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policy in June only by promising to oppose spending cuts.127 While 
union views were a key element in Labour thinking about attitudes to 
tax in this period, TUC comments did not suggest that taxes were the 
only factor in wage restraint, or indicate that opposition had 
increased.  
 
The government’s defeat on the Rooker-Wise amendment in 1977 
could have increased concerns about opposition to tax, but this was 
political rather than popular opposition, and no references to the 
amendment were found. The only factor referenced by comments 
implying that opposition had increased was the level of taxation. It 
seems possible, therefore, that the emphasis on popular opposition 
to tax peaked in 1977 because that was when effective income tax 
rates were at their highest, and perhaps declined as income tax 
liability began to fall.  
 
Labour conversations suggested some increased concern about 
popular opposition to tax in 1977, and two statements suggested that 
opposition might have increased, although not as clearly as 
Conservative comments. However, as in the Conservative party, 
either side of 1977 discussions seemed consistent with earlier 
periods — emphasising opposition but also other issues, particularly 
spending, and the importance of fairness. Fairness was perhaps less 
commonly mentioned in 1978-9 but few comments about popular 
attitudes to tax were found in those years in general. Neither the PLP 
nor the wider party appeared to feel that tax was the key factor either 
before or after the 1979 election. Attempts to obtain evidence of 
popular attitudes to tax were minimal. Union views were a prominent 
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feature of discussions, but comments about union attitudes 
emphasised fairness and prices as well as opposition to tax levels. 
The only factor referenced by comments implying increased 
opposition was the level of taxation. Increased emphasis on 
opposition in 1977 may, therefore, have reflected the fact that this 
was when effective income tax rates peaked. 
 
The civil service 
 
Civil servants were increasingly critical of the tax system in the late 
1970s.128 It was reported that Sir Norman Price, Chairman of the 
Board of Inland Revenue from 1973-6, stated in a March 1976 
meeting that he thought ‘the tax system had now become very bad 
indeed and a completely new structure was needed’.129 Criticism 
seems to have particularly focused on top rates. Around the 1976 
budget, both Treasury and IR officials argued strongly that the 
‘preposterous’ and 'indefensible’ higher rates of income tax should be 
the priority for cuts.130 This was despite the fact that in a meeting with 
the chancellor in September 1975 it had been stated that taxes had 
increased most for those on below average incomes.131  
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It is less clear that civil servants’ ideas about popular attitudes to tax 
had changed, however.132 Although Douglas Allen told the IEA’s 
Ralph Harris that ‘the general tide of opinion has turned much more 
in your direction’ in 1977, no comments were found that suggested 
that opposition to tax had increased around the 1976 budget.133 
Many officials did clearly assume that tax increases were 
unpopular.134 One July 1975 memo, for example, stated: 
I would agree with Mr. Morpeth's comment about the sense of grievance at 
the high direct tax burden and it is important to remember that this is not a 
grievance confined to the higher rate bands.135 
At the meeting in September 1975 it was also stated that:  
The fact that many of the low paid could be better off unemployed or sick 
(because benefits do not attract income tax) tended to undermine work 
incentives and was a source of resentment.136  
However, as previously, an equal or even greater number of 
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comments emphasised the importance of fairness.137 Kenneth 
Couzens wrote in February 1976, for example, that ‘the division 
between the first and second package must be such as to appear fair 
to the general public’.138 An IR note about the budget in March 1976 
also stated that there was an argument for a full indexing of income 
tax for higher earners but that ‘given the need to settle for less than 
full revalorisation at lower income levels’, the chancellor might feel 
that this was ‘as much as can be afforded politically for those higher 
up the income scale’.139 
 
Douglas Wass, permanent secretary to the Treasury throughout this 
period, stated in a 2008 book: 
By and large those whose help was needed (the markets, the IMF, etc.) 
were strongly of the view that if an adjustment had to be made to the 
government's fiscal deficit there were powerful arguments for making that 
adjustment to the expenditure side of the accounts. (Many trade union 
leaders, conscious of their members' aversion to paying taxes shared this 
view.) [italics added].140 
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However, no archival evidence was found of the TUC communicating 
that its members were implacably opposed to tax around the 1976 
budget. As with Labour politicians, it is not clear that civil servants 
thought this at the time either. One Treasury official wrote in 
December 1975 that indexing income tax might make a pay deal 
more ‘saleable’ to the TUC, while indirect tax increases would 
undermine this, but because of the effect they would have on prices, 
suggesting that he perhaps saw price increases as a higher priority 
for the TUC than taxes.141 At a meeting in February 1976 Price also 
stated that the TUC wanted benefits in kind like company cars to be 
taxed, suggesting concern about equity.142 Little evidence was found 
of representations from other outside bodies. Civil servants had been 
unimpressed with the IEA’s research in 1971, although Allen seemed 
more receptive to their work in 1977.143 No archival evidence was 
found of discussions of the next IEA report in 1979 or any other think 
tank publications.  
 
None of the comments found provided, or referenced, any evidence 
for popular attitudes to tax, nor was any sign found of attempts to 
access such evidence. Civil servants’ attitudes towards tax did 
appear perhaps to have become more negative around the 1976 
budget, with an increasing focus on the tax burden of higher earners. 
They did not argue, however, that popular opposition had increased 
and while many comments did suggest opposition to tax, this had 
 
1976 Imf Crisis, 12. 
141 ‘Memorandum from Alan Lord, 17 December 1975’. The National Archives 
(TNA) T 461/120, 1975. Wass made a similar point a few months later: 
‘Memorandum from Douglas Wass, 18 March 1976’. T 171/1248, 1976. 
142 ‘Note of a Meeting Held in the Chief Secretary's Room, Treasury on Monday, 23 
February 1976’. The National Archives (TNA) T 171/1259, 1976. 
143 Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-
Revolution, 1931-1983, 197. 
 
316 
been a regular feature before the 1970s. As previously, comments 
also emphasised the importance of fairness and prices. Overall, 
therefore, any changes to civil servants’ comments about popular 
attitudes to tax around the 1976 budget seemed to have been 
minimal. 
 
The Trades Union Congress 
 
As seen in Labour and civil service discussions, the TUC’s views 
were influential in this period. TUC officials do not, however, appear 
to have been suggesting that opposition to tax had increased. As 
previously, they appear rarely to have used members’, or popular, 
attitudes in their tax representations, and where they did this seems 
to have been exclusively in relation to wage restraint. At a meeting 
after the 1977 budget, for example, TUC representatives argued that 
the budget had made wage restraint more difficult because indirect 
tax increases and subsidy cuts were pushing up prices, while the 
standard rate cut and adjustments to higher rate bands would help 
the better off, losing any sense of social justice.144 Where attitudes 
were referenced, prices seemed to be as, if not more, often 
mentioned. A press release in response to the 1976 budget, which 
offered tax cuts and spending increases in return for wage restraint 
stated, for example: 
What comes out of these discussions, if it is to be worthwhile, must be 
acceptable to the trade union movement. I am sure that a firm commitment 
to a low price target would be the single most important commitment that 
the Government could make in that respect.145  
 
 
144 ‘Extract from Economic Committee Minutes Dated April 13 1977: The Budget 
and Pay Objectives 1977-78’, MSS.292D 410.2/5, (TUC, MRC), 1977. 




Few internal TUC discussions of popular attitudes to tax were found. 
What comments there were suggested that TUC leaders believed 
there was widespread popular opposition to contemporary tax 
levels.146 A report of a meeting about the 1976 budget, for example, 
recorded: 
The General Secretary said that the Government were in a strong 
negotiating position as they knew that the tax proposals were very 
popular…147 
The report of another meeting of the Economic Committee ahead of 
the 1978 budget recorded that, ‘The current level of tax on low 
incomes and the resulting “poverty trap” was an issue that was 
acutely felt by trade union members’.148 These comments suggested 
opposition to tax levels, and particularly income tax, but they were 
also the only discussions of attitudes to tax found. While there was 
clearly an assumption of popular opposition to tax, it does not appear 
to have been a major concern. 
 
The TUC continued to receive letters from individuals, trade unions, 
and trades councils. Letters from individuals mostly complained 
about their personal tax burden, as they had since 1949.149 Letters 
from councils and unions also suggested opposition to contemporary 
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tax levels.150 Two letters, both received in September 1977, made 
particularly strong representations of opposition. The first, from the 
National Union of Bank Employees, included the text of a speech 
their secretary had been planning to make which argued: 
The worker, whose wages are already below the minimum standards 
provided by benefit, then has to carry the extra burden of having tax 
deducted from his wages, thus making the shortfall even greater. Just think 
- we have this unfortunate worker, quietly minding his own business, when 
a great bus called ‘Society’ runs right over him, leaving him flat on his back 
and badly shaken. We dash over to him, kneel beside him - and pick his 
pockets.151 
The other letter, from the Union of Post Office Workers, stated:  
There is a growing level of criticism insider the U.P.W about the level of 
personal taxation. This is sometimes accompanied by allegations that 
workers would be better off unemployed.152 
This suggested that opposition was increasing. It continued, 
however: 
Having said that there is no inclination on the part of our membership to 
see a reduction in social security benefits.153  
If these views were being communicated to politicians they could 
have contributed to the idea that opposition was increasing in 1977, 
but there is no evidence that they were. They also appear to have 
been exceptional examples; most of the letters sampled were in line 
with those found in earlier periods.154  
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The number of resolutions relating to tax at the annual congress did 
not increase either. The numbers were incredibly small in total but 
there was no significant rise in the 1970s. There was, in fact, only 
one resolution calling for income tax cuts in the 1970s, in 1975, 
compared to several in the 1960s.155 Neither did their content change 
significantly, although resolutions protesting tax avoidance did 
become more common after 1975.156 Conference resolutions did not, 
therefore, despite the two letters cited above, suggest that attitudes 
within the union membership had changed significantly. 
 
Discussions about popular attitudes to tax within the TUC seem 
broadly consistent with previous periods. There were some 
suggestions that TUC leaders thought that opposition to tax was 
widespread. However, these comments were very rare, with only 
three found between 1975 and 1979. Although this could be because 
opposition was simply so accepted that it did not need to be 
discussed, it seems equally possible that attitudes to tax were not a 
major concern. There were two examples of increasingly forceful 
opposition to the level of taxation from member unions, one of which 
suggested opposition was increasing. However, in general, the letters 
the TUC was receiving were consistent with those in earlier periods 
and congress resolutions did not suggest that opposition was 
increasing within the TUC’s membership. Although it is clear from 
Labour discussions that the TUC were communicating their 
 
155 Trades Union Congress, TUC Report, 1962, 401-402; Trades Union Congress, 
TUC Report, 1963, 463; Trades Union Congress, TUC Report, 1966 (London: 
TUC, 1966), 538-539; Trades Union Congress, TUC Report, 1969 (London: TUC, 
1969), 605-607; Trades Union Congress, TUC Report, 1975 (London: TUC, 1975), 
538-539. 
156 See for example: Trades Union Congress, TUC Report, 1974 (London: TUC, 
1974), 460-463; Trades Union Congress, TUC Report, 1976 (London: TUC, 1976), 




members’ opposition to tax increases, they were also emphasising 
support for spending and concern about prices, and no evidence was 
found of TUC officials arguing that opposition to tax had increased. 
 
The Confederation of British Industry 
 
Unlike the TUC, the CBI does seem to have increasingly used 
representations of members’ attitudes to tax in conversations with the 
government, and two comments were found which implied increasing 
opposition to tax levels.157 At a meeting with the chancellor in May 
1976, a CBI representative stated that ‘there was an unprecedented 
feeling of bitterness among members’ and showed the chancellor a 
letter from an executive in the USA refusing to return to the UK 
because of high taxation.158 A February 1978 draft for a speech by 
Director General John Methven at Eton also suggested that attitudes 
were beginning to turn against high taxation and spending: 
Fortunately, I believe, people in Britain are rapidly learning the lesson … 
they are rapidly becoming increasingly aware that public expenditure is not 
manna from Heaven, but has to be paid for, by every citizen, in high 
 
157 ‘Meeting with the Chancellor of the Exchequer on Thursday 20 May 1976’, 
MSS.200/C 3/DG2/30, Confederation of British Industry Archive, 1976. For other 
representations of members’ attitudes see for example: ‘Note of a Meeting with the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to Discuss the Cbi's General Budget Representations, 
Wednesday 25 February 1976’, MSS.200/C 3/DG2/30, (Confederation of British 
Industry Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1976; ‘Meeting 
with the Chancellor of the Exchequer on Thursday 20 May 1976’, MSS.200/C 
3/DG2/30, Confederation of British Industry Archive, 1976; ‘Memorandum to CBI 
Team from D R Glynn, 19 May 1976: Meeting with Chancellor at 1500 on 
Thursday, 20th May 1976’, MSS.200/C 3/DG2/30, (Confederation of British 
Industry Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1976; ‘Brief for 
Meeting with Chancellor, 9/5/78 at 15.30 at Treasury’, MSS.200/C 3/ECO/3/21, 
(Confederation of British Industry Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of 
Warwick), 1978; ‘Notes on Some of the Points Made at Meeting between the 
Chancellor and the CBI on 9 May 1978 at 3.30 pm’, MSS.200/C 3/ECO/3/21, 
Confederation of British Industry Archive, 1978. 
158 ‘Meeting with the Chancellor of the Exchequer on Thursday 20 May 1976’, 




Other comments implied opposition, but not that it was increasing.160 
A brief for another meeting with the government in May 1978 stated: 
Even if 1p off basic rate of tax, and nothing else, managers, small 
businessmen, skilled workers will still be extremely angry and disappointed 
with the Government's lack of recognition of their vital contribution.161  
However, another draft for a speech Methven was to give at 
Newcastle University a few days before the speech at Eton argued: 
Again and again when we talk about the changes we would like to make, 
we come back to the need first of all to achieve an understanding of the 
reasons for change among workers, unions and the people … We cannot 
expect them to accept the need for reduced taxation at the higher levels 
unless they comprehend the importance of getting the most out of our 
business leaders.162  
This seemed to suggest, at least, that the public were not entirely 
convinced of the case for higher rate tax cuts.  
 
Internally, little discussion of popular attitudes to tax was found and 
comments did not clearly suggest a perception of overwhelming 
popular, or corporate, opposition to tax. In August 1977 a memo 
suggested that taxing benefits would be unpopular and that 
businesses did not actually want a cut in employers’ NI contributions 
because it would just result in wage claims or pressure for expensive 
 
159 ‘Memorandum from Donald Macdougall to the Director General, 24 February 
1978: Speech to Eton College Keynes Society’, MSS.200/C 3/DG3/8, 
(Confederation of British Industry Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of 
Warwick), 1978. 
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Industry Archive, 1978; ‘Brief for Meeting with Chancellor, 9/5/78 at 15.30 at 
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3/ECO/3/21, Confederation of British Industry Archive, 1978. 
162 ‘The Mann Lecture to Be Given by Sir John Methven, Director-General of the 
Confederation of British Industry in the Curtis Auditorium, School of Physics, 
University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne at 17.30 Hours on Monday, February20th 
1978’, MSS.200/C 3/DG3/8, (Confederation of British Industry Archive, Modern 
Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1978. 
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private schemes.163 A 1977 paper also argued that people thought 
there was far more ‘scrounging’ than there actually was, but, again, 
that reducing benefits would be very unpopular.164 Although the CBI 
twice suggested in external statements that opposition to tax might 
be increasing, internally officials seemed less convinced of 
opposition and emphasised the unpopularity of benefit cuts. The 
limited number of comments also does not seem to suggest that 
attitudes to tax were a major concern. 
 
The evidence for a significant increase in opposition among the CBI 
membership is also limited. In March 1975 Director General 
Campbell Adamson wrote to twenty major member companies asking 
them for information about how the CBI's budget proposals would 
affect their investment plans, but no responses or conclusions were 
found.165 When the CBI attempted to involve members in a campaign 
against the 1978 budget they also struggled to persuade them to 
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Adamson (1922-2000). Educated at Rugby School and Cambridge he joined 
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invited to join the Department of Economic Affairs as deputy under-secretary in 
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participate.166 The report stated: 
Members' reactions to the campaign varied a great deal, and were 
particularly poor in some of the English regions. This left some Regional 
Secretaries in a difficult position, since they were supposed to give the 
impression that CBI was reacting to pressure from the membership in 
pressing for tax changes … Some members clearly thought that the 
campaign was a waste of time.167 
This hardly suggests the CBI was responding to major pressure from 
its members on tax. Another attempt in June 1978 to survey 
members of the Economic Situation Committee about the impact of 
the NI surcharge also received few replies, and those they did collect 
generally indicated that it had not had any major impact. Despite this, 
the report stated that the quotations might ‘serve as ammunition’.168 
This again suggested a largely mechanistic, rather than curious, 
approach to their members’ attitudes to tax, and a willingness to 
present members as opposed to tax changes even when their own 
research indicated this may not have been the case. 
 
Despite the CBI’s difficulty in engaging members in their survey 
activities, some members were writing to them about tax.169 The 
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letter from the executive refusing to return to the UK because of high 
taxation was sent to them by a particularly active correspondent, 
Michael Edwardes, of Chloride Group, later portrayed as the 
archetypal Thatcherite businessman.170 These letters generally 
complained about members’ own tax liabilities, rather than making 
comments about popular attitudes.171 However, one letter stated: 
On Pay Determination I feel sure not only the membership but the thinking 
public at large is in tune with the C.B.I. proposals. However, on the subject 
of taxation the conviction that there is just too much of it doesn't stir the 
 
University of Warwick), 1979. 
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imagination sufficiently to encourage popular debate.172 
It included a paper arguing that people did not realise how much tax 
they paid because of PAYE and advocated abolishing it, asserting 
that ‘It would make tax cutting proposals an irresistibly popular 
platform for all politicians, not just a few as at present’.173 This did not 
seem to suggest current widespread popular opposition to tax. A CBI 
official pushed back on this argument strongly, stating: 
… I do not agree that the majority of taxpayers are ignorant about how 
much tax they pay or cannot make some sort of connection between what 
they pay to the State and what they get back.174 
Some engaged CBI members were, therefore, communicating their 
opposition to contemporary tax levels, but efforts to involve the 
membership more widely in opposing tax changes were markedly 
unsuccessful, and the only direct comment about popular attitudes 
from a member did not suggest widespread opposition and was 
rejected by the CBI. 
 
Two CBI comments suggested that opposition to tax might be 
increasing, in 1976 and 1978, and other external statements 
indicated a perception of widespread opposition. However, other 
comments, particularly internally, seemed less convinced of popular, 
or even their members’, opposition to tax. Although the CBI was 
receiving letters from a small core of members complaining about 
taxation, they also struggled to persuade the wider membership to 
engage in activities to protest tax levels, and attempts to gauge 
opinion within the membership did not suggest widespread 
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opposition. The CBI was representing members’ opposition to tax 
levels in the late 1970s, but opposition appeared to have increased, if 
at all, only within a very small core of members and CBI discussions 





The 1976 budget attracted less press attention than might have been 
expected, and was primarily judged on how well it would reassure 
foreign investors and improve the economic situation.175 Responses 
to the offer of tax cuts for wage restraint were mixed. Several of the 
right-leaning papers portrayed the trade unions as in charge of the 
budget, following Thatcher’s line that it was ‘taxation without 
representation’.176 However, others presented it as a pragmatic 
response to a difficult economic situation, if it worked.177  
 
In the six years since the 1970 election, representations of tax as 
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unbearably high had returned to levels similar to those seen in 1949-
50 (see image 4, for a visual example).178 This was now linked to 
inflation and falling living standards as well as trade union power.179 
Following the trends seen in the previous decade, the focus was 
overwhelmingly on income tax and middle-class taxpayers.180 This 
class focus was linked to the economic critique by the argument that 
high taxes were causing brain drain, and illustrated by sympathetic 
articles about the ‘exile’ of famous Britons to other countries.181 The 
Telegraph, for example, published a five page article on artists who 
 
178 ‘This Is the Christmas Card Denis Sent’, Economist, 10 April 1976; Hollowood, 
‘"There's a Lot of It About. Your Husband's Suffering from Fiscal Drag"’, Times, 15 
April 1976. 
179 See for example: ‘A Budget So Familiar’, Economist, 3 April 1976; John Warden 
and Donald Macintyre, ‘All Yours, Jim: New Premier Faces Tough Budget’, Daily 
Express, 5 April 1976; ‘A Budget So Familiar’, Economist, 3 April 1976; Nicholas 
Davenport, ‘The Plight of the Manager’, Spectator, 24 April 1976; ‘Tests for 
Tomorrow's Budget’, Times, 5 April 1976; ‘Mr Healey Opens the Bidding’, 
Guardian, 7 April 1976; ‘By Grace of the TUC’, Daily Telegraph, 7 April 1976; 
Worsthorne, ‘Healey’s Masterstroke’, Sunday Telegraph, 11 April 1976; Davenport, 
‘Why the Sterling Crisis?’, Spectator, 17 April 1976. 
180 See for example: John Chown, ‘The Curate’s Egg’, Financial Times, 1 May 
1976; ‘By Grace of the TUC’, Daily Telegraph, 7 April 1976; Roy Assersohn, ‘Is 
Denis Caught on the Wrong Foot?’, Daily Express, 5 April 1976; ‘A Budget So 
Familiar’, Economist, 3 April 1976; Patrick Hutber, ‘The Frontline for Every Family 
… ’, Daily Mail, 28 April 1976; ‘Opinion: Don't Drive Them Out’, Daily Express, 8 
April 1976; ‘Opinion: The Levellers’, Daily Express, 26 May 1976; ‘The Bananas 
Fall over Britain’, Guardian, 30 April 1976; Davenport, ‘The Plight of the Manager’, 
Spectator, 24 April 1976; Eric Short, ‘Facing up to the Increased Costs’, Financial 
Times, 8 May 1976; Arthur Sandles, ‘It Could Be a Long Hot Summer’, ibid., 22 
May; ‘Letters: Cutback in Costs - and My Friends’, Daily Express, 2 April 1976. The 
Mirror did run a couple of articles looking at the effect on ‘ordinary people’ but they 
were often not that ordinary, and got only a small corner of a page each. See: ‘… 
and How the Budget Hit These People’, Daily Mirror, 7 April 1976; Robert Head, 
‘What It Means to Them’, ibid., 6 May. The Guardian discussed the impact of fiscal 
drag at the bottom of the income distribution, but in the same article argued that it 
was middle managers who were the worst off. See: Tom Tickell, ‘Hopes of an End 
to Poverty Trap’, Guardian, 5 April 1976. For image see: Marc, ‘"Yes Dear, I 
Promise to Ask the Boss for a Drop in Salary"’, Times, 7 April 1976. 
181 See for example: ‘Opinion: Don't Drive Them Out’, Daily Express, 8 April 1976; 
‘Opinion: The Levellers’, Daily Express, 26 May 1976; Davenport, ‘The Plight of the 
Manager’, Spectator, 24 April 1976; John Chown, ‘Days of Hopes and Fears’, 
Financial Times, 3 April 1976; ‘Making His Own Pips Squeak’, Times, 23 April 
1976; Pauline McLeod, ‘I’ll Be Back!’, Daily Mirror, 14 April 1976; Denis Hart, 
‘Green and Profitable Land’, Daily Telegraph, 9 April 1976. 
 
328 
had been driven to live in Ireland, which went on at length along the 
following lines: 
"I've always distrusted Ireland" … J.P. Donleavy (above left), his wife Mary 
and one of their wolfhounds outside their Queen Anne house in Mullingar. 
Shown left is its heated swimming pool … Donleavy … has had work 
banned by the Irish Censorship Board. Nevertheless he likes living in 
Ireland and relishes the freedom from the "immense strain" of accounting 
for every penny …"To me it was enormously objectionable, a constant 
intrusion.” … ”There was even the possibility that purely for tax reasons 
one might be forced into doing one thing rather than another, and that was 
monstrous.182 
These articles were almost exclusively confined to the right-leaning 
papers. The exception was one Guardian opinion piece by Peter 
Black, which attacked both high taxation and cultural change:  
Northcote Parkinson laid down as part of his Second Law that there was a 
point of taxation where the victim refuses to pay … It’s rather horrible that 
we have not reached this point, more so when you consider how much of 
the tax burden is an act of malice, imposed on one section of the people to 
appease ignorance and ill-feeling among another … The blacks and the 
poor are right, and that's the end of it. We have even achieved the 
remarkable moral height of positively favouring the undeserving poor.183  
Discussions of tax avoidance and evasion were also more 
prevalent.184 They were seen as evidence of the breakdown of the 
British tax system and sometimes even presented as legitimate given 
the levels, and perceived unfairness, of the tax system.185  
 
 
182 Hart, ‘Green and Profitable Land’, Daily Telegraph, 9 April 1976. 
183 Peter Black, ‘Revenue Mien’, Guardian, 22 May 1976. Despite the apparently 
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Image 4: Economist cartoon, 10 April 1976 
Source: ‘This Is the Christmas Card Denis Sent.’ The Economist, 10 April 1976, 74. 
 
Despite the resurgence of complaints about the level of taxation, 
popular attitudes were not widely discussed. Where they were 
mentioned, it was consistently assumed that people were opposed to 
high taxation and in favour of tax cuts (see image 5).186 This was, 
again, generally limited to the right-leaning papers, although the New 
Statesman did publish an opinion piece by David Owen, the Minister 
of State for Health, in which he argued that people hated paying 
taxes but also disliked paying for healthcare in any other form (see 
also image 6 for a 1977 cartoon implying union pressure for tax 
cuts).187 The right-leaning papers responded to the budget measures 
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giving tax inspectors greater powers by running numerous cartoons 
about tax ‘snooping’, portraying the inspectors as overly officious and 
the public as naturally opposed to them (see image 7, for 
example).188 The Economist was the only paper to discuss popular 
attitudes to tax in depth, running a series of articles on funding the 
social services. It suggested that people were becoming less 
opposed to spending cuts as the burden of income tax was felt by 
those on low incomes.189 This was the only article, however, to 
suggest that opposition might have increased and it focused on 
spending rather than taxation. Although attacks on the level of 
taxation had returned to the levels seen in 1949-50, representations 
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Image 5: Sunday Telegraph cartoon, 23 May 1976 
Source: ‘Tax Guide for Emigrants.’ The Sunday Telegraph, 23 
May 1976, 29. 
 
Image 6: New Statesman cartoon, 1 April 1977 
Source: Garland. ‘I.O.U Reduced Income Tax.’ New Statesman, 
1 April 1977, 419. 
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Image 7: Sunday Telegraph cartoon, 25 April 1976 
Source: ‘"I Want a Girl Who Wouldn't Crack under Interrogation by Tax Snoopers.".’ 
The Sunday Telegraph, 25 April 1976, 22. 
 
Articles around the 1979 election continued to argue that tax was too 
high and damaging the economy. However, there seemed to be less 
extended discussion about tax policy than there had been during the 
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1950 election, for example.190 This could have been because all 
parties were committed to cutting income tax. However, the 
Conservatives also intended to increase indirect taxes, while Labour 
and the Liberals promised to introduce a wealth tax. They were all, 
regardless, portrayed as promising tax cuts. This seeming 
contradiction might be explained by the almost overwhelming press 
emphasis in 1979 on income tax, and, in the Conservative-leaning 
press, on top rate cuts, specifically.191  
 
Although in 1976 discussions of popular attitudes to tax had been 
limited, by 1979 they had returned to levels last seen in 1949-50. The 
press was in almost total agreement that the public were opposed to 
tax.192 A Guardian editorial in May argued, for example: 
For a very long time now we have been inundated with evidence that 
people at all tax-paying levels longed to be freed from their burdens.193 
Two articles implied that opposition to tax might have increased.194 
Ferdinand Mount stated in the Spectator:  
Stoppages from the pay packet have overtaken the weather as the great 
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conversational grievance …195  
A Guardian editorial also asserted: 
Both main parties, though (and the Liberals too) realise the intense public 
resentment of the rise in the burden of direct taxation which has taken 
place under the Labour Government.196 
Most articles did not, however, argue that opposition had increased, 
only that it was extensive. 
 
The idea of popular opposition to tax was sometimes challenged, 
particularly by the Guardian.197 The May editorial above went on to 
argue that once Labour had pointed out the cost to services of tax 
cuts public opinion began to turn away, and emphasised continuing 
support for the welfare state.198 Other articles also asserted that 
spending cuts would be very unpopular.199 The FT was in general 
less vocal about popular attitudes to tax than the other papers but 
one opinion piece questioned whether the shift in attitudes necessary 
to permit spending cuts had actually happened.200 Articles analysing 
the election result after the fact often emphasised tax as a factor, but 
also highlighted other issues, including competence, aspiration, and 
the bias against sitting governments.201  
 
195 Mount, ‘What Do the Voters Want?’, Spectator, 21 April 1979. Ferdinand Mount 
(1939-) became a columnist for the Spectator after being educated at Eton and 
Oxford. He went on to write for the Daily Telegraph and Sunday Times and also 
headed Margaret Thatcher’s Policy Unit 1982-3. See: ‘Ferdinand Mount’, Simon & 
Schuster, 2021, accessed on: 23 February at 
https://www.simonandschuster.co.uk/authors/Ferdinand-Mount/1486024; ibid. 
196 ‘Time to Be Frank About Tax Cuts’, Guardian, 25 April 1979. 
197 See for example: Peter Jenkins, ‘Election Commentary’, ibid., 27 April; Peter 
Jenkins, ‘Election Commentary’, Guardian, 26 April 1979; Shirley Williams, ‘Why 
We Lost, How to Win’, Observer, 13 May 1979; ‘Sir Geoffrey’s Unsquared Circle’, 
Guardian, 28 May 1979. 
198 ‘The Spirit of '45, the Facts of '79’, Guardian, 8 May 1979. 
199 ‘The Choice Is between … ’, Economist, 14 April 1979; ‘Taxcutters’ Election’, 
Economist, 21 April 1979; Frances Cairncross, ‘Today’s Legacy - the Party 
Choice’, Guardian, 7 April 1979; ‘Sir Geoffrey’s Unsquared Circle’, ibid., 28 May. 
200 Peter Riddell, ‘Public Expenditure Is the Key to Sir Geoffrey's Budget’, Financial 
Times, 26 May 1979. 




In addition, although this emphasis on popular opposition to tax had 
re-emerged since 1976, with a longer perspective it could be viewed 
as a revival of press discussions about attitudes to tax around 1950, 
rather than a new development. This impression is supported by a 
sentiment analysis of articles mentioning tax in several major 
newspapers, conducted using the Gale Digital Scholar Lab (the 
mean score of articles for each year is shown in figure 10).202 It 
suggests that articles about tax became more positive through the 
1950s, plateaued during the 1960s, and then became more negative 
again during the 1970s, but not, interestingly, in most cases quite 
returning to the levels of the 1950s. While coverage became more 
negative in the 1970s, therefore, this was not an unprecedented 
change; if anything, press coverage of tax seems generally to have 
been more negative in the late 1940s. 
 
Ferdinand Mount, ‘Mrs Thatcher's Triumph’, Spectator, 12 May 1979; ‘Time to Get 
Moving’, Daily Express, 16 May 1979; ‘Mistress of Downing Street’, Economist, 5 
May 1979; Peter Pulzer, ‘Why the Tories Could Still Be Vulnerable in 1984’, 
Financial Times, 12 May 1979; Ferdinand Mount, ‘The Waiting Is the Worst Part’, 
Spectator, 26 May 1979. Left-leaning papers seemed, if anything, more eager to 
attribute the loss at least partially to tax. See: Anthony King, ‘The People's Flag 
Has Turned Deepest Blue’, Observer, 6 May 1979; ‘The Spirit of '45, the Facts of 
'79’, Guardian, 8 May 1979; ‘The Choice Labour Faces: Learn, or Die’, New 
Statesman, 11 May 1979; Williams, ‘Why We Lost, How to Win’, Observer, 13 May 
1979; Christopher Price, ‘Recovering the Doorstep Vote’, New Statesman, 18 May 
1979. 
202 Sentiment analysis is a natural language processing tool which gives each 
article a positive or negative score based on the number of words that appear from 
a set dictionary of words with primarily positive or negative associations. I analysed 
articles from the Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily Telegraph, Economist, and Times 
using a search for articles with the word “tax*” excluding “taxi” and a series of 
words/phrases that sampling suggested were primarily or exclusively related to 
reports on companies’ stock issues, dividend releases etc. as they were making up 
a significant portion of the results returned and potentially skewing the findings — 
an article could be positive about a company’s results without being positive about 
tax and vice versa. The words/phrases excluded were: “general meeting”, 
“chairman”, “director*”, “company results”, “circular to shareholders”, “pre-tax”, 
“company news”, “dividend*”. The mean score of the articles for each year is 
presented in figure 9. ‘Gale Digital Scholar Lab’, Gale Cengage, 2020, accessed 
on: 29 June at https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/digital-scholar-lab. 
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Figure 10. Sentiment analysis of articles referencing tax, mean 
yearly score 1945-92 
Source: ‘Gale Digital Scholar Lab.’ Gale Cengage, 2020. Accessed on: 29 June 
2020 at https://www.gale.com/intl/primary-sources/digital-scholar-lab. 
 
There were, however, a few new features compared to 1950. The 
idea that people had become more concerned about benefit 
‘scrounging’ and tax avoidance/evasion had become more 
prevalent.203 The tone of the papers commentary on tax avoidance 
and benefit fraud was markedly different; while avoidance and 
evasion were presented as natural responses to the tax system, and 
even examples of initiative and enterprise, benefit fraud was 
presented as a threat and a cause of negative attitudes to the tax 
and welfare system.204 This clearly had a class dimension and 
 
203 See for example: Williams, ‘Why We Lost, How to Win’, Observer, 13 May 1979; 
Mount, ‘What Do the Voters Want?’, Spectator, 21 April 1979; Ferdinand Mount, 
‘Who Are the Ordinary People?’, Sunday Telegraph, 22 April 1979; Mervyn King, 
‘Reality: A Charter for Avoidance’, New Statesman, 13 April 1979. 
204 See for example: David Freud, ‘A Guide to Underground Economics’, Financial 
Times, 9 April 1979; Waterhouse, ‘Her Moving Mantra’, Daily Mirror, 23 April 1979. 
In this they were supported by Barry Bracewell-Milnes and the IEA in 1977: By Our 
Social Policy Correspondent, ‘Evasion of Tax 'May Be Good' for Britain’, Times, 25 
April 1977. See also: Golding and Middleton, Images of Welfare: Press and Public 
 
337 
national journalists’ income group — along with the fact that many 
were self-employed or did freelance work on the side, increasing 
their opportunities for avoidance — may have contributed to their 
more sympathetic portrayal of tax avoidance.205  
 
The classing of press discussions about attitudes to tax had also 
changed even since 1976. Although few articles referenced specific 
groups in relation to attitudes to tax, where they did, opposition was 
by 1979 most often depicted as a specifically working-class 
phenomenon. A Spectator editorial argued, for example: 
At any rate, working-class voters have perceived that taxes designed to 
soak the rich are dampening themselves, and many of them will vote 
accordingly next month.206 
A couple of articles cited polling in support of this.207 The FT, for 
example, reported that the IEA surveys on opting out of state welfare 
showed that those on lower incomes supported tax cuts more than 
those on higher incomes, suggesting that this vindicated the 
Conservative election strategy.208 Given that only two articles were 
found, it seems possible, but unlikely, that this polling drove the 
changing class focus. Reports from predominantly working-class 
constituencies suggested that voters were not attracted by tax cuts 
as they earned too little to benefit, contradicting the assertions of 
opinion pieces and editorials, but this seemed to have little impact.209 
 
Attitudes to Poverty. 
205 See for example: Adam Raphael, ‘Getting Down to Brass Tax’, Guardian 17 
December 1973; By a Staff Reporter, ‘Government Stifling Personal Freedom, Sir 
Geoffrey Says’, Times, 25 November 1974; Jonathan Hunt, ‘World of Word-
Spinners: Careers’, Observer 19 August 1979; John Dale, ‘Boom: Goes the Black 
Economy’, Observer, 24 June 1979. 
206 ‘Getting and Spending’, Spectator, 21 April 1979. 
207 David Freud, ‘Low-Paid Most in Favour of Tax Cuts’, Financial Times, 26 April 
1979; Renshaw, ‘Last-Ditch Labour Bid to Save It’, Daily Express, 22 April 1979. 
208 Freud, ‘Low-Paid Most in Favour of Tax Cuts’, Financial Times, 26 April 1979. 




A common argument was that income tax now absorbed people so 
far down the income scale that cutting it was universally beneficial. 
The Conservative proposals were presented as tax cuts for 
everyone, even as the right-leaning papers specifically supported top 
rate cuts.210  
 
Golding and Middleton’s 1982 analysis suggested that the journalists 
they interviewed in the late 1970s believed they were representing 
popular attitudes in highlighting benefit fraud and arguing that 
spending needed to be restrained, but emphasised how little contact 
they actually had with people outside their immediate social 
circles.211 They quoted one journalist as saying: ‘I do talk to readers, 
that is my friends, MPs I meet, people I interview. I get a certain 
amount of sob-mail but mostly from professional letter-writers’.212 If 
this was representative it potentially highlights again the importance 
of social contacts over more systematic evidence of popular attitudes 
to tax. 
 
Where articles did discuss evidence for popular attitudes it was 
almost exclusively surveys.213 Most reports focused on the ‘most 
important issue’ question, which generally showed taxation coming 
third or fourth, suggesting that taxes were actually less important to 
 
210 See for example: Mount, ‘Who Are the Ordinary People?’, Sunday Telegraph, 
22 April 1979; ‘The Choice Is between … ’, Economist, 14 April 1979. 
211 Golding and Middleton, Images of Welfare: Press and Public Attitudes to 
Poverty, 98-100, 147-149. 
212 Ibid., 149. 
213 See for example: King, ‘The People's Flag Has Turned Deepest Blue’, 
Observer, 6 May 1979; King, ‘Odds-on Tories - Don’t Bet Heavily’, Observer, 1 
April 1979; Anthony King, ‘Polls Dispute Tory Lead’, Observer, 8 April 1979; 
Gordon Grieg, ‘Tories Hold on to 6 Per Cent Lead’, Daily Mail, 17 April 1979; 
Anthony Bevins, ‘The Key to No10’, ibid., 25 April; Malcolm Rutherford, ‘The 
Manifestos Compared’, Financial Times, 14 April 1979; David Freud, ‘Low-Paid 
Most in Favour of Tax Cuts’, ibid., 26 April. 
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respondents than they had been in 1970, although this was not 
discussed.214 Barry Bracewell-Milnes mentioned the IEA polling in the 
Telegraph, stating: 
Surveys of opinion conducted for the Institute of Economic Affairs over the 
past 15 years have consistently shown widespread support for large tax 
cuts combined with cuts in welfare benefits and services …215 
This seemed like a bit of a stretch. The surveys showed support for 
contracting out rising and support for increased taxes and spending 
falling, but the numbers selecting tax cuts and selective services 
were broadly constant at around 20 percent — not an insignificant 
number but far from a majority, and lower than the number of 
respondents selecting increased taxes and spending in every case 
apart from the respondents asked about education in 1978 (see fig. 
3, p. 58).216   
 
The only in-depth discussions of polling were the FT piece on the IEA 
survey, which emphasised working-class support for tax cuts, and a 
series of articles by Anthony King in the Observer.217 King argued in 
 
214 ‘Who Swung Tory?’, Economist, 12 May 1979; King, ‘Polls Dispute Tory Lead’, 
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Increasing Desire for Choice in Education and Medicine and Its Frustration by 
'Representative' Government ’, 44-54. 
217 Freud, ‘Low-Paid Most in Favour of Tax Cuts’, Financial Times, 26 April 1979; 
King, ‘The People's Flag Has Turned Deepest Blue’, Observer, 6 May 1979; King, 
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one article, for example: 
Perhaps most important, the Conservatives offer themselves as the party 
of tax cuts; and most people in Britain want to pay lower taxes … A 
California-style Proposition 13 introduced in this country would probably 
win overwhelmingly.218  
The image of popular attitudes presented by the surveys discussed, 
however, was mixed and at times contradictory. King also reported 
BBC and Gallup election day polling showing that 70 percent of 
respondents supported maintaining services over tax cuts, but, at the 
same time, that a majority were in favour of income tax cuts for the 
wealthy.219 His conclusion was that they showed that Labour was 
conclusively out of touch with the electorate on many issues.220 
Some articles discussed polling around the 1979 election, but 
seemed perhaps to give more weight to findings suggesting support 
for tax cuts than those suggesting the opposite. 
 
The reports of IEA polling were the only time think tanks were 
mentioned in the press in relation to popular attitudes to tax. 
Individuals like Samuel Brittan and Bracewell-Milnes had significant 
links within the Conservative party and research has emphasised 
how important their articles were in shifting political ideas about 
economics.221 However, the article by Bracewell-Milnes above seems 
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the 1960s he analysed opinion polls for the Guardian and Daily Telegraph and was 
the BBC election night analyst from 1983 to 2005. See: David McKie, ‘Anthony 
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January 2017. 
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to have been the only one in which a journalist with links to right-wing 
think tanks made any comment about popular attitudes to tax. Four 
articles, including Bracewell-Milnes’s, mentioned the Californian 
Proposition 13 referendum, but of those one argued that it would not 
be successful in the UK.222 Although the visibility of the IEA and 
events in the USA seemed to have increased slightly by 1979, they 
still represented a tiny fraction of articles arguing that people were 
opposed to tax.  
 
Press discussions about popular attitudes to tax had clearly changed 
significantly by the late 1970s. After the hiatus of the 1960s, by 1976 
arguments about taxation being too high had returned to the levels 
previously seen in 1949-50. By the 1979 election representations of 
popular opposition to tax had also regained their 1950 heights. Two 
articles implied that opposition had increased in 1979, but not 
explicitly, and the vast majority of articles emphasised opposition 
without indicating that it had increased. In general, while there were 
new features of press discussions about attitudes to tax in the late 
1970s, it did not appear to be a fundamentally distinct moment in 
press coverage; with a longer perspective the similarities with 
discussions in 1949-50 emerge at least as strongly.  
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Survey evidence about attitudes to tax was discussed in 
unprecedented detail around the 1979 election but in-depth 
discussion was still limited, and opposition was most often 
emphasised despite the surveys’ mixed findings. The increase in 
income tax levels was frequently mentioned. However, unlike in 
politicians’ discussions, declining income tax levels after 1977 do not 
seem to have blunted press criticism or emphasis on opposition. In 
contrast, opposition was far more of a feature in 1979 than 1976, 





There were some suggestions that individuals in the organisations 
studied thought, or at least stated, that popular opposition to tax had 
increased in the late 1970s. However, these comments were limited; 
most discussions were consistent with earlier ideas. Three 
Conservative statements asserted increased opposition in 1977, but 
apart from this their comments had not changed significantly. 
Conservative politicians and researchers were also not convinced 
that their tax policies were necessarily popular, or would be beneficial 
for them at the 1979 election. Labour politicians likewise implied, 
though less explicitly, that opposition had increased in two comments 
in 1975 and 1977. Their discussions also emphasised opposition 
more in 1977 than in the years before or after. However, again, the 
vast majority of Labour comments were consistent with earlier 
discussions and Labour politicians did not identify tax as the major 




Civil servants seemed perhaps to have become more opposed to tax 
personally, but their comments about popular attitudes had not 
changed. Two CBI comments also suggested increasing opposition 
but others seemed unsure whether contemporary opposition was that 
widespread, even among their members. Although a few vocal 
members were communicating their opposition to contemporary tax 
levels, the CBI struggled to persuade the wider membership to 
engage with their opposition to tax changes and attempts to gauge 
opinion did not suggest widespread, or increasing, opposition. The 
TUC seemed to be communicating their members’ opposition to the 
level of taxation, but also their support for spending and concern 
about prices, and did not assert that opposition had increased. It was 
in the press that the clearest change had occurred, with articles by 
1979 emphasising opposition to tax to an extent last seen in 1950. A 
few articles implied that opposition might have increased but not 
explicitly and, in general, articles emphasised support for tax cuts 
without talking about how this might have changed.  
 
This shift in press discussions might have been expected to influence 
political ideas about popular attitudes to tax. However, there is no 
direct evidence of it doing so; no references to the press were found 
in reference to attitudes to tax. The CBI’s views were mentioned by 
Labour but did not seem to carry much weight. The TUC’s 
preferences were far more important to the Labour government, but 
the TUC emphasised spending and prices as much as taxation. 
Think tanks were also a slightly larger, but still minimal, feature of 
conversations. Polling seems like it may have had an impact on 
Conservative ideas but the conclusions drawn from very similar 
survey findings in 1976 and 1978 were radically different, indicating 
 
344 
that another factor may have been important. Polling did not seem to 
be influential in the other organisations. The only issue regularly 
mentioned was the level of taxation and how it had changed due to 
fiscal drag. The fact that the Labour and Conservative emphasis on 
opposition to tax declined after 1977 also mapped the actual fall in 
effective income tax rates. 
 
The late 1970s have been portrayed as the point when popular 
attitudes decisively broke from the post-war social contract and 
turned against high taxation and spending. It is possible to find a few 
comments supporting this theory in most of the organisations studied 
here, particularly around 1977. However, as a whole, their assertions 
about popular attitudes to tax were consistent with earlier 
discussions. Even in the press, where change was by far the most 
pronounced, the emphasis on popular opposition was not 
unprecedented — it had been at least as, if not more, significant in 
1950. Any emphasis on opposition to tax seemed also to have 
declined by the 1979 election outside of the press, suggesting that 
for most of these organisations concern around 1977 may be best 
characterised as a short-term response to unprecedentedly high tax 











7. The General Elections of 1987 and 1992 
 
 
By 1987 the Conservatives, led by Margaret Thatcher, had 
completed two terms in office and implemented significant 
macroeconomic policy changes. The top rate of income tax was cut 
to 60p in 1979 and then 40p in 1988. The basic rate was cut 
progressively from 33p to 25p, and VAT was increased to 15 percent, 
meaning that revenue increasingly came from indirect rather than 
direct taxes. Corporation tax was also cut from 50 percent to 35 
percent.1 Although the tax structure was fundamentally changed, 
taxation was not reduced overall. Taxation actually rose as a 
proportion of GDP from 38.8 percent in 1979 to 39.3 percent in 1990; 
in 1981/2 it peaked at 43.7 percent.2  
 
The first Thatcher government also experimented with using 
monetary policy as the primary tool of economic management. The 
Medium-Term Financial Strategy set ambitious targets for control of 
the money supply from 1980, marking a significant public shift away 
from Keynesian economic management.3 In reality, this trend had 
quietly begun by the start of the 1970s and it was to be short lived.4 
 
1 The small business rate was cut from 30 percent to 25 percent. 
2 Jackson and Saunders, ‘Introduction: Varieties of Thatcherism’, 15-16. VAT had 
been 12.5 percent on luxuries and 8 percent on other goods. 
3 Ibid., 5-6; Jim Tomlinson, ‘Thatcher, Monetarism and the Politics of Inflation’, 
ibid.; Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American 
Approaches to Financing the Modern State, 171-173; Barry J. Eichengreen, The 
European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond, STU - 
Student edition ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 279-282. 
4 See for example: Clark and Dilnot, ‘British Fiscal Policy since 1939’; Susan 
Howson, ‘Money and Monetary Policy since 1945’, ibid.; James, International 
Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods, 183-191; Middleton, The British 
Economy since 1945: Engaging with the Debate, 110-116; Needham, ‘Britain’s 
Money Supply Experiment, 1971–73’; Tomlinson, ‘Thatcher, Monetarism and the 
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Between 1979 and 1981 the manufacturing sector contracted by 25 
percent as a consequence of high interest rates, tight monetary 
policy, and a rising exchange rate. GDP fell by 2 percent in 1980 and 
another 1.2 percent in 1981. Unemployment rose from 1.3 million in 
1979 to 3 million in 1983 and remained at that level until 1987. 
Inflation rose to 22 percent in 1979 and did not fall below its 1978 
level until 1983.5 Despite the recession (and concerns about the 
electoral impact) the 1981 budget increased taxes, contradicting 
Keynesian economic management.6 This led to significant pressure 
on the government; 364 economists signed a letter criticising the 
budget and urging them to abandon monetarism. Although publicly 
the government insisted that they would not change course, they 
were in fact also using fiscal policy, even before the 1981 budget.7  
 
The economy slowly started to improve; inflation fell from 18 percent 
in 1980 to 4.6 percent in 1983 and interest rates fell from 17 to 9 
percent. This, in combination with the Falklands war, revived the 
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The Thatcher Government's 1981 Budget in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). 
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a Death Exaggerated: How Keynesian Policies Survived the 1970s’; Clark and 
Dilnot, ‘British Fiscal Policy since 1939’; Susan Howson, ‘Money and Monetary 
Policy since 1945’, ibid.; Buggeln, ‘Taxation in the 1980s: A Five-Country 
Comparison of Neo-Liberalism and Path Dependency’, 107-108; Eichengreen, The 
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Needham and A. Hotson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Robert 
Neild, ‘The 1981 Statement by 364 Economists’, ibid., ed. Anthony Hotson and 
Duncan Needham; D. J. Needham, ‘The 1981 Budget: ‘A Dunkirk, Not an 
Alamein’’, ibid., ed. D. J. Needham and A. Hotson. 
 
347 
Conservative government’s popularity. Their recovery was also 
assisted by Labour’s split; the Social Democratic Party (SDP) was 
created in March 1981. Thatcher won by a landslide in 1983 with a 
majority of 144 seats, although the Conservative vote share fell 
slightly — from 44 percent in 1979 to 42.4 percent. Labour only 
narrowly beat the Liberal-SDP alliance, 27.6 percent to 25.4 percent, 
but with the electoral system this translated into 32 percent of seats 
for Labour and 3.5 percent for the Alliance.8  
 
In their second term, the Thatcher government introduced the ‘Right 
to Buy’ scheme for council houses and privatised a number of 
nationalised industries. Privatisation and the windfall from North Sea 
oil helped to fund further cuts to direct taxes. The government also 
imposed caps on local taxes and metropolitan councils and, in 1986, 
significantly deregulated financial markets.9 The failure of the 1984-5 
miners’ strike was a considerable political triumph for Thatcher but 
the government’s approval ratings fell dramatically — from 42 
percent at the beginning of the strike to 23 percent by August 1985.10  
 
Nonetheless, the Conservatives won the 1987 election by another 
landslide, with 376 seats and 42.3 percent of the vote, giving them a 
majority of 102.11 Butler and Kavanagh attributed this victory 
primarily to a strong economy and concerns about Labour’s 
 
8 Jackson and Saunders, ‘Introduction: Varieties of Thatcherism’, 6-7; Robert 
Skidelsky, Thatcherism (London: Chatto & Windus, 1988). 
9 Daunton, Just Taxes, 335-338; Jackson and Saunders, ‘Introduction: Varieties of 
Thatcherism’. 
10 David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1987 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), 1-24; Jackson and Saunders, ‘Introduction: 
Varieties of Thatcherism’, 7-8, 15-16. 
11 Butler and Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1987, particularly 265; 
Jackson and Saunders, ‘Introduction: Varieties of Thatcherism’, 8-10. The electoral 
system gave them 57 percent of the seats for 42.3 percent of the vote. 
 
348 
economic competence, particularly among the ‘new working class’ 
who increasingly owned their own homes and held shares in 
privatised industries. Labour’s attempt to head off Conservative 
attacks on tax by arguing that their programme could be paid for 
exclusively by reversing the Conservative cuts on the top 5 percent 
started to unravel under pressure late in the campaign.12 
Conservative politicians and the right-leaning press attacked Labour 
for their tax and spending plans, aided by a vague manifesto and 
confused messaging about who, exactly, would face increased taxes 
if Labour won.13  
 
The October 1987 stock market crash made the economic situation 
more difficult. Attempts at reflation provoked 5 percent growth in 
1988 but also revived inflation; the RPI increased to 7.8 percent. 
Interest rates rose to 15 percent and growth slowed to 0.8 percent in 
1990, before dropping into recession in 1991.14 
The 1988 budget was criticised for favouring the wealthy at a point 
when social services were being cut.15 The Conservatives’ third term 
also, of course, saw the only tax revolt of the twentieth century in the 
UK. As a local rather than central tax, this chapter will not cover the 
poll tax, but it is an important background to all discussions about tax 
in this period. The poll tax was introduced to replace the rates in 
Scotland in 1989 and a year later in England and Wales. It was 
deeply unpopular and its abolition was announced in 1991.16 It had 
 
12 Sloman, ‘‘Where’s the Money Coming From?’ Manifesto Costings and the 
Politics of Fiscal Credibility in UK General Elections, 1955–2019’, 11. 
13 Butler and Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1987, 106, 185-186, 257-
259, 265-278. 
14 Jackson and Saunders, ‘Introduction: Varieties of Thatcherism’, 8-10. 
15 Buggeln, ‘Taxation in the 1980s: A Five-Country Comparison of Neo-Liberalism 
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16 Butler, Adonis, and Travers, Failure in British Government: The Politics of the 
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emerged as a potential policy in the early 1980s, perhaps at least 
partially as the result of work by three free-market academics at LSE, 
and was adopted as Conservative policy in 1985.17 
 
On the question of how the government managed to introduce such 
an unpopular tax reform, Butler et al place some blame on the party’s 
newfound confidence that they represented majority opinion. This 
was exemplified by Thatcher herself, who stated in one interview:  
Deep in their instincts people find what I am saying and doing right … And 
I know it is because it is the way I was brought up … I sort of regard myself 
as a very normal, ordinary person with all the right instinctive antennae.18 
They also argue that opinions expressed by Conservative activists 
and conference attendees came to be seen as a barometer of public 
opinion.19 The studies group looking at poll tax commissioned no 
market research and no attempt was made to test public opinion until 
it was already in law.20 Even as it unravelled, the poll tax’s architects 
clung to the belief that there was widespread support for the idea that 
everyone should contribute to local services; Thatcher continued to 
insist, even several years later, that it would have been accepted 
given enough time.21 In October 1990 the Conservatives lost a by-
election in Eastbourne, traditionally one of their safest seats. Two 
weeks later Howe resigned, and the following day Heseltine 
announced his leadership bid. Thatcher was ousted in favour of 
Major in November 1990.22  
 
For Labour, the 1979 election defeat exposed the widening divisions 
 
17 Ibid., 30-32, 70-87. The academics were Christopher Foster, Richard Jackman, 
and Morris Perlman. 
18 Ibid., 252-253. 
19 Ibid., 246-253. 
20 Ibid., 126-129. 
21 Ibid., 254. 
22 Ibid., 154-170. 
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between left and right. The power of the left had increased when 
Michael Foot was elected leader, prompting key revisionist MPs to 
form the SDP in 1981. However, Neil Kinnock took over the 
leadership after Labour’s 1983 election defeat and tried to regain lost 
voters by distancing the party from the unions and adopting policies 
to appeal to more affluent voters. In part this strategy was based on 
the increased use of opinion polling and PR to target voters.23 This 
seems to have cemented the idea that voters saw Labour as out of 
touch with their concerns; the Strategic Research Group consultancy 
presented findings of focus group research in November 1985, which 
highlighted the apparent disparity between popular attitudes and a 
party associated with high tax, nationalisation and minority rights.24  
 
These trends only intensified after the 1987 election, which despite 
defeat was seen as a success for this PR-focused strategy.25 
Kinnock launched a policy review, which recommended that the party 
focus their efforts on attracting floating voters and suggested that 
people saw Labour as outdated, too closely linked to the unions, and 
associated with the undeserving poor rather than aspiring voters.26 
This argument was widely accepted despite opposition from some on 
the left.27 Research by Sanders does seem to suggest that Labour’s 
 
23 Wring, The Politics of Marketing the Labour Party, 81-83; Fielding, The Labour 
Party: Continuity and Change in the Making of ‘New’ Labour, 24-26, 45-47, 95-96. 
24 Gould, ‘Why Labour Won’, 50-54; Wring, The Politics of Marketing the Labour 
Party, 89-92. 
25 Labour Party, ‘Meet the Challenge, Make the Change: A New Agenda for Britain; 
Final Report of Labour's Policy Review for the 1990s’, (London: Labour Party, 
1989); Fielding, The Labour Party: Continuity and Change in the Making of ‘New’ 
Labour, 72-72. 
26 Labour Party, ‘Meet the Challenge, Make the Change: A New Agenda for Britain; 
Final Report of Labour's Policy Review for the 1990s’; Fielding, The Labour Party: 
Continuity and Change in the Making of ‘New’ Labour, 72-72. 
27 Wring, The Politics of Marketing the Labour Party, 101-109. 
 
351 
ratings improved after the review.28 This revival of Labour’s fortunes 
coincided with the low point of Conservative party popularity amid the 
poll tax and the 1990-1 recession. However, it was still not enough 
for Labour to win the 1992 election. 
 
The Conservative campaign focused heavily on Labour’s tax policies. 
They had launched their ‘tax bombshell’ advertising campaign in 
January 1992, highlighting the amount of extra tax they said the 
average family would have to pay under Labour (see image 8).29 This 
temporarily reduced Labour’s polling numbers, although they 
recovered when the economy went into recession again in February. 
The 1992 budget, which introduced a new 20p rate of tax, did not 
significantly improve Conservative polling either. However, in 
November 1991 61 percent of respondents thought that Labour 
would increase taxes. This rose to 80 percent during the campaign, 
settling by the end at around 75 percent.30 The right-leaning papers 
also focused heavily on Labour’s tax and spending plans.31 John 
Smith, Labour’s shadow chancellor, published a shadow budget 
which suggested that Labour would increase direct taxation and 
national insurance contributions for the better-off but would not 
increase taxation for 80 percent of the population. This decision 
came in for significant criticism in Labour election post-mortems.32  
 
28 Sanders, ‘Why the Conservative Party Won - Again’, 180-182. 
29 David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1992 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), 84-85; Davies and Sloman, ‘Fiscal 
Promises: Tax and Spending in British General Elections since 1964’, 131-132; 
Denver, ‘The Government That Could Do No Right’, 22-24. 
30 Butler and Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1992 89-96. 
31 Ibid., 198-201; Davies and Sloman, ‘Fiscal Promises: Tax and Spending in 
British General Elections since 1964’, 130-131. 
32 Butler and Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1992 90-95; Denver, ‘The 
Government That Could Do No Right’. 
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Image 8: Conservative election poster, 1992 
Source: Oxford, Bodleian Library POSTER 1992-15: https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.
uk/objects/fd04625a-0532-44ef-9117-14c207882a5b. 
 
Academics have debated whether tax was actually the cause of 
Labour’s defeat.33 Kinnock’s unpopularity was a potential factor, and 
Labour’s campaign had scored a few ‘own goals’.34 It has been 
suggested that voters were lying to pollsters about supporting 
increased taxation and spending. Heath and Clifford’s analysis 
suggested that this was possible but that the numbers of people 
involved would have been very small, and it was unlikely to have 
been a major factor.35 Heath, Jowell, and Curtice point out that 53 
percent of the electorate voted for Labour or the Liberal Democrats, 
 
33 Sanders, ‘Why the Conservative Party Won - Again’; Scammell, Designer 
Politics: How Elections Are Won, 261-263; Seyd, ‘Tony Blair and New Labour’, 50-
51. See also: Daunton, Just Taxes, 3-4; Davies and Sloman, ‘Fiscal Promises: Tax 
and Spending in British General Elections since 1964’, 131-132; Coates, 
Prolonged Labour: The Slow Birth of New Labour Britain, 4-5; Denver, ‘The 
Government That Could Do No Right’; Anthony King, ‘Why Labour Won - at Last’, 
ibid.; Sloman, ‘Short ‘Where’s the Money Coming From?’: Tracing the History of 
Manifesto Costings in UK Elections, 1955-2019’, 14-15; Wring, The Politics of 
Marketing the Labour Party, 113-115. 
34 Seyd, ‘Tony Blair and New Labour’, 50-51. 
35 Peter Clifford and Anthony Heath, ‘The Election Campaign’, in Labour's Last 
Chance?: The 1992 Election and Beyond ed. Anthony Heath, et al. (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1994), 12-14. 
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both parties promising to raise taxes, as against 43 percent for the 
Conservatives. They, along with others, suggest that tax was part of 
a wider attack on Labour’s economic performance, and that the issue 
was primarily one of perceptions of economic competence.36 
However, although other issues were likely to have been more 
important, prominent Labour politicians identified tax as the key 
cause of their defeat. Philip Gould, who was strategy and polling 
adviser to Tony Blair from 1994, stated in his autobiography that tax 
‘was a fetish for us. We were certain that we had lost elections in the 
past partly because of tax, and we were determined not to let it 
happen again this time’.37  
 
This chapter will look at whether ideas about popular attitudes to tax 
had changed around the 1987, and, for the Labour party, civil 
service, and press, the 1992 election. Unfortunately, thirty-year 
closure rules prevent this analysis being extended to all the 
organisations studied here. Archival access issues due to the Covid-
19 pandemic also mean that the CBI analysis should be treated as 
provisional. Enough material is available, however, to suggest that in 
the run-up to the 1992 election there was not a widespread belief that 
attitudes to tax had radically changed — with the exception of the 
press, in which a new and specific historical story about popular 
attitudes to tax had appeared. 
 
 
36 Ibid.; Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell, and John Curtice, ‘Can Labour Win?’, ibid. 
See also: Davies and Sloman, ‘Fiscal Promises: Tax and Spending in British 
General Elections since 1964’, 131-132; Radice, Southern Discomfort; Sanders, 
‘Why the Conservative Party Won - Again’; Wring, The Politics of Marketing the 
Labour Party, 124-131. 
37 Gould, ‘Why Labour Won’, 7. 
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The Conservative party 
 
Eight years in government did not appear to have changed 
Conservative ideas about popular attitudes to tax. Conservative 
politicians still clearly believed that there was opposition to tax, 
despite their far-reaching changes to the system.38 Nigel Forman, for 
example, argued in a 1986 memo about the manifesto that:  
Many people criticise or resent both the structure and the incidence of 
income tax in this country notwithstanding the significant reductions which 
we have been able to make in both the standard rate and the higher 
rates.39  
He suggested that simplifying and cutting income tax would be 
‘electorally beneficial’.40 At a meeting of the Economic Policy 
Committee in October 1986, attended by the chancellor, Nigel 
Lawson, Major, Cropper, and others, Forman also advocated cutting 
income tax significantly by abolishing various tax allowances that 
 
38 See for example: Nigel Forman, ‘Income Tax Reform, 2 December 1986’, CRD 
4/4/189, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1986; ‘Economic 
Policy Group: Minutes of 3rd Meeting, Held on 15th October 1986’, CRD 4/4/190, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1986; ‘Economic Policy 
Group: Supplementary Minutes of 3rd Meeting, 15th October 1986’, CRD 4/4/190, 
(Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1986; ‘Managing the 
Economy: Report of a Policy Group, Autumn 1986’, THCR 2/7/5/49, (The Papers of 
Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 
1986; Norman Blackwell and J  O'Sullivan. ‘NHS - the Way Forward, 11 August 
1987’, The National Archives (TNA) PREM 19/2334, 1987. 
39 Forman, ‘Income Tax Reform, 2 December 1986’, CRD 4/4/189, Conservative 
Party Archive, 1986. (Francis) Nigel Forman (1943-2017) was a One Nation 
Conservative politician. After Oxford he spent a year at the CBI in 1970 before 
joining the CRD, where from 1975 he was assistant director. He unsuccessfully 
contested Coventry North-East in 1974 but was elected MP for Carshalton in 1976 
which he held until he was defeated at the 1997 election. Forman was critical of 
some of Thatcher’s policies which prompted several attempts by his constituency 
party to remove him. However, in 1979 Forman became parliamentary private 
secretary to the Foreign Secretary and then in 1987 to Nigel Lawson at the 
Treasury, where he remained until Lawson’s resignation in 1989. He briefly 
became parliamentary under-secretary for education in 1992 but resigned the 
same year for personal reasons. See: ‘Nigel Forman’, Times, 5 July 2017; ‘Nigel 
Forman’, Daily Telegraph, 1 June 2017. 
40 Forman, ‘Income Tax Reform, 2 December 1986’, CRD 4/4/189, Conservative 
Party Archive, 1986. 
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primarily benefited the wealthy. It was agreed that this was attractive 
but the attendees disagreed about whether income tax cuts would be 
enough to quell the backlash from wealthy taxpayers.41  
 
Even so, Conservative politicians did not assume that popular 
support for tax cuts precluded support for services or concerns about 
fairness.42 At the same October 1986 EPC meeting Major agreed 
with Howell that they had not won the argument on why tax cuts were 
good economically and stated that the ‘public’ thought tax cuts 
benefited ‘only the rich’. The attendees also agreed that the 
manifesto should only include proposals for basic rate cuts, as these 
would benefit everyone, and that it was essential that they ‘sell tax 
cuts as the way of achieving more jobs’.43 A 1986 report on public 
spending suggested that if they introduced compulsory insurance 
there would be 'inescapable' pressure to relate premiums to income 
as they would be viewed as a tax. It further argued that people 
 
41 ‘Economic Policy Group: Minutes of 3rd Meeting, Held on 15th October 1986’, 
CRD 4/4/190, Conservative Party Archive, 1986; ‘Economic Policy Group: 
Supplementary Minutes of 3rd Meeting, 15th October 1986’, CRD 4/4/190, 
Conservative Party Archive, 1986. 
42 See for example: ‘Policy Group - Initial Discussion Paper on Public Expenditure’, 
CRD 4/4/189, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1986; 
‘Economic Policy Group: Minutes of 3rd Meeting, Held on 15th October 1986’, 
CRD 4/4/190, Conservative Party Archive, 1986; ‘Economic Policy Group: 
Supplementary Minutes of 3rd Meeting, 15th October 1986’, CRD 4/4/190, 
Conservative Party Archive, 1986; ‘Memorandum from Robin Harris to Margaret 
Thatcher, 14 January 1987’, THCR 2/7/5/7, (The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG 
OM FRS THCR, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1987. Blackwell and 
O'Sullivan. ‘NHS - the Way Forward, 11 August 1987’, PREM 19/2334, 1987; 
‘Memorandum from Nigel Lawson to Margaret Thatcher, 2 September 1987’. The 
National Archives (TNA) PREM 19/2947, 1987; ‘Memorandum from Nigel Lawson 
(Signed by Moira Wallance in His Absence) to Margaret Thatcher, 22 April 1988’. 
The National Archives (TNA) PREM 19/2337, 1988; ‘Memorandum from Nigel 
Lawson (Signed by Moira Wallance in His Absence) to Margaret Thatcher, 3 June 
1988’. The National Archives (TNA) PREM 19/2339, 1988. 
43 ‘Economic Policy Group: Minutes of 3rd Meeting, Held on 15th October 1986’, 
CRD 4/4/190, Conservative Party Archive, 1986; ‘Economic Policy Group: 
Supplementary Minutes of 3rd Meeting, 15th October 1986’, CRD 4/4/190, 
Conservative Party Archive, 1986. 
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wanted higher spending as incomes rose and that spending cuts 
would be unpopular. Interestingly, its strategy for combatting this 
rested on promoting cynicism about those advocating higher 
spending: 
We need to generate a climate of opinion such that when any public sector 
interest group (or private sector subsidy hunter) plucks at our heart strings 
to plead for more 'resources' the immediate reaction is "well they would 
say that wouldn't they" and "what's in it for them".44  
 
That all these ideas could coexist was evidenced by a 1986 report 
titled Managing the Economy, the result of a policy group that 
included Lawson, Howell, Major, Cropper and others. It suggested: 
Although the upper income groups, who are often the most articulate, may 
not feel a pressing need for further tax cuts, there is considerable pressure 
further down the scale from lower income groups who find tax deductions 
at current rates leave them with barely enough to meet their needs. These 
are the crucial swing voters.45  
However, it went on to argue that there was a 'natural desire for, and 
willingness to finance, improving standards of provision as incomes 
rise’. It also, again, recommended focusing on basic rate cuts in the 
election as that ‘makes it clear that everyone will benefit, not just the 
rich’.46 Robin Harris, then Director of the Conservative Research 
Department, wrote a memo to Thatcher in January 1987 criticising 
the report as politically naive and based on the unevidenced 
assumption that people associated the Conservatives with tax cuts.47  
 
44 ‘Policy Group - Initial Discussion Paper on Public Expenditure’, CRD 4/4/189, 
Conservative Party Archive, 1986. 
45 ‘Managing the Economy: Report of a Policy Group, Autumn 1986’, THCR 
2/7/5/49, The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, 1986. 
46 Ibid. 
47 ‘Memorandum from Robin Harris to Margaret Thatcher, 14 January 1987’, THCR 
2/7/5/7, The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, 1987. Robin Harris 
joined the CRD in 1978 and was a special adviser to the Treasury (1981-83) and 
the Home Office (1983-85) before becoming CRD director in 1985. He left the CRD 
to join the Number Ten Policy Unit in 1989, leaving with Thatcher in 1990. See: 
‘Robin Harris, 1985-1988’, CRD D/10, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, 
Bodleian Library), 1985-1988; ‘Robin Harris: Biography’, Penguin, 2020, accessed 




Harris could have been frustrated because the policy group was 
stepping on the CRD’s toes. However, alone among the comments 
found he supported his arguments with survey evidence: 
The Party's Summer Survey (July 1986) showed that as many people 
believed that Labour would cut taxes as that the Conservatives would do 
so. It is also true (see attached - appendix B) that the opinion polls 
consistently show that people say (whether honestly or not) that they 
would prefer increased public spending to lower taxes. Similarly, Keith 
Britto has confirmed to me that he knows of no evidence to suggest that 
the C1/C2 group are more in favour of tax cuts than others. Our argument, 
therefore, should not be that lower taxes are more important than public 
services but rather that lower taxes and better services, because of a 
healthy growing Conservative economy, are now possible - something 
which our opponents would reverse.48 
Clearly, evidence was available. Norman Tebbit circulated some 
general survey findings in December 1986 (which it seems Harris 
may have drawn on) stating that he had been using them often in 
strategy group discussions. The results suggested that 46 percent of 
respondents thought taxes had fallen but 41 percent thought they 
had not; that more respondents trusted Labour to cut taxes than the 
Conservatives; and that 26 percent of respondents thought cutting 
taxes was important.49 This last number was actually significantly 
higher than the numbers saying tax was important in other polls 
conducted for the Conservatives around this time, if it was mentioned 
 
harris.html?tab=penguin-biography. 
48 ‘Memorandum from Robin Harris to Margaret Thatcher, 14 January 1987’, THCR 
2/7/5/7, The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, 1987. 
49 Norman Tebbit, ‘Public Opinion - Problems and Opportunities, December 1986’, 
CRD 4/30/7/8, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1986. 
Norman Beresford Tebbit (1931-) worked as an airline pilot and trade union official 
before being elected Conservative MP for Epping in 1970 and then Chingford in 
1974, which he held until he moved to the Lords in 1992. Tebbit was close to 
Margaret Thatcher, who made him secretary of state for employment in 1981. In 
1983 he became secretary of state for trade and industry and then party chairman 
in 1985. He retired from government in 1987 to care for his wife who had been 
injured in the 1984 IRA Brighton Grand Hotel bombing. See: Dennis Kavanagh and 
Christopher Riches, ‘Tebbit, Norman Beresford’, in A Dictionary of Political 
Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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at all.50 Focus group research commissioned in 1985 to find a theme 
for the party going into the 1990s also found tax was a very minor 
issue. The Conservative voter groups hardly mentioned tax, and in 
one case were quite in favour of tax increases to pay for better 
services. Floating voter groups displayed a general preference for tax 
cuts but also supported increased indirect taxes on luxuries and 
imports, and were again concerned about services.51 Polling after the 
1988 budget similarly suggested Conservative politicians were right 
to be concerned about perceptions of fairness. MORI found that 
although 60 percent of respondents supported reducing the basic 
rate of income tax, 33 percent opposed it, and 63 percent 
disapproved of cutting the top rate of tax to 40 percent, while only 27 
percent approved. Gallup found 28 percent of respondents thought 
the budget was 'fair’, the worst rating since 1981.52  
 
It is not clear, however, what impact these findings had. In a 
discussion about the results circulated by Tebbit, the strategy group 
recognised that they needed to do more to convince voters that they 
would cut taxes, but agreed to attack Labour as being too left wing 
and union dominated with policies that would lead to higher taxation 
and inflation — hardly a shift from earlier tactics.53 Nobody apart from 
 
50 See for example: Harris Research Centre, ‘Communication Theme Research, 
September 1985’, CCO 180/4/3/1, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian 
Library), 1985; Robin Harris, ‘Speaking Note Strategy Group - Monday 15th 
December 1986’, CRD 4/30/7/8, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian 
Library), 1986; Harris Research Centre, ‘A Summary Report of Private Polling 
Carried out for Conservative Central Office During the 1987 General Election, July 
1987’, CCO 180/11/9/1, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 
1987. 
51 Harris Research Centre, ‘Communication Theme Research, September 1985’, 
CCO 180/4/3/1, Conservative Party Archive, 1985. 
52 ‘Monthly Polling Review, March 1988’, THCR 2/6/4/82, (The Papers of Baroness 
Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1988. 
53 ‘Minutes of the Strategy Group Tenth Meeting: Monday 15th December 1986’, 
CRD 4/30/7/6, (Conservative Party Archive, Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1986. 
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Harris seems to have mentioned the findings that people preferred 
spending increases to tax cuts, and even he expressed some 
scepticism.54 Butler and Adonis, in their study of the poll tax, 
suggested that Conservative politicians believed they knew what 
popular attitudes were in this period, without feeling the need for 
empirical evidence (Thatcher reportedly once asserted that ‘every 
citizen aspired to a conservatory’).55 Conservative opinion research 
seems to have suggested that tax was not a particularly important 
issue to voters and that not all of their tax cuts were popular because 
some were seen as unfair. This was not far removed from the ideas 
of popular attitudes expressed by Conservative politicians, but 
evidence was rarely explicitly referenced. 
 
Think tanks appeared occasionally in these discussions.56 Both 
Norman Lamont and Lawson, for example, picked up an Adam Smith 
report about the Laffer curve in late 1986 and early 1987.57 However, 
 
54 ‘Memorandum from Keith Britto to Robin Harris, 13 January 1987’, THCR 
2/7/5/7, (The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, Churchill Archives 
Centre, Cambridge), 1987; ‘Memorandum from Robin Harris to Margaret Thatcher, 
14 January 1987’, THCR 2/7/5/7, The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS 
THCR, 1987. 
55 Campbell, Margaret Thatcher 248; Butler, Adonis, and Travers, Failure in British 
Government: The Politics of the Poll Tax, 246-253. 
56 ‘Memorandum from Norman Lamont to Nigel Lawson, 22 August 1986’. The 
National Archives (TNA) T 470/365, 1986; ‘Memorandum from A W Kuczys to C 
Scholar, 10 December 1986’. The National Archives (TNA) T 470/385, 1986; 
‘Memorandum from Ian Scotter to C Scholar, 7 January 1987’. The National 
Archives (TNA) T 470/378, 1987; ‘Letter from Kenneth Baker to Nigel Lawson, 30 
September 1988’. The National Archives (TNA) PREM 19/2947, 1988. 
57 ‘Memorandum from A W Kuczys to C Scholar, 10 December 1986’. T 470/385, 
1986; ‘Memorandum from Ian Scotter to C Scholar, 7 January 1987’. T 470/378, 
1987. Norman Lamont, Lord Lamont of Lerwick (1942-) was chancellor of the 
exchequer from 1990 to 1993. After completing his degree at Cambridge he 
worked in the CRD and as a merchant banker. He was elected MP for Kingston-
upon-Thames in 1972. Lamont was financial secretary to the Treasury from 1986 
to 1989 when he became chief secretary. In 1990 he was promoted to chancellor. 
Britain was forced out of the European exchange rate mechanism in September 
1992 and in 1993 he was offered an alternative post, which he declined, and left 
the government. See: Kavanagh and Riches, ‘Lamont, Norman’; ‘Lord Lamont of 
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think tanks do not seem to have either participated, or featured, in 
discussions about popular attitudes to tax. More influential, perhaps, 
were discussions about tax reform in the United States, which was 
referenced numerous times in 1986.58 The Managing the Economy 
report stated, for example, that there were ‘both social and political 
limits to the extent to which the level of benefits can be altered’ but 
continued:  
There is much to be learned from experience in the US and elsewhere. 
The initial uproar over curtailment of certain welfare benefits proved 
remarkably shortlived in the US and predicted horror stories failed to 
materialise.59 
In the October 1986 policy group meeting Peter Hordern also 
suggested that Reagan’s policies showed that tax reform was 
possible if it was part of a package that was fair and had cuts for low 
earners. However, Lawson argued that tax reform in America ‘should 
not allow us to believe that tax reform was necessarily popular’.60 
The American tax changes seem to have captured the attention of 
Conservative politicians for a brief period in late 1986, more visibly 
than think tanks, but it was not clear that they changed Conservative 
ideas about popular attitudes to tax.  
 
 
Lerwick’, MPs and Lords, UK Parliament, 2021, accessed on: 25 February at 
https://members.parliament.uk/member/895/career. 
58 See for example: Nigel Forman, ‘Some Thoughts on Personal Ownership and 
Personal Taxation, 8 September 1986’, CRD 4/4/189, (Conservative Party Archive, 
Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1986; Peter Cropper, ‘1986 Policy Group - Managing the 
Economy, Taxation, 9 October 1986 ’, CRD 4/4/189, (Conservative Party Archive, 
Oxford, Bodleian Library), 1986; ‘Economic Policy Group: Minutes of 3rd Meeting, 
Held on 15th October 1986’, CRD 4/4/190, Conservative Party Archive, 1986; 
‘Economic Policy Group: Supplementary Minutes of 3rd Meeting, 15th October 
1986’, CRD 4/4/190, Conservative Party Archive, 1986; ‘Memorandum from M 
Haigh to Hutson, 21 October 1986’. The National Archives (TNA) T 470/385, 1986; 
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59 ‘Managing the Economy: Report of a Policy Group, Autumn 1986’, THCR 
2/7/5/49, The Papers of Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS THCR, 1986. 
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1986’, CRD 4/4/190, Conservative Party Archive, 1986. 
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In fact, Conservative ideas about popular attitudes to tax did not 
seem to have changed significantly after eight years in government. 
Conservative politicians and advisers still assumed opposition to tax, 
despite the tax changes that they had instituted. However, as 
previously, this was tempered by the knowledge that spending was 
equally, if not more, popular and perceptions of fairness were 
important. The evidence in circulation suggested that tax cuts were 
popular but not a major issue and that voters were no longer entirely 
sure that the Conservatives were more likely to cut taxes than 
Labour. However, although broadly in line with Conservative 
discussions, these findings were very rarely discussed. Reagan’s tax 
reforms briefly sparked interest, but it is not clear that they had any 
significant impact on ideas about popular attitudes. Conservative 
conversations about popular attitudes to tax around the 1987 election 
were broadly consistent with earlier ideas, and for the most part just 
as insular. 
 
The civil service 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, civil service discussions about popular 
attitudes to tax around the 1987 election seemed similar to those of 
the Conservative government they were working with, although 
perhaps less extensive. Some comments assumed popular 
opposition to tax.61 Treasury official Rachel Lomax wrote in 
 
61 See for example: ‘Memorandum from B A Mace to R A Blythe and Nigel Lawson, 
1 February 1985’. The National Archives (TNA) T 470/315, 1985; ‘Memorandum 
from R A Blythe to Isaax, Chairman, and Nigel Lawson, 19 December 1985’. The 
National Archives (TNA) T 470/323, 1985; ‘Memorandum from R Lomax to C 
Scholar, 13 November 1986’. The National Archives (TNA) T 470/378, 1986; ‘Tax 
Issues, 1986’. The National Archives (TNA) T 432/540, 1986; ‘Memorandum from I 
Scotter to Ryding, 3 April 1987’. The National Archives (TNA) T 470/420, 1987; 
‘Memorandum from Robin Butler to Margaret Thatcher, 16 February 1988’. The 
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November 1986, for example: 
Anything we do this year, especially in the financial area, which is 
unpopular or controversial even if it is of rather limited effect, risks stirring 
up the special interest lobbies. This strikes me as very dangerous in an 
Election year.62  
A 1986 Treasury note also suggested that integrating capital gains 
with income and corporate taxes would be difficult because of the hit 
to higher-rate taxpayers.63  
 
However, other comments highlighted the importance of fairness, in 
particular.64 A 1985 Treasury memo stated that they presumed that 
the government would not wish to make a significantly larger 
increase to the higher rate threshold than to personal allowances 
because 'To do so could create problems of presentation for the 
overall balance of the income tax component of the Budget’.65 IR 
officials similarly questioned CBI representatives in November 1986 
as to how they could justify only increasing thresholds in line with 
inflation when managerial salaries were increasing.66 In July 1987 a 
Treasury official responded to a draft of a press release on tax and 
benefit statistics by stating that it almost invited ‘“Poor are getting 
poorer” headlines’ and asked whether they could be ‘less 
provocative’.67 Officials’ ideas about popular attitudes to tax around 
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Meeting with the Inland Revenue, 17 November 1986’, MSS.200/C Dec 
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1987 appear, like Conservative politicians’, not to have changed 
significantly; while they assumed popular opposition to tax, they also 
emphasised that perceptions of fairness would be crucial to how tax 
changes were received. 
 
Officials seemed slightly more focused on the popularity of tax cuts in 
1992, but this was perhaps unsurprising given that they were 
preparing a budget that would immediately precede an election. 
Treasury officials wrote a series of memos in January 1992 on what 
they thought the pre-election budget should do. Almost all proposed 
doing very little, but some suggested what one official called 
‘something to produce a warm glow with the voters’.68 The same 
official argued against increasing VAT and even for cutting it, 
'especially if popularity was a consideration’.69 Treasury economic 
advisor Michael Kell stated that if the election was further away they 
would increase fuel and tobacco duties but ‘for fear of Sun headlines’ 
would just index all duties.70 IR official Tony Orhnial similarly stated 
that he would freeze the inheritance tax threshold because he 
'wouldn't have the balls to lower it' and proposed indexing fuel and 
alcohol duties because 'lots of voters would say "Phew, it could have 
been worse”’.71  
 
There were, however, again some references to fairness and, in this 
 
68 ‘Memorandum from Mark Minford to Robert Culpin, 9 January 1992’. The 
National Archives (TNA) T 604/988, 1992. See also: ‘Memorandum from R A D 
Price to Robert Culpin, 9 January 1992’. The National Archives (TNA) T 604/988, 
1992. 
69 ‘Memorandum from Mark Minford to Robert Culpin, 9 January 1992’. T 604/988, 
1992. 
70 ‘Memorandum from M S Kell to Robert Culpin, 9 January 1992’. The National 
Archives (TNA) T 604/988, 1992. 
71 ‘Memorandum from Tony Orhnial to Robert Culpin, 8 January 1992’. The 
National Archives (TNA) T 604/988, 1992. 
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instance, economic management as well. Two of the memos 
suggested presenting a refusal to cut taxes as prudent economic 
management.72 Orhnial argued that indexing income tax allowances 
could 'be presented as a fair and sensible measure in a difficult 
year’.73 In March 1992 chief fiscal policy advisor Robert Culpin wrote 
in a memo about the Conservative manifesto that pledging to abolish 
inheritance tax would 'look mildly idiosyncratic' and argued: 
You do not have to be a fanatical believer in equality of opportunity - let 
alone a classless society - to question whether a tiny minority should 
inherit vast fortunes without either the donor or the recipient paying a 
penny of tax.74 
He suggested that raising the threshold might address 'the 
perception' that it was catching people with nothing but the houses 
they lived in.75 An IR memo for the potential incoming Labour 
government also stated that: 
… a rule which placed some limits on the maximum benefit an individual 
could derive from reliefs and allowances would have presentational 
value.76 
Officials therefore seemed perhaps slightly more convinced that tax 
cuts were popular in the run-up to the 1992 budget and election, but 
not to the exclusion of other considerations, of which fairness was 
seemingly the most important, if sometimes primarily for 
presentational reasons.  
 
No evidence was found of officials consulting survey data on 
attitudes to tax, or investigating attitudes in any systematic way. As 
 
72 ‘Memorandum from Jonathan Stephens to Robert Culpin, 9 January 1992’. The 
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with the Conservative government, think tanks came up slightly more 
frequently than in previous civil service discussions, but not in 
relation to popular attitudes.77 The closest these comments came to 
a discussion of popular attitudes was when an IR official suggested 
in January 1987 that 'public debate’ about the Laffer curve was 
increasing, giving as examples attention from the ASI and IFS.78 It 
does not seem particularly likely that the ‘public’ they were referring 
to in this case was a particularly wide one, although it is nonetheless 
interesting that think tanks and the press provoked civil service 
investigations of Laffer’s theory.79 There was not the same evidence 
of engagement around the 1992 election, suggesting perhaps that 
the interest in the Laffer curve work had been an exception, or that 
think tanks like the ASI had become less influential. Treasury officials 
did, however, meet IFS Director Andrew Dilnot to talk about the IFS’s 
budget recommendations in January 1992. A memo on the meeting 
reported that Dilnot argued that a cut in the basic rate of income tax 
would be more ‘conspicuous’ than increasing allowances, which was 
 
77 See for example: ‘Memorandum from M Haigh to Hutson, 21 October 1986’. T 
470/385, 1986; ‘Memorandum from A W Kuczys to C Scholar, 10 December 1986’. 
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more progressive.80 This perhaps implied popular support for tax cuts 
but it was hardly a strong declaration of his ideas about popular 
attitudes.  
 
Although external engagement around tax seemed slightly more 
extensive in 1987 than in previous periods, little evidence was found 
of civil servants receiving any clear representations about popular 
attitudes from outside bodies, or seeking any evidence. In any case, 
as we have seen, the years of Conservative government do not 
seem to have changed civil service ideas about popular attitudes to 
tax. They remained fundamentally consistent with earlier periods — 
assuming popular support for tax cuts, but also concern about 
fairness. 
 
The Labour party 
 
Relatively few Labour comments about popular attitudes to tax were 
found in the run-up to the 1987 election. Those that were located 
were similar to Conservative and civil service statements, although 
with more emphasis on economic competence. Some assumed 
support for spending and concern about fairness.81 At a 
 
80 ‘Note for the Record: IFS Green Budget: Tax Options, 30 January 1992’. The 
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81 See for example: ‘A "Caring Community and Personal Freedom" Campaign, 16 
September 1985’, KNNK 2/1 67, (The Papers of Neil Kinnock, Churchill Archives 
Centre, Cambridge), 1985; ‘The Proposed Campaign on Freedom and Fairness. (A 
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parliamentary committee meeting in March 1986, deputy leader Roy 
Hattersley suggested that they needed to increase taxation on the 
richest, which he was sure was 'both economically and politically 
right'.82 One November 1985 note even asserted, based on polling, 
that people were willing to pay higher taxes for services: 
A clear majority (68 per cent) believe that government services such as 
health, education and welfare should be extended, even if this means 
some increases in taxes or national insurance contributions.83 
 
However, comments also argued that Labour was not trusted on the 
economy and implied opposition to tax, particularly if services weren’t 
seen as value for money.84 The November 1985 note continued: 
The campaign must not sound as if Labour intends to "spend, spend, 
spend" in a way which is idealistic but unrealistic. We have to address 
people's understandable unwillingness to support extra public services 
through taxation if they don't think they will provide value for money.85  
At the parliamentary meeting in March 1986 John Smith stated that 
he was in favour of increasing taxation on the wealthy in principle, 
but stressed that they should avoid ‘precise figures’ in defining who 
was rich.86 Brynmor John also suggested that they had lost votes 
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through ‘irresponsibility’ and expressed concern that the 
Conservatives were costing Labour’s programme at £24 billion.87  
 
No discussions of popular attitudes to tax were found during the 1987 
election campaign itself, although Benn reported in February that the 
party leader, Neil Kinnock, had suggested that tax cuts would be a 
strength for the Conservatives.88 The party was also conducting an 
unprecedented level of polling, with summaries produced daily at 
some points. These almost universally suggested that either tax 
increases or overspending were viewed as negatives for Labour.89 
The lone exception was a report in early June which suggested that 
although tax was a negative for Labour, voters seemed ‘sick of this 
issue’.90 One polling summary at the end of May, for example, 
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reported that slightly more people thought that their standard of living 
would decline under Labour than believed it wouldn’t, with increased 
taxes the most popular reason, as well as concern about where the 
money for spending would come from.91 It quoted two participants as 
saying: 
"They'd have more tax from you. They have a track record of not managing 
the economy very well" (Male, 25-34, AB, would not vote, Vale of 
Glamorgan) … … "I think they are making promises they cannot keep. 
They have to get their money from somewhere - probably me" (Female, 
60-64, DE, Con, Darlington).92 
The report on this research did not highlight the tax findings in 
particular but did describe the findings on economic management as 
‘grim’, and suggested that they needed to find a way to reassure 
voters.93 Yet at the same time, the tone of the reports could 
sometimes be very dismissive of electorate.94 One summary in early 
June stated: 
Some evidence that CON voters are not thoughtful enough about 
events/issues/the world (a bit thick?). Find a way to appeal to them to stop 
and think.95 
 
Election post-mortems, which were also dominated by polling, 
highlighted tax as an issue but not Labour’s only problem. Defence, 
the ‘loony left’, and economic competence also featured in most 
assessments.96 Hattersley stated at a parliamentary meeting in July 
 
1987. 
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1987, for example: 
We should recognise that votes had been lost through our policies on 
defence, on the economy - particularly taxation policy ... The worry on the 
economy had been whether Labour put the new apparent prosperity in 
jeopardy, and where the money would come from for our policies.97 
A report titled ‘Economic issues in the election campaign’ was 
equivocal about whether tax or economic competence had been 
more important: 
The above summary of our polling shows that our economic competence 
was in doubt from the start of the campaign, and that the publicity given to 
income tax in the final week did not make that perception significantly 
worse. But one of the main reasons for public fear about what Labour 
would do to living standards was the fear of taxation increases … taxation 
was frequently mentioned in the final polls as making people feel less 
positive towards Labour. Additional telephone polling towards the end of 
the campaign suggested, however, that our message about restricting tax 
increases to people over £500 a week was getting through.98   
Reports on the findings of Shadow Communications Agency (SCA) 
research, which appears to have been largely based on focus 
groups, did not often present tax as the crucial issue. One of their 
reports suggested that voters had supported Labour’s plan to reverse 
the Conservative tax cuts to increase spending, for example.99 A final 
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report in September 1987 summed up the varied findings of the 
polling. It suggested that before the election it seemed that tax was 
unimportant and people supported services over tax cuts, although 
people thought tax cuts were good for them personally. During the 
election tax became a much more important issue and was negative 
for Labour on both economic competence and living standards. 
Polling after the election, however, suggested that tax had been less 
important than other issues. It did not attempt to explain these 
findings or draw any conclusions.100  
 
The 1987 defeat does not in the short to medium term seem to have 
substantially changed Labour politicians’ ideas about tax. During a 
parliamentary committee meeting ahead of the 1988 budget, several 
MPs suggested that opposing the planned tax cuts would be 
unpopular but was necessary to maintain the internal coherence of 
their message about the need for increased spending.101 Smith 
stated, for example, that they ‘did not want to be the "high tax" Party 
but could not afford to fudge the issue of the greater claims of social 
and community expenditure’.102 In meetings after the 1988 budget 
Labour politicians seemed even more sure that people supported 
spending over tax cuts. Kinnock argued, for example, that it was 
‘clear’ that they ‘were winning the argument and that people 
preferred proper NHS funding to tax cuts’, while backbencher Harry 
Ewing thought the tax cuts for the wealthy were 'hugely 
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101 ‘Minutes of a Parliamentary Committee Meeting Held on Wednesday 10 
February 1988 at 5.00 pm in the Parliamentary Committee Room’, Parliamentary 
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unacceptable' and could represent a turning point.103  
 
Once planning for the next election began in 1990, however, Labour 
politicians seemed more concerned.104 A strategic planning note for 
1990/91, for example, stated ‘Taxes is a real Achilles heel’.105 
Interestingly, this was despite including (unspecified) polling that 
seemed positive for Labour — showing them ahead on keeping down 
taxes and suggesting that people were significantly more concerned 
about the wealthy not paying their fair share than about the level of 
their own taxes.106 Fairness appeared in these discussions as a way 
to increase support for tax reform, with various notes and memos 
stressing the importance of emphasising fairness in relation to 
taxation.107 One planning note also specified that this focus on 
fairness, and prudence, was targeted at everyone but particularly ‘B, 
C1, C2 who either imagine that lots of people earn over £20,000 or 
expect/hope that they might…’.108  
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It is unclear whether increased concern was driven by polling. In 
general, this continued to show a mixed picture, broadly suggesting 
that respondents thought that Labour would put up their taxes and 
were concerned about their economic competence, but were equally 
worried about inequality, supported increased spending on services, 
and did not think that tax was a major issue.109 An SCA report (based 
on only 30 telephone interviews) in March 1989 concluded:  
Some contradictory responses here, but generally representing a shift from 
tax cuts to public spending.110 
Another SCA report a month earlier had suggested that people liked 
tax cuts and thought Labour would increase taxes, but were 
unimpressed by the tax cuts in the previous budget which they 
believed had benefited the wealthy and just been taken away from 
them in other ways.111 A note on the reception of the policy review in 
 
1960s onwards. B referred to intermediate managerial, administrative, and 
professional workers, C1 to supervisory, clerical and junior managerial, 
administrative, and professional workers, and C2 to skilled manual workers. 
109 See for example: ‘Letter from Patricia Hewitt, 14 October 1987’, KNNK 2/1 98, 
(The Papers of Neil Kinnock, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1987; Philip 
Gould & Associates Ltd, ‘The Attitudes of the Affluent Working Class, 15 December 
1987’, KNNK 2/1 95, (The Papers of Neil Kinnock, Churchill Archives Centre, 
Cambridge), 1987; Shadow Communications Agency, ‘Voters, Values and Labour's 
Policy Review. Summary of Quantitative Data: September 1988. Prepared for Sca 
Presentation on Policy Review’, KNNK 2/1 101, (The Papers of Neil Kinnock, 
Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1988; Shadow Communications Agency, 
‘Labour Party Economic Policy: Qualitative Research, 10 February 1989’, KNNK 
6/1 24, (The Papers of Neil Kinnock, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1989; 
Shadow Communications Agency, ‘Economic Background Research - Findings 
and Conclusions, 9 March 1989’, KNNK 6/1 24, (The Papers of Neil Kinnock, 
Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1989; National Opinion Polls, ‘Summary 
Presentation. Political Attitudes 2, 21st November 1990’, KNNK 2/1 164, (The 
Papers of Neil Kinnock, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1990; ‘Labour, 
Taxation and Public Spending: Summary of Research and Strategic Implications, 
November 1991’, KNNK 3/4/1 24, (The Papers of Neil Kinnock, Churchill Archives 
Centre, Cambridge), 1991. 
110 Shadow Communications Agency, ‘Economic Background Research - Findings 
and Conclusions, 9 March 1989’, KNNK 6/1 24, The Papers of Neil Kinnock, 1989. 
111 Shadow Communications Agency, ‘Labour Party Economic Policy: Qualitative 
Research, 10 February 1989’, KNNK 6/1 24, The Papers of Neil Kinnock, 1989. 
 
374 
1990 suggested that it had been partially successful — some people 
felt that Labour had changed and would not increase taxes on the 
majority, but others still thought that Labour would raise taxes on 
middle earners.112 An unsigned research summary in 1990 stated: 
There are three levels of concrn[sic] about Labour 
- How is it going to be paid for? 
- Will taxes go up more? 
- Are they competent?113 
Polling could have contributed to increasing concern about 
opposition to tax from 1990 but it could equally have reassured 
Labour that their tax policies would be popular. 
 
Most comments in the lead-up to the election in 1992 assumed that 
tax was a major problem for Labour, and that people wanted tax 
cuts.114 One outlier was Smith, who in February argued that Labour 
would win the argument over the budget 'because the nation was not 
in a tax cutting mood when the needs of the public services were so 
great and so explicit’.115 Other Labour politicians did not seem as 
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convinced, however. In a parliamentary committee meeting in 
February 1992, shadow leader of the commons Jack Cunningham 
stated that 'The Tories were wrecking us by talking solely about 
tax’.116 Shadow secretary of state for work and pensions Michael 
Meacher similarly described tax as Labour’s ‘most vulnerable point’ 
in a letter to Kinnock in January.117  
 
During the election itself, if anything polling appeared slightly more 
positive, suggesting that services were a far bigger issue than taxes, 
though voters continued to be concerned about avoiding waste and 
not being overly punitive towards the wealthy.118 Reports from 
constituencies in March also suggested that the shadow budget was 
popular.119 However, one constituency report stated that several 
candidates were concerned about tax, that there was confusion 
about it, and that some people on low pay thought that their taxes 
were going to increase.120 Given the scarcity of comments about 
popular attitudes to tax during the election itself, it is hard to say what 
impact these reports had on Labour politicians’ ideas.  
 
After the election, however, there were numerous conversations 
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March 1992’, NEC subcommittee 48, (Labour Party, Labour Party Archive, 
People’s History Museum), 1992. 
120 ‘Key Seats Unit Report, 24 March 1992’, NEC subcommittee 48, (Labour Party, 
Labour Party Archive, People’s History Museum), 1992. 
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about the result and tax. Most seemed to conclude that tax had been 
important but probably not the main cause of their defeat and 
potentially not as crucial as economic competence. Defence policy 
and perceptions of the ‘loony left’ were often mentioned, along with 
the bias of the tabloid media.121 Post-election focus groups also 
suggested that tax had been a factor, but not the most important.122 
One report placed more emphasis on taxes, but still did not argue 
that it had been the only issue: 
… the proposals to raise tax on the rich worried not only the rich but the 
aspirant rich (a very wide group) and fed off the heritage of high taxes from 
Labour governments of the past. The issue was contained by Labour's 
counter measures (the issue never rose beyond 15% in salience and never 
got to the top 6 issues) but nonetheless affected a large enough group to 
be a damaging factor on the day.123  
As with their pre-election strategy there was a class element to some 
analyses of Labour’s failure — with affluent, or aspiring, working-
class (and usually southern) voters identified as being those Labour 
had lost.124 The Fabian Society produced a report immediately after 
the election, Southern Discomfort, written by Giles Radice, which 
 
121 See for example: ‘General Election 1992. Preliminary Report: Note from 
General Secretary, 15 April 1992’, KNNK 3/4/1 76, (The Papers of Neil Kinnock, 
Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1992; ‘Interim Assessment of the Causes 
of Labour's 1992 Election Defeat: To What Extent Was It Presentation and to What 
Extent Content?, 30 April 1992’, KNNK 3/4/1 76, (The Papers of Neil Kinnock, 
Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1992; ‘Minutes of a Meeting of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party Held on Wednesday 1 July 1992 at 11.00 am in 
Committee Room 14’, Parliamentary Labour Party papers, 1968/69-1993/94 
Shadow Cabinet meetings - Minutes for 1991/92 session, Microform Academic 
Publishers), 1992; ‘1992 General Election Result. Reasons for Defeat’, KNNK 3/4/1 
76, (The Papers of Neil Kinnock, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1992; 
David Hill, ‘General Election Campaign - Some Observations, 24 June 1992’, 
KNNK 3/4/1 76, (The Papers of Neil Kinnock, Churchill Archives Centre, 
Cambridge), 1992. 
122 ‘Analysis of Post-Election Verbatims (from Nop's Poll 29)’, KNNK 3/4/1 76, (The 
Papers of Neil Kinnock, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge), 1992; ‘Post 
Election Polling’, KNNK 3/4/1 76, (The Papers of Neil Kinnock, Churchill Archives 
Centre, Cambridge), 1992. 
123 ‘Interim Assessment of the Causes of Labour's 1992 Election Defeat: To What 
Extent Was It Presentation and to What Extent Content?, 30 April 1992’, KNNK 
3/4/1 76, The Papers of Neil Kinnock, 1992. 
124 See for example: ibid. 
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looked at why Labour had failed with white-collar and skilled swing 
voters in southern England. Although it did discuss economic 
competence, it emphasised opposition to taxation and redistribution 
more than most of the other post-mortems.125 Its methodology and 
the value of its findings were questioned at the time, and have been 
since, but it was leaked to the media and was influential in debates 
about the future direction of the party.126  
 
Ideas about popular attitudes to tax in the Labour party around the 
1987 election were mixed. Although there was a general assumption 
that tax was negative for Labour, there was also a consensus that 
service increases were popular and fairness important. Their defeat 
in 1987 does not seem immediately to have changed that. Once 
planning for the next election began, around 1990, concern about 
popular opposition to tax seems to have increased, although this was 
never uncontested. It does not appear that this increased concern 
was primarily driven by opinion research, although the party was 
conducting an unprecedented amount. Research findings continued 
to suggest a mixed and nuanced picture of popular attitudes to tax, 
which did not change dramatically between 1987 and 1992. 
Interestingly, most assessments of Labour’s 1992 election defeat 
highlighted tax as one of a range of problems, with economic 
competence perhaps the most important. This chimes with the 
conclusions of the secondary literature. The analysis of tax as the 
major problem in Southern Discomfort, however, seems to have been 
 
125 Radice, Southern Discomfort. 
126 Ibid.; Giles Radice and Stephen Pollard, More Southern Discomfort: A Year on--
Taxing and Spending, Fabian Tract 560 (London: Fabian Society, 1993); Giles 
Radice and Stephen Pollard, Any Southern Comfort?, Fabian Tract 568 (London: 
Fabian Society, 1994); Heath, Jowell, and Curtice, ‘Can Labour Win?’; Wring, The 
Politics of Marketing the Labour Party, 124-131. 
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more influential within the party in the longer term.  
 
The Trades Union Congress 
 
The years around the 1987 election seem to have produced slightly 
more internal TUC discussion of popular attitudes to tax than earlier 
periods studied, although the number of comments was still very 
limited. In general, they suggested that TUC officials thought that tax 
increases were unpopular, but did not overstate this or rule out the 
possibility of wholesale change.127 Attendees at a meeting about an 
internal report on inequality in March 1987 seemed concerned about 
popular opposition to tax reform, stating that it ‘would involve severe 
political difficulty, for example, in abolishing mortgage interest tax 
relief’.128 The meeting report also stated: 
It was said that it was unacceptable that assistance to people on low 
incomes should be at the expense of punitive tax rates on middle incomes 
or squeezed income differentials … The TUC needed to be wary of income 
tax measures that would hit middle income groups and should develop 
proposals for more effective taxation of capital and wealth, including 
distributed profits.129  
In some senses the TUC had always represented ‘middle income 
groups’ (depending on what they meant here by ‘middle income’), in 
that their primary constituency was skilled workers. It is possible that 
this was simply a more explicit statement of their long-term strategy 
— increasing taxes on high earners but avoiding increased taxation 
on their members. It nonetheless felt like a change of tone, perhaps 
 
127 See for example: ‘Trades Union Congress: 1986 Budget. Econ Ctee 7/7. 9 April 
1986’, MSS.292D 410.2/12, (TUC, MRC), 1986; ‘1987 Budget Briefing, 17 March 
1987’, MSS.292D 410.2/13, (TUC, MRC), 1987; ‘Extracts from Economic Minutes, 
Dated March 11 1987: Income and Wealth Distribution’, MSS.292D 411.1/6, (TUC, 
MRC), 1987; ‘Trades Union Congress: Income and Wealth Distribution. Econ Ctee 
3/6. 10 December 1986’, MSS.292D 411.1/6, (TUC, MRC), 1986. 
128 ‘Extracts from Economic Minutes, Dated March 11 1987: Income and Wealth 




part of the “new realism” approach that the TUC adopted around this 
time.130 Interestingly, fairness was absent from the comments found. 
With so few comments it is hard to say whether ideas had changed, 
or whether fairness remained a significant part of TUC officials’ ideas 
about popular attitudes to tax, but it did not appear in the few 
comments found.  
 
At the same time, comments did not suggest that opposition was 
unmitigated, or perhaps as intense as politicians believed it to be.131 
The 1987 TUC budget briefing stated, for example: 
The Chancellor will be determined to present a 'popular' tax cutting budget, 
with few hostages to fortune in order to pave the way for an early 
election.132 
Superficially this clearly suggested that tax cuts were popular, but the 
quotes around popular perhaps implied some scepticism.133 The 
report on inequality also stated: 
One problem in this area is the opposition from the “losers” (even if the 
loss is in relative rather than absolute terms, always tends to outweigh the 
support from the “gainers”. It is certainly more vocal … there is some 
reluctance among taxpayers, keenly perceived in the political sphere, to 
see reforms in taxation that will change their circumstances in any way.134 
This again suggested opposition, but qualified opposition. It also did 
not conclude that the public were entirely opposed to tax changes but 
instead pointed out that countries that had succeeded in tax reform 
 
130 See for example: D. Marsh, The New Politics of British Trade Unionism: Union 
Power and the Thatcher Legacy (Basingstoke: Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1992, 
1992), 240-241; John McIlroy, Trade Unions in Britain Today / John Mcilroy, 2nd 
ed. ed. (Manchester: Manchester : Manchester University Press, c1995., 1995), 
210-214. 
131 See for example: ‘Trades Union Congress: 1986 Budget. Econ Ctee 7/7. 9 April 
1986’, MSS.292D 410.2/12, TUC, 1986; ‘1987 Budget Briefing, 17 March 1987’, 
MSS.292D 410.2/13, TUC, 1987; ‘Trades Union Congress: Income and Wealth 
Distribution. Econ Ctee 3/6. 10 December 1986’, MSS.292D 411.1/6, TUC, 1986. 
132 ‘1987 Budget Briefing, 17 March 1987’, MSS.292D 410.2/13, TUC, 1987. 
133 See also: ‘Trades Union Congress: 1986 Budget. Econ Ctee 7/7. 9 April 1986’, 
MSS.292D 410.2/12, TUC, 1986. 
134 ‘Trades Union Congress: Income and Wealth Distribution. Econ Ctee 3/6. 10 
December 1986’, MSS.292D 411.1/6, TUC, 1986. 
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had tended to institute comprehensive and large-scale change rather 
than piecemeal measures.135  
 
Fairness was emphasised in external representations referencing 
attitudes to tax, although only two of these were found during this 
period. In 1985, at a meeting with the chancellor, TUC 
representatives argued that:  
… people would see through a bogus budget: one which financed income 
tax cuts by further asset sales, increased VAT and mean mindedness on 
social benefits.136  
In their public budget submissions ahead of the 1988 budget, the 
TUC also identified the issues of concern for trade unionists and the 
‘taxpaying public' as tax avoidance, maintaining zero VAT ratings for 
essentials, and employment-related tax reliefs.137 Of course, external 
statements served a persuasive function. However, the continuing 
use of fairness here perhaps suggests, at least, that they thought 
fairness was strategically useful in this context.  
 
Evidence of TUC officials consulting survey results about attitudes to 
tax was found for the first time in 1986; the report on inequality 
referenced survey findings from a poll conducted by London 
Weekend Television. It suggested that most people favoured 
redistribution, but that there was less support for redistributive tax 
proposals. It was unclear which, if any, of the report’s later 
conclusions were based on these survey findings. This could have 
been indicative of increasing interest in attitudes to tax. However, the 
 
135 Ibid. 
136 ‘Trades Union Congress: Summary Report of a Meeting with the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer Held on Friday February 8 1985 at 3.Pp pm at H M Treasury. Econ 
Ctee 5/13. 13 February 1985’, MSS.292D 410.2/11, (TUC, MRC), 1985. 
137 ‘Taxation: TUC Technical Representations for 1988 Budget. Econ Ctee 2/2 - 
November 11 1987’, MSS.292D 410.2/14, (TUC, MRC), 1987. 
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fact that this survey was used rather than the more reliable BSA data, 
which had been widely reported, does not suggest a particularly 
extensive exploration of the available evidence. The TUC seems to 
have been consulting more opinion research in general around 1987, 
but most of this work did not focus on tax.138 The inclusion of a single 
survey from a television network does not seem to suggest any 
systematic effort to access evidence of popular attitudes to tax, 
although it was more than was found in earlier periods. 
 
As previously, little evidence was found of think tanks or other 
organisations influencing TUC ideas. Internal reports in the 1980s 
referenced IFS work but not in relation to popular attitudes.139 
Communications from members about tax also seemed to have 
declined. In particular, letters from individuals, unions, and councils 
almost entirely disappeared after 1981. This is potentially explained 
by a change in the TUC filing system in the 1980s, which meant that 
much less material from this period survived. The 1986 inequality 
report was circulated to unions for comment, but no responses to the 
section on attitudes to tax were recorded.140 
 
Congress resolutions continued, although few were submitted about 
national tax in the late 1980s (poll tax resolutions excluded). In 1987 
there was a resolution calling for the continued zero VAT rating of 
 
138 See for example: ‘Trades Union Congress: TUC Submission on Taxes and 
Benefits for the 1984 Budget. Econ Ctee 2/9. 9 November 1983’, MSS.292D 
410.2/10, (TUC, MRC), 1983; ‘Extract from NIC Minutes, Dated 10.10.85: Opinion 
Research’, MSS.292D 780/4, (TUC, MRC), 1985; ‘Trades Union Congress: 
Guidelines for Trade Unions on the Use of Opinion Research’, MSS.292D 780/4, 
(TUC, MRC), 1987. 
139 See for example: ‘Trades Union Congress: Income and Wealth Distribution. 
Econ Ctee 3/6. 10 December 1986’, MSS.292D 411.1/6, TUC, 1986. 
140 ‘Trades Union Congress: Income and Wealth Distribution. Econ Ctee 6/3. 11 
March 1987’, MSS.292D 411.1/6, (TUC, MRC), 1987. 
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books, magazines and newspapers, but it was moved by the relevant 
union and was primarily concerned with potential job losses.141 The 
most interesting motion came in 1989. It criticised the current tax 
system and the Thatcher government’s changes to it as inefficient 
and unfair. It stated that the TUC had wrongly been seen as in favour 
of high taxation and spending for too long, but that the motion was 
about making taxes fairer not increasing them. It also argued that 
people were beginning to see what an ‘illusion’ the Conservative 
promises of lower taxes had been for ordinary people. No evidence 
was provided in support of this claim. The motion was passed but no 
discussion of its claims about popular attitudes were recorded.142 It 
was moved by Clive Brooke, head of the IRSF and member of the 
TUC General Council. His views were therefore presumably 
accessible to other TUC leaders but they do not appear in the 
internal discussions found. The motion seems close to the line being 
taken by the Labour party on fair rather than high taxation. Given 
Brooke’s seniority, one possibility seems to be that it was primarily a 
political motion, designed to align the IRSF, or TUC, with the Labour 
party’s external comments, rather than an expression of his 
members’ views. In any case, it was the only example of this type of 
motion. Taxation did not, in general, seem to be a particular 
preoccupation of union members in the second half of the 1980s. 
Given the decline in the volume of correspondence with members 
and unions, however, this conclusion is tentative. 
 
TUC officials’ comments about attitudes to tax were, as in previous 
periods, very limited. It seems perhaps that internal comments 
 
141 Trades Union Congress, TUC Report, 1982 (London: TUC, 1982), 532-533; 
Trades Union Congress, TUC Report, 1987 (London: TUC, 1987). 
142 Trades Union Congress, TUC Report, 1989 (London: TUC, 1989), 428-431. 
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emphasised opposition to tax increases more and fairness less. This 
may have been part of the ‘new realism’ strategy. However, the few 
external comments found continued to focus on fairness. It seems 
plausible that this was a strategic decision, but it is also possible that 
it remained an important strand of TUC ideas about popular attitudes 
to tax that simply did not appear in the few internal comments found. 
Although a report referenced polling for the first time, the fact that it 
was a small survey and no reference was made to the widely 
publicised BSA data does not suggest any significant attempt to 
investigate popular attitudes to tax. The communications that were 
found from members did not suggest that tax was a key issue for 
them, either, although far fewer of these were found in this period. 
Overall, TUC officials seemed perhaps to give more weight to 
popular opposition to tax changes around the 1987 election, but this 
is a very cautious conclusion; in general, tax does not appear to have 
been a major focus. 
 
The Confederation of British Industry 
 
The CBI seemed more interested in tax policy in the years leading up 
to the 1987 election.143 A working party was established, which in late 
1985 advocated a series of radical and controversial reforms. It 
proposed, among other things, an essentially flat rate of income tax 
at 40 percent; ‘real’ capital gains taxed at the same rate; means-
testing of benefits; the end of taxation of business assets, with 
 
143 Unfortunately, due to archival access issues caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, 
the discussion of the CBI’s attitudes to tax in this period is more provisional than 
that for the other organisations discussed here. While significant archival research 
was completed, a full analysis of all potentially relevant files was not possible, 
leaving the potential that important documents may have been missed. 
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corporate taxation falling only on net distributions of dividends and 
capital; gradual reduction of employers’ NICs; and the extension of 
VAT to zero-rated items.144 It led to significant engagement and 
opposition from CBI members, as well as discussion of what 
members and the public at large would accept when it came to tax 
reform. 
 
Interestingly, it was justified as a response to ‘continuous criticism of 
the tax system by CBI members in recent years’ and as the result of 
a consultation with members in which ‘dissatisfaction with the tax 
system was one of the main membership messages to emerge’.145 
The Director General even stated that ‘all businesses were united … 
in criticism of the present tax system’.146 This emphasis on opposition 
within the CBI membership is perhaps surprising in light of the 
significant cuts to corporate taxation that had been made in the 
preceding years.  
 
CBI officials were, nonetheless, aware that the report was going to 
be controversial with members, and while they did not seem overly 
 
144 ‘Tax - Time for Change, Dec 1985’, MSS.200/C 4/1985/26, (Confederation of 
British Industry Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1985. 
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1985’, MSS.200/C 2004/Box 101, (Confederation of British Industry Archive, 
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146 ‘Tax Reform Working Party Report: Note of Points Made at President's 
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of British Industry Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1985. 
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concerned about this, dismissing them as ‘sectoral interests’, they did 
send out a questionnaire with technical questions related to the 
proposals in the report in 1986.147 Although some members 
responded by expressing opposition to the level and structure of 
taxation, many expressed concern that the proposals were unfair and 
would not be accepted by the public or by any reasonable 
government.148 One member stated that his thoughts on tax were, as 
with ‘most citizens of the U.K., unprintable’.149 However, another 
 
147 ‘Tax Reform: Speaking Brief for Regional Chairmen, 27 February 1986’, 
MSS.200/C 2004/Box 101, Confederation of British Industry Archive, 1986; 
‘Memorandum from A J Webb to A K Edwards, 6 August 1985’, MSS.200/C 
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(Confederation of British Industry Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of 
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Engineering Plc’, MSS.200/C Dec 1996/7921, (Confederation of British Industry 
Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1986; ‘Questionnaire on 
Tax Reform: Peter Clare, E. A. Clare & Son Ltd’, MSS.200/C Dec 1996/7921, 
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Warwick), 1986; ‘Questionnaire on Tax Reform: Dick Blaxland, Quilter Goodison 
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Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick), 1986; ‘Questionnaire on Tax 
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(Confederation of British Industry Archive, Modern Records Centre, University of 
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Group’, MSS.200/C Dec 1996/7922, (Confederation of British Industry Archive, 
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member, from Brintons Ltd, wrote: 
While I accept that from a business point of view zero corporation tax and 
zero employers' NIC would be a wonderful thing, from a personal point of 
view the resulting dramatic increase in the burden of my personal taxation 
would be such as to lead me to curse the CBI if they were successful in 
achieving this objective.150  
Others were more explicit that their concern was perceptions of the 
proposal as unfair. Peter Clare, from E. A. Clare & Son Ltd, argued: 
From the I.R. & P.R. point of view industry must not appear to be avoiding 
paying acceptable amounts of tax. The 'man in the street' would be unable 
to accept or understand why he paid more VAT etc. when companies were 
not paying their fair share.151 
The head of the tax department at Air Products Ltd stated: 
There is still wide dissatisfaction with the tax system but I perceive this to 
come from two causes: 1. A dissatisfaction with the so called 'black 
economy', felt by the people who cannot help paying taxes. 2. A perception 
that the rate of tax paid by low earners at entry point is just too high.152 
The memo concluded:  
… the report gives the impression of being written by a group of people 
who have had all their tax reliefs and do not want anybody else to get 
any.153 
These were presumably the most engaged members in that they 
replied to the questionnaire with detailed comments. However, in 
general, CBI members do not appear to have been delighted by the 
Thatcherite corporate tax reforms and, although they seem to have 
assumed a certain level of popular opposition to tax, they also 
appeared to think that perceptions of fairness were at least as, if not 
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Internally, discussions of popular attitudes to tax in relation to the 
working party were not extensive but seem to have echoed similar 
themes.154 The record of a meeting about the report in October 1985 
stated: 
Sir Austin Pearce said that he saw the report as being criticised on 
grounds that it went over the top in favour of business and denied the 
responsibility for business to pay any tax. This was not easy to defend … 
He saw major difficulties in selling the concepts of the report to politicians 
and the public at large.155 
A year later, in discussion about their 1987 budget representations, 
several officials ‘thought the Government should not use tax cuts to 
try and win the election’, while another ‘questioned the electoral 
advantage of tax cuts’.156 In June 1987, the minutes of a taxation 
committee meeting also reported the opinion that it might be ‘difficult 
to put a ceiling on employees' national insurance contributions if 
higher rates of tax were abolished’.157 CBI officials seem to have 
mentioned popular attitudes to tax infrequently between 1985 and 
1987, but when they did they emphasised concerns about fairness 
and even, in one case, questioned whether tax cuts were actually 
electorally helpful.  
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The CBI appeared to take a new interest in radical tax reform in the 
mid 1980s, and advocated an ambitious and controversial range of 
proposals. It is noticeable that the CBI believed their members were 
intensely dissatisfied with the tax system well into the Thatcher 
government’s second term, despite significant cuts to corporate 
taxation. With a plan to essentially entirely cut corporate taxation it is 
hard to see beyond the suggestion of blatant self-interest and 
disregard for public opinion. However, CBI officials’ comments 
outside the working party implied opposition to tax but also 
questioned how extensive it was, as well as emphasising fairness. 
Many of the CBI members who responded to the working party’s 
proposals similarly expressed concern about perceptions of fairness. 
Although mixed, CBI comments seemed, as previously, to combine 





The only place studied where conversations about popular attitudes 
to tax did seem to have changed significantly was in the press. Tax 
was a high-profile issue in coverage of the 1987 election.158 
Conservative politicians and right-leaning papers repeatedly attacked 
Labour for having ‘hidden’ plans to increase taxation on ordinary 
voters.159 These attacks were assisted by confusion in Labour 
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messaging about how far down the income scale increases would 
reach, and by a lack of information in their manifesto.160 Tax was 
even more prominent during the 1992 ‘tax bombshell’ election, when 
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Image 9: Conservative election poster, 1987 




Image 10: Conservative election poster, 1992 
Source: Oxford, Bodleian Library POSTER 1992-13: https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.
uk/objects/771f7d9e-9380-42c7-9179-24a242b77ce0.  
 
The idea that tax was too high was not particularly prevalent during 
either campaign, although in 1987 both the Telegraph and Times did 
publish multiple cartoons suggesting that taxes were overly 
burdensome and intrusive (see image 11, for example).162 Articles in 
1987, and even more in 1992, did however argue that Labour would 
damage the economy through high taxation if elected.163 Neoliberal 
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Telegraph, 25 July 1987; Maddocks, ‘No Dear - That's Just for the Carpet, If You 
Want to Tack It Down - Tax Is Extra’, Daily Telegraph, 25 July 1987; Smith, ‘It's Me 
Capital Gains Tax, Doc - It Keeps Niggling Away at Me Back Pocket … ’, Times, 23 
May 1987; Smith, ‘You Can Let Go Now - You're Not Liable for Capital Gains up 
Here!’, Times, 27 June 1987; Smith, ‘Capital Gains Tax! Capital Gains Tax!’, 
Times, 4 July 1987; Richard Wilson, ‘Hmg’, ibid., 25 July. For articles that did argue 
that tax was too high in 1992 see: ‘May the Worst Lot Lose’, Economist, 4 April 
1992; ibid.; Martin Phillips and John Husband, ‘Major's Tax Fraud: Tories Caught 
with Their Hands in Your Pockets’, Daily Mirror, 6 April 1992; Charles Moore, ‘Vote 
Labour If You’re for the Union Dead’, Spectator, 14 March 1992; John Jacobs and 
Julian Le Grand, ‘Letters to the Editor: The Gap Widens between Rich and Poor’, 
Guardian, 2 April 1992. 
163 See for example: ‘Labour's Old Curiosity Shop’, Daily Mail, 21 May 1987; 
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economic justifications for this were much more common in 1987 
than they had been in 1979. Articles argued that low taxes were 
needed to increase efficiency and incentives, reduce brain drain, and 
compete with other countries. Sometimes they also argued that they 
would benefit those in poverty too, making lower taxes on the 
wealthy the moral choice.164 In 1992 the main arguments were that 
taxing the wealthy reduced their investment and consumption, and as 
they were the major consumers this damaged the economy more 
widely.165 Articles from 1979 warning that celebrities would leave 
Britain if Labour won were also revived in 1992.166 One in the Daily 
Mail quoted Andrew Lloyd Webber as saying, for example: 
I have never left this country. But this tax thing is so desperate, I would 
have to consider it. The tragedy of the Labour Party is not that their aims 
aren't sincere, it's just they have this absurd obsession that high earners 
are rich.167 
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Everyone a Loser’, Daily Mail, 3 April 1992; ‘A Tale of Two Moralities’, Observer, 
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June 1987; ‘Opinion: Now Nigel Can Swing the Tax Axe’, Daily Express, 18 June 
1987; Terence Stringer, ‘Thatcher the Pay Snatcher’, Daily Mirror, 26 May 1987. 
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British Middle Class’, Daily Express, 18 March 1992; Frank Johnson, ‘Mr Smith 
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Gaskell, ‘Showbiz Feels Tax Urge to Get up and Go’, Sunday Telegraph, 22 March 
1992. 
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Image 11: Daily Telegraph cartoon, 25 July 1987 
Source: Maddocks. ‘Gotcha!’ Daily Telegraph, 25 July 1987, 19. 
 
Discussions of popular attitudes to tax had changed significantly. In 
both 1987 and 1992 articles raised the possibility, based on polling, 
that people might prefer spending increases to tax cuts.168 One 
Guardian article, for example, stated in 1987:  
Polls have repeatedly shown in recent years that a majority would prefer to 
pay more tax if that paid for more hospital beds and better social 
 
168 See for example: Correspondent Walter Schwarz Religious Affairs, ‘Challenge 
on Poverty Gap’, Guardian, 13 May 1987; ‘The Lady May Last Forever’, ibid.; 
Roger Cowe, ‘Self-Interest Is Not All in This Election: In the First of Three Articles 
in the Election Run-up Roger Cowe Examines the Common Belief That a Tory 
Victory Is the Best Outcome for Investors’, ibid., 16 May; Neil Kinnock, ‘What I 
Believe In’, Sunday Mirror, 7 June 1987; Quentin Political Staff Cowdry, ‘Credibility 
‘a Major Problem for Labour’’, Daily Telegraph, 27 May 1987; George Jones and 
Simon Heffer, ‘‘There Is a Greater Social Conscience among the Electors Than the 
Government Is Allowing For’’, ibid., 18 May; Anthony King, ‘Read History's Lips - 
'No New Taxes' Is Not Always a Winner’, ibid., 7 April 1992; Alan Watkins, ‘Mr. 
Smith Turns Electoral Wisdom on Its Head’, Observer, 22 March 1992; Anthony 
King, ‘This Time Round, They Are All the Guilty Men’, Daily Telegraph, 12 March 
1992; David McKie, ‘Labour Maintains One-Point Lead: The Polls’, Guardian, 16 
March 1992; Robin Oakley and John Curtice, ‘Sceptical Voters Want Higher 
Spending before Cuts in Taxes’, Times, 16 March 1992; Watkins, ‘Mr. Smith Turns 




In 1992 Anthony King argued in the Daily Telegraph:  
Today, tax-raisers outnumber tax-cutters by nearly seven to one. The 
question may not be perfect but the shift in opinion is unmistakable. Nor 
should anyone be surprised. Incomes have risen considerably in recent 
years. The total tax burden has risen only slightly. Most people see modest 
tax increases as being within their means and they value highly - because 
they themselves use - the NHS, the state education system, public 
transport and other public services.170 
In 1987 this idea was fairly partisan, appearing mostly in left-leaning 
papers.171 A few articles in right-leaning papers expressed concern 
that people might be taken in by Labour and Alliance claims about 
the levels of tax increase required to raise spending, or by the 
argument that it was moral to pay higher taxes, and would forget that 
efficiency and growth were what would really benefit everyone.172 
One Telegraph editorial asked, for example: 
What worm of self-denial, what flagellatory obsession, causes so many 
successful British people to see virtue in voting against their strongest 
personal interests? Will none consider the possibility that those policies 
which favour their own economic success may also benefit society as a 
whole? … This is the route that many of the richer members of the 
chattering classes declare that they will follow tomorrow, no doubt fortified 
by the unlikelihood that a Labour victory will make those delightful 
sacrifices necessary. Disappointed fiscal flagellants could, we suppose, 
make donations to Oxfam in lieu of the higher taxes they will not be called 
upon to pay.173 
 
In both 1987 and 1992 these survey findings were questioned by 
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right-leaning and centrist papers, and some articles suggested that 
people were lying to pollsters.174 Woodrow Wyatt, for example, 
argued in the Times in 1987 that ‘Despite disclaimers to pollsters, tax 
cuts are actually popular’.175 Thatcher herself refuted the idea in a 
Telegraph interview, stating although she was told that people would 
rather have higher spending than tax cuts that was not what teachers 
or nurses were telling her — they said they needed higher take-home 
pay.176 The Times also published an opinion piece near the 
beginning of the 1987 election campaign by IEA founders Arthur 
Harris and Ralph Seldon, in which they suggested that ‘conventional 
opinion polls’ were biased, contrasting an IEA survey which used an, 
at best, questionable methodology to argue that very few people 
were actually willing to pay higher taxes to fund services.177 No 
articles by think tanks were found about this topic in 1992, but other 
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articles made similar arguments. One Observer commentator wrote:  
… asking people whether they would prefer tax cuts or increased public 
spending is a pointless, unpriced question. Telling an interviewer one 
supports tax increases for a worthy cause is free of charge.178  
Another Observer opinion piece argued after the election: 
If anything, Labour's problem at the recent election may have been that it 
embraced market economics with almost too much enthusiasm … If the 
polls indicated that people preferred better public services, they took the 
message of the market at face value, committing the crucial error of failing 
to distinguish between hypothetical tax cuts and actual tax increases.179  
It was also reported that the Conservatives believed that the polling 
was wrong and that even Labour were concerned that, in the end, 
people would think about their wallets.180  
 
Despite this new debate about whether people would prefer 
improved services to tax cuts, articles arguing that people hated 
taxes were still far more common in both 1987 and 1992.181 One 
1987 Express editorial, for example, asked:  
Are the British people really so unconcerned about their take-home pay 
that they will blithely vote for parties which openly promise to penalise 
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them with higher tax burdens?182 
John Cole argued in the New Statesman in 1992 that tax increases 
that would hit journalists were a particularly hard sell: 
It is, of course, the oldest problem in Labour's electoral lexicon. "To tax and 
to please is not given to man", as someone - I think Benjamin Franklin - 
once said. Yet governments of the left, which wish to use taxation both as 
a means of redistribution and to fund improved public services, have to 
argue their case, and risk displeasure. The fact that this displeasure comes 
from the better-paid, and often more articulate section of the community, 
adds to the risks.183  
 
Image 12: Daily Telegraph cartoon, 23 May 1987 
Source: Maddocks. ‘Check Your Insurance - He's a Moonlighting Tax Inspector … ’ 
Daily Telegraph, 23 May 1987, 26. 
 
The press highlighted tax as a reason for Labour’s defeat at both 
elections. In 1987 articles argued that tax had been a major issue, 
normally along with defence and the ‘loony left’, and suggested that 
Labour’s tax and spending plans had not been believable and voters 
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did not trust them with the economy.184 In 1992 the focus on tax was 
even more pronounced; papers on both sides of the political 
spectrum were almost entirely united in the argument that people’s 
self-interest and concern about increased taxation had won out.185 
Surveys around polling day showed that most people (incorrectly) 
thought they would be worse off under Labour’s tax plans and this 
was identified as a key reason for their defeat.186 Articles also argued 
that Labour had failed to recognise people’s aspiration to earn an 
amount that would qualify them for Labour’s tax increases in the 
future.187 One editorial in the Mirror argued, for example:  
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What Labour overlooked in its tax proposals during the general election 
campaign was that although only 10 per cent of the people earn £21,000 
or more, the other 90 per cent want to.188  
Some articles did suggest that other issues had been important in 
1992, highlighting Kinnock’s unpopularity, right to buy, and 
perceptions of economic management, among others.189 However, 
by a large margin most articles attributed Labour’s loss to their tax 
policies.190 The Guardian alone published more than ten articles 
within a couple of weeks of the election arguing that tax was 
responsible for Labour’s defeat, and only a couple suggesting 
alternative explanations.191 A long New Statesman report from a pub 
in Staffordshire concluded: 
There was a general consensus in the Red Lion that Labour had lost 
because a) Neil Kinnock was a lousy leader, b) the party had been "too 
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cocky" about winning, and c) its plans to put up taxes were vastly 
unpopular. "Why should I have to pay more tax so that he can carry on 
living on the dole?" was a typical comment - said, as often as not, by 
someone who'd had it said of him by someone else previously.192  
 
This aspirational critique was part of a classed analysis of Labour’s 
failure at both elections. In general, conversations about popular 
attitudes to tax around the 1987 election were less explicitly classed 
than previously. The right-leaning papers did not discuss class, 
instead focusing on ‘ordinary people’ and attacking Labour for trying 
to create division.193 The only exception to this was the Mirror, which 
published two articles criticising Conservatives for helping the 
wealthy with tax cuts while those on low incomes paid more.194 After 
the election, however, articles dissecting the result did present a 
classed analysis. They argued that it was ‘prosperous’, and in 
particular newly affluent, voters from the south of England that 
Labour had failed to win over.195  
 
This had only intensified by the 1992 election, when ‘Essex man’ 
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became the archetypal ‘C2’ floating voter. ‘Essex man’ was from a 
working-class background but had voted Conservative in 1979. He 
was portrayed as self-interested, consumerist, and aspirational.196 
Although the focus on ‘C2s’ was particularly noticeable, some articles 
did also identify traditional middle-class voters in the south as those 
who would be hit by Labour’s tax plans.197 One Express piece, for 
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We are talking about overnight impoverishment of that vital layer of 
innovators, entrepreneurs, managers and professionals upon whose ability 
and energy depend Britain's future. When Labour's class war tax seizes an 
extra £5,000 of a manager's pay, how on earth is the manager to manage? 
... The family is going to have to take its punishment for the socialist sin of 
having done better than the mob. So no more BUPA for them … No more 
help from you for dear Granny; she will have to leave her retirement flat 
and go into a council old folks' home. My God, what words are there to tell 
her?198  
This class focus was not limited to the right-leaning papers, although 
in the left-leaning papers it was mostly expressed in concern that it 
was not a good electoral strategy.199  
 
The geographic area covered by discussions about attitudes to tax 
had also reduced. A basic GIS analysis (with a very small sample 
size, as few articles discussing popular attitudes to tax mentioned 
specific areas during any of the elections studied) suggests that in 
1987, and even more so in 1992, discussions about popular attitudes 
to tax increasingly focused on the south of England, where, of 
course, the national press was predominantly based (see image 
13).200  
 
198 Bernard Shrimsley, ‘Greenfly on the Red Rose: Murdering the British Middle 
Class’, ibid., 18 March. 
199 See for example: William Keegan, ‘John Smith and the Middle Class Struggle: 
In My View’, Observer, 22 March 1992; Hutton, ‘Who Needs the Middle Classes: 
Will Hutton Urges Labour Not to Alienate People Who Could Become Powerful 
Allies’, Guardian, 19 March 1992; ‘A Tale of Two Moralities’, Observer, 22 March 
1992; Cole, ‘Pity the Poor Voter’, New Statesman, 20 March 1992; Teresa Hunter, 
‘Independent Schools --- the Painful Lesson for Parents: Finding the Money to Pay 
for a Child's Education Is Proving Increasingy Difficult as the Recession Continues 
to Take Its Toll’, Guardian, 4 April 1992. 
200 Articles referencing attitudes to tax around elections recorded as part of the 
initial analysis were recoded on whether they mentioned a geographical location 
and, if so, where. The results were mapped using ArcGIs based on number of 
mentions of each location. For 1992 mentions of ‘South’ and ‘South East’ have 
been aggregated to make the map more legible as ArcGIS marks these locations 
in the same place, near London. London and ‘South’ have not been aggregated so 
two circles are visible centred on London. If they were the disparity would be even 
more extreme. In general, England dominated coverage — Scotland and Wales 
were rarely mentioned and no mentions of Northern Ireland were found. 
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Image 13: Geographical locations mentioned in articles 
discussing popular attitudes to tax, 1950, 1959, 1970, 1979, 













Along with this new class and geographical focus, two stories about 
the recent history of popular attitudes to tax also emerged at the 
1987 election. The first suggested that attitudes had fundamentally 
changed since Thatcher’s election in 1979.201 The other argued that 
Thatcher’s election was the result of attitudes changing throughout 
the 1970s, culminating in a groundswell of support for tax cuts.202 
One Economist article demonstrating the second idea argued, for 
example: 
By 1979, many Britons — including many who did not call themselves 
Conservatives — were thinking in Thatcherite terms … Taxes were too 
 
201 Smith, ‘Commentary’, Times, 12 May 1987; Cowe, ‘Self-Interest Is Not All in 
This Election: In the First of Three Articles in the Election Run-up Roger Cowe 
Examines the Common Belief That a Tory Victory Is the Best Outcome for 
Investors’, Guardian, 16 May 1987; Lord Blake, ‘The Meaning of Thatcherism’, 
Daily Telegraph, 29 May 1987; Wyatt, ‘My Forecasts for 1992’, Times, 13 June 
1987; ‘Any Socialists Now?’, ibid., 20 July; Hugo Young, ‘The Convictions That Will 
Not Serve the Full Term’, Guardian, 21 July 1987. 
202 ‘June's Choice’, Economist, 6 June 1987; T. E. Utley, ‘Thatcher Factor—the 
Facts’, Times, 8 June 1987; ‘Voting for Freedom’, ibid., 11 June; Livingstone, ‘Lost 







high, especially given the quality of public spending which they paid for.203  
Neither idea was common but in 1987 the suggestion that attitudes 
had changed since 1979 was mentioned roughly twice as often as 
the idea they had changed in the 1970s.204 They were both limited to 
the broadsheets but did not only appear in right-leaning papers; 
Guardian articles also argued that the Conservative governments 
had fostered ‘attitudes of self-interest’ since 1979, while Ken 
Livingstone, in another article for the Guardian, suggested that 
Labour had lost skilled workers in the 1960s and 1970s because they 
had made them pay for helping the needy rather than squeezing the 
wealthy as they had promised.205 
 
The idea that opposition to tax had changed fundamentally in the 
1970s appeared for the first time in the sources covered in the press 
around the 1987 election, although at this point the idea that attitudes 
had changed after 1979 was much more common. By 1992, 
however, that idea had entirely disappeared, leaving only the theory 
that people had become more opposed to tax in the 1970s.206 This 
was now exclusively found in the right-leaning centrist broadsheets, 
with the exception of one article in the Daily Express.207 Peter Riddell 
 
203 ‘June's Choice’, Economist, 6 June 1987. 
204 Seven articles mentioned the first idea, while only three referenced the second. 
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Convictions That Will Not Serve the Full Term’, ibid., 21 July; Ken Livingstone, 
‘Lost Votes That Can Be Won Back’, ibid., 26 June. 
206 This idea had not become much more common — only four articles were found 
— but it now appeared to be the only historical argument about popular attitudes to 
tax. See: ‘A Lesson for the Losers’, Daily Express, 11 May 1992; William Keegan, 
‘Why the Conservatives Deserve to Lose’, Observer, 5 April 1992; Riddell, 
‘Labours Credibility Gap’, Times, 25 March 1992; Riddell, ‘Will Lamont's Magic 
Work?’, Times, 11 March 1992. 
207 Keegan, ‘Why the Conservatives Deserve to Lose’, Observer, 5 April 1992; 
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wrote in the Times, for example: 
The post-war orthodoxy was that the tax burden could be raised to pay for 
an expanding welfare state ... But the hostility of many skilled workers to 
ever larger deductions from their pay-packets was one of the main reasons 
for the defeat of the Callaghan government in 1979, and of Jimmy Carter 
18 months later.208  
As in Riddell’s article, this historical story was also clearly classed; it 
was working-class taxpayers who were portrayed as having become 
dissatisfied with high taxation in the 1970s.209 
 
Where these ideas had come from, and why the second had become 
dominant by 1992, is not clear — no other organisations or 
individuals were cited in the articles that advanced them. 
Partisanship does not seem entirely to explain it. Although several 
articles were unattributed, the authors that were named were mixed 
— journalists like Woodrow Wyatt and T E Utley were close to 
Thatcher, but others were centrist or left wing.  
 
It does not appear to have been founded on any clear evidence. A 
few academic studies published in the early 1980s argued, based on 
the BES surveys, that opposition had increased in the 1970s.210 
However, none provided particularly convincing evidence; the BES 
data itself did not show that opposition to tax had increased in the 
1970s — it only went up to 1970.211 Other academic studies that 
 
11 May 1992. 
208 Riddell, ‘Labours Credibility Gap’, Times, 25 March 1992. 
209 See for example: ibid.; Watkins, ‘Mr. Smith Turns Electoral Wisdom on Its 
Head’, Observer, 22 March 1992; Kinsley, ‘Uppity Mobile Essex Men’, Guardian, 8 
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210 See for example: Hibbs and Madsen, ‘Public Reactions to the Growth of 
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211 Butler and Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral 
Choice, 459; Butler and Stokes, ‘Political Change in Britain, 1963-1970’. 
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suggested the opposite were also published around the same 
time.212 None of this research was reported in the press. Papers did 
report IEA studies arguing that popular opposition to taxation had 
increased in 1971 and 1979, and studies have shown that some 
journalists had close links to the IEA.213 However, although the Times 
published an opinion piece by IEA founders Harris and Seldon during 
the 1987 election, no other reports on IEA surveys were found in the 
1980s or early 1990s.214 By 1987 even the most recent IEA study 
was eight years old, and the idea that attitudes had changed after 
1979 was still more prominent. It seems unlikely that an IEA study 
changed press ideas about attitudes to tax more than a decade later.  
 
The BSA surveys perhaps provide one possible reason why the idea 
that attitudes had changed in the 1970s might have become more 
prominent. They clearly suggested that the idea that attitudes had 
changed during the 1980s was incorrect, showing an increasing 
preference for spending over tax cuts through the 1980s. They did 
 
212 See for example: Coughlin, Ideology Public Opinion and Welfare Policy : 
Attitudes toward Taxes and Spending in Industrialized Societies, 127-154; Lewis, 
The Psychology of Taxation. 
213 Harris and Seldon, ‘Choice in Welfare, 1970: Third Report on Knowledge and 
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Medicine and Its Frustration by 'Representative' Government ’, 44-54. For 
newspaper reporting see for example: By a Staff Reporter, ‘Many Favour 
Contracting out of State Welfare’, Times, 8 January 1971; Charles Lyte, ‘Support 
Grows for Cash Axe on Welfare Services’, Daily Express, 8 January 1971; ‘The 
War of All against All’, Economist, 14 July 1979; ‘For a Referendum’, Guardian 30 
April 1979. For a detailed discussion of the surveys see chapter one. On the links 
between the IEA and the press see: Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-
Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 1931-1983, 325; Jackson, ‘The 
Think-Tank Archipelago: Thatcherism and Neo-Liberalism’; Parsons, The Power of 
the Financial Press: Journalism and Economic Opinion in Britain and America; 
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Neoliberal Politics particularly 134-179, 233-234; Tomlinson, Managing the 
Economy, Managing the People: Narratives of Economic Life in Britain from 
Beveridge to Brexit, 73-74. 
214 Seldon and Harris, ‘The Vanishing Volunteers’, Times, 21 May 1987. 
 
408 
not cover the 1970s and so did not rule out the idea that opposition 
might have increased before 1979. However, again, it is unclear why 
they would have influenced ideas in 1992 but not in 1987, given that 
they were widely reported from 1985 onwards.215 It is possible, but 
not clearly evidenced, that several years of survey results were 
required for the results to be accepted. Some journalists continued to 
ignore, or reject, this evidence in both 1987 and 1992. In general, it 
does not appear that these new historical ideas about the 
development of popular attitudes to tax were primarily, or perhaps 
even partially, driven by evidence of popular attitudes. 
 
Another possibility is unconscious bias.216 The Sutton Trust found 
that the majority of its sample of the top 100 journalists in 1986 were 
privately educated and went to Oxbridge, suggesting that the social 
circles of many national journalists might have included a significant 
proportion of high earners who had benefited from Thatcher’s tax 
changes and would be hit by Labour’s increases.217 However, there 
is no clear evidence to suggest this was an important factor.  
 
Finally, it is possible that as the Conservatives won consecutive 
elections, journalists, like Labour politicians, became increasingly 
distrustful of surveys suggesting that people preferred service 
provision to tax cuts, and so by 1992 were more prepared to believe 
 
215 See for example: ‘Public View’, Economist, 6 July 1985; ‘Tory Supporters Prefer 
Services to Tax Cuts’, Guardian, 29 October 1986; Paul Wilenius, ‘High Anxiety!’, 
Daily Express, 29 October 1987; Bill Frost, ‘Enterprise Culture Fails to Take Root’, 
Times, 15 November 1990. 
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1987; Clark, ‘What Were the British Earnings and Prices Then? (New Series)’. 
217 Philip Kirby, ‘Leading People 2016: The Educational Backgrounds of the UK 
Professional Elite’, (The Sutton Trust 2016). See also: Golding and Middleton, 
Images of Welfare: Press and Public Attitudes to Poverty, 98-100, 147-149. 
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that the 1979 election result indicated that popular opposition to tax 
had increased in the 1970s. Certainly, the 1992 election seems to 
have convinced most journalists, at least in the short term, that 
polling about attitudes to tax was misleading. All of these are just 
possible factors, however; further research is needed to properly 




It does not seem that the historical stories that had developed in the 
press by 1987 had come from the other organisations studied. Ideas 
about popular attitudes to tax in the political parties, civil service, 
TUC, and CBI did not appear to have significantly changed. 
Conservative politicians and researchers continued to assume 
popular support for tax cuts, but, as previously, this was 
accompanied by the knowledge that spending was equally, if not 
more popular, and perceptions of fairness crucial. Civil servants 
expressed similar ideas. The CBI seemed more interested in tax 
reform around 1987 and its members were reportedly highly 
dissatisfied with the tax system, despite corporate tax cuts, but both 
officials and members also expressed concern about perceptions of 
fairness. 
 
Labour politicians seemed slightly more concerned about popular 
opposition to tax as the 1992 election approached, and in the long 
term their defeat appears to have convinced key figures that popular 
opposition to tax increases was implacable. Around the 1987 
election, however, their ideas were similar to those in the 
Conservative party and civil service, and even during the 1992 
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election campaign perceptions of opposition were never entirely free 
of ideas about support for spending and fairness. In addition, 
assessments of their defeat in the immediate aftermath of the 1992 
election were not unanimous that tax had been the major factor. That 
consensus appears to have emerged later. TUC leaders seemed 
potentially more convinced of popular opposition to taxation, but tax 
did not seem to be a major concern, and their discussions about it 
were limited.  
 
None of these organisations expressed any kind of historical idea 
about the development of popular attitudes to tax, nor did their 
discussions seem to have changed dramatically, although 
consecutive election defeats appear perhaps to have made those on 
the left more pessimistic about the possibility of obtaining popular 
support for tax increases. Discussions also remained largely insular 
— although the political parties had access to extensive polling, it is 
not clear that it had any real impact on their ideas about popular 
attitudes. It was only in the press that ideas about popular attitudes to 
tax had changed significantly. There, the now dominant popular and 
academic idea about the historical development of popular attitudes 
to tax appears to have been emerging by 1987 and was fully formed 
by 1992. Exactly where this had originated is unclear, but it does not 
seem to have come from any of the other organisations studied here, 






None of the available evidence for popular attitudes to tax is without 
issues, and so the conclusions presented here are by necessity 
somewhat cautious. However, all the evidence consulted seems to 
point to a new periodisation of popular attitudes to tax in Britain 
between 1945 and 1992, one that emphasises continuity without any 
fundamental shift in popular attitudes in the 1970s.  
 
Although of varying quality and availability, the quantitative evidence 
does not suggest that people became more opposed to tax in the 
1970s. There are some suggestions that support for increased 
spending may have declined as expenditure rose through the 1960s, 
in particular, but there is little evidence that this translated into 
support for tax cuts if they required spending cuts. In contrast, the 
quantitative evidence indicates that popular opposition to tax was 
most likely consistently at a relatively low level throughout the whole 
period studied, although the evidence is more plentiful and reliable 
from the 1980s onwards. 
 
Looking at the qualitative evidence, most individuals within the 
organisations studied seem to have consistently believed that people 
disliked paying taxes, but cared about fairness and supported service 
provision. The only exception was the short period in the early 1960s 
when Conservative politicians and researchers (and one civil 
servant) suggested that opposition to tax was no longer a major 
issue. While perceptions of opposition to contemporary tax levels 
were widespread in the 1970s, and a few comments suggested that 
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rising tax levels were fuelling opposition, there was little evidence 
that individuals in the organisations studied believed that popular 
attitudes to tax had changed in any fundamental way. That idea first 
appeared in the press in the 1980s.  
 
The late 1940s and early 1950s do not appear as a golden age of 
popular consensus around, or consent for, high taxation. Discussions 
among political parties, civil society organisations, and the press 
assumed significant popular opposition to tax levels, with the press 
emphasising this particularly strongly. Individuals in the other 
organisations assumed opposition to tax, but also, as in later periods, 
that there was widespread support for services and that fairness was 
a major concern. Whether this view of popular attitudes to tax was 
correct is difficult to confirm. There is almost no survey evidence 
available for the late 1940s and early 1950s. Two isolated and 
potentially unreliable Gallup surveys suggest perhaps that 
respondents were willing to pay higher taxes for increased spending. 
The evidence could, therefore, suggest a situation not so different 
from that in 1992 — politicians and the press emphasising popular 
opposition to tax while survey evidence suggested taxpayers were 
willing to pay higher taxes to fund spending. Without better quality 
quantitative evidence this is speculative. Whether following the 
quantitative or qualitative evidence, however, the period around 1950 
does not appear as a moment of unprecedented consent to taxation.  
 
By 1959 first the press and then, a year or two later, Conservative 
politicians and researchers had largely stopped emphasising popular 
opposition to taxation. Conservative politicians even began to 
suggest that people were more concerned about services than tax 
cuts. However, ideas about popular attitudes to tax did not appear to 
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have changed in the other organisations studied. They continued to 
emphasise opposition, fairness, and support for spending. It is not 
entirely clear what caused this shift in ideas in the press and 
Conservative party. Effective tax rates had not fallen for most people. 
Conservative politicians and researchers’ increased access to, or 
interest in, polling might explain why their perceptions changed, but 
does not seem to explain the shift in press reporting. Without access 
to detailed information on the tax system, journalists may well have 
taken the headline income tax cuts at face value. This could have 
been reinforced by a decline in their own, and likely many of their 
social contacts’, tax liabilities. 
 
The decline in Conservative and press concern about popular 
opposition to tax does not appear to have been the result of any 
actual change in popular attitudes, although there is, again, very little 
available survey evidence for the period around 1960. The CRD had 
polling in the early 1960s indicating that people were more 
concerned about services than tax cuts. Other surveys also 
suggested support for increased spending over tax cuts, although 
perhaps particularly in relation to pensions. As little survey evidence 
was found for the 1940s and 1950s, it is hard to say conclusively 
whether this was a shift, but it appears broadly in line with both 
earlier and later survey findings. The limited quantitative evidence 
available does not, therefore, seem to suggest any major shift in 
popular attitudes to tax around 1960.  
 
Whatever drove this change among some elements in the 
Conservative party and the press, it does not seem to have lasted 
long. By the mid 1960s Conservative politicians and researchers, and 
some senior civil servants, were suggesting that opposition to tax 
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was increasing and might soon become a major issue. This could 
have been driven by the press, which did emphasise popular 
opposition to tax slightly more around the 1965 budget. However, 
press comments about popular opposition were still far less prevalent 
than they had been around 1950. CPC reports suggested opposition 
to the level and structure of taxation among the most engaged 
Conservative activists, but it was not clear that this opposition had 
increased, or what impact it had. Conservative researchers’ 
responses to one survey, however, also suggested that their ideas 
about tax might be systematically biased by their personal 
characteristics and social contacts. 
 
Quantitative evidence suggests that support for increased spending 
was falling through the 1960s, but cuts to services remained more 
unpopular than tax increases. The survey evidence showing this was 
not available until much later in the decade and so is unlikely to have 
driven the revived concern about popular opposition to tax in the 
Conservative party and civil service. Conservative party polling 
suggested that tax was not a major issue for the public. The fact that 
their concern about popular opposition increased again as Labour 
was being elected, with proposals to increase taxation of high 
earners, might again suggest that conscious or unconscious bias or 
their social contacts were a factor. 
 
Again, discussions in the other organisations studied did not appear 
to have changed significantly. The FBI expressed members’ concern 
about the 1965 tax reforms but did not fundamentally challenge 
them. Labour politicians and civil servants were concerned about 
opposition to the 1965 budget from wealthy taxpayers but, in general, 
their ideas about popular attitudes to tax remained consistent. 
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Conservative politicians and researchers, and some senior civil 
servants, displayed concern about increasing popular opposition to 
tax in the mid 1960s but they appear to have been essentially alone 
in this, and it does not seem to have been based on research or 
evidence.  
 
Although the late 1960s has often been cited as the point when 
popular opposition to taxation started to increase, evidence for this in 
the sources consulted here was limited. More survey data was 
available for this period, and, although still in short supply and of 
variable methodological quality, perhaps suggests that support for 
higher spending continued to fall through the late 1960s, while 
support for tax cuts, if they did not mean spending cuts, was 
concurrently increasing. However, it also suggested that even in 
1969 cuts to services were still more unpopular than tax increases.  
 
A few comments indicated that opposition to tax might have been 
increasing, but these were isolated. Overall, discussions about 
popular attitudes were consistent with earlier periods. The TUC 
seemed slightly more concerned about opposition to tax but did not 
suggest that opposition had increased and continued to emphasise 
the importance of fairness. Butler and Duschinsky suggested 
changing attitudes among Labour’s grassroots activists drove 
increasing concern about opposition to tax in the party but, if so, this 
appears perhaps to have been informal — it is not immediately 
evident in the archival record. Labour comments again demonstrated 
the consistent mix of assumptions about opposition to tax but also 
concern about fairness and service provision. Conservative 
politicians had evidence of extensive, though not necessarily 
increasing, opposition to the tax system among their most engaged 
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activists through the CPC groups, but this does not appear to have 
changed their ideas about popular attitudes. Neither party thought 
that tax was particularly important to the 1970 election result either, 
although polling indicated that tax had become a more important 
issue.  
 
Press emphasis on popular opposition to tax had increased again 
and become more partisan by the 1970 election, with right-leaning 
papers emphasising opposition far more than left-leaning papers. On 
the other hand, press representations of opposition still had not 
returned to the levels seen around 1950, and articles expressed 
doubts about how attractive Conservative tax policies would be to 
voters. There were, therefore, some indications that support for 
service expansion was declining through the 1960s and that a few 
individuals in the organisations studied thought that opposition to tax 
might be increasing. However, there was little evidence that 
decreasing support for service expansion meant increasing support 
for tax cuts if they required spending cuts, and the comments 
suggesting increasing opposition were isolated. Overall, the 
continuities in discussions about attitudes to tax were far more 
prominent.  
 
There is more evidence that some individuals within the 
organisations studied thought, or at least stated, that opposition was 
increasing in the late 1970s. However, these comments were still a 
small minority; most discussions were, again, consistent with earlier 
ideas. Two Conservative statements in 1977, for example, asserted 
that opposition had increased, but apart from this their discussions 
had not changed. Conservative politicians and researchers were not 
convinced that their tax policies were necessarily popular or 
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electorally beneficial and thought they would be considered unfair. 
Labour politicians seemed to suggest, less explicitly, that opposition 
had increased, and emphasised opposition to tax more in 1977 than 
other years. However, most Labour comments were in line with 
previous discussions. Neither Labour nor Conservative politicians 
seemed to believe at the time that opposition to tax would win, or had 
won, the Conservatives the 1979 election. 
 
Civil servants appeared perhaps slightly more opposed to tax 
themselves around the 1976 budget, but their comments about 
popular attitudes had not changed. The CBI increasingly suggested 
that members were opposed to tax in arguing for its policy priorities, 
but their largely fruitless attempts to engage their membership on tax 
policy did not suggest widespread opposition. The TUC was 
communicating opposition to the level of taxation but did not argue 
that this outweighed support for spending or concern about prices or 
suggest that opposition had increased. 
 
It was only in the press that a significant shift seemed to have taken 
place — popular opposition to tax was barely mentioned around the 
1976 budget but was heavily emphasised by the 1979 election. Even 
this, however, was not new, and could be seen as much as a return 
to the tone of press conversations about popular attitudes to tax seen 
around 1950 as an unprecedented change. This qualitative 
impression is supported by a sentiment analysis, which suggests that 
press coverage of tax was still in most cases less negative in the late 
1970s than it had been in the late 1940s. In addition, while a few 
comments implied that opposition might have increased, none 
asserted it explicitly, and most articles gave no indication of how they 




The available survey evidence does not suggest that popular 
opposition to tax increased unprecedentedly in the 1970s. Support 
for increased spending seems perhaps to have continued to decline 
but in 1979 there was a clear preference for maintaining services 
over tax cuts. Comments which implied that opposition had increased 
were also almost exclusively confined, outside the press, to the 
period 1975-7. None were found in the lead-up to the 1979 election. 
It seems, therefore, that the comments that did imply opposition had 
increased might best be viewed as a response to historically high 
effective income tax rates, which peaked in 1977, rather than to any 
idea that attitudes to tax had changed fundamentally. 
 
This is perhaps supported by conversations about popular attitudes 
to tax in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Outside the press, no 
statements suggested that opposition had increased during the 
1970s. Defeat in the 1987 and, in particular, 1992 elections seems to 
have increasingly convinced Labour politicians that there was 
widespread popular opposition to tax. However, even in 1992 this 
remained contested, with services and fairness emphasised. 
Labour’s immediate assessments of the 1992 election defeat placed 
tax as only one of a range of issues, with economic competence 
likely the most important. TUC officials also seemed slightly more 
convinced of opposition but, in general, did not seem overly 
concerned about attitudes to tax. Conservative politicians, civil 
servants, and CBI officials acknowledged opposition to taxation but, 
as previously, accompanied by the assumption that spending was 
equally, if not more, popular, and perceptions of fairness crucial. 
 
The idea that popular attitudes to tax had changed significantly in the 
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1970s appeared for the first time in the sources studied in press 
reporting around the 1987 election. In 1987 articles were divided 
about whether attitudes had changed before Thatcher came to 
power, resulting in her election, or after 1979, as a result of her 
policies. In 1987 the second option was far more common. By the 
1992 election, however, this second idea had disappeared, leaving 
only the suggestion that opposition had increased in the 1970s.  
 
Where this idea came from and why it emerged in the press in the 
late 1980s is unclear. It was not supported by any survey evidence 
apart from one methodologically questionable IEA report published in 
1979. It is possible that this could have been the source of this idea 
but there is no obvious reason why it would have changed journalists’ 
views a decade after it was published. It does not appear to have 
come from academic studies either. Although a few academic articles 
in the early 1980s did suggest that attitudes to tax had changed in 
the 1970s, others suggested they had not, and neither were reported 
in the press either at the time or a decade later. Further research is 
needed to investigate the source of this idea. It does not, however, 
seem to have been primarily driven by, or based on, formal evidence 
of changing popular attitudes to tax. 
 
Despite the IEA survey, this does not appear to be a story of 
neoliberal think tanks radically changing ideas about popular 
attitudes to tax. While the IEA does seem to have been trying to 
press a specific idea about popular attitudes to tax, or even more so 
services, the archival evidence consulted does not suggest it was 
particularly influential outside the press. Even in the case of the 
press, articles were emphasising popular opposition to tax before the 
IEA was founded, and the vast majority of articles suggesting popular 
 
420 
opposition to tax did not reference the IEA or other think tanks. In 
general, the conversations found were remarkably insular. The 
organisations studied do not seem to have been talking to each other 
or anyone else about popular attitudes to tax, with the obvious 
exception of the press, and TUC and CBI representations to 
successive governments.  
 
Conservative researchers expressed some interest in evidence of 
popular attitudes to tax in the 1960s and 1970s, in particular, but, in 
general, the organisations studied here did not seem that interested 
in accessing evidence of popular attitudes. The TUC and CBI may 
simply have been focused on representing their memberships. The 
political parties clearly were concerned about attitudes to tax but, 
despite this, the Conservatives for large periods, and Labour for 
almost the entire period leading up to the late 1980s, did not seem to 
make significant efforts to obtain evidence of popular attitudes to tax. 
When they did have reliable survey evidence in the 1980s and early 
1990s, politicians often seemed willing to discount it in favour of 
personal impressions and electoral results. Subjective beliefs seem 
often to have been given the most weight in discussions about 
popular attitudes to tax — politicians, journalists, and officials all 
seemed broadly confident they knew what popular attitudes to tax 
were and did not need to investigate further. This again perhaps 
points to the importance of what was accepted as the ‘common 
sense’ view of attitudes to tax in elite social circles in shaping the 
ideas shown here. 
 
Individuals in these organisations did not generally specify whose 
attitudes they were talking about. The press and Labour politicians in 
the immediate post-war period occasionally referenced ‘housewives’ 
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as a constituency with opinions on tax — although their possible 
interest in tax was almost exclusively confined to indirect taxes as 
that was what affected the weekly shop. This image ceased to be as 
frequent later on. However, this only really resulted in women’s 
further erasure from the debate; by the 1992 election ‘Essex man’ 
was dominant and women were even more invisible in the discussion 
about popular attitudes to tax than they had been in 1949. The 
possibility that some of the people with attitudes to tax might belong 
to minority ethnic groups was seemingly never even considered, 
despite the increasing diversity of the British public.  
 
Class was the only major characteristic assigned to the people 
whose attitudes were discussed, particularly in the press. In 1949-50, 
both working- and middle-class taxpayers were portrayed as angry 
about high taxation, although working-class taxpayers were 
concerned about indirect tax, while middle-class taxpayers wanted 
reduced income tax. By the 1970s this had simultaneously intensified 
— middle-class taxpayers were being viciously attacked and might 
be wiped out by high taxation — and flattened into everyone being 
worried about high income tax. This was on the one hand fairly 
reasonable — the number of people paying income tax had 
increased dramatically — but it also, whether consciously or not, 
facilitated the presentation of the Conservatives’ 1979 tax proposals 
as tax cuts for everyone, rather than regressive changes that would 
benefit the wealthy. By the 1987 and, in particular, 1992 elections, 
press attention was concentrated on a group that the politicians had 
increasingly focused on since the 1960s — floating voters in the ‘C2’ 
occupational group. By 1992 this was also linked with a new 
geographical focus on South East England to create ‘Essex man’. 
The number of people whose attitudes to tax were highlighted as 
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important, therefore, progressively shrank between 1949 and 1992, 
and the idea that different groups might have varying interests when 
it came to tax, even in terms of class, slowly slipped out of press 
reports.  
 
As in the case of gender and ethnicity, the sources, as well as time 
and space constraints, have imposed limitations on what this study 
could cover. The case studies selected are by their nature restricted, 
and an exploration of other moments might bring up other interesting 
findings. The thirty-year closure rule also meant that it was not 
possible to study in detail the potentially crucial years after 1992 
when Labour politicians’ conviction that voters were implacably 
opposed to tax increases seems to have hardened. 
 
There are various ways in which this study could usefully be 
extended. Work in other fields suggests that examining 
interconnected issues like views on the efficiency of spending and 
‘deservingness’ of welfare recipients could provide important further 
context. ‘Fairness’ was a crucial component of ideas about popular 
attitudes to tax, but what it meant was rarely specified. A closer 
examination of discussions about fairness might help to illuminate 
this. How popular attitudes differed in relation to various forms of 
taxation, if they did, could also be important, as might regional 
differences in attitudes to tax. Britain was, and is, one of the world’s 
largest tax havens. This does not appear at all in the sources 
consulted here — were people aware of this and, if so, how did this 
affect their attitudes to tax? Although the national press presented 
attitudes as homogenous, they also decreasingly represented the 
attitudes of anyone outside the South East; it would be interesting to 
investigate whether local newspapers were making similar 
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arguments. A final valuable extension might be a study of wider 
popular culture — books, films, television, radio — to see whether 
the idea about popular opposition increasing the 1970s appeared 
only in the press, or if it was a more widespread feature of popular 
discourse.  
 
As a study of an area in which there had been little previous work, 
this thesis has been necessarily broad and leaves open many areas 
that could benefit from further exploration. It does, however, suggest 
a new periodisation of the development of popular attitudes to tax in 
the second half of the twentieth century, one in which attitudes were 
broadly consistent, without a fundamental rupture in the 1970s. This 
perhaps has some wider implications. It highlights that politicians’ 
ideas about popular attitudes do not necessarily reflect attitudes 
themselves, and draws attention to how limited their evidence was 
(and how variable the impact it had on their ideas was). This 
suggests caution in using politicians’ ideas as evidence for historical 
popular attitudes in other areas. This study could also support 
arguments emphasising the limits of consensus in the immediate 
post-war period, particularly outside elite groups, and those 
suggesting that the role of think tanks in changing political ideas in 
this period has been overstated. Similarly, it perhaps gives further 
backing to arguments that people were not as converted to 
Thatcherite arguments as was initially assumed. Finally, it potentially 
also lends credence to arguments against seeing the 1970s as the 
singular moment of change in post-war history.  
 
Although these conclusions are tentative, given the difficulty of 
accessing evidence for historical popular attitudes, the evidence 
presented here suggests that previous assumptions about how 
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popular attitudes to tax in Britain developed in the second half of the 
twentieth century may be inaccurate. Popular attitudes to tax, and 
even, to a large extent, perceptions of popular attitudes in the 
organisations studied here, appear to have been broadly constant. 
There is little evidence to suggest that there was unprecedented 
popular consent to taxation in the immediate post-war period or a 
drastic increase in popular opposition in the 1970s. Although the 
evidence is far from conclusive, based on the organisations studied 
here the idea that popular attitudes to tax changed dramatically in the 
1970s seems to have appeared first in the national press in the late 
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